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The metaphysics of the
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THE METAPHYSICS

OF

THE SCHOOL.

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INTRODUCTION.

THERE is a passage in the *Leviathan* of Hobbes, which I will set before the reader, not without a definite purpose, as a sort of Introit to my Preface. It is, as follows: 'There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the School-men; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are, therefore, by those other egregious persons counted idiots. But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schol-man in his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; transubstantiation; free-will, &c., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar. What is the meaning of these words, *The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work?* They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez' first book, *of the concurrence, motion, and help of God*¹. When men

¹ The above momentous question discussed by Suarez, which Hobbes thus holds up to the ridicule of his hearers, will find a place for itself in the last Book on *Natural*

write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so¹?

A German writer of great and deserved reputation shall take up the fuge. 'The soul of the Scholastic Philosophy,' writes Brucker, 'and the hinge on which it all turned, was not an attentive inquiry after Truth, undertaken without prejudice and made up of connected truths deduced from concordant Principles; but the empty and ambitious affectation of a sort of subtlety that made show of great intellectual acumen. Furnished with dialectic and metaphysical weapons, it was wont to dispute, with extremest stretching of the brain, about questions most difficult indeed and acute, but commendable neither by reason of their utility nor of their certitude; and would come down into the area for the purpose of carrying on its countless philosophical skirmishes, with the help of verbal disputes, of worthless mental abstractions, of axioms assumed at hap-hazard, of distinctions destitute of the smallest foundation, and of the horrors of a barbarous terminology².' A little further

Theology. It will not, therefore, be treated here, even by way of explanation. But it is expedient to notice at once, that no little part of the obscurity, attaching to the title, is due to the translation of the caricaturist. It might, perhaps, be more intelligible, if translated by some one who knows the subject. The first Book of the *Opusculum* is *On the concurrence and efficacious assistance of God, necessary to acts of free-will*. The title of the sixth Chapter might be better rendered thus: *The First Cause exercises no necessary influx into the secondary cause (in order to help it on towards its action), by virtue of the essential subordination of the second cause to the First*; (*De concursu et efficaci auxilio Dei ad actus liberi arbitrii necessario. Causam primam nihil necessario influere in secundam, ex vi subordinationis causae secundae ad primam, quo illam ad agendum juvet*). The title of a Chapter, contained in a sort of parenthetical Treatise that is illustrative of a problem discussed at length elsewhere, is scarcely a fair example in proof of the assertion made by Hobbes. It receives its explanation from the previous Disputation of which it is a sort of Appendix. Moreover, it includes certain Terms, a definite acquaintance with which is presupposed. Still, it sufficed to engender, and then to propagate, a prejudice.

¹ *Part I, Chap. 8, v. ff.*

² 'Philosophiae Scholasticae animam, et in quo omnia vertebantur, cardinem non fuisse, inquisitionem veritatis attentam et sine praejudiciis institutam, nexque veritatum ex principiis convenientibus deductarum constantem, sed subtilitatis ejusdam, magnum ingenii acumen demonstrantis affectationem vanam et ambitiosam, quae dialecticis et metaphysicis armis instructa, de quaestionibus difficilibus quidem et acutissimis, sed nec usu nec certitudine commendandis, summa animi contentione disputaret, et ad innumeras velitationes philosophicas, logomachiis, mentis praecisionibus vanis, axiomatibus precario assumptis, distinctionibus fundamento carentibus, terminorumque barbarorum spectris adjuta, in arenam descenderet.' *Historia Critica Philosophiae, Period. II, Lib. II, Pars. II, cap. 3, sect. III, § 2.*

on, the same author deploras its 'obscure ideas,'—'words without meaning,'—'barbarous terms which had a sort of frightful sound from their very clatter;' . . . and describes its teaching as the 'hobgoblins of boys,'—'empty clouds,'—'an immense ocean of verbal disputes¹.'

Mosheim follows in the same chorus. These are his words: 'Yet notwithstanding all the subtilty of these *irrefragable*, *seraphic* and *angelic* doctors, as they were commonly styled, they often appeared wiser in their own conceit, than they were in reality, and frequently did little more than involve in greater obscurity, the doctrines which they pretended to place in the clearest light. For, not to mention the ridiculous oddity of many of their expressions, the hideous barbarity of their style, and their extravagant and presumptuous desire of prying into matters that infinitely surpass the comprehension of short-sighted mortals, they were chargeable with defects in their manner of reasoning, which every true philosopher will, of all others, be most careful to avoid. For they neither defined their terms accurately, and hence arose innumerable disputes merely about words; nor did they divide their subject with perspicuity and precision, and hence they generally treated it in an obscure and unsatisfactory manner. The great *Angelic Doctor* himself, notwithstanding his boasted method, was defective in these respects; his definitions are often vague, or obscure, and his plans or divisions, though full of art, are frequently destitute of clearness and proportion².' Lord Bacon³, as was only to be expected from

¹ 'Ideae obscurae, voces nihili, termini barbari ipsoque strepitu suo horrendum quid sonantes . . . puerorum terculamenta,—inanes nubes,—immensum logomachiarum pelagus.' *Ibid.* § 4.

² *Ecclesiastical History*, Cent. xiii, Part II, ch. 3, n. 6.

³ 'Atqui non absimilis est eorum ratio, qui non tam veritatem perspicuis argumentis, auctoritatibus, comparationibus, exemplis illustrare nituntur; quam in hoc solum incumbunt, ut minutos quosque scrupulos eximant, et captiunculas expediant, et dubitationes solvant; hoc pacto quaestionem ex quaestione gignentes. . . Adeo ut Scyllae fabula ad vivum exprimat hoc genus philosophiae, cujus os et pectus virginem formosam praeferebant, intus vero fuisse aiunt,

"Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris." *Virg. Ecl.* vi. 75.

Sic generalia quaedam apud scholasticos invenias, quae pulchra sunt dictu, et non perperam inventa; ubi autem ventum fuerit ad distinctiones decisionesque, pro foecundo utero, ad vitae humanae commoda, in portentosas et latrantes quaestiones desinunt.

so broad and high an intellect, is a little less unmeasured, perhaps, in his animadversions; but he contributes his quota to the general indictment, and introduces an unsavoury quotation from Virgil, in order to give point to his censure. He, too, accuses the Scholastic Doctors of hair-splitting,—of the multiplication of useless discussions noisy and monstrous, to the neglect of those practical questions that are of advantage to human life. Nor must it be supposed, that these clamours against the Scholastic Philosophy and the Scholastic Method have diminished in number or intensity, since the time when it has found no home save in the Schools of the Catholic Church. It has long ago been exiled by the world; yet the directors of public opinion and the Professors of the multiform new philosophies have pursued it with their continued invective. Kant, for instance, designates it, as ‘the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism’¹. A modern composer of a *Vocabulary of Philosophy* teaches us, (under the word, SCHOLASTIC), that ‘If from scholasticism you eliminate theology, it will be found as a philosophy to be the quarrel between Nominalism and Realism’². Another writer of our own time, while informing his readers that he could not pursue his reading of the Scholastics, continues in the same strain as the rest. ‘The depressing weariness and impatience,’ he writes, ‘which causes us to push them’ (the Scholastic folios) ‘aside after each new effort at study, arise, I conceive, from our sense of the futility of the questions discussed, and the mode of discussing them, even more than from the arid and often frivolous poverty of the style. . . . The work of the Schools had to be done, but it is at an end. Their folios are fossils.’ (May the museums be multiplied with at least equal avidity, through the length and breadth of this our favoured land!) ‘Monstrous and lifeless shapes of a former world, having little community with the life of our own, they have for us an interest similar to that yielded by the megatherium, and the dinornis’³. It remained for

Itaque minime mirum, si hoc genus doctrinae, etiam apud vulgus hominum, contemptui obnoxium fuerit.’ *De Augmentis Scientiarum, Lib. I, v. m.*

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the first Edition.*

² *The Vocabulary of Philosophy, by William Fleming, D.D.*

³ *Lewes' History of Philosophy, The Transition Period, Chap. i. p. 3.*

two distinguished members of a time-honoured University, engaged as philosophers in editing the works of an English philosopher, to speak of the labours of a St. Thomas, a St. Bonaventure, a Dun Scotus, and the rest, as 'the mire of Scholasticism' ¹.

In presence of such general and unmeasured invective against the philosophy of the School, it will excite little or no surprise to find, that similar hostile prepossessions not uncommonly exist against the metaphysical Science, as such. When, then, an eminent English statesman is reported, at a public distribution of prizes, while addressing his youthful auditors, to have 'cautioned them against Metaphysics of any kind whatever,' adding that, 'it was absolutely a waste of time; far better read one of Dickens' novels; because Metaphysics began by assuming something that was not true, and ended in something absolutely absurd;'—it must be acknowledged that he was merely expressing, however unwisely, a more or less general conviction. Whether the ignorance even of those who profess themselves students of Philosophy, touching the writings of St. Thomas and of the other Doctors of the School, has diminished in these later years, I cannot tell. Certainly there are no palpable proofs of any such change. But, thirty or forty years ago, it was, I know, a common impression, even in our Universities, that the Angelic Doctor is exclusively occupied with the discussion of such questions as, *How many Angels could dance on the point of a needle*. I myself entertained the same idea; till subsequent study of his works opened my mind to the absurdity of the fable ².

Now, it is not my purpose in this Preface to enter upon any examination into the causes of this vulgar prejudice. But I want, first of all, to set before the reader the formidable difficulties which, as I foresaw, would beset me; when I consented, at the request and advice of others, to undertake the task, of which the present Volume is a first instalment. I felt that it would be a mere

¹ *Hume's Treatise on Human Nature*, edited by Green and Grose; *Introduction*, p. 7.

² I find that this respectable tradition still survives. The reader will find it handed on in Professor Tait's *Lectures on Some Recent Advances in Physical Science*, *Lecture III*, p. 54.

waste of time to compose a work like the present, unless there were a well-grounded hope that I should be able to secure a certain number of readers, belonging to that class of educated and thoughtful students in whose interest I wish to labour. But how, I said to myself, is one to get a hearing for the School? At the outset, there confronts us that prejudice against Metaphysics in general, which for a long time has been only too general in this country and is still nurtured by personages who, in virtue of their position, influence, and abilities, contribute in no small measure to the formation of public opinion. This, however, did not present itself to my mind as an obstacle too formidable to be overcome. For in the literature of the day is to be found evidence abundantly sufficient to show, that English thought has awakened to a growing interest in, and to a sense of the paramount importance of, metaphysical investigation. But the main difficulty recurred: Can our English students and men of letters be induced to concern themselves with Scholastic teaching? Here is a Philosophy which has been all but universally condemned by theological and ecclesiastical writers of every shade of opinion outside the Catholic Church,—scorned and vilipended by most of the modern philosophical writers of greatest repute in this country,—used as a proverb of contempt by our men of literature,—erected by many professors of physical science as a target for the shafts of their wit,—despised by men of culture generally, who have been taught, almost from their cradle, to regard it as the amalgam of an obsolete Theology and of dialectical hair-splitting,—painted in perhaps more repulsive colours in standard as well as popular Encyclopedias, in Dictionaries, Vocabularies, Catechisms and compendious histories of Philosophy,—hated and abused by the *illuminati*, those prophets of a future gospel of truth,—pronounced by most to be already dead and buried out of sight,—what hope can there be of making way against such a torrent of opposing forces? Nevertheless, in face of this to me most formidable difficulty, I took courage; and, gentle reader, I will tell you why. There are already trustworthy signs of a turn in the tide. I have good reason for saying, that there are not a few men of information and study in English-speaking countries, even among such as

have devoted themselves to physical pursuits, who, tired with the ever-rising Babel of new philosophies and with the universal disintegration of scientific thought that has resulted from what has been called the *critical* method, are looking back with a wistful glance towards the old Philosophy, but are puzzled where to look for it. As yet, it has never been presented in an English dress; and it would be too much to expect, that these inquirers, however earnest, should collect it for themselves out of the many folios of the Scholastic Doctors. The obstacles to such eclectic research would be too vast to be easily surmounted. For the most part, philosophical solutions are introduced, as it were, parenthetically into the standard works of the School. They only appear, when necessary to the defence or elucidation of some dogma of Theology natural or revealed. Consequently, they are not presented to the reader in scientific form, or as a complete, proportioned, whole. They must be sought out, collected, arranged. These remarks apply with peculiar force to the voluminous writings of the Angelic Doctor. It is true, indeed, that St. Thomas has sometimes expressly and exclusively discussed various questions of philosophy in one or other of his *Opuscula*, or smaller works; but these discussions were plainly enough professorial notes, intended for the class or for the benefit of some puzzled student, and treat of this or that isolated point independently of the rest. These little dissertations are eminently serviceable to such as have already mastered the Peripatetic system; but would only add to the perplexity of those who are novices. There is one exception to the remarks just made touching the treatment of philosophical truths in the writings of the School. Suarez has left us a complete Course of Scholastic Philosophy; and I have carefully consulted and received valuable assistance from it, in most of the Books into which the present Work is divided. Neither would it do, however, for the general reader, as an introduction to the said Philosophy. The circumstance that it is written in Scholastic Latin would prove a stumbling-block to many; to others the logical precision and attendant dryness would be repulsive; and others, again, would find questions of comparatively little interest to them discussed at great length, while other points, about which they are desirous

of receiving the fullest explanation, are perhaps summarily dismissed. In a word, Suarez wrote for a past century and for students of Theology: that which we now want is a course of Scholastic Philosophy, suited to the needs of this nineteenth century and to the apprehension of men of culture. It is this want that I have attempted to meet; with what success, it must be for my readers to judge. One thing I may here be allowed to observe. I lay no claim to originality. Every man should get to know his own deficiencies; and originality is not my forte. Besides, such an effort would have been out of place in a work which professes to give, only in a popular and elementary form, a system of Philosophy that has been historically defined. I lay claim to the office of an interpreter rather than to that of a teacher. But this I can conscientiously say, that I have tried my best to do justice to the original; and that I present before my readers the fruits, (such as they are), of the labours of many years.

But, before I enter upon an explanation of the way in which I have endeavoured to carry out this idea, I deem it expedient to answer the charges which have been made against the philosophical teaching of the School, as they are embodied in the quotations that stand at the head of this Preface. There is one which I shall consider first of all; not so much by reason of any weight that may possibly be imagined to attach to it, as because it has taken such general possession of men's minds, and is repeated by several of the writers whom I have quoted. Hobbes accuses the Schoolmen of an '*abuse of words*,' which he denounces as *absurd*; and asks, if those who have written '*whole volumes of such stuff*, are not *mad*?' Brucker speaks with emphasis '*of the horrors of a barbarous terminology*,' which he attributes to them. Mosheim calls attention to '*the ridiculous oddity of many of their expressions*,' and to '*the hideous barbarity of their style*.' Mr. Lewes complains of '*the arid and often frivolous poverty of their style*.'

I gather, from these, and similar passages, three distinct accusations, generally brought against the *form* of writing common to the School. The first is, that the scholastics adopted a barbarous terminology; the second, that they offended against classic purity of style; the third, that their diction is dry and poor.

It is my purpose to examine into the truth of each article in this indictment.

i. Touching their *barbarous terminology*,—how much of truth is there in the complaint? Can anything be said in their justification; or by way of an extenuation of their offence, if offence they have really committed?

Now, at the outset, I think it will be conceded by every man of sense, that all Sciences and Disciplines have, must have, a terminology proper to themselves. It is necessary; because each Science has its own peculiar concepts derived from its own special subject-matter, and those concepts must be expressed in appropriate Terms. Thus, for example, when in comparatively recent times a remarkable impulse was given to the study of Geology, we began to hear of the *Neptunian* and *Plutonic* theories,—of *metamorphic* rocks, of *fossiliferous strata*,—of *flora* and *fauna*,—of *faults*, *strikes*, *dips*,—of *coprolites*, *encrinites*, *trilobites*, *ammonites*,—*Eocene*, *Miocene*, *Pleistocene*, periods,—and so on. Again, a terminology is necessary at times, in order to avoid perpetual circumlocutions that would end in reducing the reader's mind to a state of hopeless confusion. I lately came across a striking illustration of this necessity in a Paper written by a distinguished physiologist on a special point of Comparative Anatomy, and read some few months ago before the Royal Society. I quote from this Paper the more readily, because it not only serves to illustrate the necessity of which I am now speaking, but will go to establish a fact, (not sufficiently realized, perhaps, by those modern writers who have called the Scholastics to task for their *barbarous terminology*), that physicists of our time are not a whit behind the medieval Doctors in the invention of a technical vocabulary, whenever the occasion offers. The following is the passage to which I am referring:—‘Of these I shall term a longitudinal line traversing the centre of the sacral vertebrae, the *sacral axis*; a second, drawn along the ilium, dorso-ventrally, through the middle of the sacral articulation and the centre of the acetabulum, will be termed the *iliac axis*; a third, passing through the junctions of the pubis and ischium above and below the obturator foramen, will be the *obturator axis*; while a fourth, traversing the union of the ilium,

in front with the pubis, and behind with the ischium, will be the *iliopectineal axis*. . . . The ventral rami of the pubes are short and, like those of the ischium, they are united throughout their whole length in a long symphysis, the ischial division of which is as long as, if not longer than, the pubic division. The cotyloid ramus of each ischium gives off a stout elongated *metischial process* backwards. . . . I am disposed to think that, in this animal,' (the *Ornithorhynchus*), 'the rectus, at least in its posterior moiety, is represented by the homologue of this muscle, which has extended laterally over the dorsal face of the enormously enlarged homologues of the rami of the ypsiloid cartilage¹. Now, as a layman in this branch of knowledge, I should be the last to venture the assertion, that such an elaborate terminology is either unnecessary or useless. But, if we bear in mind that it centres round *one* bone in the structure of vertebrates; I think it should make the men of this generation more modest in their diatribes, against the Scholastic Doctors, touching this matter. It may, perhaps, be objected that I have purposely selected an exceptional case,—that the author, from whom the quotation has been taken, exhibits a special proclivity for the invention of new terms,—that Comparative Anatomy, by reason of its recent development, (one might almost say, by reason of its recent genesis as a physical Discipline), claims to itself a new nomenclature, that the instance given, therefore, cannot be considered as typical,—consequently, that it is doing a grave injustice to the physical Sciences, so called, in general, and savours largely of a sophistical unfairness, to saddle these latter with the responsibility of an abnormal usage. What can be said in answer to such an objection, if not to adduce other instances from other Works on Physics, which will serve to

¹ A Paper by Professor Huxley, included in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society for March 6, 1879*. I could not help fancying that this eminent writer must have had such passages as the above in his mind, when he penned the following words, (*Hume*, Chap. i, p. 59): 'Since physical science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery, of a new pattern, warranted to drive solid bolts of facts through the thickest skulls, things are looking better; though hardly more than the first faint flutterings of the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall be no more . . . are as yet discernible,' etc.

show that the example already given is not so exceptional as may have been supposed? Accordingly, I proceed to set before the reader another illustration, taken from a paper on *the green Rhabdocele Planarian*, (Convoluta Schultzei), published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, March 27, 1879. These are the words of the writer:—‘I will first notice an interesting point in the histology of the ciliated ectoderm. In teased preparations, kept cold, the ciliated cells often become amœboid, some of the cilia changing into slender finger-like or stout fusiform pseudopodia. These often retain their curvature parallel to the unaltered cilia, and I have even seen the finer pseudopodia contracting gently in time with the cilia of the same cell, thus establishing a complete gradation between the rythmically contractile cilium and the amœboid pseudopodium, through what is really a rythmically contractile pseudopodium.’ Again, in a well-known Work on Chemistry inorganic and organic, I find the following words:—‘By treating phenylamine (aniline), $\text{NH}_2 (\text{C}_6 \text{H}_5)$, with dichloride of ethylene (Dutch liquid), the *diphenyl-diethylene-diamine*, $\text{N}_2 (\text{C}_6 \text{H}_5) (\text{C}_2 \text{H}_4)''_2$, is obtained, which represents a double molecule of ammonia ($\text{N}_2 \text{H}_6$), in which H_2 are replaced by two of ethylene, and H_4 by two of ethylene. By the action of chloroform upon aniline, *formyl-diphenyl-diamine*, $\text{N}_2 (\text{CH})''' (\text{C}_6 \text{H}_5)_2 \text{H}$, has been obtained, in which H_3 are replaced by the triatomic formyle (CH), and H_2 by phenyle. It has been seen that phenylamine is produced by the deoxidising action of ferrous acetate upon nitrobenzole ($\text{C}_6 \text{H}_5 \text{NO}_2$),¹ etc., etc. In another well-known Book on Chemistry, we frequently encounter passages like the following:—‘TRIETHYLIA,’ (I omit the chemical symbols), ‘is formed from diethylia by the further action of ethylic bromide. Triethylia combines in its turn with ethylic bromide, or still better with ethylic iodide. The salt thus formed contains TETRETHYLAMMONIUM.’ And again: ‘The salt might have to be called metethylprobutammonic iodide².’

I have been told by those who are experts in those branches of knowledge, that the terms, therein coined in such abundance, are of great service to the student; and, indeed, it would be rash

¹ Bloxam's Chemistry, p. 539.
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² Williamson's Chemistry, § 269.

to suppose that men of eminence would establish a difficult and elaborate vocabulary for the mere purpose of parading their particular Discipline on stilts. Nevertheless, it is at least hazardous to declaim against the *barbarism* of the Scholastic terminology, in face of such modern specimens as those which I have signalized. It should be added, moreover, that the Scholastic terminology has been, in great measure, borrowed from Aristotle, and is established by the sanction of about eight hundred years; while these vocabularies are, all of them, comparatively modern, and are daily receiving fresh additions to the number of their words. Nor do I think that the most determined adversary of the former could discover in the voluminous writings of either St. Thomas or Suarez any single phrase which could hope to rival such phrases as, '*The cetyloid ramus of each ischium gives off a stout elongated metischial process backwards,*' or, '*Phenylamine is produced by the deoxidising action of ferrous acetate upon nitrobenzole,*' or, '*Homologues of the rami of the ypsiloid cartilage.*'

But I have not yet concluded my defence of the Scholastic terminology. Hobbes has taken the heading of a Chapter which he discovered in one of the *Opuscula* of Suarez. It is not the first Chapter; and, as I have before remarked, the little Treatise in which it appears, discusses a question already mooted in one of his great Works, and presupposes, on the part of the reader, a knowledge of the controversy. Now, I intend to test the worth of the declamatory criticism of Hobbes, by introducing a parallel instance from modern physical science. And I purpose making my selection from no small or parenthetical *brochure*, but from an elaborate Work in two volumes. The Book which I have chosen is *The Evolution of Man*, by Ernst Haeckel. The author informs us, in his first Chapter, that he has striven 'to present this branch of the science in as popular a form as possible.' I think, then, that I have been exceptionally fair towards Hobbes; though I shall beg leave to imitate him so far as to take my example from the heading of the sixteenth chapter, which is as follows:—
 'Relation of the General Inductive Law of the Theory of Descent to the Special Deductive Laws of the Hypotheses of Descent.—
 Incompleteness of the Three Great Records of Creation: Palæonto-

logy, Ontogeny, and Comparative Anatomy.—Unequal Certainty of the Various Special Hypotheses of Descent.—The Ancestral Line of Men in Twenty-two Stages: Eight Invertebrate and Fourteen Vertebrate Ancestors.—Distribution of these Twenty-two Parent-forms in the Five Main Divisions of the Organic History of the Earth.—First Ancestral Stage: Monera.—The Structureless and Homogeneous Plasson of the Monera.—Differentiation of the Plasson into Nucleus, and the Protoplasm of the Cells.—Cytods and Cells as Two Different Plastoid-forms.—Vital Phenomenon of Monera.—Organisms without Organs.—Second Ancestral Stage: Amœbæ.—One-celled Primitive Animals of the Simplest and most Undifferentiated Nature.—The Amœboid Egg-cells.—The Egg is older than the Hen.—Third Ancestral Stage: Syn-Amœba, Ontogenetically reproduced in the Morula.—A Community of Homogeneous Amœboid Cells.—Fourth Ancestral Stage: Planæa, Ontogenetically reproduced in the Blastula or Planula.—Fifth Ancestral Stage: Gastræa, Ontogenetically reproduced in the Gastrula and the Two-layered Germ-disc.—Origin of the Gastræa by Inversion (*invaginatio*) of the Planæa.—Haliphysema and Gastrophysema.—Extant Gastræads.’

It is to be presumed that Hobbes knew nothing whatsoever of the great controversy, between the Dominican and Jesuit Schools, touching the way of reconciling the concurrence and help of God in human action with the liberty of the human will; otherwise, he could not possibly have made the unmeasured animadversions that have been quoted at the beginning of this preface. Accordingly, I am in my strict right, if I summon a man of ordinary culture, who has never made acquaintance with modern labours in comparative anatomy, to read through the above summary and tell me how much he understands of its contents. As he passes along the array of unusual and, to him, unintelligible names with which the heading is studded; what would most probably be the impression produced upon his mind? what the judgment he would pronounce? If he were a self-sufficient man or occupied by an antecedent prejudice against this particular study, I am afraid that he would follow in the wake of the author of the *Leviathan*. If, on the contrary, he were a modest, reverential, man, conscious of

his own ignorance, he would reserve his judgment. He would say to himself, that every science or discipline has its terminology,—that possibly all these big words are a necessary peristyle, albeit of unpolished granite,—that new facts, like new ideas, give birth to new expressions,—that a man of wisdom will not care to quarrel with terms, however absonous and false to their derivation, which have been consecrated, by common consent, as symbols of those facts or natural phenomena,—that, in any case, he will be better able to judge, when he has to a certain extent mastered the subject-matter. I am not quite so sure that, after having done his best in this direction, his verdict would be as favourable to *the Evolution of Man* as to *the Opusculum* of Suarez. Anyhow, the reader must not imagine that I have picked out my example of set purpose, because it stands out in contrast with the summaries, or headings, of other Chapters in the same Book. If he should take the trouble to examine, he will find, that there are summaries of Chapters, which might have been cited with equal effect. In particular, as regards the nomenclature, the following is a collection from the headings of the first six Chapters: ‘Ontogeny,—Phylogeny,—Biogeny,—Heredity,—Adaptation,—*Purposive* Causes,—Monistic or Unitary Cosmology,—Dualistic or Binary Cosmology,—Embryology,—Palingenesis,—Kenogenesis,—Physiogeny,—Morphogeny,—Morphology; (Summary of Chapter I).—Incubated chick,—Animalculists,—Ovulists,—Epigenesis; (Summary of Chapter II).—Purposelessness, or Dysteleology,—Chorology,—Ækology; (Summary of Chapter V).—Yelk,—Chorion;’ (Summary of Chapter VI). I think I may safely say that there are more technical words in this one Work, than could be collected from the twenty-five Volumes of St. Thomas or the twenty-five Volumes of Suarez. The reader will be able to determine the point, in great measure, for himself, by examining the Glossary in the Appendix to the present Volume. If he makes abstraction of words which have become common property among all philosophical writers and students of whatsoever School, and adds to these such words as, though in common use, have received a determined meaning from Scholastic usage; he will find that ‘*the barbarous terminology*,’ will be reduced to surprisingly small dimensions. But I must put him on his guard

against supposing that, on this account, the study of the Scholastic Philosophy will prove easy from the very commencement. There are three principal reasons for concluding the reverse. Two of these reasons are common to all time; the third applies more pointedly to the present age. The first is traceable to the abstract nature of the subject-matter. Those whose minds have been hitherto accustomed to deal exclusively with the concrete,—with that which is purely phenomenal and perview to the senses, will, for the most part, experience a great difficulty at first in habituating their minds to the conceiving of ideas, so remotely and feebly assisted by *phantasmata*, or sense-paintings. Yet, without the aid of these latter, thought, (at least, in the actual order), is impossible. This is one principal reason why physicists so often make but lame metaphysicians. The second reason is traceable in the common use of the terms, with which the metaphysical science primarily deals. All men conceive such ideas, and make use of such terms, as, *Being, Nature, Thing, The Individual, One, True, Good, Possible, Existence*, and the like. But, in the minds of the unphilosophical and unscientific, the concepts formed of such realities are vague, indistinct, superficial. The vulgar use the words, because they must; because the objects, of which those words are the instituted symbol, come across them everywhere and at every moment. But they begin by using them as children; and they end by using them like children. Consequently, they always attach these concepts to the concrete and individual,—to *this* thing, *this* Being, *this* One, *this* Good, *this* Possible, *this* Existent, and so on; and the instinctive propensity for individuating, together with the indefiniteness of the idea, causes that their primitive notions touching these realities are mixed up with imaginations; and clouded by connection with sensile perceptions, (the lowest and least significant of the actions of the human soul), to such an extent, that they are prone, first of all, to misconceive the vast realm of highest truths which are set before them in the metaphysical science, and afterwards, to despise, as unpractical and sophistic, that which carries them so far aloft above the conceptionless chaos of mere matter and its belongings. They cannot follow; so they curse or mock, (according to their natural bent), the aeronaut who would allure

them to attempt the lofty heights. Moreover, many among them there are, who have no stomach for a journey towards the heavens; while they can succeed in digging yellow nuggets from the bowels of the earth. But I am digressing. I say, then, that it is a misfortune for the vulgar, (and by the word, vulgar, I understand all such as have not enrolled themselves as students under the supreme natural science, whether they be simpler folk, or physicists, or politicians, or otherwise men of culture), that the objects, which they are summoned by Metaphysics to contemplate, are already familiar to them, however imperfectly and even erroneously, in thought and speech; so that, like a pupa, they must isolate themselves from this outer world, contract within themselves, and shake off that outer integument of sense, before they can hope for wings. The third and last reason is, as I have already said, more germane to the mental condition of the present time. It is to be found in the intellectual make, produced, in part by the system of education now in vogue, in part by the action of our ephemeral literature. I will refer, first of all, to the former. To my mind, (but I wish to speak with all deference for the judgment of those who have made a special study of the subject), the great error in the modern system of mental education consists in confusing the education of the intellectual faculties with the acquisition of knowledge. Yet, the two are essentially distinct; and the former is an absolutely necessary *preparation* for the latter. You cannot expect men to acquire accurate knowledge, till their minds have formed a habit of accuracy. But, if, at the outset of their education, you stimulate those who are comparatively children, and whose intellectual habits are as yet unformed, to become encyclopedian,—if you set before them Latin, Greek, modern Languages, Geography, English Literature, Arithmetic, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and force upon them the study of each and all, irrespective of their natural tastes and propensions, you render the acquisition of solid accuracy, perspicacity, depth, impossible. Add, yet further, the stimulus of competition. What is the inevitable result? The young intellect is subjected to an unwholesome system of *cram*, as it has been called. The mental stomach is overloaded, in anticipation of the competitive examination. At that time, the sufferer

discharges his load at the feet of the examiners; and labours henceforth, unto his life's end, from an intellectual indigestion. His faculties have been warped, not developed, by the process; and he is rendered permanently incapable of acquiring true science. Not only is his mind warped, but it has become positively hostile to deep, patient, laborious, thought; and it requires no ordinary power of will to purge oneself of the prejudice, and to bring back the distorted bow to its natural curve. As things go, supposing the Darwinian theory to be true, I anticipate, at least in this country, the evolution of a new tribe of men who will be mainly hydrocephalous. Our ephemeral literature has likewise had its influence in nurturing a habit of mind peculiarly inimical to metaphysical study. Not that I mean to bring any indictment against our periodicals and lighter works, which, as I think, for the most part contrast very favourably with those of other countries. Indeed, the fault lies in the excess of devotion to such productions, rather than in the character of the productions themselves. It would be nearer the mark, therefore, were I to say, that the important position which this species of literature holds amongst us, is a symbol, or even result, of the defect to which I am referring, rather than its cause; though in this, as in other like cases, there is always more or less of a causal reciprocity, on the well-known principle of demand and supply. The intellectual defect to which I am alluding may be most clearly described as an habitual passivity of thought. Under its influence the mind is prone to submit, without effort of its own, to the impressions and ideas set before it. It loves to be fed, as children are fed, without enduring the trouble of purveying for itself. It takes in ready-made views and plausible conceits, as a man buys gold chains and rings, for ornamental wear; but will not rouse itself to examine, discriminate, compare, pursue, judge. Wisdom is, in its eyes, an article huckstered in book-marts; not the prize of the patient labours of a lifetime. Such enervation of the intellectual powers is fatal to metaphysical study; where, if anywhere, the mind must be on the alert, first of all in order to understand the deep truths that are there discussed, and then to be able to preserve itself from the hydra-headed impostures of false philosophies. If a man thinks

that he can *get up* Metaphysics, (to use a popular expression), as he can *get up* views about the prehistoric man or the evolution of living bodies; he had better spare himself the loss of time, and adopt the advice of the Member for the University of London.

ii. But I must now return to the attacks which have been made against the form of writing adopted by the philosophers of the School. The second complaint preferred against it is, that it exhibits an utter contempt for, or ignorance of, classic purity of style. The indictment must, in great measure, be admitted. Whether we regard the vocabulary employed or the construction of sentences, there is no denying that we can discover no traces of that severe purity proper to the Augustan age. I will even go further and confess, that the Latinity of the Scholastics is such as would not be now tolerated in any public school. But the first question, which should in all justice be answered before the Scholastic writers are condemned, is this: Was it possible for them to avoid such solecisms and such neglect of established models? It should not be forgotten, that it was their appointed task to *initiate*, (one might almost say), the scientific evolution of Christian Theology. They had, therefore, to deal with new ideas which demanded a new terminology. Moreover, this scientific evolution, as regards its form, was regulated by the principles of the Peripatetic Philosophy. Hence, the terminology of Aristotle soon found itself transformed into Latin use; and the Latin version of the terms was ordinarily a literal transcript of the original Greek. To this must be added that the Latin translation of the Works of Aristotle, (the only one then in existence and, consequently, the text-book in the class-rooms during the epoch of the earliest and greatest Scholastic Doctors), was made from the Arabic translation of Averroes. It was not till the middle of the fifteenth century, that Pope Nicholas VI caused a new Latin version to be made from the original. The old translation will be found embedded in the Commentaries of St. Thomas on the Philosopher. If the reader should have the curiosity to examine, he will find that the Greek text has been rendered with such verbal accuracy as to make it far more difficult to follow the meaning of the author in the Latin than in the original. We have positive proof that these Latinized

Greek idioms soon became naturalized in the vocabulary of the Schools. Again: I cannot withhold the expression of a long-cherished conviction, that the provincial Latin of the early African Fathers and of the African version, or versions, of the Sacred Scriptures, had a marked influence, more particularly after the death of St. Augustine, on the ecclesiastical Latin which was gradually forming in the Catholic Church. Certainly, this influence is conspicuous in the Vulgate, as we now have it; and the present Vulgate is substantially the same as it was in the days of Albert the Great, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure. Interesting and valuable evidence in proof of the above statement may be found in two letters of Cardinal Wiseman on *The Three Witnesses* of St. John, originally published in *The Catholic Magazine*, afterwards placed first among his collected *Essays on Various Subjects*. Of course, we must also take into account the gradual decadence of the language, until finally it ceased to be a living language altogether. Nevertheless, after taking all these contributing causes into consideration, there still remain peculiarities in the Scholastic style, which demand further explanation. For, in the construction of the sentences and phrases, an order and collocation of words have been observed, more consonant with the modern languages than with the Latin tongue. My explanation of this indubitable fact is derived from the manner of teaching in the medieval schools. I allude, in particular, to the custom of giving the professorial lectures in Latin. When a professor was lecturing daily in Theology or Philosophy, it would be obviously impossible for him to prepare his matter with sufficient care, if he attempted to write his lectures textually and then to learn them by heart. Hence, so far as the words went, he would necessarily deliver his lectures *extempore*; as is the custom, up to the present time, in the Catholic Schools. In the previous mental preparation for giving his class, (to use an established phrase), his thoughts would naturally follow in the groove of his own native tongue. He would think in Italian, Spanish, English, as the case might be. What wonder, then, if his Latin instruction should accommodate itself, in its syntactical form, to the construction and genius of his native language; more especially in those respects wherein modern languages unitedly contrast with the Latin?

Such construction, continued daily for years, and instinctively adopted by the scholars in their repetitions and disputes, would soon become stereotyped; so that a new language would eventually result, Latin in its dress, but European in its synthetical structure. Such are the causes which, to my mind, satisfactorily account for the peculiarities of style observable in the writings of the Scholastic Doctors. With respect to the Angelic Doctor in particular, I may add that many of his *Opuscula* and, indeed, of some of his other writings, seem to me to have been mere notes dotted down for reference in class,—some of them so hastily, that the most patent grammatical mistakes have remained untouched; and the reverence of his editors for the great Doctor has hindered them from venturing to touch, even by way of emendation, these venerable relics.

So much, by way of apology or explanation. But a far more important question remains to be determined; and it is this: Has such acknowledged transgression of classical usage any deleterious effects on the transmission or comprehension of the Scholastic Philosophy? For this is, after all, the main point. I am free to admit that, in school-exercises,—in notes of editions of the Classics,—in orations,—solecisms, in the use of words or of constructions, ought not to be allowed; because purity of style is one of the main objects of the author, and there is nothing in the nature of the subject-matter to interfere with the legitimate pursuit of such an end. But the case is quite different, when it is question of Works on Philosophy or Theology. Then the advice of St. Augustine is in reality the expression of a great principle, where he says, ‘Let us not fear the canes of grammarians, provided only that we attain to solid and more certain truth¹.’ If truth can only be acquired and communicated by the adoption of a new terminology,—if its acquisition and communication are made more easy by a verbal sequence and grammatical construction, less consonant, perhaps, with the dead language that has been adopted, by common consent and for grave reasons, as the established medium of thought in these higher studies,—if phrases, borrowed from the Greek, have

¹ ‘Non timeamus ferulas grammaticorum, dum tamen ad veritatem solidam et certiore perveniamus.’ *Tract. II in Joan. n. 14.*

a force, clearness, accuracy, which would be lost by a slavish adherence to classical models,—if a philosophical or theological *dialect* (so to speak) has been in this way gradually evolved and universally accepted; surely, it would be mere folly to reject or condemn it, because it does not satisfy the full requirements of the grammarian, or because it fails to harmonize with the over-refinements of mere classical scholarship. Here the most fitting opportunity presents itself for saying a word touching the selection of the Latin language, in the Schools of the Church, as the vehicle of a scientific education. There would seem to have been two principal reasons for doing so. First of all, it was deemed advantageous, if not necessary, that there should be a common language, by means of which the learned in every country might be able to hold intercommunication. Those only can thoroughly appreciate the value of such an arrangement, who have to deplore its loss. Since the theological and philosophical disintegration of the civilized world, consequent upon the great Revolution of the sixteenth century, the practice has fallen into abeyance; and the consequence is, that, unless a man should have acquired a knowledge of all the languages in Europe, he is practically cut off from the literary and scientific contributions of foreign peoples, with the exception of that imperfect information which he can gather from translations. The second reason is, that a dead language has a great advantage over living languages, as the vehicle of theological and philosophic teaching; because its terms are not subject to those variations of meaning, which living languages must admit for the simple reason that they are living. Such stability in the meaning of words markedly conduces to a corresponding fixedness of thought.

iii. The last objection that has been brought against the style of the Scholastic Doctors is, that it is dry and impoverished. In order to meet this accusation satisfactorily, it will be necessary to invoke the aid of a general principle which, in the abstract, (if I do not mistake), will be universally admitted; whatever differences of opinion there may be, touching its application to this or that particular instance. It cannot be doubted, that the style of an author should be accommodated to the nature of the subject-

matter. It would be as ridiculous to write a treatise on Mathematics in the glittering periods of Macaulay, as to compose a cookery-book in elegiacs. Similarly, it would fare ill with the brilliant contributions of Ruskin to Esthetics, if they were transformed into Scholastic phrase; just as the *Summa* of St. Thomas would not be recognised in the magniloquent periods of Dr. Johnson. In the pursuit of theological or philosophical truth, our labours must be directed by pure reason. There is no room here for imagination or the feelings. Within such a sphere these are dangerous, treacherous, companions. Seeing, therefore, that the process of thought is purely scientific and subject to the strict laws of demonstration; it is impossible that the style should be otherwise than dry. Nay more; it is impossible that it should be otherwise than impoverished, that is, that it should not exclude all ornament or any words that are not necessary exponents of the thought. In the same sense, one might accuse Euclid, or Newton, or Carpenter, or Ganot, or Max Müller, of adopting a dry and impoverished style in the composition of their respective Works; and with as little reason. I think, on the contrary, that, if our modern writers on philosophical subjects would consent to conform somewhat more nearly to Scholastic terseness and logical precision, it would be better for their readers and for those interests of truth which we must suppose them to have at heart. We might be presented as a consequence, with less of rhetoric, less of fanciful illustration, less warmth of advocacy, less of unmeasured declamation against opposite Schools of thought; but we should be saved much needless repetition, slipshod discoursing, decretorial assertions unsupported by even an effort at demonstration, and from many patent paralogisms. Scientific knowledge of truth can only be gained by severe process of Demonstration; whereas views, half-formed ideas, inconsistencies of thought, are wont to lie hidden under that loosely copious and unmethodized style of composition which seems to find favour at present. If, however, by this accusation against Scholastic diction it is intended to insinuate, that there is any poverty of *thought* in the writings of such Doctors as St. Thomas; I must give to the assertion an unqualified contradiction. The reader will have full opportunity, while perusing these volumes, of judging

for himself, whether the charge has any element of truth in it; for he will be confronted with a multitude of passages, selected from nearly every one of the works of the Angelic Doctor, and the original of each passage will, as a rule, be given in the notes. The real fact is, that every Article, every paragraph, is overcharged with deep thought. There are many passages which can be comprehended only after the hard study of hours; but, once comprehended, they amply repay one for the labour. In order, however, to be capable of deriving profit from such study, the mind must be properly disposed for the work.

Such are the accusations that have been brought against the general style of the Scholastic writings. I shall now proceed to pass in review the principal animadversions which have been made upon the subject-matter selected by the Schoolmen and their method of treatment.

Hobbes complains that the Doctors of the School '*converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, or in questions of abstruse philosophy.*' Now, is there any,—if so, how much, of truth in this complaint? It does not admit of doubt, that, when the author of the *Leviathan* speaks of *matters incomprehensible*, he is referring to the dogmas of the Christian Faith and of the grave questions to which these latter have given rise. This is not the place to enter upon an elaborate examination into the justice of such a charge; nevertheless, I cannot wholly pass by it, without rendering myself obnoxious to the charge of evading that which I could not meet. I admit, then, at once, that the mysteries of the Christian Faith are, for the most part, incomprehensible in this sense, viz. that they surpass the natural, unaided, powers of human reason; so that the intellect of man could never have reached them without the aid of a Divine Revelation. I further acknowledge that, after those mysteries have been Divinely revealed, they are still *incomprehensible* by the mind of man. But I stoutly maintain that they are not *inapprehensible* by the mind of man. Furthermore, though they are *above* human reason, after the manner just explained, as every Christian would willingly admit; they are not *contrary to* reason. It is impossible that they should be, on the supposition that they are true. Again: though human reason could not have

discovered them; yet, when once they have been revealed, it can discover a wondrous analogy between them and the truths of the natural order, which greatly adds to the reasonable motives for their credibility. Once more: it is within the province of human reason to exhibit the relation of dogma to dogma, and in this way to evolve the objective unity of the Faith, as well as to render a multitude of truths explicit, which had previously been implicitly contained in the revealed Creed. Such a result is affected by process of pure Demonstration; which differs from natural Demonstration only in this, that, in the former, the premisses are taken from a Divine Revelation. By the employment of reason in the three ways here mentioned, the Science of Supernatural Theology has been constructed. Such was the great work which circumstances, into which it is not necessary now to enter, imposed upon the Doctors of the School. Looking, then, at the whole question in this light, it is surely more than an amphibology to assert, that the Schoolmen *conversed in questions of matters incomprehensible*. But it would seem that they are not guilty of this offence alone; for they have likewise conversed *in questions of abstruse philosophy*. Doubtless they have; and wherein the blame? Is it because they ventured upon questions of philosophy? If so, why are they to be singled out for special reprobation? They followed in the wake of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Zeno, Pythagoras, (to omit a crowd of other names); and they have been followed by Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Wolff, Kant and those Germans of the critical School who succeeded him, by Sir William Hamilton, and others of our own day. The world of letters has never been without its schools of philosophy, since the commencement of civilization. Once give to man the occasion of studious leisure; and you will try in vain to hinder him from seeking for an answer to such questions as, *What is the Soul? What is Thought? What is Will? What is Existence? What, the primary constitution of material substance?* and the like. It cannot, then, be, that Hobbes quarrels with the Scholastic Doctors, because they dealt with questions of philosophy. So the ground of complaint must be restricted to the fact, that the questions, which the said Doctors have treated, are *abstruse*. Yet, is it possible that he could

have meant this? Are there any metaphysical questions which are not abstruse? Moreover, abstruseness is no special property of Metaphysics. Most mathematicians, I will venture to say, would admit, that the Quaternions of Hamilton and the Elliptic Functions of Jacobi are sufficiently abstruse, even for those who are ordinarily grounded in the mathematical science. Hence; we are justified in concluding, that this second Article in Hobbes' indictment has no significance or value.

Another accusation by the same author is insinuated rather than expressed. He says that '*the common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are, therefore, by those other egregious persons*' (that is to say, the School-men) '*counted idiots.*' If these words mean anything, they evidently convey the imputation that the Scholastic Philosophy is opposed to the dictates of common sense, because it despises that which has some meaning and is capable of being understood. Yet nothing can be further from the truth. As all are aware, who know anything at all about the matter, the great Doctors of the School adhered unanimously to the Peripatetic Philosophy. St. Thomas, in particular, never loses an occasion of showing his reverence for *the Philosopher*, (as he perpetually styles him)—habitually quotes his authority, as though it were practically tantamount to a demonstration in the order of natural truths,—has left us elaborate Commentaries on his principal Works,—has used his Ethics as the scientific basis of his own Moral Theology, and his Metaphysical writings as the scientific basis of his own Dogmatic Theology,—and, in those of the *Opuscula* which are exclusively devoted to questions of Philosophy, contents himself with evolving the principles, conclusions, teaching of the Stagyrice. Yet, if there is one thing more than another that is characteristic of Aristotle, it is his repeated appeal to, and confidence in, the general voice of mankind. He announces the following canon, as though it were a self-evident axiom: 'We assert'—these are his words,—'that an opinion, held by all men, is true¹.' Commenting on this *dictum*, St. Thomas observes that 'it is held as a sort of Principle. For it is not possible that the

¹ 'Ο γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν. *Ethic. Nic. L. x, c. 2.*

natural judgment should err in all men¹. Perhaps there is nothing that is more characteristic of the Scholastic Doctors, as a body, than the account which they professedly make of the common verdict of mankind and of the judgments of common sense. Indeed, it is precisely because the modern Schools of German Philosophy, (not to mention others nearer home), seem so entirely to dispense with these important criteria of Truth, that the Peripatetic can see in their manifold theories nothing else save the symmetrical conceits of baseless speculation. Lest it might be imagined that this is a mere retort provided for the occasion, I will quote from a Lecture, which I delivered some years ago, on *Evidence and Certainty in their relation to Conceptual Truth*; wherein, only in a more popular form, (as befitted the occasion), I expressed the same conviction. After having quoted two passages from Reid on the authority of common sense and the necessity under which the true philosopher finds himself of submitting to its guidance, I proceed as follows:—‘Men may waste their time in spinning cobwebs, like the spider, from the entrails of their own consciousness. There those cobwebs will be, up in the corner of the study, objects perchance of wonder for their geometrical symmetry and delicate—all but aerial tissue. Some poor fly or two may be entangled in their meshes. But ere long comes the inevitable broom. Common sense,—that valuable maid of all work,—spies the intrusion in the corner, sweeps it ruthlessly down; and mankind in general suffers little from the demolition. In vain will you endeavour to persuade the child that the piercing of a pin or a scratch from pussy is a mere evolution of its own consciousness;—fruitless your efforts to convince the sailor that the cat-o’-nine-tails is the absolute reason in its act of self-alienation, or that the pain of the bleeding wounds on his back are determining phenomena of a primal nonentity. Nay, let the philosopher himself, when under the torture of a racking toothache, console himself, if he can, with his theory of identity or his dream of the absolute. *Naturam expellas furca tamen sique recurret*. You may not be able to demonstrate immediate

¹ ‘Illud enim quod videtur omnibus, dicimus ita se habere; et hoc videtur quasi principium. Quia non est possibile quod naturale iudicium in omnibus fallatur.’ *In Ethic. L. x, Lect. 3, ad loc.*

evidence. I know you *cannot*. You may not be able to analyze its nature. I own that it is difficult. But you dare not deny or doubt its existence; if you do, until you cast the doubt or denial from you, you logically condemn yourself to a perpetual paralysis of mind, heart, affection. The exigencies of common life are for ever crying shame upon you; and the practical instincts of human nature are forcing you to give the lie to your own useless speculations. Your philosophy is that of an arm-chair;—it cannot show its face at the table, in the shop, the market-place, the exchange, the council, or the court of law. It is this unwise spirit of universal criticism, or rather of universal scepticism,—this ruthless destruction of primitive facts and of first principles,—this wild yearning after a self-constructed philosophy, which shall take nothing for granted and evolve itself out of one fundamental principle by process of pure reason, irrespective of all facts or judgments of common sense,—which has in modern times concealed the fair face of the Queen of sciences with a mask of unreality, unreason, sophistry, and emptiness; and turned the very name of Metaphysic, in this our country at least, into a proverb of reproach.’ It will be seen, in the course of these volumes, how frequently I recur to the criterion of common sense; as I have learned to do from the great Doctors of the School, whose disciple I profess myself.

The reader must not, however, conclude from the above remarks, that the deep problems of Philosophy, discussed and solved in the scientific form and language of the School, would be understood by the unaided common sense of the vulgar. This it would be too much to expect. All which is required is, that the metaphysical science should be rooted in the general convictions of mankind and the dictates of common sense; and that in its teaching it should never contravene either of these primitive sources of truth.

Brucker adds to these accusations of Hobbes three others, which I now propose to examine.

The first is, that the Scholastic Doctors were ‘*wont* to dispute, with extremest stretching of the brain, about questions . . commendable neither by reason of their utility nor of their certitude.’ To this complaint may be added, because of its affinity, that of

Mr. Lewes, who inveighs against 'the futility of the questions discussed.' I own to a perplexity, which has somewhat exercised me, touching this latter accusation. Mr. Lewes has informed us that he tried, but was unable, to continue his reading of the Scholastics; and, accordingly, he pushed them aside. I do not understand, therefore, how it was possible for him, save in the spirit of vaticination, to form a *general* judgment as to the nature of the questions discussed in these quickly discarded Folios. However, I will take his opinion for what it is worth. I will accept it as the unmotivated echo of modern opinion. It shall cease to be his, and will be treated as a popular prejudice.

What is to be said to the charge? I can only speak to the extent of my reading. Neither occasion nor time has offered itself for studying the other Scholastic Doctors, as I have studied St. Thomas and Suarez. Nevertheless, I have repeatedly consulted the former; so that I have been able to arrive at a more or less definite judgment touching the general tenor of the questions which they ventilate. The first thing that one naturally asks is; What does Brucker understand by *utility*? He surely cannot wish to limit metaphysical investigation to such matters as conduce to the comforts and conveniences of life. He cannot mean that nothing which does not help to light our streets, or to facilitate locomotion, or to substitute machinery for manual labour, or to transmit our messages, or to furnish our rooms, and the like, is worthy of thought or study. Indeed, I do not understand the reasons why Brucker has chosen to test science by the standard of utility at all. I had thought that Truth, wheresoever it may be found, is eligible for its own sake,—that it is the adequate object of the noblest faculty of the human soul,—and that the perfect beatitude of man formally consists in its inamissible possession. I have been taught by the greatest Philosopher of antiquity, that a life contemplative of Truth is man's highest state; and that the practical life is rightly regarded in the mere light of a necessary preparation for the former. Experience and observation have conspired to assure me, that there is in man, as it were instinctively, an insatiable hunger after Truth, which is temporarily cheated out of its appointed satisfaction by the necessity of living and of social and

civic obligations; but is destined to receive the fulfilment of its desires at the last. To measure Truth, therefore, by its *utility*, as the word is ordinarily understood, is tantamount to turning means into an end and the end into means. It savours, moreover, of that miserable doctrine which, making no account of the acquisition of Truth, deems such acquisition valuable only for the excitement of the search and the exercise of the faculties that it presupposes. I cannot, then, bring myself to believe that such could have been Brucker's meaning. I prefer to suppose that his *utility* is intended to bear a cognate meaning to the *futility* of Mr. Lewes; and that he is accusing the Scholastic Doctors of dealing with questions which have little or nothing to do with Truth,—a battling about mere words,—unmeaning subtleties.

Taking the accusation in this light; what counterplea can be urged in defence? I should be very loth to maintain, that no one of the Doctors of the School has been ever tempted, by an over-subtlety of mind, to enter upon the discussion of questions that seem to be of comparatively little importance. I have encountered some such discussions myself; occasionally, (if I may be permitted to say so), even in the writings of Suarez. This is only saying that the philosophers of the School are men; and that they sometimes pushed their love of clearness and precision beyond the due proportions of science. But what I most emphatically deny, is this; that such is the general characteristic of the questions which they propose for discussion. As a fact, the main subjects of discussion are the common property of all. If one consults Suarez or Fonseca, for instance, it will be found that, in the treatment of by far the greater number of questions, either the authority of the School *in globo* is invoked, or the names of celebrated Doctors are introduced on one side or the other,—often, on both sides. Hence we gather, that the particular subject-matter has been submitted to general treatment. Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise; since the works of Aristotle were the text-book of Philosophy. Although, then, it may happen,—nay, has happened,—that a stray question may here and there occur in the writings of a particular Doctor, which has been started by himself and is, perhaps exclusively, his own property; nevertheless, these are exceptions to the rule, and

it is unjust to frame a general indictment on the strength of a peculiar exception. As to St. Thomas, I may say that I have been occupied in the study of his Works for many years; yet I have never as yet come across a single question in his voluminous writings, that did not amply repay the labour of mastering it and the time expended upon it. Nevertheless, the labour often is not light, and the time is by no means short. The reader will have the opportunity of testing the truth of these assertions in the course of the present Work; for one of the objects I have had in view has been, to make him familiar with the writings of the Angelic Doctor.

I cannot help thinking, that prepossessions, such as those exhibited by Hobbes, Brucker, Lewes, and the rest, owe their origin to a defective acquaintance, often a total unacquaintance, with the special subjects of discussion and with the immediate bearing of these on truths of great moment. A problem, it may be, is set before them in its own naked simplicity; in all probability isolated from the weighty questions that depend on its solution. How is it possible for them to form a just appreciation of that which is involved in the Article or Chapter, over which they have only cursorily glanced? Even a professed student, until he shall have mastered the Scholastic Philosophy as a whole, is scarcely in a position to determine the measure of importance attributable to this or that *Disputation*. What hopes of success, then, can there be for those who turn over a few pages, here and there, of their author; and form a judgment on the strength of what little they imagine themselves to have picked up in the process? I can anticipate no other possible issue of such levity, than that their heads will become more muddled, and themselves further removed from an acquaintance with the Scholastic teaching than they were before. Neither do I think that the result of such *butterfly*-reading would be more propitious in other branches of knowledge. I will illustrate what I mean by an example. There is, perhaps, no part of the Philosophy of the School which has been so common a subject of amimadversion and scorn, as its doctrine about Modes. A superficial and opinionative thinker would be tempted to exclaim: In the interest of Truth, what can it matter whether there be a special class of Accidents that are absolutely incapable of being separated from their Subject, or

not? Do not all these divisions and subdivisions savour rather of logical subtlety and of hairsplitting, than of solid and profitable knowledge? Such is the appearance that the dispute wears, so long as it is considered in itself, apart from its bearings. But now, let us apply it to a subject of vital consequence,—the essential constitution of man. Every man is constituted of a soul and a body. But *how* is he constituted of these two elements? What is the *nature* of such constitution? For the formation of a man, is it enough that there should be a human soul and an inanimate body, side by side? Of course not, you will answer; the two must be united.—Most true; and what is that *union*? Is it something, or nothing?—You reply, Of course it is something; because, without it, the body and soul would not become a man.—Well, then, Is it a Substance or an Accident?—It cannot be a Substance, will be the answer; because it cannot stand by itself. But it cannot be an Accident either; for then man would be a man by accident. Besides, I can conceive an Accident to be separable from its Subject. As a fact, in Mathematics I do so conceive of Quantity. But a union without any things to unite, is inconceivable. Therefore, it is neither Substance nor Accident.—What is it, then?—I cannot say.—Suppose we call it a *Mode*. Surely, this is a truth not wholly unimportant in its way. At all events, it *is* a truth; and as such cannot be accounted a mere ‘verbal dispute.’

The remaining part of the first accusation which Brucker brings against the Scholastics is, that they ventilated questions that are not ‘commendable by reason of their certitude.’ I do not find that he makes any exception; much less that he treats the questions complained of as exceptional instances. Hence I am forced to conclude, that he makes this charge against what may be called the body of their teaching,—and of their philosophical teaching in particular; because only as philosophers could they legitimately find a place in his *History of Philosophy*. If this interpretation of his meaning be correct, I must meet the assertion with a categorical denial; and I confidently appeal, in justification, to the greater number of truths demonstrated in the present Volume,—taken, as they are, for the most part, (as will appear), from the writings of the accused. I will presume, then, that Brucker intended his

animadversion to apply only to certain,—too frequent perhaps, but still, for all that,—exceptional cases. Thus understood, his censure has greater show of reason. The mere fact, that there are questions which are points of controversy between rival Schools, and others concerning which Doctors of the same School have defended opposite opinions, is a proof, (if any were needed), that equal certainty does not attach to all the conclusions of the Scholastic Philosophy. But is this peculiar to that Philosophy? Has there ever existed a system of Philosophy, or even a science or discipline, whose teaching is equally evident throughout and, consequently, equally certain? Are there less numerous or less momentous points of difference now between modern, than there were formerly among the medieval, Schools? Surely; within the abstract sphere of Metaphysics there will ever arise problems which, for a time at least, fail of receiving a satisfactory solution, either because they have not as yet been sufficiently sifted by careful thought, or because the light of evidence seems to distribute itself in opposite directions. But, with regard to such questions, I recognize a wisdom of treatment in the School, which, if adopted in our own day, would signally contribute towards the restoration of scientific knowledge and the gradual diminution of baseless assumptions and pretentious theories. Consult Suarez, for instance, on one of these debated points. It will be found that the reasons for and against each of the different solutions are given with strict logical precision. When at last he offers his own, he supports it by the pure method of demonstration; while, at the same time, he examines and answers in form the arguments advanced in favour of the opinions which he rejects. You may not always agree with his conclusion; but you know where you are. The motives for each conclusion are plainly and tersely set before you. There is no declamation,—no misleading rhetoric,—no tirade against opposing Schools,—no magisterial *dicta* resting solely on the teacher's own authority and unsupported by a particle of evidence. He submits his own decision to the same test as that which he applies to the conclusions of others,—the simple test of reason. You perceive that all ideas and consideration of self give way before the paramount claims of Truth. Thus assisted and instructed, our task is made com-

paratively easy. We have only to weigh the arguments adduced, examine into the evidence of the premisses, as in turn we review each opinion; and then form an impartial judgment, to the best of our ability. Assuredly, if certainty is to be reached; such is the only safe road by which to attain it. It may be more pleasing to be presented with a medley of original views, even though they lack mutual consistency; or with startling paradoxes, tricked out in the colours of a vivid imagination and with all the ornaments of a brilliant style. The pages of the Scholastic Doctor may prove prosaic and tedious in comparison. But it must be borne in mind, that we do not come to Philosophy in order to be pleased or moved, as men betake themselves to a novel; for we are no true philosophers,—that is, lovers of wisdom,—unless we have a *single* desire of discovering Truth. And, if such be our intent, I confidently put the question, Whether the Scholastic method, as I have just described it, is not the surest means towards the attainment of this end?

The second complaint which Brucker makes against the teaching of the Scholastic Doctors is, that it carried on ‘its countless philosophical skirmishes with the help of worthless mental abstractions.’ Now, I must begin by protesting, first of all, against what I will call the preamble to this indictment. From Brucker’s method of expression, his readers would be led to imagine, that the Scholastic, or Peripatetic, Philosophy is substantially polemic. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Let any man of honest purpose take up one of the great Works of the Angelic Doctor, (and I would leave him perfectly free to make his choice); and he will not be long in discovering, that the said ‘skirmishes’ are not the rule, but a very rare exception. It is just possible that Brucker may have been misled by the form which St. Thomas has adopted in the composition of by far the greater number of his Theological and philosophical writings; and as the reader might possibly fall into the same error, if it should happen that he has yet to make acquaintance with these writings, I will add a few words of explanation touching this point, taking the *Summa*, (the last and most finished of the works of the Angelic Doctor), as my illustration. This compendium of Theology is divided into four principal Parts; viz. the first Part,—the first half of the second Part,—the second

half of the second Part,—and the third Part. As it would be foreign to the subject-matter of these Volumes, to which the present Preface is an introduction, that I should enter into an explanation of this division; I will say no more than this, that the aforesaid division is theologically clear, and will commend itself to the mind of those who make a study of the contents. Each Part is composed of a number of Questions, each one of which treats of a particular truth. The disposition and process of these Questions are based on logical and scientific principles. As a given truth ramifies into a certain number of *sub-truths*, each Question of St. Thomas is made up of a certain number of Articles, in which these *sub-truths* are discussed and determined. Let me take an example. In the eleventh Question of the first Part, St. Thomas treats of the *Unity of God*. There are four problems to which this Question gives birth. First of all, What is Unity? Does it add anything to Being? Then secondly, since God is so One as to exclude from His essential Nature any multiplication of Itself, it occurs to inquire, Are One and Many opposites, i. e. opposed to each other? Thirdly, Is God one? Fourthly, Is God pre-eminently and especially one? These four problems are respectively discussed in the four Articles of which the said Question is composed. All the Articles are constructed on one uniform plan. As Heading, the problem is proposed. Then follow, (under numbers 1, 2, 3, &c.) objections which either have been or may be urged against the true resolution. After these have been stated, there follows an argument in favour of the true resolution. Next comes what is called the *body of the Article*, (*corpus articuli*), in which the true resolution of the problem is given. Finally, an answer is made to each of the difficulties in order. I will take the *third Article* of the above Question, by way of illustration; setting it before the reader in an abbreviated form. The problem is, *Whether God is one?*

‘1. It would seem that God is not one. For it is said in 1 Cor. viii. 5, *For there be gods many, and lords many*.

‘2. *One*, which is the principle of Number, cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity can be predicated of God. In like manner, neither can *one* which is convertible with Being be predicated of God; because it signifies privation, which is an imperfection.

‘On the other hand, it is said in Deuter. vi. 4, *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.*

‘I answer, that the unity of God is demonstrated by three arguments. First of all, it is proved from His simplicity: secondly, from the infinity of His Perfection: thirdly, from the unity of the world.’ (I have purposely omitted the demonstrations themselves; since they are not necessary to the illustration of the form.)

‘In answer to the first, therefore, it must be said, that there are many gods in the erroneous opinion of certain persons who worshipped many gods. Hence, the Apostle subjoins in the same place, *Yet to us there is but one God.*

‘In answer to the second it must be said, that *one*, as the principle of Number, is not predicated of God, but of those things only which have material Being. But *one*, as convertible with Being, is predicated of God. For though there is no privation in God; nevertheless, according to the measure of our apprehension He is not known by us save by mode of privation and remotion. In this way, there is nothing to prevent certain privatives in expression to be predicated of God,—as, for instance, that He is incorporeal, infinite. In like manner it is said of God, that He is one.’

I have chosen this particular Article because of its comparative brevity; but, however long others may be, they are all constructed on precisely the same plan. In the most important work of St. Thomas after the *Summa*,—his *Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, there is a slight addition made to the form. The *Commentaries on the four Books of the Sentences* are composed of Questions and the Questions of Articles, as in the instance of the *Summa*. But it occasionally happens, owing to the concise compendiousness of *the Sentences*, that the problem which heads a given Article virtually contains two or three distinct, though cognate, questions; in which case, the Article is subdivided into two or three *little questions*, (*quaestiunculæ*), as they are called. These *little questions* are, each of them, constructed on the same principle as an Article. There is one other work of St. Thomas, which is very frequently quoted; and, at first sight, the method of arrangement seems altogether different from the rest. I allude to his *Summa against the Gentiles*; which is divided into Books, and each

Book subdivided into Chapters. But the difference is more apparent than real. For it will be found, on examination, that objections are stated and answered in scientific form, whenever the occasion requires.

To resume my consideration of Brucker's innuendo against the Scholastics, viz. that they indulged in 'countless philosophical skirmishes:'—It would seem highly probable, (as I have before suggested), that this misconception has arisen from the form of the Articles, as I have just explained it. For the same form has been substantially maintained, as a rule, by the later Scholastic Doctors; although they have not retained the division into Questions and Articles in so many express terms. On the contrary, other names have been introduced. Suarez divides his *Metaphysics* into *Disputations*; while each *Disputation* is subdivided into *Sections*. I cannot help regarding this nomenclature as most infelicitous; since the word *Disputation* suggests the idea of a philosophical skirmish, and gives occasion to the erroneous idea which I am now considering. Nevertheless, touching the form itself, it will be found to be admirably adapted for implanting clear, distinct, scientific, cognitions of the subject under discussion. Not only is the solution of each problem established by rigid demonstration; but the student is invited to return to the truth,—to go round about it,—to weigh all the objections that may be urged against it; while, at the same time, he is provided with an answer to each objection in order and logical form. This is all done as simply and as tersely as possible; so as to encourage, while guiding, the thought of the reader. There is thus room,—nay, a necessity, if the student would hope to master the subject,—for sustained intellectual exertion.

In making the above observations, I have no intention of denying that there were points of controversy between rival Schools, even on questions of Philosophy; but I am quite sure that their number and importance have been greatly exaggerated. If we except the Nominalists, whose theories never took root in the Church's Schools, the rest of the Doctors had one common foundation of Philosophy,—the teaching of Aristotle. Hence, touching all the principal metaphysical truths they would naturally agree;

and differed only about subsidiary questions, more or less intimately connected with the former.

But Brucker goes on to say, that the Scholastics carried on these 'countless philosophical skirmishes *by the help of worthless mental abstractions.*' The whole force of this accusation consists in the supposed worthlessness of these mental abstractions; for mental abstractions of some sort or other you must have, if you aim at acquiring science properly so called. There is no science of the individual and contingent, but only of the necessary and universal; and, so far as human knowledge is concerned, the necessary and universal are only discoverable in mental abstractions,—that is to say, in ideas which abstract from all material conditions. Neither are these ideas less real, because they are formally logical,—or rather, logical in form; on the contrary, it is only by means of these concepts of the understanding, that we can hope to pierce through the sensible, contingent, temporary, and mount to the pure heaven of Truth. Even the physical disciplines are compelled to use universals of their own; otherwise, they could adopt no classification and evolve no order or constancy of law. Are, then, the mental abstractions, which the Scholastic Doctors have used in the service of Metaphysics, worthless or not? Brucker has given no instances in proof; but has contented himself with the bare assertion. I am, therefore, compelled to give the statement a categorical denial. *Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.* For the same reason, I must treat in the same way the further accusation of Brucker, that the philosophers of the School dealt in 'axioms assumed;' as well as the decretorial asseverations of Mosheim, that there were 'defects in their manner of reasoning,'—that 'they did not divide their subject with perspicuity and precision,'—and, in particular, that 'the definitions' of St. Thomas 'are often vague, or obscure, and his plans or divisions frequently destitute of clearness and proportion.'

There remain now only two accusations that I have not noticed. Hobbes asserts that the School-men 'conversed in questions of matters incomprehensible;' and Mosheim denounces 'their extravagant and presumptuous desire of prying into matters that infinitely surpass the comprehension of short-sighted mortals.' It

is impossible to say for certain, (for, as usual, no instances are given as guides to the meaning and right application of these censures), but I am forced to conclude, that these writers must be referring to the Theological problems of the Scholastic Doctors; for, if their indictment applies to the Philosophy of the School, it becomes simply absurd. Assuming, therefore, my conclusion to be just; I must be excused if I decline to enter upon a question, which will involve the admission into these pages of a discussion concerning the science of supernatural Theology.

Before explaining the method which I have chosen for the attainment of my purpose, it will be well to set before the reader certain obstacles that he may encounter, so soon as he has determined to seek an initiation into the Philosophy of the School. I will suppose that he has been purged of the prejudices to which attention has been directed in the preceding pages. Fatigued with the Babel of that legion of theories and dreams which, in our day, are undeservedly graced with the title of philosophy,—hungry after Truth, if haply he may find Her,—casting a wistful glance back upon that ancient Doctrine which has stood the test of above two thousand years, and calmly holds its own, spite of the unmeasured calumnies and copied scorn of interested adversaries,—anxious for a foundation upon which to rest his feet and build,—hopeful, yet doubting, he resolves to try his chance. His difficulties are not over; they have yet, after a sort, to begin. He brings with him to the trial a certain disposition, certain prepossessions, certain intellectual habits, begotten of the genius of his age; and he must be made aware of them at the outset, in order that he may rid himself of them as speedily as he can. These impediments have been signalized in a thoughtful article which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette* for June 27, 1879; and I cannot do better than take it as the text of what remains to be said on this head, quoting those passages which suit my purpose. The writer observes, ‘He’ (that is, the student of philosophy) ‘should have acquired also, as he naturally will in learning to handle scientific ideas, a certain discipline in the exact use of thought and language. He will understand that metaphor is not argument, and have found out the danger of generalities. And

when he comes to apply himself particularly to the standing problems of philosophy, he should likewise understand that philosophy, like other special studies, has its language and its history, both worth knowing something of if one means to take it up seriously.' Again: 'Now the use of independence is to do your own work in your own way, but not to do it in ignorance of what the conditions of it are, and what other people have done before you. But this is a lesson which needs learning; and, having been prevented from learning it sooner as concerning philosophy, we must expect to spend some time in learning it now. Thus a great deal of the difficulty and misunderstanding at present incident to philosophical discussion, comes of pure ignorance—the ignorance of well-meaning and often otherwise well-informed persons. And this may be seen even in the work of writers who seriously intend to proceed in a scientific manner. Perhaps the commonest form of all is ignorance of the difficulty of the subject. It is frequently assumed that everybody is competent to criticise philosophical theories, and that no philosophical theory can be worth considering which is not clear at first sight to an intelligent man who knows nothing of philosophy.' Yet again: 'Ignorance must be taken to include confused thinking and inaccurate use of terms as well as complete absence of information, which indeed is comparatively harmless.' Once more: 'Great havoc is wrought in the minds of the weaker brethren among philosophical students by scientific phrases and formulas which they do not understand. The wild and unmeaning statements that have been solemnly propounded about Force are alone a surprising monument of human infirmity.' Lastly, to conclude these quotations: 'Then we have ignorance of the philosophical conditions; in other words, absence of the special training required to deal effectively with philosophical questions as such. In this way it may come about that men of science' (physical) 'give the philosophers their revenge¹.'

From these extracts, which abound in good sense, I desire to collect certain of the principal obstacles which beset the student's path, when he first enters upon the study of the Scholastic Philosophy.

¹ Extracts from an Article headed *The Discipline of Philosophy*.

As I am professedly addressing myself to beginners, either young or old; I trust I may be excused for the monitory tone of my observations.

The first obstacle, which may possibly interfere with his progress and success, is an habitual inexactness of thought and expression. This seems to me a pressing danger; because it is one of the characteristics of the age; and I attribute it, in great measure, to the neglect of philosophical training, and to the multitude of subjects enforced in the curriculum of our modern schools. To see a truth, is not to know or comprehend it. Similarly, to seize an idea, is not to realize, or make it one's own. Yet those who are specially gifted with a quickness of intuition, are peculiarly liable to confound the two. As they read, they see at once what is meant. They have caught the idea; but they cannot retain it, because they have not waited to *comprehend* it. So they pass on from sentence to sentence, imagining that they know all about the subject-matter; and find in the end that they are in possession of an unordered congeries of confused notions, which represent no definite, tangible, truth. In order to comprehend and adequately realize the philosophic truths which are set before us, it will be necessary to go round them, one by one,—to test each by supposed objections,—to argue them out in one's own mind,—to find out their mutual connection and their affinity with other truths of the same order, and even of other orders. In a word, the student should aim with zealous labour to gain *distinct* as well as *clear* ideas,—that is to say, ideas which not only represent their object, but also definitely limit off that object from every other. It is better to delay, (if needs be), for hours over one sentence, till it is consciously mastered; than to go rapidly over thirty or forty pages, gathering up a medley of half-formed ideas as we proceed. This, of course, will be a work of time, for habits are not formed in a day; but it will tell in the long run. It will soon be found, that the labour of intense thought is insensibly lessening; and that new cognitions, as we gradually acquire them, add fresh clearness and precision to those which have preceded them. The author of the above quoted Article, with considerable discernment, has selected the popular idea of Force as his instance

of an inexact concept; and, when I say *popular*, I include the idea of Force which one meets with in many physical and mathematico-physical works. As this idea will occupy our prolonged attention in the second Volume, I will only remark here, that Force is often set before us as a substance, existing of itself and (as it were) in its own right,—a concept of it, which is consonant neither with the common acceptation of the term nor with the examples of it that are subject to human observation.

If our thoughts are clear and distinct, our expressions, as a general rule, will be clear and distinct likewise. Of all the sciences which are acquired by the natural use of reason, the metaphysical science is the one wherein exactness of expression is most essential. This is perhaps due to the fact, that it deals with abstract and Transcendental truths, whose cognition can be aided but feebly and indirectly by sensible phantasmata; while these phantasmata are neither more nor less than the terms, *spiritually* uttered, by means of which alone we can think such truths.

It occurs here to warn the student against a not uncommon propensity of beginners for picking up, and making indiscriminate use of, scientific words and phrases, without having acquired an exact notion of what they mean. Better the pebble of David than the panoply of Saul, if you have not essayed the latter. It is indeed reported of O'Connell, that he once reduced an abusive fishwoman of Dublin to silence by pouring out upon her a long selection from the terminology of Euclid: but I greatly doubt whether similar weapons would succeed in more serious controversy. The one object of the true philosopher is, first of all, to discover Truth, and then to impart it to others; and this high purpose, if steadfastly set before his eyes, will effectually preserve him from needlessly parading unusual words or phrases which only minister to vanity and self-conceit.

Another form of inexactness of expression shows itself in a proneness for polysyllabic words. This, objectionable enough anywhere, is unpardonable in English. For it is peculiar to the genius of our language, that its fundamental words are chiefly monosyllabic; and our approved models are conspicuous for their selection of such words, whenever it is possible. Those who have never made the

calculation, would probably be surprised at the number of lines in Shakspeare, which are either exclusively, or all but exclusively, composed of monosyllables. And this is one reason why the English language is, (as I conceive), so peculiarly adapted for the expression of metaphysical truths. It seems in this respect to bear a striking resemblance to the Greek. Hence, though the Metaphysical Science has for years been so entirely neglected, and though it has never been attempted before to offer the Metaphysics of the School in an English dress; I have, nevertheless, found myself obliged to add but a very few words to the recognized philosophic vocabulary. I would that the same could be said of our modern efforts in the construction of new philosophies. I have seen a recent work on Psychology, which fairly appalled me with its terminology, and forcibly recalled to my mind the professor's frame in the grand academy of *Lagado*, the metropolis of *Balnibarbi*. There is nothing which is a surer token of impoverished thought and imperfect knowledge than this diseased inventiveness of new, sesquipedalian, terms. Imitating the manners of the sepia, it obfuscates the waters of truth, in order to escape from inconvenient scrutiny.

There is another hindrance to success in studying the Philosophy of the School, which arises from exaggerated views touching the independence of thought and from a corresponding contempt for, and studied neglect of, the treasures of the past. Men of our time have been so carefully educated in the idea of continuous progress and of the superiority of their own, to all preceding, ages in every sphere of thought, that they deem a recurrence to the teaching of older philosophies as useless and unbecoming, as for a man of mature years to return to the spelling-books and grammars of his childhood. To this must be added that morbid fear of the influence of authority in the formation of opinion,—that general inculcation of an exaggerated reliance on private judgment,—that excessive admiration for what are called self-formed men,—those popular sophisms concerning intellectual freedom,—which, together, interpose a formidable barrier to progress in the pursuit of metaphysical truth. On the other hand, I should be the last to deny that a certain independence of thought is a property of the

true philosopher. But such independence was, as I believe, more practically maintained in the medieval Schools than in the private studies of our modern philosophers, paradoxical as at first sight the assertion may appear. I freely admit that the student of philosophy must be guided to his conclusions by process of pure reason. Then, and then only, will he merit the name of a philosopher, when his knowledge rests upon strict demonstration. He must eventually rely on intrinsic evidence, where this is possible; and only have recourse to extrinsic evidence by way of confirmation and under certain exceptional circumstances. He must see his own way, and become a slave to no human teacher. Here, however, two excesses are to be avoided. It is a widely different thing, to set before oneself this intellectual emancipation as the goal of continued labour; and to claim an impossible autonomy, while we have as yet to learn the first letters of the alphabet. The one is becoming and desirable; the other, absurd and ruinous. Who is there venturesome enough to deny, that a student must go through a state of pupilage in Metaphysics, as in all sciences, disciplines, and arts whether liberal or mechanic? He must provisionally trust to authority; and he does wisely in so trusting. The man who digs out a way for himself, may be very original; but his originality will probably show itself in missing the right direction. To follow one's own lights before they can possibly appear, is but doubtful policy; and such eccentricities will eventually assume the form of errors. Independence of thought, by rights, follows after previous discipline. First, the docile pupil; then, the independent thinker, if so be, in due season. There is another excess to be avoided equally with the former. If the student would hope for success in his philosophical studies, he must never despise or neglect the labours of a glorious past. For, in the first place, by so doing he will lose time uselessly; since he will be toiling at a foundation for himself, while a solid foundation has been already provided, ready to his service. If wise, he will begin where others have left off; so soon, that is, as he is fitted for the task. He will take up the skein of truth from where it has been set free, and continue the work of disentanglement. It surely argues the foolishness of childhood, to

unwind the wound silk and to throw it back into a heap of twisted confusion, in order to ensure to oneself the weary task of unravelling it afresh from the commencement. Of course, I do not mean that the matured philosopher is to accept these fundamental and generally accepted truths on faith,—that is to say, on the mere authority of others howsoever distinguished by their genius and learning; but I maintain that he will do well to seek for the evidence or demonstration of them in their writings, to weigh that evidence and accept it, (if it commends itself to his reason), instead of beginning *ab ovo* for himself in the vain expectation of finding proof of the self-evident. In the next place, in order to be able to pursue metaphysical studies to advantage, it is necessary to have an historic acquaintance with the different Schools and systems of Philosophy. Without such knowledge, the earlier part of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* would be scarcely intelligible; and the Angelic Doctor not unfrequently either discusses or makes allusions to ancient as well as more recent systems, which presuppose some degree of cognizance of such systems in the reader. Nor can it be presumed that we are competent to instruct others, so long as we are destitute of this necessary information. I have lately come across a seeming instance of this deficiency, which will serve for an illustration of my meaning. A modern author, while engaged in giving his readers a synoptical account of the philosophical opinions of Hume, makes the following observation: 'The first and second parts of the twelfth section of the *Inquiry* are devoted to a condemnation of excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain "mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted under the title of "academical philosophy."' I would invite the reader's attention to the last clause in the quotation. Unless the writer has for once forgotten his usually happy clearness of expression, the selection of words and the inverted commas would seem to justify the conclusion, that he had never heard of the Greek Middle and New Academies before; and that he was wholly unacquainted with the *Academics* of Cicero, (who more or less adhered to the teaching of the Middle Academy), as well as with the philosophical treatises of St. Augus-

tine, wherein this form of scepticism is discussed and refuted. I do not deny that writers thus unprovided may, notwithstanding, have an aptitude for metaphysical investigation; but it cannot be said that they are safe guides or competent authorities. I repeat, then, that Philosophy occupies no unimportant place in history; consequently, that place should be definitely understood by such as would devote themselves to philosophic study. If this holds good in the case of all philosophies that have had even a temporary hold upon the minds of a people, and have contributed ever so little to the common treasury of human knowledge; with how much greater force does it apply to a philosophy which has had so remarkable an influence for centuries over the Schools of Christian Europe, and has been selected as the most fitting instrument for the scientific evolution of Christian Theology? Yet, how is it likely that students will burden themselves with such additional labour, when they are taught on all sides to regard the folios of the Scholastic Doctors as 'monstrous and lifeless shapes of a former world, having little community with the life of our own?' Moreover, it ought not to be forgotten, that the censure, directed against the Doctors of the School, extends to Aristotle, for the reason that the Scholastic, is substantially identical with the Peripatetic, Philosophy; so that the student will be equally deterred from having recourse to those rivers of wisdom which, flowing forth from the most consummate of human geniuses, have not ceased to fertilize the minds of men for above two thousand years. So true are those words of the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, 'The use of independence is to do your own work in your own way; but not to do it in ignorance of what the conditions of it are, and what other people have done before you.'

Another possible hindrance to success in the study of Metaphysics has been justly noted by the same writer. It consists in an unconsciousness of the difficulty of the subject, and in an impression, (which public opinion has helped to invest with a measure of plausibility), that no philosophy can be true or worthy of serious regard, which is not easily comprehensible at first sight even by the untrained beginner. How it has come to pass I cannot say, unless it be that men of our time have accustomed themselves

to disbelieve in the objective reality of metaphysical and theological Truth; but the fact is incontestable, that the bearing of our men of *education* (in the conventional sense of this term) towards Metaphysics and the Science of supernatural Theology is very different to that which they observe towards other sciences and disciplines,—nay, even towards the liberal and mechanical arts. In all other spheres of truth a man is expected to have made himself master of his subject and, for this purpose, to have passed through a sufficiently long apprenticeship of labour and mental discipline, before he ventures to take upon himself the responsibility of attempting to instruct others or of publishing his opinions. Indeed, an instinctive modesty and sense of propriety teach the pupil this salutary lesson; and ordinarily secure him against the risk of self-exposure. If some rare case should arise, wherein, through proneness to an overweening estimation of his own talents, a man should be foolish enough to publish a Work on geology, or chemistry, or comparative anatomy, without having previously acquired a sufficient knowledge of his subject; he would speedily receive such a lesson from the *savans* in that particular branch of knowledge and from competent critics, as would effectually deter him from repeating the offence. A lawyer would not deem himself justified in pronouncing a decretorial judgment upon the pathological theory of some distinguished physician, unless it should chance that he had gone through a thorough medical education; and a mathematician, unversed in animal structures, would scarcely think of disputing with a distinguished anatomist touching the relative value of some fossil bone. Let us suppose that a man, to whom the whole subject was a *terra incognita*, should take up Mr. Darwin's Book on *the Origin of Species in the Animal and Vegetable Kingdom*, and, after dipping into a few pages here and there, should cast the Work aside, and publish his discontents to the world in this wise:—‘The depressing weariness and impatience, which cause us to push this publication aside after each new effort at study, arise, I conceive, from our sense of the futility of the questions discussed, and the mode of discussing them;’ what would be the judgment pronounced by public opinion on such an exhibition of temerity? Yet this is precisely the treatment which

the Peripatetic, or Scholastic, Philosophy has received at the hands of Mr. Lewes. *Cuilibet in arte sua perito credendum*, is a text from the bible of common sense. As such it is recognized in all the practical concerns of life. Why, then, is it, that Metaphysics and the Science of supernatural Theology must not be protected by the same salutary rule? Whence comes it, that men who are not only unversed in these sciences, but whose special studies have engendered habits of thought which are rather uncongenial than otherwise with a contemplation of these higher orders of Truth, pretend to discuss and pronounce their verdict, (frequently with much lack of modesty), upon philosophical Schools and systems; and are not ashamed to publish their half-digested views, or even sudden fancies, on problems the deepest and most momentous that can occupy the human mind? Why is it, that, at the end of a Work professedly written *on the anatomy of vertebrates*, we should be treated with an extra-polemical Theology and psychological theories that are unique in their way? How does it come to pass, that, in an interesting Work *on the Evolution of Man*, the author should find it necessary to indulge in repeated diatribes against theologians, School-philosophy, certain metaphysical doctrines, and against the Catholic Church in particular? On what principle are such questions, as 'the moral ordering of the world,'—'the History of Creation,'—'the teleological philosophy of the Schools,'—introduced into a dissertation on eggs, egg-cleavage, embryos, protoplasm, rudimentary bodily-structure, and the rest? The writer to whom I am referring absolutely revels in the supposed triumph of his Gastraea theory over the Mosaic cosmogony. Let me here insert by way of parenthesis, that this theory, (or, rather, the physical phenomena which form its basis), is not only not at variance with the Mosaic account of creation, but serves in a marked manner to elucidate its truth; and that it has been actually forestalled by the Angelic Doctor, as I shall have occasion to point out in my second Volume. But that which I want to know now is, What has Physics to do with the Mosaic cosmogony and a supernatural Revelation, (for, as such, the Bible is offered, and, as such, it is attacked)? She is a trespasser; and it is a work of charity to warn her off the ground. The goat must browse, where

it is tied ; if it goes beyond, it has slipped the tether. Once more : one can rarely take up a book on physical science nowadays, (more particularly if it treats of these infant theories), without becoming absolutely wearied with the repeated attacks on Teleology, (as it is the fashion to call it), or the doctrine of final causes. But again I ask, What have final causes to do with physical induction? They are a metaphysical question, and altogether beyond the sphere of physics. Surely, it must be, that metaphysical and Theological truths are generally considered to be so easy of attainment as to be the common appanage of all, and to require no special acquirements or intellectual training in him who volunteers to discuss them. In somewhat the same way and under the same delusion, we see others, equally unaccustomed to philosophic thought, who take up at hap-hazard some particular question that forms a single link in the centre of a chain of scientific truths, discussing it, dogmatizing about it, as though it had nothing to do with a *before* or *after* by which it is proportioned and determined. Thus it happens that cause in general is confounded with efficient causation,—unity with mere unity of number,—Being, with existence,—the Transcendental with all that transcends the perceptions of sense,—the infinite with the indefinite,—space with place,—infinite time with the eternity of the Infinite. Hence it comes to pass, that our modern Metaphysics is a thing of shreds and patches ;—here a Logic,—there a sort of Psychology,—in another work, an Ideology,—sometimes an essay on causes,—or a dissertation on final causes,—or a discussion on the primordial constituents of primordial substance. There is no order or completeness, but a general disintegration ; and the disintegrated parts receive their respective names in token of their individuality. Accordingly, we read of Teleology, Aetiology, Morphology, and other imposing *ologies* without number, which remind one of Job who ‘openeth his mouth in vain, and multiplieth words without knowledge.’

The simple fact is, that the educated men of our time, owing to the prepossessions which they have imbibed from their cradle and to the specimens of philosophy which have fallen across their path, have not as yet realized the fact that Metaphysics is a science,—with its own terminology and its own first principles,—most

difficult of acquisition,—requiring long-continued, patient, devoted, laborious, study. They seem to imagine that they can jump into it all at once with as much ease as they can get into a new suit of ready-made clothes.

Know, then, gentle reader, that, if you would be a metaphysician, you must make up your mind for work,—mental work of no ordinary kind. It is an error to suppose that true philosophy is easy of comprehension, or that it can be mastered in an hour. You are told, (and nothing is more certain), that philosophy must be built upon common sense; and you may, therefore, hazard the conclusion that the former will present no greater difficulties than the latter to your endeavours after the acquisition of its truths. But it must be remembered that, if common sense is the foundation, the metaphysical science is the lofty temple erected on it. It may be easy work to traverse the ground-floor; but it requires a steady head and sure foot to walk along the parapet of the roof or to stand upon the pinnacle.

There is another not uncommon impediment to success in the study of Metaphysics, to which the writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette* makes allusion in the concluding quotation:—‘Then we have,’ he writes, ‘ignorance of the philosophical conditions; in other words, absence of the special training required to deal effectively with philosophical questions as such. In this way it may come about that men of science give the philosophers their revenge.’ This impediment consists of a certain peculiar bent which the mind acquires from exclusive devotion for a long period of time to certain particular sciences or disciplines. I refer more especially to the study of Physics and Mathematics. This difficulty has been already hinted at; but the practical importance of the subject justifies me in putting it more directly and explicitly before the reader. But, before doing so, I would interpose an observation. It is an old proverb, that *there is no rule without an exception*. I should be the last to deny, that there may have been men, eminent in Mathematics or Physics, who have been likewise eminent in Metaphysics or Theology. Genius and resolution conquer all difficulties. Again: I am not speaking of the simple study of these branches of knowledge, but of the (morally speaking)

exclusive study of them for a long period of time. Accordingly, I contemplate for the most part students whose intellectual formation is already complete, and who have lost in mental elasticity that which they have gained in mental nerve and thew. I repeat, then, that the exclusive pursuit of these studies gradually tends to form habits of thought, in the generality of cases, which render after application to metaphysical subjects exceptionally difficult. As this impediment assumes a very different form in Physics to what it does in Mathematics, I propose to consider each in turn.

I must premise that, in the observations which follow, it would be a great mistake to suppose that I have any intention of depreciating the value of physical investigations, or of ignoring the many indisputable advantages which accrue from the brilliant discoveries that have been made in this important, though lower, field of Truth. All truths, physical no less than metaphysical, natural as well as supernatural, spring from one Source, and return to Him again. Wherefore, physical truths cannot safely be disregarded by him, who is a servant at the Court of the Queen of Sciences. Nay,—to say out what I think,—while unable to adopt to the letter the somewhat rhetorical assertion of Mr. Huxley, that ‘the laboratory is the foreground of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of admission into the sanctuary¹;’ it is my settled belief, that a previous general acquaintance with the progress of physical investigations will prove a valuable aid to the student who proposes entering upon the study of Metaphysics. All I am contending for, is this; that the exclusive application to Physics or to any particular branch of it, continued for any length of time, has a tendency to unfit the mind for the after study of Metaphysics, and so to make such study more than ordinarily difficult. If I am asked to assign a cause to this effect, I should be inclined to attribute such mental bias, partly, to the necessity of invariably using the inductive method in all physical research. If we would know nature’s laws, we must have recourse to nature’s facts; in order that, by a progressive synthesis of these latter,—

¹ *English Men of Letters*.—Hume, p. 52.

the phenomena of bodies,—we may be able to infer that constant order which is what is understood by natural law. But such is the inductive method. Now, physical induction can never be logically perfect. It inevitably includes the assumption, that the quasi-Middle Term (that is to say, the collection of experimental facts) equals the Major Term (that is to say, all the past, present, future, and possible facts that have, or have not, been subjected to experiment). When, therefore, the mind has been long accustomed to these imperfect forms of thought, it is liable to become loose in its logic, from being wholly unaccustomed to the use of stricter and perfect forms. Hence arises, or may arise, a mental slovenliness, if I may so express myself, which is wont to manifest itself in a neglect of logical order,—in the use of an undefined terminology,—in causeless repetitions,—in careless and imperfect definitions, when they are given at all,—in the perpetual confusion of legitimate physical inductions with mere theories, or with deductions which, because they are deductions, belong to some other science. It would be difficult for me to illustrate these defects by illustrations taken from living authors, without rendering myself obnoxious to the charge of personality and possibly wounding the feelings of those respectable writers who would be thus invidiously brought before the public notice. Yet, illustrations from living authors are the only ones that I could furnish, because my reading has been almost entirely directed to them; as they are the ones that best suit my purpose, because they occur in the latest developments of physical science. But happily it is in my power to adduce an instance of what I mean,—by no means, however, the most striking,—where there will be no danger of those evil results which I should so much deprecate. Professor Tait stands so deservedly high in public estimation as one of the most eminent physicists of his time, that he can well afford to endure the ordeal, such as it is. Besides, his style is so lucid,—there is, for the most part, such attention to unity of plan,—comparatively so sparing a use of unusual terms,—that I may be thought, not without reason, to have put myself at a disadvantage by selecting him. I propose, then, to take my illustrations from his most interesting and instructive *Lectures on some recent advances in Physical*

Science. In his introductory Lecture, the learned Professor calls especial attention to the fact, that the advances of physical science are attributable to the use of the inductive method. By way of emphasis, he italicizes the following canon, as it may be called: 'These advances come or not, according as we remember, or forget, that our science is to be based entirely upon experiment, or mathematical deductions from experiment¹.' According to this author, then, the advance of physical science depends upon the exclusive use of the inductive method, with one exception. He admits of *mathematical* deduction, and no other. But those mathematical deductions must be founded on experiment. Now, turn we to another passage in the same Lecture. The Professor is occupied in extolling the praises of the discovery of what is denominated *Dissipation of Energy*. He calls it a *Principle*; and anticipates great results in the future from its general application to physical phenomena. Referring in particular to its bearings on Astronomy, he writes as follows: 'Finally, as it alone is able to lead us, by sure steps of deductive reasoning, to the necessary future of the universe—necessary, that is, if physical laws for ever remained unchanged—so it enables us distinctly to say that the present order of things has *not* been evolved through infinite past time by the agency of laws now at work, but must have had a distinct beginning, a state beyond which we are totally unable to penetrate; a state, in fact, which must have been produced by other than the now (visibly) acting causes².' Now, these conclusions are not 'based entirely upon experiment;' for we are told that they are the result of deductive reasoning. Consequently, if the application of this so-called Principle is to give birth to these great advances in Physical Science, the aforesaid conclusions must be 'mathematical deductions from experiment.' But they are attributed to the *Principle*, (or as some, in its relation at least to Astronomy, might prefer to call it, *Theory*), of Dissipation of Energy. Are we, then, to understand that mathematical deductions from this Theory can lead us 'by sure steps' to such conclusions? Where are 'the experiments' from which these mathematical deductions

¹ p. 6. I have ventured to punctuate the sentence, in order that it may be more readily understood.

² p. 22.

must proceed? If we seek for them in the phenomena revealed to astronomical observation, as interpreted by the said Theory, I would respectfully inquire whether the facts are certain; about which one is naturally more anxious, since Mr. Lockyer's spectroscopic investigations have cast a serious doubt upon the supposition that there is any identity between the physical composition of the earth and that of the celestial bodies¹. Finally: assuming the facts, the Principle, and the applicability of the Principle to Astronomy, to be free from all doubt; I would fain know whether there are any mathematical calculations, starting from these premisses, which could demonstratively elicit the like conclusions?

I will take another instance of a different character from the same Lecture. The learned Professor complains, and justly complains, of the vague, confused, employment of the word, Force. Accordingly, he gives one of his own. 'Force,' he writes, 'is any cause which alters or tends to alter a body's state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line².' It is right to subjoin, that he limits this definition to Force, as it is understood in physical science; but even so, I question whether the definition would be universally accepted by his brother physicists. This is not the point, however, to which I wish to call attention. Professor Tait finds one serious difficulty in his own definition; and it consists in the use of the word *cause*. 'For this,' he proceeds to say, 'among material things, usually implies objective existence. Now we have absolutely no proof of the objective existence of force in the sense just explained. In every case in which force is said to act, what is really observed . . . is either a transference, or a tendency to transference, of what is called energy from one portion of matter to another.' So let it be; but what is a transference? A transference, if I mistake not, is the passage, or communication, of something from one entity to another. But this connotes three things,—something which is transferred, that which makes the transfer, and that which is Subject of the transfer. Now, if the entity which makes the transfer is hypothetically, (i. e. under the circumstances and according to natural law) necessary and of

¹ See a Paper read before the Royal Society, March 20, 1879, on *Young's List of Chromospheric Lines*.

² p. 16.

itself sufficient for the existence of the *energy* in the Subject of the transfer, that entity is univocally and truly a cause. But let us now see whether the Professor gains anything in this respect by the substitution of the term *Energy* for that of *Force*. Energy, we are told, is 'the power of doing work, or, if we like to put it so, of doing mischief¹.' Now, with submission, I must venture on the expression of an opinion, that this declaration does not satisfy the laws of definition. For it is, first of all, essential to a true and proper definition, that it should be more intelligible—clearer—than the word or idea defined. But *the power of doing work or of doing mischief* confuses, rather than illustrates, the simple idea of *energy*, in the case of those at least who are not versed in the new theory. I am not at all sure that the proposed definition is *adequate*,—another essential requisite, nevertheless, of a true definition; since there are energies, such as life itself, which are purely *immanent* activities. Certainly, it offends against the third canon, which excludes a redundancy of words. For the second clause, *of doing mischief*, is implicitly contained in the first, *the power of doing work*; for that which does work harmful to another, does mischief. If the *or* is to be taken in a substitutive sense, the student should not be left unaided to make the selection. Finally, I object to the definition, because the phrase is not univocal. But that which I specially wish to call attention to is, that the idea of *Energy* is preferred to that of *Force*, because *Energy* 'claims recognition on account of its objective existence².' If, however, we analyze the definition given, we shall find that it essentially connotes the idea of *Force*; more particularly, if we interpret the definition by the light of the illustrations that follow. For, *to do work*, and more notably, *to do mischief*, imply some *other* in which the work is done,—the mischief effected. But such energy is causal. The mass of snow on the mountain top has a power of doing mischief on the traveller in the gorge; because, if it falls by the force of gravitation, it may cause his death. The food of animals is not a mere transfer. There is a multiform causal action by which the material substance is decomposed,—the nutritive constituents, absorbed and assimilated,—the useless, rejected³. Briefly, in these

¹ p. 18.² p. 17.³ p. 18.

and the other instances, there is an agent, the Subject, and something caused by means of the former in the latter. Therefore, there is causality; and, because the agent cannot do *the work or mischief* unless it has the force, or power, to do it, it must have a force.

My last illustration shall be taken, again, from a different order. Professor Tait observes, as follows: 'A revelation of anything which we can discover for ourselves, by studying the ordinary course of nature, would be an absurdity¹.' This assertion directly impugns the truth alike of Judaism and of Christianity; however innocent its author may have been of such an intention. For, in the Old Testament, the existence and unity of God,—the free-will and accountability of man,—the fundamental principles of the natural law,—are all subjects of Revelation. In the New Testament, the beauty of the lily,—the unfitness of building on sand,—the growth of corn, of the fig-tree, in Palestine,—are all subjects of Revelation. But it may be, that the learned Professor would not agree with me in either of these statements. Wherefore, I will change the venue, and consider the question independently of the facts of Revelation. Why is it an absurdity to suppose that God should reveal a truth, already discovered by a study of the ordinary course of nature, in order to seal it with the sanction of His own Infallibility? Anyhow, the subject is fully considered and discussed in the Science of supernatural Theology; but I deprecate, as wanton, its parenthetical introduction into a Work devoted to the consideration of material phenomena.

Of the defects in the literature of Physics, which I have already enumerated, by far the most serious is the confused intermixture of legitimate physical inductions with arbitrary hypotheses or theories, and a consequent shaping of facts in order to dovetail them with the theory. I call it a most serious defect; because, even though a clear-headed student of Physics may be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, and thus to pursue his physical researches with success, his mind will be more or less affected by the practical identification of things certain with things dubious. He may, and probably will, become disaffected towards that logical

¹ p. 25.

precision which the study of Metaphysics absolutely demands. The metaphysician must accurately distinguish between truths of intuition and truths of demonstration,—between demonstration and mere opinion,—and opinions must themselves be graduated with great care, according to the weight of intrinsic, or (in defect of intrinsic) of extrinsic, evidence producible in favour of each. But this presupposes great accuracy of thought, which the student of Physics is tempted to condemn as mere hair-splitting.

Another reason why the continuous and exclusive study of the physical sciences has a tendency to unfit the mind for ascending the heights of Metaphysics, is to be found in the nature of the subject-matter peculiar to each. The intellectual eye of the physicist is continually fixed on the material and concrete,—that is to say, on those objects which are the least intelligible and are lowest among the orders of truths, while easiest to sensile perception. Metaphysics, on the other hand, contemplates the abstract and immaterial. The physicist deals with the contingent, the temporary; the Metaphysical Science invites him to a contemplation of the necessary, the eternal. Unaccustomed, then, to anything save sensile phenomena, if he accepts the invitation, he is liable to become dazzled and giddy; like men who work day and night in coal-mines when first they revisit the upper earth and encounter the sun's rays. Or the mental twist may take another form. The long concentration of his mental faculties on material matter may have helped to form a cherished prejudice, that there is nothing real but material being, that there is nothing knowable save that which is subject to sensile perception; that, consequently, the immaterial and spiritual are mere creations of the intellect, and destitute of all objective value. Of the two indispositions this latter is, evidently enough, the more difficult of cure; while it would necessarily cause, for so long as it lasts, an invincible aversion for metaphysical study. There are other subsidiary reasons that I could mention; but the limits of a Preface will not admit of my treating this important and interesting question at greater length.

Again: I must be permitted to express my settled conviction, that a long-continued and too exclusive study of Mathematics is liable to unfit the mind for the pursuit of metaphysical truth.

I should do an injustice to myself, if I were to afford any ground for the suspicion that I placed Mathematics on a par with Physics in this respect. If we had not the express authority of Aristotle to assure us, a merely superficial acquaintance with Mathematics would of itself be enough to satisfy us, that it is, in the strictest sense of the word, a science. It is supreme among the subordinate sciences, (with the exception, perhaps, of Logic), in its aptitude for generating in the mind habits of clearness and precision. Moreover, it deals, as all true sciences do, with the abstract and universal; and its conclusions, in their evidence and cogency of demonstration, surpass those of all the other sciences, save the Architectonic. Nay, in one respect, it excels even this latter; for, owing to the nature of their respective subject-matters, the purely mathematical science excludes, while Metaphysics admits, mere opinion, and the sufficiency of the motive of probability, in default of clearer evidence. In all these respects Mathematics markedly contrasts with the physical disciplines, whose conclusions are all extra-logical. Moreover, though it agrees with those disciplines in dealing exclusively with material entities; nevertheless, it does not treat them *as* material entities. It fixes upon their Quantity alone,—the primal Accident of bodies; and not even upon Quantity in the concrete, but upon the universal and immutable laws or abstract forms of Quantity. It cannot, then, be doubted, that this science occupies the most eminent place, after Logic, in the propaedeutics of Philosophy.

Nevertheless, a too exclusive application to Mathematics has a tendency to indispose the mind for the study of Metaphysics, after a manner of its own; first of all, because it trains the mind to be too exacting. This is a fault, (if fault it may be called, apart from its indiscriminate application), which is not likely to become epidemic in an age like our own, wherein men are too busy to think and, *a fortiori*, to acquire true cognition by rigid demonstration. Yet this demand for scientific proof, reasonable and even laudable as it is in itself absolutely, may become excessive; if it is made, irrespective of whatsoever diversity in the nature of the subject-matter. By all means let us have scientific proof, if scientific proof is to be had; but it does not follow that we should quarrel with probable opinions, or conclusions drawn from analogy,

in defect of higher evidence. In Mathematics the exaction is just ; because the subject-matter of this science is as purely formal in its way, as is that of Logic in its way ; the only difference being, that the latter deals with subjective, while the former deals with objective, forms. But, when we ascend to the contemplation of immaterial and spiritual Being,—of Transcendentals,—of truths most abstract and difficult to sense,—and of Him Who is the all-containing Truth ; it is not in every case easy to find, and therefore it is not just to postulate, a strictness of demonstration which is only natural to, and is absolutely necessary for, a science that exclusively deals with the abstract forms of material quantity. The practical experience of the mathematician would, one might suppose, suffice to teach him, that,—to use a homely but expressive proverb,—he must cut his coat according to his cloth. For, as in Logic the forms of thought are subject to modification, when applied to different orders of truths ; so, the mathematical science loses somewhat of its rigidity, when applied to the complex facts of nature. If there be no other change in the character of its proofs, so much at all events is undeniable ; that these exchange their metaphysical, for purely physical, evidence. A conclusion cannot be stronger than the premisses which give it birth ; consequently, syllogisms which, under their pure algebraic form, are strict demonstrations and metaphysically evident, become, when the symbols are interpreted by physical facts, as firm or infirm as the facts which have been substituted. Even within the proper sphere of Mathematics, there is a graduated scale of demonstration. Many of the demonstrations in Euclid, for example, assume the form of a dilemma ; others, of a *reductio ad absurdum*. But neither of these demonstrative forms can pretend to an equality with categorical and ostensive demonstration. Nevertheless, it not unfrequently happens that mathematicians, long habituated to their abstract symbols and the formal rigidity of their subject-matter, are disappointed and repelled at the outset of metaphysical or Theological study, and make less way in either than one might have anticipated ; because they desiderate a clearness of demonstration *throughout*, which the nature of the subject-matter in its relation to human thought will not always admit. I cannot help thinking, that to this mathematical infirmity we are indebted for

the philosophical *doubt* of Descartes, which has had such pernicious influence over modern thought; and, as legitimate parent of the subsequent Schools of Idealism and Scepticism, has contributed more than aught besides towards uprooting the fundamental principles of objective truth out of the minds of men.

Another danger, incident to the exclusive study of Mathematics,—and a much more serious one it is, serious in itself, more serious in its consequences,—arises from a proneness to elevate Mathematics above its rightful place and practically to claim for it the throne of supremacy among the sciences. It is an excusable weakness which leads men to exaggerate the importance of their own particular subject of study, and to make it the universal measure. As the physicist, then, would fain make his sensible phenomena the criterion of truth; so the mathematician is often too inclined to intrude the special forms, laws, principles, and ideas of his own science into higher regions of thought. But it can never be permitted to any science, that it should transgress its natural limits; for this would result in revolutionizing the established order. Besides, it is absonous to suppose, that a science, which cannot ascend beyond the sphere of material Being, should ever become oecumenical. Consequently, it behoves us summarily to reject all those ingenious attempts to transform Logic into a chapter of Mathematics. Logical Mathematics I can understand; but a mathematical Logic is a monstrosity. For the laws, or forms, of Quantity cannot be made, in reason, to regulate the processes of human thought. You might as well try to take the measure of an angel with a theodolite. So, again, it is not reasonable that Mathematics should be allowed to determine for us the nature of the ultimate constituents of bodies, or material substances; for (as I have more than once remarked) it has nothing to do with bodies themselves, but only with one of their Accidents,—to wit, Quantity. Let the physical Disciplines,—more particularly Chemistry,—supply the necessary facts. Let the common sense of mankind be consulted on a question which, up to a certain point, is evidently subject to its judgment. But it is the metaphysical Science, and the metaphysical Science alone as Queen of the Sciences, that has either the right to determine the question or the capacity for arriving at such a determination. If this comely order of the sciences had been observed in modern as

it was observed in the olden times, we should never have heard of that dynamic theory of Boscovich, which Professor Tait very justly pronounces to be 'a mathematical fiction'¹.

As I have cleared my way,—first of all, by answering the complaints and accusations brought against the Philosophy of the School, and then by afterwards pointing out the general or special difficulties which may beset the path of a student who is proposing to himself to enter upon the study of Metaphysics ;—it remains for me now to explain the intention, plan, sources, and divisions of the present Work.

The title of the Book sufficiently explains its aim and purport. It does not pretend to be a new, or original philosophy. Of these we have (if I mistake not) quite enough already. It professes simply to give in English, to the best of the author's ability, the fundamental Philosophy of the School, which will be found to differ little, if at all, from that of Aristotle,—a philosophy which goes by the name of the Peripatetic. But two obstacles to the accomplishment of my purpose presented themselves. It is well known that among the medieval Scholastics there were rival Schools of philosophy. To begin with,—there were the Nominalists, the Realists, and the Conceptualists, mutually opposed on the question of Universals. These, of course, would not trouble us much in Metaphysics ; since the subject of their disputings properly belongs to Ideology. But, besides these, there were the rival Schools of the Scotists, of the Thomists, and of the Augustinians. It would have been impossible to introduce the points of difference between these different Schools, without unreasonably adding to the bulk of the Work, already extending itself to four Volumes. Then, again, if it had been otherwise expedient, there was one palmary reason why it should not be attempted. For it would have certainly created inextricable confusion in the mind of a beginner ; while it would have uselessly distracted his attention from those fundamental principles on which all the Schoolmen, morally speaking, are agreed. Moreover, many of these disputed questions are *philosophico-Theological* ; that is to say, they are *Theological* problems which include a *philosophical* problem. But these would be ex-

¹ *Recent Advances in Physical Science, Lecture XII, p. 288.*

cluded from the present Work by reason of their quality; since it is neither in harmony with my purpose nor with the title of the Book, to allow of any digressions into supernatural Theology. Lastly, many of these disputed questions are of comparatively minor importance; and may be safely left to the after study of such as are willing to pursue their investigations. Nevertheless, there are certain questions, at once philosophical and of great moment, wherein there is a marked dissidence of teaching in rival Schools. How then was I to represent the teaching of one School to the exclusion of another, without making myself the arbiter, and furthermore identifying the Scholastic teaching, as a whole, with that of a mere section? This was the first difficulty which, as it seemed to me, I had to encounter in the prosecution of my purpose.

Another obstacle arose out of the fact, that the medieval Doctors have not written express treatises on Metaphysics. I cannot call to mind one of them who has left behind him anything that can claim the name. The fact is, that they had other work to do. They were fully occupied with a scientific evolution and a scientific construction (i.e. construction in scientific form) of the Christian Faith and Revelation; and, therefore, they were wont to discuss metaphysical truths, here and there, as these chanced to present themselves in connection with, or relation to, Christian dogmas. It is true (as I have had occasion to remark already) that, in the writings of St. Thomas,—the Angelic Doctor,—we find Commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, as on most of the other Works, of Aristotle; and several *Opuscula* which are exclusively devoted to subjects of Philosophy. Thus, for instance, in the forty-eighth (otherwise, the forty-fourth) *Opusculum*, we find an exposition of *the entire Logic of Aristotle*. The forty-second (otherwise, the thirty-ninth) treats of *the nature of Genus*; the forty-third (otherwise, the fortieth), of *the powers, or faculties, of the Soul*; the forty-fourth (otherwise, the forty-first), of *Time*; the thirty-second (otherwise, the twenty-eighth), of *the nature of Matter and indeterminate Dimensions*; and so on. But these *Opuscula*,—most valuable, as they certainly are,—have neither unity of order nor methodical combination. They would appear to have been independent tracts,—some of them, mere notes for Lecture,—others, again, written for the benefit of some individual student

who was in the meshes of a difficulty,—all written for a particular occasion, or with a particular purpose, or to satisfy a temporary want. From this desultory (if I may so call it) and subsidiary treatment of metaphysical questions, one great advantage accrues; viz. that we are thus enabled to gather the mind of St. Thomas with the greater certainty and clearness. For, as he is on this account led to treat the same subject over and over again in his writings,—considering it now in its relation to one, now in relation to another, of the Christian dogmas,—at another time, (it may be), as it is in its own essential nature, independently of its connection with other truths; we are enabled to look round his teaching on the given point, and to substitute that which is clear and certain in one passage for that which may be obscure and doubtful elsewhere. Nevertheless, the reduction of this copious body of doctrine into a methodical whole must be done by the student for himself. The Scholastic Doctors who flourished after the Council of Trent,—now that the work of scientific evolution had reached its maturity,—were enabled to turn their attention to the construction of an ordered treatise on Metaphysics. Accordingly, such treatises began to appear, and remain to this day. Conspicuous among these is the exhaustive Work of Suarez, which has been of the greatest service to myself in the construction of the intended Volumes; for it has not only reduced the digressive and somewhat unmethodical *Metaphysics* of Aristotle to an order that harmonizes with his own *Disputations*, (as he calls them), but it at the same time supplies us with a scientific development of truths, and a division of the subject-matter, which materially lessen the difficulty of construction. There is, however, a considerable drawback. For, since Suarez, (as he tells us himself in the Preface), wrote his *Metaphysics* with an eye to supernatural Theology, and for the purpose of supplying the Theological student beforehand with that knowledge of philosophy which was necessary to the successful prosecution of his studies; he has discussed the problems of natural Theology, here and there, in common with those of finite Being, instead of reserving the former for separate treatment. It may be that he was moved to the selection of this method, by the consideration that the student would have all these Theological truths again set before him, collected under one conspectus in the Treatise of supernatural Theology on *the One God*.

Or he may have adopted it, because he deemed it a more logical arrangement and easier for purposes of instruction. Whatever the case may have been; the fact added another difficulty in the way of my attempt.

I will now let the reader know in what way I have encountered these difficulties. I determined to assume the general order, method, and divisions of Suarez, as the logical basis of my Work; reserving to myself the full liberty of introducing a change here or there, if it should seem better suited to my purpose. The following, then, is the principal division. I propose that the entire Work should consist of nine Books. The *first* treats of the Definition of Metaphysics; the *second*, of Being; the *third*, of the Transcendental Attributes of Being. These three Books complete the present Volume. In the *fourth* Book will be considered the Principles of Being; in the *fifth*, the Causes of Being; in the *sixth*, the primary Determinations of Being; in the *seventh* and *eighth*, the Categories of Aristotle; in the *ninth*, natural Theology. So much for the skeleton. But this, though a serious, was by no means the most serious, difficulty. It remains for me now to explain, how I have attempted to meet the greater difficulties touching a discriminate selection of the questions proposed for discussion.

First of all, then, I have omitted most, if not all, of what may be called subordinate questions which, however interesting in themselves and sometimes fertile in thought, might only perplex and weary the beginner. By so doing I secure another advantage; because, for the most part, it is precisely these questions which form the battle-field of contending Schools. I have likewise scrupulously avoided such discussions as are connected with supernatural Theology. I will not shrink from the expression of a conviction, that the Metaphysics of the School does incline the mind towards a belief in the Catholic Creed, not only by helping to remove intellectual difficulties, but likewise by bringing out into strong relief the harmony that exists between the highest truths in the natural, and those in the supernatural, order. This, however, is no fault of mine. Truth must everywhere be one, because it proceeds from One. But these two orders of truth are perfectly distinct in themselves. The one rests upon Divine authority; the other, is discoverable by pure process of unassisted reason, (that is to say of

reason *supernaturally* unassisted). It is with the latter, and with the latter only, that the metaphysical Science concerns itself. I should, therefore, consider that I was betraying the confidence of my readers if I did not scrupulously exclude from these pages, (save occasionally, for the mere purpose of illustration), all discussion or consideration of the former order of truths. This determination secures me, again, from the necessity of entering upon many minor questions which are subjects of controversy in the Schools. But there still remained the obligation of choosing from among the different Schools that one in particular which might be considered as representative, more than any other, of the Scholastic teaching. Here, however, I found but little difficulty. No one, who has any knowledge of the history of Scholasticism, can be ignorant of the paramount influence which the writings of St. Thomas of Aquino have exercised, over the Schools from his time up to now. The *Summa* of that great Doctor very soon became the general text-book, supplanting the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Most of the religious Orders, which were chosen by God to be the principal repositories of the higher branches of knowledge,—the Benedictines, Augustinians, Carmelites,—in their rules and constitutions commanded their subjects to study the teaching of St. Thomas and religiously adhere to it. I need not mention the illustrious Order of St. Dominic, which can justly boast of having given to the Church and to the world this paragon of wisdom. But I may not omit a special reference to that Order to which I belong,—the Society of Jesus. It tells its members, and particularly its professors of Scholastic Theology, that ‘Ours are to follow entirely in Scholastic Theology the teaching of St. Thomas, and to consider him as their own Doctor: and they are to use their utmost exertions to render those that follow their Lectures as well disposed towards him as possible.’ It cautions its Professors of Philosophy ‘not to speak of St. Thomas otherwise than with praise, following him with a willing mind as often as it behoves; or with reverence and gravity forsaking him, if occasionally he should not be quite so acceptable.’ He who has charge and supreme supervision in these matters is thus admonished: ‘Let him above all things bear in mind, that those who are not well affected towards St. Thomas are not to be promoted to the Chairs

of Theology; and that they who are averse to him, or are even not sufficiently given to the study of him, are to be debarred from the office of teaching.' It is evident, then, how entirely the Society of Jesus has accepted the teaching of St. Thomas as her own in supernatural Theology alike and in Philosophy. That these directions have been carried out in her Schools, is sufficiently patent from the fact that the works of her most celebrated Scholastic Theologians, with scarcely an exception, are commentaries on the *Summa* of St. Thomas; while her philosophical teaching according to her rules, must be based on that of Aristotle and on the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor. Add to this testimony of the religious Orders the yet weightier witness of the Catholic Church. Not only have the writings of the Angelic Doctor been frequently extolled with highest praises by successive Popes; but their study has been repeatedly commended, or rather enjoined, by the same authority, on the Universities and Colleges. I will add one more fact which speaks volumes. In the Sessions of the Council of Trent the *Summa* of St. Thomas was placed in the midst of the conclave on the altar, together with the Sacred Scriptures and the Papal Decrees;—an honour and tribute of praise which, as Leo XIII points out¹, had never before been offered to any Doctor of the Church.

I think, then, that I had sufficient reason for my selection. Nor must I omit the confession that, in doing so, I was following likewise the bent of my own tastes and the conclusion of my own judgment. For many years I have been more or less occupied in the study of St. Thomas; and increasing acquaintance has only served to strengthen that admiration for his genius and that veneration for his doctrine and authority, which conquered me from the first. His writings, in one respect, bear a great resemblance to the sacred Scriptures. I refer to the wonderful fecundity of thought discoverable in the briefest passages; so that, as you read them over and over again and ponder over them, fresh

¹ Sed haec maxima est et Thomae propria, nec cum quopiam ex doctoribus catholicis communicata laus, quod Patres Tridentini, in ipso medio coclavi ordini habendo, una cum divinae Scripturae codicibus et Pontificum Maximorum decretis Summam Thomae Aquinatis super altari patere voluerunt, unde consilium, rationes, oracula peterentur.' *Epistola Encyclica, Aeterni Patris.* Aug. 4, 1879.

ideas are awakened, new revelations of truth are made. There is not a philosophical problem that has risen up in our own day, so far as I have had an opportunity of observing, which does not meet with a satisfactory solution in his pages. Nay, even within the sphere of Physics, where he lay under peculiar disadvantage by reason of the imperfect knowledge then existing concerning such subjects, he almost seems to have forestalled, in the *principles* which he has given for our guidance, the latest discoveries that have been made. This at all events can be safely said,—and I hope to be able to convince the reader, in my second Volume, of the truth of the assertion,—that his teaching with regard to the genesis of the material universe, the primordial constituents of bodies, and the generation of man, harmonizes wonderfully with the inductions of modern experimentalists. I ought not to omit another characteristic of St. Thomas,—his admiration and (it is not too much to say) his reverence for Aristotle as a philosopher. His moral Theology—to repeat what I have said before—is built upon the Ethics of the grand Stagyrte; just as the morality of the Gospel is based on the natural Law. He rarely, if ever, determines a problem in philosophy, without summoning the authority of the Greek Philosopher to his support; and whenever he quotes him, it is always by the distinctive title of *the Philosopher*. To my mind, it is impossible to separate the two in our estimate of the great leaders of thought that have been given to us since the commencement of the historic period. They stand absolutely alone;—the one the giant of the old world, the other the giant of the new. Whether we look to the universality of their genius which seems to have embraced every subject that is knowable by man,—or to their profundity of thought,—or to their practical common sense and prudence of judgment,—or to the influence that their writings have exercised and continue to exercise on their fellow-men,—they are unrivalled. As is right and fitting, the style of the two is so exactly similar, that one might, without exaggeration, pronounce it to be identical. Terseness of expression, that great mark of intellectual grasp,—a simplicity that is so entirely stripped of ornament as to be almost bald,—a chariness in the use of hard words and technical phrases,—short, pithy, sentences,—admirable precision; such are the characteristics of St. Thomas, as of Aristotle. Equally remarkable

are they both in their power of mental grasp. They do not nibble at a truth, as men of inferior make so often do. On the contrary, they contemplate it from every side,—realize its proportion, bearings, multiplex relations,—separate it from all that exhibits a likeness to it but is not really of it,—clearly comprehend its fulness at once and its limits,—sift that which is essential from what is merely adventitious;—and all this, as if by intuition. Hence it will be often found that, by a single word or a simple distinction, they will throw a flood of light on the particular object of contemplation, and will extricate it from a network of difficulties in which, at first sight, it seemed to be hopelessly entangled.

But this singular power of comprehension in the teacher not unfrequently puts the student at a disadvantage, more especially at the commencement of his apprenticeship. I here allude in particular to the Angelic Doctor; and shall take him as the instance of what I mean. Since, then, St. Thomas retained an intimate, ever-present, vision of the varied and often mutually discrepant connection of each truth with those that surround it; it constantly happens that he represents a given truth now under one relation, now under another. In themselves, these representations will be independent of each other; sometimes, even discrepant; though to the intuition of their author they are indissolubly connected. Hence it comes to pass, that the doctrine in one passage seems to be at open war with the doctrine in another. The reader can at once convince himself of the fact, by consulting the *Index*, or *Tabula Aurea*, which is commonly subjoined to the complete Works of St. Thomas. He will find there, in alphabetical order, a summary statement of the teaching of this great Doctor on any given question with a list of references. Immediately after, (sometimes as often as three or four times in a single page), his eyes will fall on the oft-repeated sentence, *He seems to say the opposite*, followed by another list of references. It is needless to observe, that there is no real opposition. A careful collation of the two series of quotations will not only serve to reconcile the apparent contradiction, but will result in the acquiring of a more accurate and more comprehensive cognition of the truth explained. In order, however, to be capable of conducting such an investigation with success, we must possess an intimate acquaintance with

the mind and writings of St. Thomas ; and, at first, we must rest satisfied to have the work done for us by others. Yet, as no one can become an adept in the Scholastic Philosophy or can hope to secure to himself the deep truths which are contained therein, unless he is familiar with the writings of the Angelic Doctor ; I have done my best to assist the reader in this direction, not only by copious quotations, but likewise by giving the original at the foot of the page. By comparing the translation with the Latin text, it seemed to me that a beginner might soon accustom himself to the style and mind of St. Thomas, with comparatively little cost of labour. When once he has accomplished this, his way is plain before him ; if he wills to work.

As soon as I had determined upon constructing the present treatise upon the model of Suárez' *Metaphysics*, the difficulty of reducing the philosophical teaching of the Angelic Doctor into one proportioned whole well-nigh disappeared ; since it only remained for me to collect under certain heads, corresponding with my contemplated division, those passages in his different Works which dealt with the respective subjects of discussion. I would that some one might be found, able and willing to perfect such arrangement ; and thus to give to the world a complete *Metaphysics* of St. Thomas, (composed entirely of passages collected from his writings), in an English dress. I feel sure that it would be generally hailed, by men of thought, as a great boon. In the mean time, I have done my best to contribute towards this desirable result ; so far as it was consonant with the professed purpose of this work to do so.

One other difficulty has been mentioned above,—the hardest with which I have had to deal. Owing to reasons which have been already explained, it is not always easy to determine the meaning of St. Thomas ; and, accordingly, Doctors, who sincerely profess to follow with equal devotion the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, differ at times in the interpretation of his words,—sometimes on questions of no ordinary importance. Such divergence is more observable within the sphere of Scholastic Theology, perhaps, than within that of Philosophy. Still, even here, there are a few very grave problems which, according to the Dominican, or Thomist, School, are solved by St. Thomas in one way, but,

according to the Jesuit School, are solved by St. Thomas in another way ; while each declares that it represents the true mind of this Doctor. It was, in fact, one of these questions that excited the uninstructed wonder, and disturbed the equanimity, of Hobbes ; —the only one, moreover, so far as I can foresee at present, that will claim consideration in these Volumes. It might naturally be supposed that I should adopt the teaching and the interpretation of St. Thomas, which have been defended by the Order to which I belong. But, while admitting the justice of the supposition, I can sincerely aver, that the primary motive which has induced me to defend the one and the other has been the greater weight of intrinsic evidence that, as it seemed to me, can be produced in their favour. Nevertheless, to err is human ; and it can hardly be denied, that an interpretation of St. Thomas, which is commended to us by an authority so grave as that of the justly renowned Order of St. Dominic, must carry with it an extrinsic evidence second to none. Wherefore, when the proper occasion offers, I will do my best to put the reader fully in possession of the two opinions, together with the reasons that have been adduced in support of each ; leaving him to select for himself the one which may seem, in his judgment, to be more conformable with the truth.

So much for the *matter* of the present Work : I have now to add a word or two touching what may be called its *form*. I can easily imagine that a complaint may be urged against the length of my Treatise. It is a proverb, which the men of our time are not likely to forget, that *a big book is a big evil*. The taste prevailing at present favours compendiums, summaries, Pinnock's catechisms, *et id genus omne*, on all graver subjects of reading. There seems to be a general impression that mental labour, like manual work, may be done more expeditiously by a simplification of force. But I do not think that even the mechanist has ever dreamt of reducing human labour, by subtracting from the necessary material. It is reported, indeed, of one of the Pharaohs, that he ventured on the experiment ; but the unfortunate Hebrew workmen did not find that it lightened their work. For a like reason I confess to a settled aversion for compendiums and all abbreviations of whatsoever kind, more particularly in the higher and nobler spheres

of knowledge. It seems to me, that they inflate rather than inform; or, if they impart knowledge, it is that little knowledge which, as we are told, is so dangerous a thing. But, when admitted into Philosophy and Theology, their results are the more disastrous, in proportion to the excellence and dignity of the subject-matter. It will be a happy day in the interests of truth, when such ware is relegated to the second-hand book-stalls of our back streets. I saw lately a letter in one of our newspapers, wherein the writer, (evidently anxious to acquire some knowledge of the philosophy of St. Thomas), expressed a desire that some one should publish a Work on this subject in a moderately sized octavo. Why, you might as reasonably hope to lull a giant to sleep in a baby's cradle! One might, indeed, collect the headings of those Articles in which St. Thomas discusses matters of Philosophy, subjoining an answer in the affirmative or negative, as the case might be; but how much more of the Angelic Doctor and his teaching would the reader of such a production know at the end, than he knew at the beginning? No: we must not be content with the mere conclusions, but must painfully labour at the demonstration of each conclusion; unless we would be contented with the humble and unenviable position of an animated index. I am, nevertheless, conscious that a Work on Metaphysics, which presents itself before the public, (as the present one purports to do), under the form of four portly Volumes, will be not unreasonably regarded as a trespass on the patience of its readers, if these should be forthcoming. But I have something to say for myself, which may possibly mollify the just indignation of my critics; and it is this: no inconsiderable addition has been made to the bulk by a copious use of illustrations. I have known from my own experience that, for beginners in any abstract science, (such as that of Mathematics or Philosophy), nothing helps towards an understanding of the subject so much, as a plentiful use of examples. Minds hitherto accustomed to the contemplation of Truth in the concrete,—that is to say, so far as it reveals itself to the perceptions of sense,—are bewildered when first summoned to the contemplation of abstract truths; because they find themselves almost entirely deprived of that aid from sensile *phantasmata*,—those material images, impressed upon the inner senses, which had

till now guided them along the first pathways of knowledge. Accordingly, it is no small consolation to them; when the place of these phantasmata is, in a measure, supplied by familiar examples taken from the common experience of life. In satisfying this need, moreover, I am but following in the footsteps of Aristotle and St. Thomas, whose writings abound in homely illustrations; though I may have been more prodigal in this respect, because I considered them peculiarly necessary in the present general unprovidedness of even cultivated intellects in this country.

I now proceed to explain the shape into which I have thrown the subject-matter,—in other words, the didactic method which I have chosen. I could have wished to follow the pattern of St. Thomas, whose manner of treatment has been fully explained in previous pages of this Introduction; but I feared lest, by doing so, I might destroy every chance of securing readers. It seemed to me more than probable, that even those who were otherwise favourably inclined towards the general purpose of the Work, would be scared at finding short sentences, short demonstrations, short answers to difficulties,—stripped of all ornament,—answer on one page or column to a difficulty on another, with the true resolution of the problem, (sometimes of considerable length), intervening between the two. It would postulate too much of the student, in the actual state of things. He would have to divine the meaning, and fill up for himself all that was implied but not expressed, besides perpetually turning the pages backward and forward in order to connect each solution with its corresponding objection;—to say nothing of the repelling influence which the all but mathematical strictness and baldness of the style would probably have upon him. Suarez has followed much the same system, but has increased its difficulties. For he ordinarily begins a *Disputation* by enumerating all the opinions which have been maintained concerning the subject-matter, together with the arguments on which each reposes, and the objections brought against his own chosen solution. He then proceeds to answer the former, while reserving the latter. After this comes his own resolution of the question, with the arguments by which he supports it. Finally, he answers the various objections which have been made, by fautors of the rejected opinions, to his own. As he pursues

each step at great length, the answers last named are often separated from the corresponding objections, by an interval of some ten, or even twenty, pages. I judged it better, therefore, to adopt a more recent method which, while substantially preserving the old Scholastic system and order, would obviate the inconveniences which the student might experience in a literal imitation of the latter. Accordingly, I have thrown the matter into the form of Propositions, or Theses; and, at the end of each, I state the objections brought against it, (if any such there be), one by one, together with an answer to each objection which immediately follows after the exposition of the difficulty. The several Books are divided into Chapters,—the Chapters, for the most part, into Articles,—and, finally, where the complexity or fulness of the subject under discussion has rendered it necessary, the Article is subdivided into Sections.

In my former Works critics, (in other respects sufficiently friendly), have been rather hard upon me, because I had failed to offer for their convenience a general index. The evident honesty of the complaint was to me a great satisfaction; for it seemed so fully to justify me in my determination to disappoint their desire. There are critics who, as the story runs, make a point of never looking into the Book that they are reviewing, for fear lest this work of supererogation might influence the impartiality of their judgment. There are others of a more scrupulous habit of mind, who are loth to write a review in which not a single passage from the author is to be seen, if only as an embellishment of the pages. So they desiderate an index, by whose aid they may hover over the garden, such as it is; and, plucking a flower from one of the beds, may be ready with their proof that they have really visited the inclosure. Their review is in truth an independent Essay expressive of their own opinions; but they will to throw in occasionally a quotation from the Book which, by a bold stroke of the imagination, they suppose themselves to be reviewing; much after the manner of scientific cooks, who add a spoonful of wine or a pinch of spice, as a crowning glory to their culinary *chef-d'œuvre*. But, for myself, I have always mightily relished the wisdom of Swift who, after dealing out his contemptuous banter on *Abstracts*, *Abridgments*, *Summaries*,

proceeds to give us his notion of *Indexes* in this wise:—‘To this’ (use of Abstracts, &c.) ‘is nearly related that other modern device of consulting indexes, which is to read books Hebraically, and begin where others usually end. And this is a compendious way of coming to an acquaintance with authors; for authors are to be used like lobsters, you must look for the best meat in the tails, and lay the bodies back again in the dish¹.’ I should be sorry to inconvenience the powerful body that may be affected by these prepossessions, or to merit their ill-will; but I must own to a disinclination that a *Work*, which is the fruit of some labour, should be treated somewhat after the manner in which certain books are treated by the superstitious who open them at a chance page, with the expectation of receiving, from the hazard, prophetic knowledge. At all events, such a dressing of the window, (as shopmen term it), is not necessary in the present instance; since the adopted method of dividing the subject-matter renders a recurrence to any particular question extremely easy.

At the request of others in whose judgment I place implicit confidence, a Glossary of Terms has been given at the end of this Volume; to which additions will be made in succeeding Volumes, if they should be deemed necessary. As a rule, whenever I have used a purely Scholastic term, or have felt myself compelled to coin a new word (a very rare occurrence); attention has been called to it at the time, and a full explanation afforded of the meaning. Nevertheless, as these words recur again and again, and the reader may be glad of a reminder; they are included in the Glossary, together with a reference to the page in which they are explained at length. I must here take occasion to ask those who are familiar with the philosophical literature of the day to excuse me, if they find terms admitted into the said Glossary, which for them are household words. No one who is at all conversant with treatises on Logic of any authority, whether ancient or modern, can fail to know what is meant by *Second Intentions*. Similarly, those who have read the Works of Sir William Hamilton will have no difficulty in understanding the precise value of the word, *Concept*. But it should be remembered that the present *Work* is principally intended

¹ A letter to a young poet.

for beginners; to many of whom these words will prove as strange, as some of the purely Scholastic terms may possibly seem to those whose equitable consideration I solicit. In the formation of a Glossary it is better to be too copious than too meagre.

In the quotations from Aristotle I have always followed the Berlin edition of Bekker; in those from St. Thomas, the Roman edition (folio). Unfortunately in arranging the *Opuscula* of the latter, subsequent editors have not followed the order of this edition; which has caused unnecessary confusion. It will be seen that, whenever I have made a citation from any of these lesser writings, I have given two different numbers. Of these the former refers to the Roman edition; the latter to that of Parma in quarto, which has been completed only within the last ten years.

I am afraid that the reader will find this first Volume somewhat dry and very difficult. It was on this account that I had wished to bring out the first and second Volumes together; but circumstances occurred to hinder me from prosecuting my original design. The second Volume, which will comprise the fourth and fifth Books, includes subjects of more general interest, such as a survey and discussion of the philosophy of Kant,—an estimate of some of the more important points in the Logic of Sir William Hamilton,—an elaborate exposition and defence of the Scholastic teaching with regard to the primary constituents of bodies,—a defence of the principle of causality, with answers to the objections that have been brought against it,—the doctrine touching efficient and final causation. But it may be a consolation for the reader to know, that an accurate knowledge of that which is contained in the present Volume is a necessary preliminary to the study of these (to him, at least) more interesting questions; and I have every confidence that, in the contemplation of the great Transcendentals, he will come across more important and attractive truths, than he would be led at first sight to imagine.

BOOK I.

THE DEFINITION.

INTRODUCTION.

VARIOUS names have been assigned to this science. It would appear that it was originally called *Wisdom*; till Pythagoras, impressed with the conviction that the mind of man could but scantily measure its length and breadth and height and depth, termed it, modestly enough, Philosophy or the love of Wisdom, and those who dedicated themselves to such investigations, Philosophers or lovers of Wisdom. Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that these titles of Wisdom and Philosophy were exclusively reserved for Metaphysics; since they were occasionally applied to other branches of study. Whosoever in their generation had a reputation among their fellows for superior knowledge, let the particular line of knowledge pursued by them have been what it might, were frequently designated by common consent Wise men and Philosophers. Somewhat similar to this is the use of these words in our own day. We hear and read of mental philosophy, of moral philosophy, of the philosophy of history, of natural philosophy. Nay more, the words *philosophy*, *philosopher*, like those of *science* and *scientific men*, are, not too modestly, restricted by modern physicists to a study of natural phenomena and to those who, like themselves, have made these phenomena their exclusive study.

Aristotle graces Metaphysics with manifold appellatives of honour. He calls it wisdom, the philosophy, the first philosophy, the first science, the Divine science, the science of sciences, the Queen of sciences. The series of treatises which he has written on this subject received, subsequently to his time, in their collected form the name of Metaphysics (*μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*); though the phrase occurs more than once in his own writings. It seems hardly necessary to remind the reader that the Greek preposition cannot be understood to express (as some have understood it¹) an elevation

¹ 'Ens metaphysicum, i. e. supra naturam elevatum, ut sunt angeli et Deus.' Goudin, *Philos. D. Thomae, Intr. a. i.*

above the things of nature. Its only admissible rendering in the present instance is, *after*; and consequently the phrase should be translated, *after physics*. Let it not, however, be thence imagined that this same, *after* denotes the rank or position of metaphysics in the family of sciences, as though the first science were subordinate to physics; for such an interpretation would contradict the invariable teaching of the Philosopher. It merely means, that the former comes after the latter in order of analysis and, more particularly, in the curriculum of studies. We naturally begin with objects which are perviews to, and thence go on to those which are beyond and above, sensible perception. He would be ill prepared for the contemplation of ontological truth and for an investigation of the abstract and difficult questions which it involves, whose mind has not been previously disciplined by a course in physics, and especially in mathematics. Such is the interpretation given of this phrase by the Angelic Doctor. 'The science,' he remarks, 'which treats of all these subjects' (i.e. of God, Angels, Substance, Quality, Faculty, Act, &c.) 'is *Theology*, i.e. the Divine science, so called, because in it God is the primary Object of cognition. It has also received the name of *Metaphysics*, i.e. beyond physics, because to us, who naturally arrive at the knowledge of things immaterial by means of things sensible, it offers itself by rights as an object of study after physics. It is also called the *First Philosophy*; because other sciences receive their first principles from it, and are, therefore, secondary to it¹.'

In more recent times it has been not unusual to call this science *Ontology*, or the science of Being. Some moderns have likewise styled it *General Metaphysics*, to distinguish it from what they designate as *Special Metaphysics*. This latter is identical with those sciences which among the ancients and in the School were known by the name of *Natural Philosophy*, a term now commonly adopted to express the sum of physical discoveries. It is probable that the new nomenclature of *General* and *Special Metaphysics* was, in great measure, suggested by a desire to avoid the inevitable

¹ 'De quibus omnibus est Theologia, i.e. Divina scientia, quia praecepium cognitorum in ea est Deus. Alio nomine dicitur Metaphysica, i.e. transphysica, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum scientiae aliae, ab ea principia sua accipientes, eam sequuntur.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Boet. de Trinit. Q. 5, a. 1, in c.*

confusion which must otherwise have resulted from this change in the meaning of *Natural Philosophy*; but those names are liable to serious objection, as tending to subvert the true limits of metaphysical investigation.

Hegel, in consonance with his theory of *the ideal Absolute*, identifies Metaphysics with Logic. His Logic, however, is not the science of the forms of thought or Second Intentions, as commonly understood; but is,—to borrow his own phrase,—‘*the Science of the pure Idea.*’

When the titles of Wisdom, Theology, the Divine Science, the First Philosophy, and the like, are claimed for Metaphysics; it must be understood that such presidency affects those sciences only which are acquired by pure process of the natural reason. The science of supernatural Theology, supposing of course that there is such a science, must from the very nature of the case be paramount. But it is equally plain, that supernatural Theology is wholly distinct from the natural sciences, seeing that it belongs to another order. It may have, it is true, its legitimate authority and power of direction even within the sphere of Metaphysics; but such authority will be indirect, negative, and external to all scientific process of development. The two sciences are in themselves essentially distinct; for whereas the first premisses of supernatural Theology are objects of faith, those of Metaphysics, as of the other natural sciences, are subject to the intuition of the understanding. The former rely for their acceptance on extrinsic; the latter, on intrinsic evidence. Hence, in supernatural Theology, authority holds the foremost place, while in the natural sciences it goes for next to nothing; for in the former the authority is Divine and is the formal motive of assent, but in the latter it is human and consequently insufficient for scientific cognition. Nevertheless, human authority even in Metaphysics may have a certain value, in so far as it sets before us principles of philosophy which have stood the test of time, continue to arrest the mind by the brightness of their own intrinsic evidence, and are ready to hand for the work of present construction; or, again, forasmuch as the genius of the wise and learned in past ages may serve to adjust our intellectual telescope, while we painfully strive to precise the *nebulae* which cross our field of view.

There is another element of distinction between supernatural Theology and the natural sciences, arising out of the nature of

their respective objects. For of the former the *principal* object are mysteries, the *adequate* object a supernatural Revelation; while the object of the latter is limited to such truths as are open to the cognition of the unaided human intellect. Other differences there are which shall be omitted here, because they are not germane to the course of thought upon which we are about to enter. It cannot be denied, indeed, that supernatural Theology has incidentally led the way to great discoveries within the defined boundary of metaphysical truth. Yet even in such case human reason has only been put on the scent, so to speak, by the revealed mystery; but has pressed forward in pursuit by the strength of its own processes, and has come up with the truth, thus pointed out to it, by virtue of its own demonstrations.

Here it may be necessary to anticipate an objection which might present itself to the mind of the reader; for if it be true that Metaphysics rests on reason, not on authority, he may be puzzled to understand what purpose is to be gained by those numerous quotations which he will encounter in the present work. Let it suffice, then, to say, that they are not produced as proofs but as witnesses to proofs; while each proof must stand or fall according to the intrinsic evidence which it possesses. Their appearance is due to the fact that the author professes to present the Peripatetic philosophy before the public in an English dress. He is an interpreter rather than a philosopher; handing down the teaching of others, not professedly publishing his own. He could not, therefore, content himself with merely exhibiting that philosophy; but was bound to stamp his statements with the seal of the chief among those Doctors whose system he has undertaken to expose.

These prefatory observations introduce us to the fundamental question touching the nature and limits of Metaphysics. And, first of all, it behoves us to determine its definition. By some it has been defined to be, *the science of things which either surpass matter or are separated from it by abstraction*; by others, as *the science of things either positively or negatively immaterial*. These two definitions are substantially the same. For things positively immaterial are such as in their own nature and essence surpass and exclude matter; while the negatively immaterial are those which, though material in themselves, are considered by the intellect apart from their material conditions, and are, consequently,

separated from matter by abstraction. They are both, however, generic definitions at the best; and would seem to have been adopted in conformity with the modern usage of including under Metaphysics Anthropology and Cosmology. According to the ancient and accepted definition, which is every way preferable and will therefore be retained in this work, Metaphysics is 'a science which contemplates real Being as such¹.'

A science may be considered either *subjectively* or *objectively*. It is considered subjectively, when regarded as an accidental quality inhering in the Subject who possesses it; objectively, when it represents the objects of cognition, i. e. the hierarchy of truths with which the subjective habit is conversant. Thus, for instance, when *Sir Isaac Newton* is said to be a great mathematician, the science is considered subjectively; when we speak of *the Differential Calculus* as forming a part of mathematics, it is considered objectively. Now 'there are three, and three only, requisites for science; to wit, the active faculty of the thinker by which he judges of things, the thing thought, and the union of the two²;' in other words, a subjective intellect, an objective fact or truth, and the representation of that truth in the intellect. The proper definition of any such habit will give the subjective element in the *Genus*, the objective in the *Differentia*, and consequently the two conjoined in the entire definition. For every science is differentiated by the subject-matter of its investigation, or (which comes to the same thing) by the object of its contemplation.

According, then, to the definition already adopted, Metaphysics is subjectively a science, objectively the truths of Being as such; while in its complete and essential nature it is the science of Being, or of the truths of Being, simply as such.

¹ 'Ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἥ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν. *Arist. Metaph. L. IV (aliter III), c. 1.*

² 'Ad scientiam non requiruntur nisi tria; scilicet, potentia activa cognoscentis qua de rebus judicat, res cognita, et unio utriusque.' *D. Thom. de Verit. Q. ii. a. 1, b. 3.*

CHAPTER I.

THE GENUS OF METAPHYSICS.

FOR one who has undertaken to write a work on any given subject, nothing can be of more vital importance than that he should at the outset afford an accurate definition of that concerning which he is about to treat. It serves to give clearness and precision to the after evolution of thought, since it begins by presenting the whole question, as it were, in a nutshell. Now, a logical definition is made up of the *Genus* and *Differentia*, or, as these would be respectively termed in Metaphysical phrase, the *material* and *formal* parts. The former represents a class or universal under which, equally with others, the object of definition is included; while the latter expresses the determining or differential addition which essentially distinguishes the same object from all the others included under the same class. Thus, for example, when *man* is defined to be a *rational animal*, the term *animal* denotes the class or order to which *man* belongs in common with *bird*, *fish*, *quadruped*, *reptile*, *insect*; while the adjective term *rational* exhibits that essential form which distinguishes man from the rest of the animal kingdom.

The present Chapter will be dedicated to a consideration of the Genus of Metaphysics.

PROPOSITION I.

Metaphysics is a science, properly so called. More than this, it is the highest science, or, in other words, Wisdom.

I. In THE FIRST MEMBER of the present Thesis it is asserted, that *Metaphysics is a science properly so called*. The last modifying clause has been introduced for the purpose of defining the sense in which the word *science* is here understood. This has

become the more necessary, in that of late years the term has not only been misapplied to the imperfect inductions of physical experiment, but strangely enough has been more or less generally accepted as representative of these inductions only, to the exclusion of, and even in contradistinction to, the cognition of necessary and eternal truths. By *science*, then, in accordance with the philosophy of the School, is here understood *the habit of demonstration*, otherwise *the certain and evident cognition of things by their causes*. From this latter definition it follows, that the middle term in the demonstrative syllogism must necessarily be one or other of the four causes; about which more anon.

That Metaphysics is a science, may be deduced from the enumeration of the intellectual habits as given by the philosopher in the sixth book of his Nicomachean Ethics. These are, as he tells us, *Understanding, Science, Wisdom, Art, and Prudence*. But Metaphysics is neither Art nor Prudence; for Art is effective, Prudence is practical; while Metaphysics is purely speculative. In the first, and proportionally in the second, we pursue Truth for an ulterior end, using it merely as a means for the attainment of certain results; in the third, we pursue Truth simply and purely for its own sake. Again, it is equally plain that Metaphysics is not only Understanding or the habit of intuition; for this latter is conversant with principles or immediate and self-evident truths, and has nothing in common with any whatsoever process of ratiocination; whereas Metaphysics is principally demonstrative. There only remain, then, Science and Wisdom. Which of the two is Metaphysics? The Peripatetic would reply, It is both the one and the other.

Further, all certain and evident cognition of things by their causes is Science, properly so called. But Metaphysics is a certain and evident cognition of things by their causes. For not only is the investigation into the nature of causes its own exclusive function; but it likewise demonstratively, and therefore, certainly and evidently, deduces from the causes, thus scientifically cognized, its conclusions touching the nature, conditions, attributes, constitutives, modifications of Being. It follows, therefore, that Metaphysics is truly and properly a science.

II. Metaphysics is not only a science; *it is also the highest science, or Wisdom*. The truth of this last Member of the Proposition is evinced by a threefold declaration.

i. There is this primary distinction between the intuitive habits and Science on the one hand and Wisdom on the other, that the latter comprises in itself the other two. The scientific habit is purely ratiocinative. It is not master of its own principles or fundamental premisses. These are reserved for the understanding or habit of intuition: and as the premisses must, from the nature of the case, surpass the demonstrative conclusions of which they are the cause, it follows that the understanding must in a corresponding manner surpass science in order of rank and excellence. It would be vain, then, to claim for Metaphysics the highest place among the intellectual habits, unless it were something more than simple science: otherwise, it would of necessity be surpassed by that intuitive habit to which, under such a hypothesis, it would stand indebted for its primary premisses.

But, again, Wisdom differs from intuition, in that it is contemplative of mediate as well as of immediate truths. Nay, more, it not only deduces conclusions by process of scientific reason: but it proves first principles themselves, not indeed by *ostensive* demonstration, (for that would be a contradiction in terms, seeing that ostensive demonstration supposes a real middle term, and so first principles would no longer be first principles), but by the *reductio ad absurdum*. And this is a principal reason why science rather than intuition is pronounced to be the Genus of Wisdom; even though the latter, exclusively considered, assumes by right the higher place.

Wisdom, lastly, differs from science, not only for that it comprehends within itself the habits intuitive of its own first principles: but also because, while each science deals with a separate and particular sphere of truth, Wisdom embraces the universe of Being within its field of view. But these distinct attributes of wisdom are discoverable in Metaphysics, and in Metaphysics only; consequently, Metaphysics is the supreme science, or wisdom, in the natural order.

ii. That science which treats of the highest truths,—which investigates the nature and properties of causes as such,—whose object includes within itself all Being,—whose investigations are principally directed to things immaterial and spiritual and, among these, primarily to that one Being who is the supreme Reason and efficient and final Cause of the rest,—which includes within

itself the habit of its own first principles, is the highest science or Wisdom. But all these attributes are claimed for Metaphysics. Assuredly, it has in these respects the right of possession; nor has there as yet appeared any other science which has ventured on such claims. It will be well, however, to confirm the *Minor* of the syllogism more explicitly. Wherefore,

1. Truths assume a higher excellence, in proportion to their elevation above the reach of matter. One reason of this is, that by how much they recede from matter, by so much are they assimilated as its objects to the subjective faculty of thought and, therefore, become proportionately intelligible. Another reason may be added, which is this: The further a truth is removed from contingency and from the limitations of space and time, the more complete is its stability and in consequence the nobler its rank. But a truth is more remote from contingency and more fully liberated from the conditions of space and time, in proportion as its freedom from matter is absolute. Now, certain truths there are which may be called material facts. These are wholly wedded to matter, and form the adequate object of Physics. There are other truths which are derived indeed from matter, but from matter free of that concrete imperfection which characterises its actual existence in nature and its intrinsic constitution. It is accordingly denominated by the ancients *intelligible matter*,—matter, i.e. so purified by process of abstraction as to have become a proper object of intellectual cognition. Such truths are far removed from contingency; because they are the eternal and immutable laws of space and time,—the necessary forms of matter, just as Second Intentions are the necessary laws or forms of thought. These are the adequate object of Mathematics. There are likewise truths which are conversant with the nature and conditions of the visible world, considered *as an existing fact*. These are the object of Cosmology. Again, there are truths that regard the nature and condition of man, considered *as an existing fact*. These are the object partly of Ethics (including under the term Oeconomics and the political science), partly of Anthropology and therein notably of Psychology. Finally, there is a universe of omnipresent truths, which have little or nothing in common with either sensible or intelligible matter, though often to be found hidden under both, which are free by nature or abstraction from all modifications of time or space, which reveal the essences of

things without regard to their actual existence, and which include spiritual natures and Him, in particular, who is Head, as their primary object. These form the subject-matter of Metaphysics. Since, then, a science is differentiated by its formal object and thence receives rank and excellence, it follows that among the real sciences Physics holds the lowest place; Mathematics, a higher; Cosmology, a higher still; Ethics and Anthropology, a yet higher; Metaphysics, the highest.

2. While Metaphysics is the science of Being in general, as such; its peculiar object, nevertheless, is Being that is in its own nature immaterial and spiritual. But in the hierarchy of truths these necessarily claim the foremost place.

3. Metaphysics has received from Aristotle the name of the Divine Science. And that philosopher gives as reason for the appellation, that this Science most nearly resembles the Divine, and that it proposes to itself God and the things of God as the foremost Object of contemplation.

4. Metaphysics embraces the doctrine of causation, which lies at the root of all scientific cognition.

5. It is the sole guardian and champion of first principles.

iii. The second member of the Proposition is further confirmed by an argument borrowed from the special properties of Wisdom, which the Philosopher reduces to the six following. 1. Wisdom in a way treats about all things. 2. It is versed in questions of more than ordinary difficulty, and further removed from sensible perception. 3. It is gifted with greatest certainty of cognition. 4. It is best adapted for teaching. 5. It is most worthy of desire and pursuit for its own sake. 6. It is paramount over the sister sciences. Now all the fore-mentioned properties of Wisdom are the appanage of Metaphysics; seeing that they either exclusively belong to it or, if one or other of them can be claimed by other sciences, nevertheless even these are legitimately reputed as its own, because within its sphere they acquire a singular perfection and independence, as for other reasons, so in particular by reason of their fellowship with the rest of the above-named properties. The doctrine of the Philosopher, which supplies the *Major* of this confirmatory declaration, requires further elucidation.

1. The explanation of the first-mentioned property, which postulates a universality of object, will find its more fitting place in the next Proposition. 2. That Wisdom should be versed in

questions of greater difficulty and further removed from sensible perception, may be safely left to the verdict of common sense; for who would ever dream of calling that man wise, whose knowledge was confined to those obvious truths which are more or less the heritage of all men, and require no special intellectual culture for their perception? 3. When it is added that Wisdom possesses the highest certainty of cognition, it is worthy of remark that this of necessity involves the highest degree of evidence; for, since certainty is the legitimate offspring of evidence, it follows that such as is the evidence, such will be the certainty. Where, therefore, there is *truly* the greatest subjective certainty, *there* likewise must be found the greatest objective evidence. Now it is of the nature of a science that its cognition should be certain; for it is this which essentially distinguishes it from assumption or opinion. If, then, certainty of cognition is an indispensable requisite of all science, it follows that the head science should boast of the highest certainty. 4. No one can properly be said to know a thing, unless he is acquainted with its causes; for without such knowledge he knows not the thing, but the fact merely—a cognition which hardly rises above the level of sensible perception. But no one is fitted to teach what he does not know: hence a man is capable of teaching, in proportion to his thorough acquaintance with the causes of his subject-matter. Science gives to its possessor a capacity for teaching in proportion to the wider and firmer grasp it gives him of the causes of things. But, if this be so, then that science, which includes the doctrine of universal causation within the sphere of its subject-matter, must needs supply the fittest and highest qualification for the office of a teacher. 5. The fifth characteristic requires no comment; for it is evident that, among the speculative sciences, that one which affords a wider and deeper insight into truths of the highest order, must be the most desirable for its own sake. 6. That Wisdom must be pre-eminent among the sciences, is likewise plain enough; but it is by no means so plain what sort of pre-eminence it is that is claimed for her. Is it such as would interfere with the autonomy of the other sciences? Is Wisdom the one subalternant science, and are all the rest subalternate to her? This last question provokes an explanation which will subserve to a solution of the supposed difficulty. In the catalogue of sciences there are some that are inferior to, because fundamentally dependent upon, others.

The cause of such dependence mainly consists in this, that the first principles of the former are not axiomatic or self-evident truths, but are borrowed from a higher science in which they form the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism. They are taken for granted by the one, because they are scientifically proved by the other. Thus *perspective* and *music* borrow their first principles from the higher science of mathematics. If the inquiry should be pushed a step further, and it should be asked whether there is any special reason or known foundation in the nature of things for this dependency; it must be said that it is due to a corresponding dependence inherent in the respective formal objects of each science. To put it more clearly: wherever such dependence exists, it will be found that the *material* object of both sciences is the same; but that in the case of the inferior science a certain accidental difference is added, (accidental, that is, to the quiddity of the material object), which suffices to constitute in the order of cognition a *formal* object specifically distinct from that of the superior science. Thus, for instance, *number* enters into the formal object of mathematics; *sounded number* is the formal object of *music*. So, *the line* enters equally into the formal object of mathematics; the *visual line* is the formal object of perspective. But an accidental difference, in the sense already explained, must intrinsically depend upon the principles of its subject. Hence, on the other hand, where there is an essential diversity between the material objects of any two sciences; it is impossible that such dependence should exist in the formal object and, consequently, in the science contemplative of either. Wherever there is such dependence of one science on another, the inferior is called the *subalternate*, the superior the *subalternant*. Is this, then, the position which Wisdom is supposed to occupy in relation to the other sciences? Most assuredly not. Such an assumption would at once collapse before the logic of facts; for who is there foolish enough to suppose that Mathematics, for instance, borrows its first principles from without, or that those axioms are capable of ostensive proof? Wisdom does not encroach upon the liberty of her sister sciences within their proper sphere; and leaves them perfectly free to pursue their several conclusions from the principles peculiar to their own subject-matter. In this respect her pre-eminence is rather a pre-eminence of rank; nevertheless, it is not *absolutely* this only. For, though she respects the autonomy of

the rest within their own limits; yet she supports and strengthens them by virtue of her fundamental principles which dominate all Being, and she defends their first premisses against the cavils of scepticism.

That these characteristics belong to Metaphysics (which is the *Minor* of the syllogism), is a fact only to be realized by patient submission to her teaching.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. In the confirmatory proof adduced in favour of the second part of this Thesis, it has been asserted that Wisdom deals with matters which are more difficult of apprehension and further removed from sensile perception. But this assertion is at war with itself, and is directly opposed to the teaching of the Philosopher. It is at war with itself; for the most abstract and universal ideas are evidently those which are furthest removed from mere sensible perception, since all objects of the senses are concrete and individual. Yet Peripatetic Ideology teaches that abstract and universal truths are the proper object of the human intellect, and are therefore more easily apprehended by it than those individual facts which are presented to it through the medium of the senses. It is, in the second place, directly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle, who states, in the First Book of his *Physics*, that in science we must proceed from the higher universals to particulars, because we must begin with what we know best, and the higher universals are best known to us. This doctrine of the Philosopher is confirmed by experience. For the child, when it first sees a watch or other sensible object, begins by seizing the idea of *thing*; nor, till years afterwards, does it fully comprehend the nature of a watch. Yet *thing* is the very highest universal.

ANSWER. This difficulty admits of easy solution. Universal ideas are of two kinds. There are universal ideas which are direct and primitive; others that are reflex and scientific. The former are rude, confused, potential, such as is the idea which a child forms of *thing*; the latter are philosophic, clear, distinct, explicit. In the process of mental development, we begin with the former and end with the latter. But in scientific inquiry touching the causes and properties of things, the truths which are less universal are the first cognized; since it is with the aid of these, that the mind is

enabled to arrive at the higher universals. In this way the contradiction disappears¹.

II. A difficulty occurs as to the third characteristic of Wisdom, or Metaphysics; for it is anything but plain, that it is gifted with greatest certitude of cognition. Indeed, the reverse would seem nearer to the truth. Take Mathematics. Its axioms or first principles are all but unrivalled in the clearness of their evidence its conclusions are deduced from these by the most rigid demonstration. Its formal object is not wholly removed from sensile perception; yet is in its entirety necessary, immutable, eternal. Indeed, the common consent of philosophers allows to Mathematics a certitude and evidence which in the natural order cannot be surpassed. Then, again, as all human knowledge is primitively derived from the senses and sensile perception, and to a certain extent is dependent on these throughout; it would seem as though clearness and certainty must proceed from the same source. By how much, therefore, the formal object of a science is remote from sense; by so much is that science likely to lose in certitude of cognition. Now, the formal object of Metaphysics is wholly separate from all that is material and sensile; whereas Mathematics is exclusively occupied with the laws or forms of material quantity. Lastly, the Philosopher repeatedly insists on the distinction between truths that are evident *absolutely*, or *in their own nature*, and such as are evident *to us*, maintains that they are in inverse proportion to each other, and states emphatically, in the Second Book of his *Metaphysics*, that our intellectual vision, in presence of the former class, resembles that of a bat in the sunlight.

ANSWER. These difficulties are weighty, and demand the fullest investigation. First of all, then, let it be observed that Metaphysics consists of two principal parts; one of which considers Being, the other the primary determinations of Being. Confining ourselves for the moment to the former of these, it cannot be doubted that Metaphysics excels the rest of the sciences, Mathematics included, in certainty of cognition. For, regarded in such wise, it deals with

¹ The above is the solution of the difficulty which the Angelic Doctor gives. 'Magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem primo sunt nota. Nam primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut dicit Avicenna; . . . sed quantum ad investigationem universalium proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia, eo quod per causas particulares quae sunt unius generis et speciei, pervenimus in causas universales.' *Opusc. LIII, (aliter XLIX), v. f.*

primary and fundamental truths which permeate the universe of Reality and are independent of all lower orders of truth; while these, on the contrary, are dependent upon them. Furthermore, the difficulty of apprehending them at the first, arising from their abstract and immaterial nature, is in the long run more than compensated by the simplicity of the subject-matter, consequent on the reduction of the multiform and complex, by continual process of abstraction, to the simplest and fewest elements. The same may be said of its fundamental principles, the great *Dignities* (to use a logical phrase) of all science; for they, too, are few in number and most simple in expression. Lastly, there is no science whose first principles do not owe all their strength in ultimate analysis to these primary Metaphysical canons; and consequently, the certitude of the former has its being in the evidence and certitude of the latter. Nor can it be granted for one moment, that all evidence and certainty are *formally* and *immediately* derived from sensile perception; though it is true that they are so derived, as one may say, *occasionally*; inasmuch as, at the first, sensile perception occasions the presence to the mind of those intellectual truths, imbedded in it, which rejoice in their own proper evidence and, by that evidence, generate certainty of cognition. It may be as well to add, for the sake of greater clearness, that there are two kinds of certitude, each essentially distinct from the other; viz. sensile and rational. The former does immediately depend upon the senses; but not the latter. It is necessary, in the actual order, that we should gain our first idea of two, for example, and of a pair of twos from sensile perception; but there are few who would be rash enough to maintain that the evidence or certainty of the judgment, *Two and two make four*, is dependent on any collection, however multiplied, of sensile pairs of pairs.

It is when we come to consider the second part of Metaphysics, which investigates the primary determinations of Being, that the real difficulty begins. Let it not escape us, however, before proceeding further, that the question is already practically settled. For the nobility and pre-eminence of a science are measured by the nobility and pre-eminence of its principal formal object; so that the claims of Wisdom or Metaphysics to the possession of the highest certitude are already established, if the previous conclusions are correct. With this reservation, let us consider the difficulty under this its second aspect.

The problem, then, is this: can Metaphysics, when treating of the primary determinations of Being, claim for itself a greater certainty of cognition than belongs to the Mathematical or any other science? Are its first principles in this particular portion of its work, and consequently the conclusions which it demonstrates from these, more evident and certain than those of any other science? At first sight it would seem not. The logic of facts is against it. For pure mathematical demonstrations are irrefragable. They admit of no doubt and, as a fact, no one doubts them. But Metaphysical conclusions such, for instance, as those touching the primary constituents of material substance, the existence and nature of accidents, the Being of God, and the like, are so far from being undoubted, that, now more than ever, the philosophical student is perplexed with the multitude of opposing schools, each proposing a theory on these matters different from its rivals. To take the one question touching the nature of primordial matter: there are the atomic and dynamic theories, with their respective varieties, there is the Peripatetic theory, there is the Idealistic; all mutually opposed and too often advocated, not without show of temper. But this could not be the case, if the Metaphysical conclusions on these and kindred points were *equally* evident, *equally* certain with pure mathematical demonstration. How, then, can it be that the certainty of the former surpasses that of the latter? In considering this difficulty there is something to be premised, which will materially lessen its weight. Mathematical deductions are not of a nature to excite human passions and human prejudices; Metaphysical deductions, such as we are now considering, *are*. Those are purely formal; while these are specially *real* and have their bearing upon every other science. Thus it comes to pass, that the will plays a part prominently in these philosophical controversies. Prejudice in favour of a particular School or of a particular Professor, love of novelty, impatience of the just authority of the past, that intellectual egoism which, wedded to its own favourite branch of knowledge, would fain make it the final measure of all truth to the subversion of scientific order, an ambition of reputed originality, distaste for a patient labour of thought and a premature desire to escape from a state of pupillage, disbelief in the responsibility of thought, national and theological prepossessions, the tyranny of passions,—these, and many others such as they, enfeeble, or even deform, the minds of those

who have entered upon Metaphysical speculations; whereas they have no appreciable influence on the study of Mathematics. Still, after making all due allowance for the action of these disturbing causes, it must be owned that many of the conclusions in this part of Metaphysics yield to Mathematical demonstration in the measure of their certainty. Nor does the concession in any wise rob Metaphysics of this its third characteristic. For it still preserves the supremacy of certitude in its principal subject-matter; and, even in the second part, many of its deductions can boast of an equal degree of certitude; while those which are less certain and evident, trace the loss to no defect of evidence in the object, but rather to a disproportion between the grandeur of the objected truth on the one hand and the weakness of the human mind on the other. Hence it is that this partial diminution of certainty tends only to heighten the surpassing nobility of the Metaphysical science by revealing the nobility of even its secondary object¹.

III. It may fairly be doubted whether Metaphysics possesses that superior aptitude for teaching which has been claimed for it. For such aptitude is founded in the greater ability of a science to demonstrate the attributes or passions of its Subject by its causes. When a man knows, and therefore can convey to others, the *why* and *wherefore* of the properties of things, he is fit to teach. But every science, properly so called, demonstrates by its own proper causes, and can consequently claim an equal aptitude for teaching. Neither is it enough to say, that the object and causes which Metaphysics contemplates are more sublime and excelling. For this, though it may with reason be advanced in support of the pre-eminence of that science, has no bearing on its aptitude for teaching, which is affected, not by the excellence of the subject-matter, but by the proportion of the effect to its proper cause.

ANSWER. It is undeniably true that every science does demonstrate by the causes of its object. But in the instance of all the other sciences those causes are not primarily independent; on the contrary,

¹ The Angelic Doctor offers a similar solution of this point of the difficulty. He says, 'Philosophus dicit in I^o. de Anima, *Una notitia praeferitur alteri, aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut propter certitudinem*. Si igitur subjecta sint aequalia in bonitate et: bilitate, illa quae est certior erit major virtus; sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et majoribus, praeferitur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus.' I. 2^{ae}. lxxi. 5, ad 3^m.

they are subordinate to a higher order of causation. There cannot, therefore, be that adequate proportion between cause and effect, which the ultimate causes will exhibit. It follows that the science which investigates these primary or ultimate causes, (*primary* in order of nature, *ultimate* in order of logical analysis), will possess a greater aptitude for teaching.

CHAPTER II.

THE DIFFERENTIA.

It has been already remarked that each science is differentiated by its *formal* object. The *material* object is not unfrequently common to many sciences; whereas the *formal* object, i.e. the real form, or, if you will, the point of view under which the former is considered, serves to distinguish essentially one science from another. Thus, for instance, *man* is the material object common to Ethics proper, Oeconomics, Politics, Medicine, and Anatomy,—not to mention others, such as Ethnography and Ethnology. But in the first three he is considered as a free agent under direction of a moral law; in the fourth, as a living body or animal subject to disease; in the last, as an organized structure. The first three, again, are distinguished from each other, in that Ethics proper regards the free agency of man in relation to the moral law as affecting himself *individually*; Oeconomics, as affecting his relation to the social order; lastly, Politics as affecting his relation to the state. Hence it is evident that it were vain to seek for the *Differentia*, or *Difference*, of Metaphysics in its material object; the more so that this latter includes within itself all possible reality. In mootings, then, the question touching the *differentia* of Metaphysics, we are in truth instituting an inquiry into its formal object. Wherefore,

PROPOSITION II.

The formal object of Metaphysics is real Being, as such, and the primary determinations of real Being, formally contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction.

This Proposition contains two members, which shall be taken in their order.

I. AS TO THE FIRST MEMBER, wherein it is asserted that *real Being, as such, is the formal object of Metaphysical Science*, it may be safely said that the verdict of the School is all but unanimous in its favour. It is the teaching of Aristotle, who describes Metaphysics to be 'a science which contemplates Being, as such, and its immediate attributes¹.' The Angelic Doctor distinguishes Metaphysics from all the other speculative sciences, in that the former considers the nature of Being *absolutely*, while the latter treat of Being under some determining form². The same doctrine is maintained by Albert the Great, Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, Avicenna and others, together with the later Scholastics and, in particular, Suarez, who, adducing the authority of the afore-named Doctors, subjoins that it is the opinion of 'nearly all the other authors³.'

Moreover, it stands to reason that such should be the case. For the first or highest science must necessarily contemplate first principles and first causes. Now, every principle and every cause is principle and cause of some nature: hence it follows that the highest and most general causes and principles will be causes and principles of the highest and widest nature, which is no other than Being. But, if Metaphysics, as the first science, inquires into the causes and principles of Being, Being must be its formal object.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Thesis, which affirms that the *primary determinations of Being formally contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction are included in the formal object of this science*, is easy of proof so long as we confine ourselves to the simple question of fact; but when we proceed to inquire into the reasons for, and limits of, this extension of the object, the investigation is not without its difficulties. Moreover, sundry terms in the enunciation require preliminary explanation; otherwise, instead of facilitating progress, as they are intended to do, they will only create fresh impediments. Accordingly, the following Prolegomena are here set down.

PROLEGOMENON I.

What is meant by *determinations* of Being? Determinations of Being amount to what would be *divisions* of Being, if Being

¹ *Metaph. L. IV (aliter III), c. 1.*

² *In 2 Sent. d. iii, Q. 3, a. 2, in c.*

³ 'Et reliqui fere scriptores.' *Metaph. Disp. I, sect. 1, n. 26.*

were capable of logical division. Cannot, then, Being be divided? Certainly not; neither it nor any other of the Transcendentals. The reason is as follows:—A logical Whole is resolvable into its subordinate species by a *differentia*. Thus, for example, if you want to divide *animal*, you introduce the Difference, *rational*, which by Dichotomy (the sole purely logical division), resolves the Genus, *animal*, into its two subordinate species, viz. *rational* and *irrational* (not rational) animals. Thus much is assumed as a *Lemma* from Logic. Now, it is a canon of Philosophy, that the Genus cannot enter into the essential nature of the Difference. Thus, by way of illustration, *animal* is not an essential constituent of *rational*; for angels are rational¹ and acts are rational, yet neither angels nor acts are animals. But it is impossible to discover a supposed *Differentia* for Being, (and the same may be said for the other Transcendentals), in which Being itself is not essentially included. Take, for instance, the two groups of material and immaterial things. A material thing is *something*, and something is Being; otherwise it is *nothing*. The same observation plainly applies with equal force to things immaterial. You can never escape from Being within the sphere of reality: yet Being cannot be its own divisor. Nevertheless, Being admits of what may be called classifications; and these *quasi* classifications are called its *determinations*. But why? Because one and the same object is more clearly defined, or rather determined, by the representative presence of additional notes or determining forms. This may perhaps be more easily understood by an illustration. We will suppose that a man is viewing an object through a telescope. He has not as yet got the right focus, and the object presents itself as a dark *something*. That is all that he can make out of it. As he gradually adjusts the glass to his eyesight, it begins to assume a more definite shape, till at last the hull, masts, ropes, sails of the ship are each distinctly visible, and he can even read the name of the vessel on the stern: nevertheless, it was the same object from first to last. No real addition has been made to it; but it has become more determined in proportion as the observer neared the proper focus. In like manner, *James*, for instance, may be conceived by the mind as a *being*, as a *substance*, as an *animal*, as a *man*, and as *this*

¹ *Rational* is here used in its generic meaning as equivalent to *endowed with reason or intellect*.

particular man with all his individual characteristics. Yet all the way through, there is no division of the object, which is identical at every stage; but there are degrees of determination, or, in other words, of a finite representation. Analogously we can determine Being; but it is impossible to divide it. For whatever seems to be added to Being must be Being, and is therefore already contained implicitly in the dividend. Thus *Substance* is Being, determined to such a mode of Being by the note of self-support, or, in other words, of freedom from essential inhesiveness in another.

PROLEGOMENON II.

It is stated in the enunciation of the Thesis that the determinations of Being, included in the formal object of Metaphysics, are *primary*. Now by the word *primary* must not be understood exclusively the *immediate* determinations of Being, i. e. those determinations between which and Being no mediate determination is discoverable. For instance, *Substance* is an immediate determination of Being, but *Quantity* is mediate; because, between the latter and Being, *Accident* intervenes, which is more determinate than the one and less determinate than the other. By the primary determinations, therefore, are to be understood such as are of wider periphery and have a more direct relation to the essences of things *in general*, as distinguished from those more contracted and particular determinations which constitute the special object of one or other of the subordinate sciences.

PROLEGOMENON III.

These determinations of Being are admitted to a place in the object of Metaphysics only in so far as they are contained within the limits of Metaphysical abstraction. The question, therefore, naturally occurs; What is it precisely that is meant by Metaphysical abstraction? The answer to the question will enable us to fix, more definitely than has been as yet attempted, the limit to such primary determinations of Being as are alone admissible in the formal object of this science. The primitive objects of human cognition are sensible, material, individual things. Thus much is assumed as a *Lemma* from the Ideology of the School; for it would be obviously out of place to discuss the matter here. The human intellect in scientific operation proceeds to work on this

material, and by repeated processes of abstraction and generalization arrives progressively at three different stages. It begins by getting rid of individuality, or, as it is called in the Schools, the *hæcceity* (the *thisness*) of a thing, on its road to laws. It proceeds to abstract from the *qualitative* modes of matter, i.e. from *sensile* matter, as it has been called, regarding matter only under its *quantitative* forms or laws, i.e. *intelligible* matter. Finally, it abstracts from matter altogether, and cognizes the immaterial and purely intelligible. The first constitutes the limits of physical, the second those of mathematical, the last those of Metaphysical abstraction: hence Metaphysics excludes all that is material and sensile, *as such*, from the sphere of its formal object. Not that it altogether abjures the consideration of material things; but, in contemplating them, it fixes itself only upon that which is common to them with immaterial and spiritual Being, abstracting from their materiality and subjection to the senses. As the Angelic Doctor puts it with his accustomed clearness,—‘Being and substance are said to be separated from matter and motion, not because it is of their essence to be without matter and motion, as it would be of the essence of an ass to be without reason; but because it is not of their essence to be in matter and motion, although sometimes they are in matter and motion, just as *animal* abstracts from *rational*, albeit some animals are rational¹.’

PROLEGOMENON IV.

Every whole may be regarded either *absolutely* or *relatively*, in other words, either as an actual or as a potential Whole. In the former case it simply represents an objective form, as it is absolutely in itself and separated by precision of abstraction from any subject or subjects in which it may be found, or, if concrete, at least an absolute and undetermined supposit. Thus, when we say that *Philosophy is the love of Wisdom*, we have present to the mind a certain real objective form, as it is absolutely in its own nature; and though, as a fact, it exists only in the intellect of man, yet

¹ ‘Ens et substantia dicuntur esse separata a materia et motu, non propter hoc quod de ratione eorum sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini est sine ratione esse; sed propter hoc quia de ratione eorum non est in materia et motu esse, quamvis quandoque sint in materia et motu, sicut animal abstrahit a rationali, quamvis aliquod animal sit rationale.’ *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Boet. de Trinit. Q. 5, a ad 5^m.*

the mind abstracts from such inhesion and subject of inhesion, and represents Philosophy in its own quiddity, independent of its concrete existence. But in the judgment, *Philosophy is either speculative or practical*, the mind has made a further step. It has not only objectivized its concept by a total abstraction from the Subject; but it considers the form represented by such concept as potential, distributive, i.e. as referable to the inferiors included within the sphere of its extension. The former is a *Metaphysical*; the latter, a *Logical Whole*.

And now we may securely proceed to the declaration of this second part of the Proposition. That Metaphysics does not limit itself to the sole consideration of Being and its attributes, is a patent fact. For there is not a single work, which professedly treats of Metaphysical science, that does not deal with questions touching the nature of *Substance, Accident, Necessity, Contingency, Infinity*, the *Simple*, the *Composite*, and the like. Yet all and each of these overleap the boundaries of simple Being, considered absolutely and abstractedly as such. The only difficulty is to determine, at what precise point the introduction of these all but endless subordinate determinations of Being into the formal object of our science is to stop. Shall it be allowed to continue till the whole chain is exhausted? Does Metaphysics profess to deal with the proper and specific nature, causes, energies, of each and every grade of Being? If so, it is no longer a particular, but it is the universal science; and all the other sciences and disciplines become mere chapters or pages in its Encyclopædia. This concentration of knowledge, however, is a practical impossibility in the actual order. The question, then, returns, What determinations of Being are legitimately admitted by Metaphysics within the sphere of its subject-matter, and what are excluded? Is it possible to draw the line with sufficient accuracy? The following is the answer. This, the First Science, acknowledges those determinations of Being alone which are either formally contained within, or essentially connected with, its own particular abstraction. To put it in another way: Metaphysics includes all real entities within the range of its material object; yet it does not investigate the special natures of each in particular, but only those forms or modifications in each, which are either positively or negatively immaterial. It may be necessary to repeat here the meaning of these two expressions. By *positively* immaterial forms are meant those which,

by virtue of their own nature and as existing in the concrete, are wholly separate from matter; while *negatively* immaterial forms are such as, though material in the concrete, or as they actually exist in their Subject, are nevertheless purified from all material conditions by the abstracting faculty of the mind, and only represent those notes which they share in common with immaterial beings. Thus, *Substance* in an Angel is a positively immaterial form; but Substance in a stone or tree is a negatively immaterial form. It is by the aforesaid way of abstraction only, that *Body* becomes intelligible; for as the Angelic Doctor teaches, 'The form of corporeity itself becomes intelligible by virtue of its separation from matter¹.' By a similar abstraction even primordial matter is transformed into a sort of object of cognition, as an imperfect quiddity or nature. In fact, it is impossible to form a concept of what kind soever, unless the object has been freed from its individualizing conditions. To borrow the words of St. Thomas, 'Since things outside the mind are material and particular, and since everything whatever is intelligible in proportion to its separability from matter; it is manifest that an entity, so far as it is in particular matter, is unintelligible, save by abstraction from individualizing conditions. For a stone cannot be conceived, unless it be abstracted by the intellect from individuation and time and other like things².' So much, at all events, of abstraction and of consequent universality of cognition, is necessary for whatsoever science or Discipline. As, then, sensible and material things are not intelligible in the concrete, but become so by process of intellectual abstraction which frees them from their existing individuality, and as things are the more intelligible in proportion to their remoteness from matter; it follows, that the Supreme Science will occupy itself exclusively with those forms or determinations of Being which are entirely immaterial and, consequently, of wider universality. Furthermore, as spiritual Being is the highest and noblest form of the immaterial and is of the same nature with

¹ 'Cum ipsa forma corporeitatis sit intelligibilis per separationem a materia.' *In 1 Sentt. Dist. viii, Q. 5, a. 2, c, init.*

² 'Cum res sint materiales et particulares extra animam, et unumquodque sit intelligibile secundum quod est a materia separabile, manifestum est quod res secundum quod est in materia particulari intelligi non potest, nisi abstrahatur ab omnibus conditionibus individuantes; lapis enim non potest intelligi, nisi per intellectum abstrahatur ab hoc, et nunc, et aliis hujusmodi.' *Opusc. LVI, (aliter L, Tract. 2^o), init.*

the Soul which is the Subject of all science, and as perfectness of cognition principally depends upon a natural similarity and, as it were, sympathy, between object and subject, according to the well-known axiom that 'everything that is received is received according to the nature (or measure) of the receiver;' it follows that spiritual Being, so far as it is discernible by the mind of man, will form the principal object of Metaphysics amongst the determinations of Being.

From the above exposition certain practical conclusions are deducible, which will serve to solve the problem proposed at the beginning.

1. The Metaphysical science does not concern itself with the lower and more specific forms of material things, as such. Their consideration is proper to Physics.

2. Neither does it contemplate those necessary laws of Space and Time, or of continuous and discrete Quantity, to which the visible Universe is subject; for these are the proper object of Mathematics.

3. It does not investigate the *special* nature, constitutives, causes, energies, of the material world or of man, AS SUCH. These are reserved for Cosmology and Anthropology.

4. But it considers the quiddities or essences of all beings in their *more general* relation to each other by similarity of determining forms¹.

5. It is conversant *only* with the essences of things, not with their concrete existence; and in this it is principally distinguishable from Cosmology and Anthropology. Nevertheless it treats of Existence itself; yet not as a *fact*, but as an *essence* that demands scientific determination.

6. It primarily investigates the Transcendentals, i.e. those Realities which not only permeate, but *transcend*, or go beyond, the Aristotelian Categories. These are Being and its three Attributes.

7. It specially contemplates, so far as the weakness of the human mind will allow, the nature and properties of pure Forms, or, in other words, of spiritual substances. The Angelic Doctor is our authority for this assertion. 'For though it is the office of a

¹ 'Metaphysicus considerat etiam de singulis entibus, non secundum proprias rationes per quas sunt tale vel tale ens; sed secundum quod participant communem entis rationem; et sic etiam pertinet ad ejus considerationem materia et motus.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), Q. 5, a. 4 ad 6^m.*

Metaphysician,' he observes, 'to treat of all realities, in so far as they are included in the notion of Being, nevertheless it behoves him in an especial manner to treat of separated' (i.e. from matter) 'and spiritual entities; because in them is preserved with greater perfectness the idea of Being, which is *the* object of Metaphysical research; as also because their special and particular nature is hidden from us, and therefore there can be no special science which considers them¹.'

8. It principally treats of Him Who is infinite Being, infinite Spirit, First Cause. For this reason Aristotle calls it the Divine Science, as we have seen.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The object of Metaphysics ought not to be limited to *real* Being, but should be extended to all Being, *logical* as well as real. The reason for this opinion is gathered from the declarations just made. For we are told that the object of the highest science will be the highest or most universal concept. But Being, as inclusive of the logical and real, is wider in its periphery than only real Being by itself. Therefore the former, and not the latter, is the proper object of Metaphysics. This argument is further confirmed by reference to the nature of logical entities. Some of them are mere forms of thought or, as they have been termed, *Second Intentions*. Now, as to these, though it is true that Logic investigates their special nature, divisions, interconnection; yet the fact remains that in themselves they are real entities and, as such, claim a place in the object of Metaphysics. There are other logical entities, again, which go by the name of *entities or creations of the mind*, (*entia rationis*). They are easily to be distinguished from Second Intentions, for that they are to a certain extent representative of real beings; but they are not real concepts, either because these real objects, which are many, are represented as one by a purely logical synthesis, or because the representation of the real object is indirect and material, while the formal representation is logical. A *heap of stones* or a *mass of sea-weed* is an instance of the former;

¹ 'Licet enim Metaphysici sit de omnibus agere sub ratione entis; praecepue tamen ad ipsum pertinet tractare de rebus separatis; tum quia perfectior ratio entis in eis salvatur, quam Metaphysicus quaerit; tum quia in particulari eorum natura occulta est, unde non potest de eis scientia particularis esse.' *Opusc. XLII, (aliter XXXIX), cº. 6.*

the second class comprises all negative and privative ideas. But there is no science which expressly deals with these *entities of the mind*; consequently, if they are excluded from the sphere of Metaphysics, they will be entirely neglected.

ANSWER. As to the principal argument it suffices to say, that such a generalization of real and logical Being under a higher universal is impossible. True it is that the word, *Being*, is in use without the modifying addition of adjectives, *real* or *logical*. But when it is so employed, all the world understands it to mean real Being; so that a man would excite general astonishment who should formally predicate Being of a *syllogism* or *hypothetical judgment*. Whenever it may be found necessary to apply the word to logical Forms, a modifying epithet is added, such as *logical* beings, beings or entities *of the mind*. The fact is, that there is no form common to real and logical Being; so that there is nothing which can be predicated univocally of both. Is there, then, any analogy between the two, which may suffice in some way to reduce them under one common concept? Certainly not; for, in order to this, it would be necessary that they should be Analogates of attribution, which presuppose a real Form somehow common to the two; whereas in the present case the only analogy that offers itself, is an analogy of proportion¹. In other words, there is nothing truly common to logical and real entities respectively; though there is *that* in the former which bears some proportion of resemblance to the other. And now to proceed to the first member of the confirmatory argu-

¹ There are three kinds of analogy according to the Ideology of the School: (i) that of *proportion*, which intercedes between *analogates* (i.e. the subjects of analogy), whose determining Forms, as expressed by the analogy, are absolutely distinct and diverse, yet bear a sort of geometrical proportion to each other; as, for instance, the *idea of foot* as applied to a *man* and to a *mountain*. (ii) There is the analogy of *attribution of the first class*, which exists between analogates whose denominating Form is the same, but the said Form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate, extrinsic to the rest. Thus, to take an example, *healthy* is attributed to *man*, to the *pulse*, *food*, and *bodily exercise*; but in *man* alone is the form of health intrinsic, while in the rest it is a mere extrinsic denomination derived from the relation of these latter to the form of health in *man*. (iii) Lastly, there are analogates of *attribution of the second class*, whose determining Form is not only the same in all (which is common to analogy of attribution of whatever kind), but also *intrinsic* in each; nevertheless, in the principal analogate it is absolute and independent, whereas in the secondary analogates it connotes a necessary relation to, and dependence upon, the Form as determining the principal analogate. Of this last kind are all concepts which cover the Infinite and the finite, the concept of Being as referred to substance and accident, &c.

ment ; Second Intentions, or pure forms of thought, may be considered either objectively as *logical forms* or subjectively as *psychical facts*. As the former, they constitute the object of Logic ; as the latter, they formally belong to Psychology or Ideology, but are included materially, forasmuch as they are real entities, in the object of Metaphysics. In order to afford a clear and satisfactory answer to the second member of the same argument, it will be necessary to take the two classes of these *entities of the mind* separately. A *collective* concept may be regarded either materially or formally. Materially, it is representative of real entities, each one of which accordingly is included of necessity under real Being. Formally, it is a synthesis of these many into one. The former is real, the latter logical. The synthesis, then, as being a logical entity, belongs to Logic or Ideology ; the material reality which it presupposes, viz., diversity and multitude in Being, are subjects of Metaphysical inquiry. Negative and privative concepts may likewise be considered either formally or materially. Formally, they are concepts of a negation and, therefore, logical ; materially, i.e. as representative of a real entity which is removed by the formal negation, they are, *indirectly*, objectively real, and this their indirect object finds its due place within the sphere of real Being. Thus, to take an instance, *Irrational* is either a negative or privative attribute according to the nature of the subject which it is supposed to modify. It is purely negative, when applied to a stone or plant ; privative, when applied to a man or a course of action, because in these last cases reason ought to be there, but is not. Now this concept, *Irrational*, is formally a negation of reason and consequently purely logical, because negations have neither essence nor objective existence. Materially, however, and indirectly it is real ; because it represents that *reason* which it removes by negation from the subject. Care must be taken in this place not to confound *words bearing a negative form* with negative or privative concepts ; for there is no necessary equivalence between them. The reason of this is, that the negation of an imperfection (which latter is itself a negation), may be the expression of a positive perfection ; just as two negatives make an affirmative. Thus, *Immateriality*, *Infinity*, *Unchangeableness*, *Impassible*, *Indestructible*, and the like, are negative grammatically ; yet notionally they are *directly* representative of simple perfections. Nevertheless, even in this class of *quasi* negative attributes, if we look exclusively to the form of the

concept or the mode of representation, and not to the object represented, it must be owned that it is likewise logical.

II. It is further objected that the present Proposition, as interpreted by the subsequent declaration, is not self-consistent. For to Metaphysics has been assigned the highest place among the sciences, and it has been admitted that God is its principal object; yet at the same time it is enounced that Being is the adequate object. But these respective assertions are scarcely compatible. For, seeing that Metaphysics is Queen among the sciences, it postulates the noblest of objects; indeed, it is a point which is accepted in the declaration as a sort of first principle. Yet God, the Infinite and infinitely Perfect, must necessarily be a nobler Object when considered exclusively in Himself, than when included under a transcendental concept which embraces indifferently the Infinite and the finite. For whatever is gained by the latter in extension, is more than counterbalanced by its defect of comprehension; and Metaphysics does not ambition for its objects the widest universal *as such*, but only, because, in the cognition of the finite, the more universal the concept, the deeper and more lofty is the truth which it represents. Nor can it be urged in reply, that God is beyond the capacity of unassisted human thought; because it stands confessed that He is the principal Object of this science. Hence it is prone to conclude that God, not Being, is the adequate Object of Metaphysics. For that science which has God for its adequate Object, considers Him immediately as He is in His own Nature; whereas the science which includes Him together with all other entities within the periphery of its object, does not contemplate Him as He is in Himself, but puts before itself some vague and general idea or form of being, which is common to the Infinite and finite. Finally, such an abstract concept of Being as is here supposed, would seem to be impossible; since it is difficult to imagine any common form or abstraction which should include in one the Infinite and the finite.

ANSWER. It must be admitted that, if an intuitive knowledge of the Divine Nature could be naturally attained by man, the objection would hold good. But such is not the case. On the contrary, Metaphysics, since it proceeds by the simple light of unassisted reason, is compelled to content itself with those imperfect ideas concerning God, which it can gather from His partial manifestation of Himself

in His works. Therefore, in the actual order of human cognition, it can be, that real and true concepts of Being and of certain determinations of Being, (such as Substance, Intellect, Will, Spiritual Being), should be found to embrace the Infinite and finite, and even to exhibit a more intimate proportion and agreement between God and His creature than is occasionally discoverable between one creature and another. For though, between the essential Nature of God as It is in its own infinite Perfection and even the noblest of His creatures, there is an immeasurable distance, not to be bridged over by any effort of human thought; yet there is no such chasm between that which we can know of God from His works by reason, and the perfections of the creature. It must not, however, be imagined that this possibility to human science of reducing the Infinite and finite under one common concept and denomination of Being and of sundry determinations of Being, supposes on the part of such conceived Form or determination any *priority of nature* in regard of the Infinite; however it may postulate a *logical* or *conceptual* priority. Far from this, it will appear, in the course of our Metaphysical investigations, that these determinations and Forms are without exception so absolutely and pre-eminently attributes of God, as to exclude the possibility of their being *univocally* predicated of God and the creature; though they are predicable according to analogy of attribution of the second class.

III. It is urged that Substance, not real Being, is the adequate object of Metaphysics; and for this reason. Every science, regarded subjectively, is a habit of demonstration; and all demonstration proves the Attribute or Passion of the Subject by means of the immediate and proper causes of both. Accordingly, the Attribute, as such, cannot enter into the object of any science. Now, Being is either Substance or Accident, and includes both. But Accident is the Attribute of Substance; and ought not, therefore, to be included in the object of Metaphysics.

ANSWER. As will be seen in the next Book, there is a real objective concept of Being which is common to Substance and Accident. If so, Substance is included under Being. Unless, therefore, Being were its object, Metaphysics would not be the Supreme Science. And though it must be allowed that Accident is the property of Substance and is essentially ordered towards its information; yet it is equally true that it is not *only* this. For it has a proper entity or

essence of its own, and, *as such*, is justly included in the object of this science.

IV. It is, lastly, argued that real Being, as such, cannot be the proper and adequate object of the noblest natural science. For the idea of Being is of all ideas the most vague, imperfect, and confused. But an object of this description is unworthy of any science; how much more, then, of the highest and most noble.

ANSWER. It is undoubted that the primitive and direct idea of Being, such as children form of it, is that which has been described in the objection. But the same can in no wise be predicated of the reflex and philosophical concept of Being. On the contrary, it will be seen that it contains within itself every perfection, absorbs into itself all that is intelligible, and reduces to unity the multiplicity of finite truths¹.

¹ 'Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi; secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent.' 1^{ae}. iv, 2, *in c.* Cf. *ibidem*, *ad 3^m*.

CHAPTER III.

COROLLARIES.

THERE are certain Corollaries, deducible from the doctrine exposed in the preceding chapters, which may throw further light on the nature and prerogative of the Supreme Science ; and so lessen, if not remove, the reasonless prejudices that have been excited against it in more recent times.

I. *Metaphysics is a real science, inasmuch as its formal object is eminently real.* In order to render the declaration of this Corollary more clearly intelligible to the reader, it will be well to define two philosophical terms, borrowed from Ideology, which will be used in the sequel. These terms are *formal concept* and *objective concept*. By *formal concept* is understood the subjective conceptual representation of a given object in the mind of the thinker. The *objective concept*, on the contrary, does not formally embrace in its meaning the representative act of the intellect, as one might have been led to suppose from the name ; but, in the case of real ideas, is that reality in the object which is covered by the formal concept, to the exclusion of all those other forms, properties, and modes, with which the reality so represented may be united in the object or, in other words, as it *de facto* exhibits itself in the concrete. By way of illustration we will suppose that a man, who is engaged in the study of magnetism, turns his thoughts upon the *magnet*, more particularly in its connection with the art of navigation. He naturally enough calls up the idea of its *polarity* ; and this is his *formal concept*. Now, there are many other realities in the magnetic needle which he might have included in his intellectual representation of it, had it so pleased him. There is the *substantial metal*, the *shape*, and *size*, the *qualities of hardness, cold, colour*, the *balance on the pivot*, the *power of attracting iron* ; all of which are

co-existing in the same object, any one of which he might have called to mind without troubling himself about the rest. In the instance given, however, the formal concept represents the *polarity* of the needle and nothing else; and, consequently, this property in the case supposed will be the *objective concept*, as being that reality in the object which the mind has selected for cognition. It has been named by Averroës the *intentio intellecta*, i. e. that Form in the object, over which the intellect has stretched itself for the purpose of representation.

And now that it is safe to use these terms with freedom, let it be said that the formal object of Metaphysics is real, because the objective concept of Being is eminently real. Nor is there any show of reason in the objection, that the formal concept of Being does not explicitly cover all the reality discoverable in the material object. For this is only saying that Metaphysics, like all the other sciences, deals with the abstract; and that it lays aside the lower and ulterior determinations of Being, in order to arrive at the noblest and most fundamental truths. This there is no one who would care to deny. But the point of contention is, that there is a definite *reality*, common to all objects of cognition, which corresponds to the concept of Being. This granted, the object of Metaphysics is real, and Metaphysics a real science.

II. *The supremacy of Metaphysics over the rest of the sciences is a necessary consequence of its special line of abstraction.* It has been already remarked,—but the tendencies of modern thought would seem to require that the statement should receive additional prominence by its repetition in this place,—that objects become more intelligible, in proportion to the completeness of their separation from matter and sensile perception. As the Angelic Doctor observes, ‘since a Being possesses intelligence, for the reason that he is unencumbered by matter, it suits with this, that those entities should be most intelligible which are most separate from matter. For the Intelligible and the intelligence must needs be proportioned and in the same genus, since they are *in act* one. But entities the most separate from matter are such as not only abstract from determinate and individual matter, as all natural or physical forms do, conceived as universals, . . . but from sensile matter altogether,—and that, not by a mere logical distinction, as mathematical entities; but in their own essence, like God and pure Intelligences. Hence that science, which devotes itself to the consideration of

such entities, is evidently the most intellectual, and Chief or Queen of the rest¹. This Corollary is further confirmed by the fact that the object of Metaphysics is all-embracing in its universality.

III. *Seeing that Metaphysics is the Architectonic Science, it directs and regulates the rest, which depend upon its strength in ultimate analysis, and are bound to accept its guidance in all that goes beyond their own particular subject-matter.* This proposition, which is implicitly contained in former declarations, has received the sanction of all philosophers worthy of the name, and, in particular, of the Philosopher and of the Doctors of the School. The former puts it very plainly. He describes Metaphysics as 'the most principal and most authoritative of the Sciences, and, as such, it is not right that the other sciences, forasmuch as they are her servants, should give back a word to her in answer².' The Angelic Doctor follows in the wake of Aristotle, and may fairly stand sponsor for the School. 'Wisdom, that is Metaphysics,' he says, 'directs all the sciences³.' So again, with greater explicitness: 'In all sciences and arts which are grouped together in one, the end of the ordered group is evidently the end of that science or art which has right of command and government over the others; just as the art of navigation, to which the end or purpose of the ship, i.e. the employment of it, belongs, has the right of ordering and superintending the art of ship-building. Now, the First Science holds just such a position in relation to the rest of the speculative sciences. For all the others depend upon it; inasmuch as they accept from it their first principles, and a defence against such as deny those principles⁴.' Once

¹ 'Nam cum unaquaque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, . . . sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae. Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime videtur esse intellectualis, et aliarum princeps sive domina.' *Meta. Proem.*

² 'Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη, καὶ ἥ ὡσπερ δούλα οὐδ' ἀντιπεῖν ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας δίκαιον. *Metaph. III (aliter IV), c. 2.*

³ 'Omnes scientias sapientia, scilicet metaphysica, dirigit.' *In 2 Sentt. d. xxiv, Q. 2, a. 2, ad 4^m.*

⁴ 'In omnibus scientiis et artibus ordinatis, ad illam videtur pertinere ultimus finis, quae est praeceptiva et architectonica aliarum; sicut ars gubernatoria, ad quam pertinet finis navis qui est usus ipsius, est architectonica et praeceptiva respectu navifactivae. Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas.

more, he adds that it 'pronounces judgment on the *conclusions* of the other sciences, as well as on the first principles of the same¹.'

Now, these declarations, more particularly the last, seem at first sight to clash with the admission previously made, that the relation of Wisdom or Metaphysics to the other sciences is not that of a subalternant to its subalternates; and that, as a consequence, the first principles of these latter are immediate and self-evident, so that they are in no need of help from any other science whatsoever. Moreover, if it be true, as has been said, that the inferior sciences are free within their own proper sphere; how can it be true that Metaphysics has the right to '*pronounce judgment on their conclusions?*' The contradiction, however, is more imaginary than real, as a closer examination will evince.

The question cannot be more fittingly introduced than by a statement of the principal difficulty which has been raised against the doctrine maintained in the present Corollary. According to the philosophy of Aristotle and of the School, there is an intellectual habit which is simply intuitive of first principles. This habit is called *Understanding* (*voûs*); and each particular science has its own particular habit of understanding. Now the *habit* of understanding only facilitates the *act* of adhesion to self-evident truths; for the *faculty* is an essential element of the mind. The intellect is as powerless of resistance in presence of an axiom which it intues, as is a needle within range of the magnet. Nothing, consequently, can strengthen the certainty with which the understanding embraces a first principle; so soon as the truth has been duly presented to it. On the other hand, the habit is formed simply by a repetition of acts within the sphere of the particular subject-matter. There is, then, neither need here nor room for guidance or direction from without. But, again, a demonstrative conclusion cannot be made more certain or subjectively evident by any foreign control. For, since the syllogistic laws are immutable and universal; the certainty of the conclusion must invariably follow the nature, and be measured by the degree, of certainty and evidence which belong to the premisses. Such being the case, it is difficult to conceive how the first principles and demonstrative conclusions

Nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia et directionem contra negantes principia.' *q. Gentes, L. III, cº. 25, p. med.*

¹ 'De conclusionibus scientiarum dijudicans et de principiis earundem.' I. 2^{ae}, lviii, 2, ad 2^m.

of any but a subaltern science can either require, or fairly admit, the interference of any other science, however excellent.

Nevertheless, in the following ways Metaphysics has a regulative authority or a strengthening influence over the other sciences; and such direction no more interferes with the autonomy of the latter, than the hegemony in Greece interfered with the internal freedom of the confederate States. First of all, it provides the other sciences with a clearer, more definite, more complete knowledge of the terms which constitute the essential elements of their first principles. For it is the exclusive province of the Metaphysical science to dive into the essential nature of the primary determinations of Being, such as Substance and Accident, the Material and Immaterial, Whole and Part, Faculty and Act, continuous and discrete Quantity, &c., and to instruct in the philosophical meaning, value, and relation of each. Now, as first principles have no middle term by which the connection between their extremes may be ostensibly demonstrated, (otherwise they would no longer be first principles), and as on this account the connection between the extremes must be made manifest to the intellect by evidence inherent in the terms themselves; it follows, that the science which mainly contributes to the comprehension of these latter, will contribute also, however indirectly, to the certain cognition of the first principles themselves¹. Then, again, Metaphysics adds directly to the subjective evidence and the certitude of these first principles. For it does not treat them as first principles, but submits them to a certain process of demonstration. It can thus do what the intuitive habit cannot attempt; since this latter does not give additional certainty to the act of assent, but only imparts a facility and promptitude in eliciting it. It must not, however, be imagined that Metaphysics augments the subjective evidence of the understanding *intensively*, but *extensively* only, in that it adds evidence of another kind. It is obvious that nothing could add to the degree of certainty with which the understanding, fully provided from within and from

¹ So St. Thomas: 'Veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum. Cognito enim quid sit totum, et quid est pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est magis sua parte. Cognoscere autem rationem entis vel non-entis, et totius, et partis, et aliorum quæ consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam. . . . Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis sicut etiam aliae scientiae, sed etiam judicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes.' 1. 2^o, lxvi, 5, ad 4^m.

without, assents to these immediate truths in each given case; but the Supreme Science adds a new evidence and a new certitude, the result of a *quasi* demonstration¹. Thirdly, Metaphysics determines and distinguishes the subject-matter of the other sciences. For there is no science, save the First, which does not presuppose its subject, and proceed at once to demonstrate the Passions or Attributes peculiar to it. But Metaphysics determines the subject of each as well as of its own; not, of course, by virtue of any arbitrary edict, but because it alone is capable of assigning the real limits to the determinations of Being by reason of its profound cognition and, in many cases, comprehension of their nature. It is true that a particular or inferior science may be able after a manner to precise its own subject-matter; but it can never establish effectual lines of demarcation between itself and its fellow sciences, because it is not conversant with other objects than its own. But this Metaphysics, because of its universal grasp, can do for it. Fourthly, the Supreme Science has the right to judge the conclusions or seeming conclusions of the other sciences, when they extravagate beyond their own assigned boundaries. The harmony of the Sciences and inferior Disciplines can be preserved then only, when each Science and Discipline keeps religiously within the boundaries of its own subject-matter and formal object. *Non omnia possumus omnes*, is an axiom equally applicable to the sciences and to men of science. While each science works in its own field, it adds to the common stock of knowledge and becomes an auxiliary to Wisdom. But, if every science permits itself to run riot in its neighbours' property,—if Osteology out of its dry bones constructs a Theology,—if comparative Anatomy must needs trespass on Cosmogony,—Physical science, on Psychology,—Mathematics, on Logic,—if Physics and applied Mathematics are to meddle with the essential nature and constitutives of Being,—if Metaphysics is to change its teaching at the beck and call of each whimsical theory of the hour; then anarchy is introduced into the commonwealth of sciences, the old landmarks are subverted, vagabond Caprice is liberated from prison, and *Truth* is expatriated. Lord Monboddó

¹ 'Inferiores scientiæ nec probant sua principia nec contra negantem principia disputant; sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientiæ. Suprema vero inter eas scilicet Metaphysica, disputat contra negantem sua principia, si adversarius aliquid concedit; si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo disputare, potest autem, solvere rationis species.' 1^o, i, 8, *in c.*

long since protested against these excesses in one particular direction; and the passage is well worthy of a place here, since his caution is not unneeded in our own time. 'With respect to Experimental Philosophy, as it is called'—these are his words—'I am far from denying the use of it; but I would have the gentlemen who value themselves so much upon this kind of *manual* Philosophy to distinguish betwixt the *phenomena* and the *principles* of Nature, and not imagine that the latter, as well as the former, are objects of sense, to be discovered by chymical analysis, or seen through a microscope. They should consider themselves as the historians of nature, who, by great attention and minute observation, investigate facts which escape the vulgar, and may be called the *anecdotes* or *secret history* of nature. But history and philosophy are two things very different; though I admit that, without the knowledge of facts, it is impossible to form any system of natural philosophy that is not a mere dream, being no other than the imaginations of men, in place of the wisdom of God. But nothing deserves the name of philosophy, except what explains the causes and principles of things¹.' These remarks may be deemed perhaps by some a trifle too polemic in their tone; but they will prove of service in calling attention to an important fact. In the general confusion of the Sciences and Disciplines consequent upon our past and present neglect of Metaphysical studies, physical investigation has made itself notorious for the constantly repeated transgression of its due limits; and it is necessary, therefore, to remind the student that Physics has for object to observe the phenomena of the material world and to discover their laws. But it is not its province to theorize on its own facts and laws, or to undertake a reconstruction of Cosmology, Anthropology, and Metaphysics. In the one it is our legitimate teacher; for the other it can show no genuine certificate. Here, then, it is that Metaphysics has a right to interfere with the conclusions of other sciences. Lastly, in the inferior, and more particularly in the subaltern, sciences, it may occasionally happen that the conclusions are sophistical and false; either because the assumed principles are infirm, or because the supposed demonstration is based upon a misunderstanding of one or other of the terms that are embodied in these principles. And here, too, Metaphysics has the

¹ Introduction to *Ancient Metaphysics*.

supreme right of sitting in judgment on principles at once and conclusions.

IV. *The Metaphysical Science is SPECIFICALLY one.* To some this proposition may appear so self-evident, as to render its insertion here among the Corollaries unnecessary. Yet it is not without its difficulties. For, if it be true that all habits receive their specification from their formal object; it stands to reason that a specific diversity in the formal object must postulate a specific diversity of habit. Now, it seems at first sight undeniable, that there is a specific diversity in the formal object of Metaphysics. For, in the first place, there is apparently a specific distinction between entities which are *positively*, and those which are *negatively* immaterial. Then, among such as are positively immaterial, the soul of man is surely specifically distinct from pure Intelligences, and both from God. Granting, therefore, (what cannot easily be denied), that Metaphysics is one science *generically*, it is hard to understand how it can be *specifically* one.

ANSWER. This objection would doubtless be a grave one, if our cognition of things immaterial and, in particular, of pure Intelligences and of God were immediate or intuitive; so that we could naturally gain a knowledge of them as they are in their own simple essence. But *de facto* our knowledge of them, as has been before hinted, is not intuitive, but mediate and syllogistic. It is principally deduced from facts patent to sensile perception, invariably from *facts* of some kind. As a consequence, the attributes which we assign to immaterial and spiritual Being are homologous with those which we have obtained by a purifying abstraction from material Being; of which the word *Immaterial* is itself a sufficient instance. If to this is added, that God is infinite Being, the infinitely One, True, Good, Perfect,—that is, that He contains all finite reality within Himself, not by identity, indeed, but by equivalence and, beyond that, by infinite excess; it will be seen that to human intelligence these objects, however distinct and diverse, are revealed truly, albeit imperfectly, by primary determinations and attributes, in which all Being participates. Thus the specific unity of the formal object is preserved; and, therefore, the specific unity of the corresponding scientific habit.

BOOK II.

BEING.

INTRODUCTION.

THERE are objects of intuition, and those the noblest and most intelligible, which defy all definition and are often rendered obscure by efforts to describe them. They are to the intellectual, very much what light is to the physical, order. Light permeates everywhere, exercises an energy second to none in the vital mechanism (so to say) of nature, is the most necessary medium by which material things become present to sense, may be said to measure time for us, and to span space; yet, who can define it as it is in itself? What description of it is there, that does not cast a cloud over its simplicity?

Among these objects of purely intellectual intuition, Being occupies the foremost place. It cannot be defined; because definition supposes the intersection of two distinct and separate wholes, whereas Being includes all genera, differences, and species within its infinite extension. To whatever Category you may betake yourself,—in whatever field of the knowable or intelligible you may will to work,—if you should even venture upon the mysteries of a supernatural Revelation, Being confronts you everywhere and gathers all up into itself. It is the child's first thought; as it is the last unfinished, because unfinishable, thought of the philosopher. Yet it is in itself so utterly simple, so undifferential, that any description even of it is extremely difficult.

Nevertheless the effort must be made; and perhaps one of the easiest introductions to a subject which will occupy us throughout this second Book will be, to consider Being as it offers itself to the awakening intelligence of a child.

Let the child, then, teach us our first Metaphysical lesson. There is no word more habitually on its lips, in the first months of its attentive curiosity, than that of THING. 'What is this thing?' it asks at all hours and of all persons. It wants to know about every *thing*. A plant, an animal, a watch,—each is to it a *thing*, till

subsequent investigation begins to limit the sphere of extension by enlarging that of comprehension. It sets to work at differentiating; and thus resolves Thing by degrees into its Categories. It is true that this notion of the child is vague, confused, destitute of notes; but the object is one with that which Metaphysics claims as peculiarly its own. And thus the commonest experience teaches us, that the human intellect naturally intues the universal, not the singular; and that, though compelled by its substantial union with a body to perceive through the latter, its proper home is with the former. This *Thing*, then, is another name for Being.

It is likewise called *QUIDDITY*, because it is the answer to the question, *What, or of what nature is this?* (*Quid sit hoc?*)

Similarly, it is called *ESSENCE*, because it reveals the Being (*esse*) of a thing.

Again, it is called *NATURE*, by which, in the language of Metaphysics, is understood the principle of operation or of the tendency of each thing towards its constituted end.

Finally, in still more technical phrase it is sometimes called *FORM*, to signify the perfection and certitude of each thing¹.

Now, most of these denominatives imply a resolution of this most simple idea into two elements, as it were,—*the informed*, and the *informing form*. For, as in carpentering, the wood is the subject informed, and the proportions, parts, of a table are the form which gives to the thing its nature as a table; thus, Being is composed and decomposed by thought, so that it is considered as a thing, a reality and at the same time as that something by which it is a thing, or a reality (*res*); which in the School is expressed by the words *Quod* and *Quo*. *Thing* directly seems to represent the former, *Quiddity*, *Essence*, *Nature*, *Form*, the latter; yet with delicate shades of difference. For *Quiddity* and *Essence* are an absolute expression of determinate reality; while *Nature* and *Form* seem to denote more definitely a referribility to the subject or concrete thing, though in different ways. For *Form* exhibits the reality by which a thing is what it is in itself, *Nature*, the source of its essential energies; forasmuch as all things that are, have their own proper energy and operation.

It will be useful in this place to introduce the reader to a two-fold signification of the word, *Being*, borrowed from the Philosopher

¹ See St. Thomas, *De ente et essentia*, *Opusculo XXX (aliter XXVI)*, c. 1.

and repeatedly referred to by the Angelic Doctor¹; as it will serve to define the subject-matter of this science with greater precision. *Being* may be taken to mean anything about which an affirmative judgment can be pronounced; or it may mean that which is resolvable into the ten Categories. The former sense, which is sometimes called *copulative Being*, includes, as will easily be seen, mere creations of the reason (*entia rationis*). Thus for instance, the mind forms the judgment, that *Blindness is a physical evil*. Now it is plain that, in this judgment, *blindness* is treated as Being; for that which bears a sort of resemblance to real Being is attributed to it, and the whole proposition represents an undoubted objective truth. Yet blindness is not real Being, so neither is evil; for the one is equivalent to privation of sight, the other to privation of good. But privatives form a special class of negatives; and one can easily understand that a negation can have no objective reality. The latter of the two meanings indicated above has been already considered in the earlier part of this chapter. Real Being may be described, then, as a being which either exists or may exist outside of, or beyond, the objective concept of the intellect. It, and it alone, is the direct and formal object of Metaphysics.

Is it therefore to be understood that the Metaphysical Science altogether ignores those beings which are creations of the intellect, —the *entia rationis* as they are called? By no means; such a conclusion is contradicted by experience. As a fact, it does investigate their nature too, but indirectly only and for its own purposes; first of all, because of a certain proportion which they bear to real Beings, and in order that a clearer conception may be formed of their logical formality, as distinguished from, and related to, their fundamental reality; secondly, that it may be the easier able to set forth the properties of real Being, which otherwise could with difficulty be explained; thirdly, that it may declare the nature of that reality which is the foundation of many of these logical Beings, and the intimate reason for the adaptation of the said reality to such a function.

There remains yet another diversity of meaning in the use of the word *Being*, which is of the gravest importance. It has been reserved to the last, because it suggests the division of the subject-matter which will be adopted in the present Book.

¹ For instance, in *Opusculo supra citato, ibidem*; 1^o, iii, 4, ad 2; 2 *Sentt. d.* xxxiv, a. 1, in c; *q. Gent. L. i, c^o. 12, Nec hoc, &c. &c.*

Being may be understood either *nominatively* or *participially*. In the one case it is assumed as a noun ; as for instance, when it is said that *Being is either infinite or finite*. In the other case it is assumed as a participle ; as when we say, *Being in London, he went to the Tower*, or, *There was not a single being at home*. In this second example the word is grammatically nominative, but conceptually participial. Now, as a noun, it abstracts from all conditions of time and represents pure Quiddity or Essence, free and unconditioned ; as a participle, it is the mood of a verb and, like all other moods, with the possibly partial exception of the Infinitive, connects Time and is modified by its conditions. But Time is the measure of contingent existence which it presupposes. Consequently, Being in its participial use denotes, or at least connotes, contingent existence. Two realities are thus set before the mind, to wit, *Essence* and *Existence*. Not that these two are capable of real separation, independently of intellectual abstraction or precision ; but, notwithstanding, there really is in each existing entity an Essence, Quiddity, or Nature, and there is in like manner Existence by which that being, whatever it may be, has a place in the actual order outside its causes. Though, therefore, you cannot *physically* divide the one from the other ; yet, in the instance of contingent being, there is enough of Metaphysical distinction in the idea, to demand a parallel distinction in the objective concept. As a fact, the reality which is covered by the formal concept of Essence is, in and by itself, really distinct from that other reality which is covered by the formal concept of Existence. Hence, there is a sufficient foundation for conceiving these realities as distinct, even though in the concrete they are identical.

It is true that all real Being has a transcendental relation to existence ; and, consequently, in every conceivable case real Being either exists or may exist, i. e. there is at least no repugnance in the idea of its existence. But it is by no means necessary that the concept of Being should include actual existence as its indispensable note. And here it would seem as though the illustrious Spanish philosopher, Balmez, has fallen into a serious exaggeration, if not fatal error ; for he maintains that ‘ pure being, in all its abstractness, is inconceivable without actual being ; it is existence itself¹.’ But, if this be true, if the most abstract idea of Being necessarily include

¹ *Fundamental Philosophy*, Bk. V. ch. 4. -

actual existence and is identical with it; then, there is no room for the doctrine of possibility, and the Universe is God¹.

To resume: two realities, really distinguished yet not two in the concrete but one, offer themselves to human thought: *Essence*, *Existence*. How are these two separable in idea? What is precisely the objective concept which is represented respectively in the two notions of Essence and Existence?

Being, in its nominal signification, represents the Essence, Quiddity, or Nature of a thing, without taking count of its existence actual or possible. It does not *negative* existence, be it well understood; it simply *precinds* from the idea of existence. On the contrary, Being, in its participial signification, represents Essence, Quiddity or nature, as specifically determined to actual existence *hic et nunc*. It stands for a being that really exists, outside its proper causes. Now, unless Being *essential* and Being *existent* are synonyms, it is plain that there is a *hiatus* somewhere. For participial Being is a determination of nominative Being, and there must therefore be another determining member,—Being, that is, which is not actually existing outside its causes; otherwise, there is no determination at all. Yet it has been stated that all Essence has a transcendental relation to the being of existence; which seems to exclude the missing member. These seeming contradictions can easily be reconciled. For there is a determination opposed to existing Being; and that determination is, *possible* Being. But possible Being does not exclude,—on the contrary, in its very essence it includes,—possible existence, as will be more clearly seen later on. Merely possible Being, therefore, is a Nature or Essence, which does not *actually* exist outside its causes; although there is no intrinsic or extrinsic repugnance to its existing in the future. Accordingly, it is distinguished from nominative Being, in that the latter holds itself, so to say, in a state of indifference with regard to existence, while the former positively excludes actual existence. It is equally distinguished from participial Being, in that this latter formally includes, while the other as formally excludes, actual existence.

Thus, then, three transcendental concepts emerge from the foregoing analysis, mutually distinct, yet in close correlation. There

¹ See, in confirmation of these two distinct significations of Being, St. Thomas, *Quodlibet*, Q. 2, Art. 3.

is, first of all, *nominative* Being, widest in its periphery and complete in degree of abstraction; which is proximately determined to two distinct concepts included within it, *actual* or *existing* Being, that is to say, and *possible* Being. Whence it is clear that the two latter are what might be called divisions, (if such a word were strictly admissible), of the former. The three together, will constitute the subject-matter of the present Book. There is one difficulty, however, that can be urged against such a method of treatment, which ought to be mentioned. It may be objected that possible Being is excluded from one member of the two primary determinations of nominal Being; for the Infinite positively excludes the idea of mere possibility, as contradictory to its essential perfection. This is most true; yet on the whole it has seemed more conducive to clearness of arrangement and more in harmony with the rational order of these concepts, to include the Metaphysical doctrine touching Existence and Possibility in this Book, and not to defer its consideration, as is generally done, till the treatise on the Infinite and Finite has been given. One reason is, that, as existence under some form or another, either explicitly or implicitly, accompanies Being; in *such sense* it may be said to form an equation with it, at least in measure of extension. Another reason is, that *negative* possibility,—by which is meant a possibility that does not exclude existence,—is conceivable by abstraction, of all being, and therefore has a share of its own in the full extension of nominative Being. For even necessary and infinite Being, since it must necessarily be actual, may *à fortiori* be conceived as *negatively* possible, though not as *merely* possible. A third reason is, that a knowledge of the nature of possibles is a necessary preliminary to a right understanding of subsequent discussions touching contingent Being and the fundamental complex principles of Metaphysics.

In the present Book, therefore, the nature of nominative Being will form the first subject of investigation. After this will follow a discussion as to the nature, constitutives, and foundation of merely possible Being. The last subject of enquiry will be touching the nature of existence in itself, and in its relation to possible as well as actual Being.

CHAPTER I.

ESSENCE.

THE reader may remember an observation made further back, that Being, like every other whole, may be considered either absolutely or relatively; that is, it may be regarded either as expressive of an abstract nature as it is in itself, or as expressive of a *quasi* logical universal, and connoting, therefore, a relation to the inferior wholes which are included under it. Being, under this twofold aspect, will form the subject of the following Propositions.

PROPOSITION III.

The objective concept of Being is one, and therefore prescind from all and any of the particular modes by which Being is determined.

PROLEGOMENON I.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to call attention to the fact, that Being is here understood in its *nominative* acceptance.

PROLEGOMENON II.

The particular modes alluded to, are such as determine Being, for instance, to Substance or Accident, to Necessary or Contingent Being, and so on.

At first sight the truth of this Proposition may seem to be all but self-evident; and yet, on closer inspection, it will appear to be beset with no ordinary difficulties. For, if the objective concept of Being be one; it follows that there is one form, common to all Beings, which constitutes the objective concept. Yet it is hard to understand, how Being in the Infinite and Being in the Finite can have any common form. The same may be said of Substance and Accident; for the latter is diminished and essentially habitual

Being, and is, accordingly, described by the philosophers as *Being of Being*.

Then, again, Being must be contracted to its inferior determinations by itself; for, outside of itself, there is nothing. But how can Being contract itself to such opposite determinations as the Infinite and Finite, the Necessary and Contingent, Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect? Something *must* be added to establish the distinction; yet nothing can be added. Furthermore, how can Being be abstracted from the particular modes which determine it; seeing that those modes must be Being and, in consequence, are included in the objective concept of Being?

Lastly, if the objective concept of Being be one; *that* unity must be either univocal or analogous. But it is commonly acknowledged to be analogous; and if so, there is either a contradiction in terms or, at the least, no true and proper unity. For analogy includes either distinct and diverse forms which have only some similarity of proportion; or distinct and diverse habitudes of relation to one form. To affirm unity of objective concept to the former, i.e. to analogy of proportion, is a contradiction in terms; the unity of the latter, or analogy of attribution, is no true and proper unity.

Such are some of the difficulties which surround this perplexed question. In a matter so subtle and intricate, it will be well to imitate the method of treatment adopted by Suarez, and begin with that which is easier and more clear. Wherefore,

i. It is obvious that the *formal* concept of Being is one; and that, consequently, it prescind from the particular modes by which Being is determined.

Personal experience will attest the truth of this enunciation. For it needs but a cursory examination of one's own ordinary course of thought to perceive, that there is an idea of Being which is one in itself, and perfectly distinct from all special contractions or determinations of the same. We think of God as a Being, of a man as a being, of an animal or a plant as a being. The idea conveyed by the word *Thing* is identical with the former; yet we conceive of *virtue* as a thing, of a *yard* as a thing, of an *hour* as a thing, of *fatherhood* as a thing. Now of these the first is a quality, the second a quantity, the third in the category of *When*, the fourth in the category of *Relation*, all of them accidents. Again, the preceding examples are all taken from entities, either actually

existing or, at least, conceived as such. But we also conceive of a *future eclipse* as a thing; just as *Antichrist* is conceived as a being. Yet these are not actual, but merely possible. Furthermore, on reflection it will be seen that this concept, applied to Being Infinite as to Being finite, to Accident as well as Substance, to things possible as to things actual, prescind from all the particular modes by which Being is determined; otherwise, it could not be equally conceived of all, but would be limited to that particular determination, or those particular determinations, by which its representation is contracted. This receives additional confirmation from the fact of which we are conscious that, in conceiving Being of these objects, we are conceiving some one Form common to them all,—that our idea is throughout one and the same. It may be hard to express what we mean in words, because the idea is so luminously simple; but it never enters into our mind to doubt that, through all the multiform applications of the concept, we understand one and the same thing,—something which is neither God, nor Substance, nor the actually Existent; though all three, as everything else that is real, are it. This argument is confirmed by the evidence of human speech, as representative of thought. For in all languages, ancient as well as modern, there will be found to exist some word which is equivalent to our English word *Being* or *Thing*. These two words correspond to the Latin *Ens*, *Res*; and, like them, are representative of the same object. Now, as words are mere conventional symbols of thoughts; it is plain that a word stands for a concept, which must have preceded the former, at least in priority of nature. It is true that some words are equivocal, that is, are expressions of more than one idea. But this arises from the poverty or imperfection of a particular language; and is strictly local. Equivocals are not Catholic; hence the impossibility of rendering puns into a foreign tongue. Anyhow, in the words now under consideration, there is no equivocation. If it be true, then, that a word is necessarily the symbol of an idea; is it conceivable that the human family should have retained in all languages some word which is equivalent to our *Being*, if there were no corresponding unity of concept or idea?

Again; on a closer examination of the idea, it is seen to differ from all other ideas by its extreme simplicity. In every process of continuous abstraction, the Ultimate, beyond which thought cannot traverse, is Being. All other ideas are finally resolved into it.

Take the Porphyrian tree; if the mind essays to ascend higher than the highest *Genus*, which is Substance, it reaches Being. It is the same if the line of abstraction be pursued in any other Category. *There*, in like manner, beyond the highest Genus, outstretches the transcendental realm of Being. In all other ideas there is an evident contraction. Such or such a Being with such determining notes is represented. But in the idea of Being itself all modification, all determination of whatever kind, has disappeared. Such is the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. 'As in those matters,' he remarks, 'which are the subject of demonstration, there must be an ultimate reduction to certain self-evident first principles; so must it likewise be in any investigation touching the nature of any and every *thing*. If it were not so, in both cases there would be an *infinite process*; and in this manner all science and true knowledge of things would come to nought. But that which the intellect first of all conceives as best known—that into which all its other concepts are finally resolved,—is Being; as Avicenna says at the commencement of his *Metaphysics*. Hence all other conceptions of the intellect are necessarily formed from some addition made to Being¹.'

Lastly; there can be no conceivable impediment on the part of the human intellect to the unity of this formal concept of Being. For, as it can by its innate power synthesize many distinct material objects into one universal; so has it the power of abstracting from one and the same material object many forms which are really distinct in themselves, though not distinct as they exist in the concrete and individual. But more of this somewhat later on.

It follows from the arguments already advanced, that the formal concept of Being is not only one in itself, but that it is distinct from all other formal concepts which represent certain determinations of Being; so that it does not admit of multiplication in its relation or referribility to more determined or contracted concepts. For in this its transcendental relation to inferiors, it retains that unity of idea which originated in a similarity common to all the objects included under it,—a similarity in this, that each and all have an essence, namely, that by which they must be what they are or may be. Unless this were so, *then*, as soon as the idea of *Being* were referred to its determinations, its unity would be destroyed and it would be broken up into as many formal concepts as there

¹ *De Veritate*, Q. I, a. I, in c.

were determinations into which it could be resolved. In other words, it would be impossible to think of Being in relation, say, to *Substance* or *Animality*, without the idea of Being melting down into the two formal concepts of Substance and Animality. But our own self-consciousness gives the lie to such a hypothesis. For no one supposes that when he pronounces—to take another example, Accident to be Being, he is guilty of an identical judgment. On the contrary, he is conscious that when he thinks *Accident*, he has one formal concept; and that when he thinks *Being*, he has another.

It is, further, sufficiently plain that this formal concept of Being is not merely nominal, but real. For, however true it may be, that the majority of men now, as before, often form concepts by the aid of language; yet it is no less true, that the first formal concept must have existed prior to the first imposition of the word. It is impossible even to conceive of a word which was not originally adopted as the expression of some thought; consequently, the thought must have preceded the adoption of the word. Again, as all thought is the act of a faculty which is wholly determined by its object, the existence of a thought presupposes the objects which it represents; and a purely positive thought, a positive, objective reality.

ii. The objective concept of Being is one, so as not expressly to represent Substance or Accident, God or creatures, but all together under one common form; in so far forth as they resemble each other and agree in Being.

This conclusion follows, as a sort of Corollary, from the position just established. For if there be one formal concept, there must necessarily be one objective concept; since the two are correlative, and the former receives its determination entirely from the latter. All thought is purely representative; and a representation, *qua* representation, is defined by the thing represented. If, therefore, the representative thought be one, the object of the thought must be one also. Furthermore: it is evident that, as a fact, all real entities, however widely separate from each other by excellence of essence on the one hand and by imperfection of essence on the other, have a true likeness to one another and come together as it were, in that they are beings, or in other words, in that they are essences, quiddities, natures, *some things*.

Yet again: since the formal concept of Being is one; the objective concept, or reality formally represented, must be one

somehow. Now, *that* unity can only be either entitative, or collective, or formal. But it is evidently not entitative or numerical; because such unity is individual, whereas Being is common to every real entity. Neither is it collective; for how is it possible that the very simplest of all formal concepts should represent an aggregation of distinct forms or natures? It is simply inconceivable. Nothing, therefore, remains, but that it should be formal; i. e. that the form, represented and covered by the intellectual idea, should be one.

iii. The objective concept of Being prescind from those real determinations of Being which are included under it, however primary and simple they may be. This conclusion follows as a necessary consequence from the preceding; yet, further discussion will not be out of place, as serving to throw additional light upon an abstract and difficult subject. Let it be once supposed that the objective concept of Being includes within itself any of its subject determinations or contractions, it will be necessary to determine how far this inclusion is to go. What rule or principle can be reasonably suggested, which shall justify the inclusion of one determination and the exclusion of another? But, if no such principle is forthcoming; at what point is the outstretching of this objective concept to stop? Let it be granted, for the sake of illustration, that *Substance* is explicitly included in the objective concept of Being, and *Accident* is admitted only as a sort of dependent upon the former. If Substance, why not *animated* Substance? if animated Substance, why not *rational*? Where is the line to be drawn? Yet, if no line can be drawn, it must follow from the hypothesis which is now under discussion, that the objective concept of Being is a simple agglomeration of every actual and possible reality in its distinct entirety, without the shadow of a reason for the agglomeration; than which nothing more irrational can well be conceived.

Nevertheless, there is a grave objection to the above positions, which must not be passed over in silence. For, on the one hand, it is maintained, that this objective concept of Being is real, i. e. that it is something in the object of thought; yet, on the other, it cannot but be admitted that, *as* it is in that object, it is really identical with ulterior determinations of Being. How, therefore, can the *objective* concept of Being avoid including those particular contractions with which it is *objectively* identified? If, on the other

hand, this separation and quasi-purification should be assigned to an intellectual process ; it seems to follow, as a consequence, that the objective concept of Being is logical, not real.

In answer to this difficulty, it will be readily granted that the precision or abstraction of the form of Being is an act of the intellect ; and that such a precision or abstraction exacts no previous distinction or real precision of forms in the objects themselves.

The mind of man, owing to the imperfection of its range and of its mode of operation, does not embrace the whole of its object in one complete and adequate intuition. On the contrary, it represents the object to itself, as it were, by parts, i. e., it represents the object now under one form, now under another. These forms are objective realities. Further, they are realities in the object conceived ; but no one of them exhausts the total of reality comprehended in the object. Moreover, because they are represented by distinct ideas, they are *conceptually* distinguished from each other ; whereas, *in the material object*, there need be no distinction between them.

Now, these objective forms, with the exception of such as embrace purely individual notes, find their counterpart in other objects ; i. e., there is a greater or less number of beings, or entities, that are like one another in this or that note or property ; which gives occasion to the human mind of forming a universal concept representative of such note or property. This similarity may extend itself over a wider range in one case than in another ; till it ends at last, as in the case of Being, by including all reality within the periphery of one form.

It stands to reason that, as the similarity extends over wider ground, and the resultant concept rises higher in its universality, the number of distinctive forms or realities belonging to the object or objects must proportionally disappear from the intellectual representation, and the idea must become less and less comprehensive and distinct as it increases in extension. Nevertheless, that which is represented remains a reality ; and a reality the more important and essential to be understood, because of its universality of range. To recur to an illustration of the same subject in the preceding Book : The man who was regarding a ship through his telescope, first of all perceived nothing but a dim shadow with an outline ; then he saw it was a ship of some sort or other ; then, that it was a brig. At last (as he gets the proper focus), sails, masts, rigging, colour

appear, even to the name of the vessel and of the port to which it belongs. Now, who will be inclined to deny that the first shadowy outline was a reality, as far as it went? If it had not been a reality, it could not have been seen. Of course, no comparison is perfect on all sides; and this illustration squares more nearly with the direct, primitive, intuitions of the child, than with the reflex intuitions, or cognitions rather, of the philosopher. Yet it sufficiently serves the purpose for which it has been introduced here, which was to show that, because an idea does not represent the *whole* reality of the object, it by no means follows that what it does represent, is not real. More than this, it serves to explain how the reality, so represented, may be considered by the human mind apart and distinct from other realities with which it is nevertheless objectively identified; just as the mere shadowy outline of the ship was first presented to the eye without the appearance of mast or sail or rope, though that outline was really identical with all of these in the object. As it is necessary to insist more particularly upon this latter point, in the investigation of the difficulty before us; let us analyze a process of ideas in the concrete. Suppose a mind that is stimulated to thought by the sensible presence of a fuchsia. By its faculty of abstraction it is enabled to consider this particular fuchsia as a *thing*, as a *substance*, as a *bodily substance*, as a *living body*, as a *vegetable life*, as a *plant of such a definite order or species*; lastly, as having such and such individual notes which distinguish it from other fuchsias. Now *Being*, *Substance*, *Body*, *vegetable life*, such a given specific nature, are in this fuchsia really all one and the same; yet who will deny that its *Being* is a reality, its *substance* a reality, its *body* a reality, its *vegetable life* a reality, and so on for the rest? Moreover, *Being* is distinct *in itself* from *Substance*, and *Substance* from *Body*; though they are all three identical *in the fuchsia*. It does not follow, therefore, because to various distinct concepts of one object there is no responding distinction in the material object conceived, that the objective concept, or the object as represented by the formal concept, has no distinct reality. On the contrary, it is plain that *Substance*, though identified with *Body* in the fuchsia, is *in itself* a reality distinct from *Body in itself*; otherwise there could be no substance other than corporeal, which only the extremest materialist would maintain. As a fact, unless this truth of Ideology be admitted, there is an end at once to the objective value of all universals,—of all, even

physical, classification. Both the one and the other would degenerate into mere logical figments; and science of whatsoever kind would become impossible.

The doctrine which has been here enforced is strikingly confirmed by the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. 'That which is common to many,' he says, 'is not anything over and above the many, save to the reason only; just as animal is not something distinct from Socrates and Plato and other animals, except to the intellect, which apprehends the form of animal, stripped of all its individualizing and specifying notes; for man is that which truly is animal. Otherwise it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there would be more animals than one, to wit, animal itself in common, and man in common, and Plato himself. Wherefore, much less is Being itself in general, anything other than the existing things themselves, save in the intellect alone¹.' That is to say, the human intellect may represent Plato to itself either as Plato, or as a man, or as an animal; but between Plato and man and animal *in Plato* there is only a distinction of reason. For, *in him*, the animal is the same as the man, and both are the same as the individual Plato; though animal, considered in itself absolutely, is something really distinct from man, regarded in the same way. In like manner, Being, in a particular object, is really identical with the individual nature of that object, as, for instance, with its body, with its life, and so forth; though Being *in itself* is really not life, nor body, nor substance, but something distinct from and above all the three.

It follows, that the objective concept of Being is formally one and free from all the determinations or contractions which it virtually contains, not only in itself absolutely, but also in its relation or referribility to its inferior determinations. For, if its form or nature be one; it must preserve that same unity of form in all those more determinate forms of which it is predicable.

DIFFICULTIES.

Of the three principal difficulties proposed at the outset of this Proposition, the second and third will find their discussion and solution in the Propositions immediately to follow.

IN THE FIRST DIFFICULTY it was argued, that a common form or Essence which shall include in one the Infinite and Finite is an

¹ *g. Gent. L. I, c. xxvi, 4^o.*

impossibility, by reason of the absolute disproportion between the two. For Being, as it is in God, and Being, as it is in things contingent, are so opposed to each other, that there is hardly a single attribute predicable of the one, whose opposite must not be predicated of the other. Moreover, the Infinite in itself, and of itself, seems to exclude the possibility of its being associated with the Finite under a common denomination.

ANSWER. It has sometimes been said, by way of an answer to this difficulty, that there is indeed nothing in common between God and His creatures, if the Infinite Being be apprehended as He is in Himself; but that such intuitive cognition is not given to man in the actual order, or indeed as by any exigency of man's nature. God is only known to man in and by His works; and such imperfect apprehension of Him admits a certain community of form between the Infinite and the Finite as conceived by human thought. But this supposed answer, so stated, sins by defect alike and by excess. It sins by defect. For, though it is true that human concepts of God are primitively derived from His creatures, yet they do not rest there; otherwise, they could never reach His infinity. And, though the nature of that Infinity is incomprehensible,—nay more, inapprehensible,—by human thought; yet, by process of reason, human thought does climb to the FACT that God is infinite; and when it has reached so far, the difficulty of concluding the Infinite and Finite under one common form, confronts it. It sins likewise by excess; since it can never be admitted, that there is nothing whatsoever that is in any way common between the Creator and His creature. For, as universal efficient Cause, God must at least virtually precontain whatever there is of Being and Truth and Goodness in His works; so that there is at least a *causal* unity such as exists,—to make use of a most unworthy illustration,—between the spider and its web. Yet such an intimacy of relation, which is suggestive of a certain community by way of communication on the one hand and of acceptance on the other, is *objectively* true; and therefore, perfectly independent of the subjective imperfection of the concept.

The only satisfactory answer to the objection is based upon this last observation. It may be safely said that God, in the act of creation, primarily *in order of nature*, produced outside Himself beings or essences which were partial, imperfect, graduated imitations of His own infinite Essence. These creatures are distin-

guished in their various orders, and, within one and the same order, are distinguished from one another by individual differences. Yet all agree in this, that they are *essentially* of such sort as they are, i. e. that they are essences or quiddities as opposed to nothings. In like manner God is Essence: therefore, there is a conceivable term of thought really and truly common to the Infinite and the Finite. Neither does it affect the legitimacy of such abstraction, that there is an infinite chasm between essence in the Creator and essence in the creature; because that chasm intervenes as the consequence of the determination of Being, and therefore cannot affect the antecedent abstraction, unless it should be that between the Essence of the Infinite and that of the finite there is no common note of similarity. But it is plain that, as a fact, there is; and, consequently, it is possible to abstract Being from the Infinite and Being from the finite in such wise as that both are Being. It is not strictly true, therefore, to say that there is no proportion of any kind between the Infinite and the finite; for there is a proportion due to the causal dependence of the latter on the Former. This conclusion is amply confirmed by the testimony of experience; for, while we attribute Being to God and Being to all finite entities severally as well as collectively, we are intimately conscious that, by Being, we understand a definite reality which is truly attributable to the Infinite and proportionally to the Finite, yet expressly exhibits neither. Of Being in this fulness of its universality no contradictory, or rather opposite, attributes can be affirmed, since it is equally indifferent to either extreme; and that opposite attributes are predicable of the primary determinations of Being, which are themselves necessarily opposites, is only the fulfilment of a natural anticipation.

The difficulty of finding a common term to include Substance and Accident, by reason of their disparate nature, is a much less serious one than that which has just been treated. For, though it is true that Accident is diminished Being, or, as it has been termed, *Being of Being*, because in its essential nature it exhibits a transcendental relation to Substance, and cannot *naturally* exist unless by inhesion in the latter; nevertheless, there can be no doubt that, over and above its relation to Substance, it has an essence or quiddity of its own, in which that relation, or referri- bility rather, is included. There is no one who would deny that colour, e. g. or a moral action, or a thought, is *something*; though

neither of these is Substance, since it cannot possibly exist according to the natural order by itself, but postulates some subject of inhesion. And yet there have been some philosophers who, led captive by this difficulty, have not scrupled to maintain that Being *immediately* and expressly represents Substance, while including Accident by a sort of virtual concomitancy. But, surely, such a theory contradicts the witness of common experience; for, to many minds, more especially to such as have been exclusively engaged in the study of physical phenomena, it may still be questionable whether Quantity is a Substance or an Accident. They have been unable to determine the point for themselves; yet evidently they have not a moment's difficulty in deciding that Quantity is something. But what does this show, if not that both the formal and objective concepts of Being, or *something*, are distinct from, and independent of, the formal and objective concepts of Substance or Accident? Further: If Being immediately represents or exhibits Substance, while including Accident by virtual concomitancy; then, in whatever case Being is predicable, there, by reason of the supposed identity, Substance with its virtual inclusion of Accident will be predicable also. But everything is either Being (i. e. something) or nothing. What follows? *God* is Being; therefore He is Substance with its virtual inclusion of Accidents. *Smoothness* is something; therefore it is a Substance with its virtual inclusion of Accidents. The *substantial union between soul and body* is evidently something real, and really distinct from either soul or body, of which it is the union; therefore, this union in and by itself is Substance with its virtual inclusion of Accidents. But, plainly enough, these several propositions are simply absurd.

PROPOSITION IV.

Being is contracted to its inferior determinations, not after the manner of composition, but by way of a more express concept of some being contained under transcendental Being. Both concepts are simple, and only differ in their greater or less determinateness; and consequently the more determinate cannot be resolved into two elements, of which one is common with, the other outside of, the less determinate.

This Proposition gives a solution of the second difficulty exposed in the introduction to the last Proposition; and, as it is the most

knotty and important of all the difficulties that bear upon this branch of the subject, there may be an advantage in repeating it with more of circumstance.

If, then, the objective concept of Being is one, and if, as such, it prescind from all and each of the determinations or contractions of Being; it is not easy to understand how it is possible, having reached this transcendental height, to descend again. In the determination of *Genera* to their subordinate *Species*, the descent is made by means of a foreign element, so to speak, in the shape of a *Differentia*. Accordingly, it may be said that while the *Genus*, as *Genus*, is simple; its subordinate *Species* is the result of a logical composition, viz. of the *Genus* + the *Difference*. Thus, to take an instance, let *Animal* be the *Genus*. In order to determine it, the *Difference*, *Having four feet*, is added to it; and the result of the addition is, the contraction of the *Genus* and constitution of the species *Quadruped*. Now, it is evident that the differential addition is not essentially included in the objective concept of *Animal*, but is something adventitious and, as it were, external to it; otherwise, neither tables nor chairs could have four feet without becoming animals, while reptiles, birds, and fishes, could not be animals without being furnished with the same number of feet. The objective concept, therefore, of *Quadruped* is composite and admits of resolution into two forms: the one of which identifies it with its genus, while the other, as extraneous to the *Genus*, constitutes its specific nature. So far all is plain.

But now, turn to Being. How is it to be determined? Extraneous addition is impossible; for that which is added is either something or nothing. It cannot be nothing; for the addition of nothing is no addition. Therefore, it is something. But something is Being; therefore, it is Being that determines Being. But this is impossible; for $\text{Being} + \text{Being} = \text{Being}$, and nothing else. Moreover—to turn now to the supposed determination itself—how is it to be resolved? Take Being as its *quasi Genus*; what is the remaining element? It is either Being or nothing. But Being, prescinded or divided from itself, is no resolution into really distinct components. The question therefore returns; How can Being be contracted to its subordinate determinations, on the hypothesis that its objective concept is one prescinding from every more determinate form? It may be said, indeed, that Being is not a *Genus*, and, consequently, is incapable of division by whatsoever

Difference. This is most true, and follows from its being a Transcendental. But the fact does not solve the difficulty; it only expresses it in other words. So far the above argument is irrefragable, that Being is incapable of division and consequent determination by *anything extraneous added to itself*; that it cannot, therefore, form part of a composite, but permeates through all its graduated contractions, even to the singular and individual. And thus much is freely conceded in the present Proposition. But can Being be no otherwise determined or contracted? Such is the question which awaits solution.

By way of introduction, let the ship appear on the scene again, as viewed through the telescope. When it has been brought to the exact focus, and all its parts and most minute appendages can be clearly and distinctly perceived; there is no real addition made to that obscure extended figure which first appeared within the field of view. The one is not a composite, which admits of resolution into that uncharacterized other and a new, extraneous element, by which the former has been differentiated. For, however numerous the parts of the vessel, however complete the arrangement of sails, ropes, pulleys, and the rest; they are all covered by that original, extended figure. There is nothing whatever new. The only difference is, that the object originally presented itself to the eye as a merely extended something; whereas, afterwards, it is seen in its specific characteristics as a ship belonging to a certain particular class. So, again, the mind may consider the quantity of an object in its indeterminate universality; and it may afterwards conceive it as determined by the *inch*, or the *foot*, or the *yard*, or the *pole*. Now, in these latter concepts, no real *Differentia* has been added to Quantity; for an *inch* is simply quantity; so is a *foot*, so a *yard*, so a *pole*; and no addition has been made save to the clearness and definiteness of the representation. Similarly, in the degrees of a Thermometer, no real addition is made to the essential nature of *Heat*; the degree only determines the intensity and precises the concept. Such is the way in which Being is contracted to its inferior determinations. The objective concept of Being and the objective concept of Substance, for instance, are not in one and the same object two distinct realities: but it is the same reality in both, with this sole difference; that in the former concept it is objected to the mind in its simplest, most confused, and indeterminate form; whereas in the latter it is

contracted and determined by the distinguishing mode of *Perseity*. Accordingly, both concepts are equally simple. It is utterly impossible to resolve Substance into *Being* and *Perseity*, as two distinct components of one composite; because *Perseity* is a determination of Being, and therefore Being. Consequently, it determines Being and thereby contracts it; but it cannot really differentiate it.

The illustrations already given abundantly show the possibility of such a manner of determination or contraction; and this is sufficient to justify and establish the truth of the present Proposition. For the concept of Being is not really prescinded from its subordinates, but merely by an abstraction of the mind. Now, such abstraction can be effected only in one of two ways; either by a *quasi* separation of one from the other, as of the Formal from the Material, or of the Material from the Formal, whereby one grade is separated off from another, as in the instance of Genera and Differences; or by a sort of confused cognition 'by which the object is considered not distinctly and determinately as it really is, but according to a certain likeness or agreement which it has with other objects. But this agreement, so far as the concept of Being is concerned, exists in things as regards their entire entities and modes: and therefore the confusion, or prescindent nature, of such concept is not the result of a separation by which one grade is cut off from another, but simply of a cognition which cuts off a confused from a distinct and determinate concept¹.' To admit the former method of abstraction in the case of Being, involves the subject in all those inextricable difficulties which have been pointed out at the commencement; whereas the latter enables us to understand how Being can be one in its objective concept, prescinding from its determinations, and yet can be contracted to those subordinate determinations, without the introduction of an extraneous Difference.

The above explanation is in accordance with the teaching of St. Thomas:—'That which the intellect conceives as most known,' he remarks, 'and into which it resolves all its concepts, is Being; so that all the other concepts of the intellect must necessarily be formed by addition to Being. But nothing can be added to Being as of a nature extraneous to it, in the way that Difference is added to Genus; because every nature whatsoever is essentially Being.

¹ Suarez, *Metaph. disp.* ii, § 6, n. 10.

So that certain things are said to add to Being, in this way, viz., that they express its mode, which is not expressed by the simple name of Being.' And again, in the same place, 'Substance does not add to Being, any Difference; but by the word, *Substance*, is expressed a special mode of being¹.' And, once more, in a passage which Suarez has passed over, 'Substance, Quantity and Quality, and that which is contained under them, contract Being, by determining Being to some definite Quiddity or Nature².'

PROPOSITION V.

Real Being, in its most universal acceptance, is not generic or univocal; but analogous according to the analogy of attribution of the second class.

That Being is a whole, and a whole of infinite potentiality, must have been made sufficiently apparent during the course of these previous discussions. An idea which embraces the Infinite together with the Finite can admit of no *beyond* in the extension of its universality. Everything that is real is included under it. But it is of the highest importance, in the interests of a science which has this Transcendental for its adequate object, that the true nature of its potential universality, or distributiveness, should be accurately ascertained; for—not to allude to other advantages—such knowledge is absolutely necessary to a scientific acquaintance with those primary determinations which the Metaphysical Science embraces within the periphery of its subject-matter.

Now, it cannot be doubted that Being, as a *formal* concept, must be representative of one only Form, either composite or simple, as the case may be. Otherwise, it would be difficult to vindicate its own unity; which is determined by the unity of the object represented by it. Therefore Being, as an *objective* concept also, must be one. So much was established in the third Proposition. But the difficulty at once arises touching the *possibility* of any such unity. For it would seem inconceivable that any Form could be discoverable, which should equally embrace the Infinite and Finite. Moreover, it is all but universally admitted by philosophers, that Being, as a potential or relative whole, is not univocal. But it cannot be equivocal; for, besides that equivocation presupposes

¹ *De Verit. Q. i, a. 1, in c.*

² *1st, v, 3, ad 1^m.*

plurality and diversity of forms, its unity is only verbal, and as a consequence equivocals cannot become an object of science properly so called. Nothing remains, then, but that the unity which is claimed for the concept of Being should be a unity of analogy. But, if so, the third Proposition must be abandoned; since all unity of Form in such hypothesis would disappear, at least as soon as it is referred to the analogates which it comprises. These analogates, however, are in the instance of Being, its primary determinations; consequently, either the Metaphysical Science ceases to be one, or it must be limited to the simple consideration of Being and its three attributes as coincident with the chief analogate. For Analogy is either of *proportion* or of *attribution*. In analogy of proportion there are absolutely two Forms; and the only discoverable unity between them consists in a certain similarity between these two Forms, which can be represented by a sort of Geometrical proportion. Hence they are called analogates of proportion. In analogy of attribution there is but one Form indeed; but that Form is only intrinsic in the principal analogate and, therefore, properly belongs to it alone; while it is predicable of the secondary analogates by extrinsic denomination merely, and by reason of their connection with the Form as inherent in the principal analogate¹. But, if Being is to be understood as an analogate of this kind; then, considered under its primary determinations, it appertains only to the chief, and is a mere denominative as applied to the rest. These latter could hardly, therefore, be included in its real, objective unity. Such was the third and remaining difficulty, which still awaits its solution.

It will be well, for the sake of greater precision, to follow the order of discussion as suggested in the enunciation of the thesis.

I. The exposition of the preceding Proposition has already prepared the way for the verification of the FIRST POSITION here maintained, viz. that *Being is not a Generic whole*. For it is indivisible by any real Difference; since whatever mode may be introduced for the purpose of determining it, that mode is either Being or nothing. But it belongs to the essential nature of a Difference, that its form should be extraneous to the form which it divides. Yet Genus is a logical whole, which admits of division by a real

¹ See note to Difficulty I, under the Second Proposition.

Difference, and is thereby contracted to some subordinate species. Moreover, in the constitution of its species, Genus plays a subordinate part; for—to speak metaphysically—it constitutes the material element only, while the Difference constitutes the formal. But if a Metaphysical division (supposing it to be possible) were instituted of any of the determinations or contractions of Being, Being would not limit itself to the quasi-material part alone; it would claim the whole, seeing that outside of Being there is nothing. To put this argument in form:—

That universal, which is common to many diverse species, not only in so far as they exhibit one and the same essential characteristics, but likewise as specifically constituted by those opposite notes which distinguish them from each other, cannot be Generic.

But Being, in its most universal acceptation, is such a universal; and, therefore, cannot be Generic.

II. *Being cannot be a univocal whole.* For it is the peculiar property of a univocal, that the form which it exhibits should be *equally* predicated of all and each of its subordinates; in other words, that the form represented should be predicable as absolutely and indifferently of one as of the other. But it is impossible that such should be the case in the instance of a form which includes the Infinite with the Finite, Substance with Accident, and so on. For Being in the Finite has a necessary and essential dependence on Being in the Infinite; and Being in Accident has an essential relation of dependence on Being in Substance. Wherefore: That universal which is not equally and independently predicable of each and all its inferior determinations, is not univocal.

But Being cannot be equally and independently predicated of its subject determinations; and, consequently, is not univocal.

III. *Being, in its universal acceptation, is an analogous Whole.*

This position naturally follows from the two preceding. For, since Being cannot be equivocal, it must either be univocal or analogous. But it has already been proved that it is not univocal. It remains, then, that it should be analogous.

But, for the sake of further elucidation, let the proposition be submitted to independent proof. In whatsoever case it happens that a Whole is predicated of its subject-contents severally, so that it is primarily and principally referred to one of those subordinates and only secondarily and subordinately to the rest; that Whole is analogous. Such a Whole is Being. For, considered in its deter-

mination to the Infinite, it enjoys a super-excellence of perfection such, that there is an infinite principality and wholly comprehensive reality in it; whereas, determined to the Finite, it seems almost to lose itself in its intrinsic imperfection and diversity of characteristics. Moreover, in the former, it is absolute, independent, unlimited; in the latter, it is transcendently relative, dependent on, and limited by the Infinite. Observing due proportion, a similar inequality exists in the relation which Being bears, so to speak, to Substance and Accident.

It is evident, therefore, that Being is analogous in some way or other.

IV. *Being is an analogous Whole according to analogy of attribution of the second class.*

Though there is this infinite diversity between Infinite and finite Being; yet is there a distinct similarity and agreement between them, which is a sufficient foundation to the human intellect for conceiving a form which shall include them both in common. Nor is it to be supposed that this form or essence is a purely logical concept; since it corresponds with a reality truly present in both extremes and, therefore, as an objective concept it can and does exist outside the objective representation of the intellect, although it is, if one may say so, as confused and indeterminate as is the formal concept from which it receives its denomination. The language of mankind has universally consecrated such phrases as *The Divine Essence*, *The Essence of finite beings*, *The Essential nature of man*; in which and similar phrases there is evidently an element common to all, viz. *Essence*, *Essential nature*, and the like, while there is also a determining mode.

Consequently, the general consent of men recognises Essence as a form in some sort common to God and His creatures. Moreover, when Essence is conceived and predicated of the finite, everybody understands by it something that is really intrinsic in such entities; and not a mere extrinsic denomination, borrowed from Essence as belonging to the Infinite Supreme. But this Essence has very different bearings and characteristics, when determined to the Infinite, from what it has, when determined to the finite. In the former it is absolute, independent, in its own right, as it were; in the latter it is intrinsically dependent on the Infinite Essence, relative to it. The Divine Essence *is*, because it *must be*, and is wholly unchanged by the position of those finite

entities which issue forth from the fulness of Its omnipotence ; whereas finite essence *must be*, only because it *is*, and depends for its form, existence, continuance, on that Prototypal Essence which is the sufficient Reason and efficient Cause of its entire being. Thus then in form :—

That Universal, which is apprehended as apt to represent several analogates according to a common Form proper and intrinsic to each, although that Form in the principal analogate is essentially absolute, while in the secondary analogates it is essentially relative to, and dependent upon, the Form in the principal analogate, is an analogous Whole according to the analogy of attribution of the second class.

But Being, in its most universal acceptation, is such a universal ; and, therefore, is an analogous Whole according to attribution of the second class.

The doctrine here exposed is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For, in one place, he lays it down that ‘The nature of Entity (or Being) is of one Form in all things according to analogy¹ ;’ where he evidently takes it for granted that this one Form is intrinsic in each of the analogates. Elsewhere he says that ‘All univocals are reduced to one first, which is not univocal but analogous. And that first is Being².’

NOTE I.

Before proceeding to the discussion of Possibles, which will form the subject of the next chapter, it will be necessary to consider somewhat more precisely the nature of Essence. For, as Being in its nominative acceptation is equivalent to Essence, it may truly be said that Metaphysics is the science of Essences. It is well to remind the reader once more, that Being or Essence, which constitutes the object of Metaphysics, does not *exclude*, as neither does it *include*, existence. It prescind from existence altogether. But this explanation gives birth to a difficulty which must be removed out of the way at once, before going further. For it might seem at first sight as though Being in its nominative, and Being in its participial signification,—in other words, Essence and Existence, or more properly, That which has Essence, and That which exists,—express two distinct concepts, or two distinct modes of Being,

¹ 2 *Sentt. d. 1, a. 1, in c.*

² 1^o, xiii, 5, ad 1^o.

which logically divide some one common concept. Therefore, the ultimate universal has not yet been attained. Such an assumption, however, would be erroneous; because it supposes that Being in its nominative acceptation *positively* prescind from existence, whereas it only does so *negatively*. These two significations do not exhibit two distinct modes or ways of Being; but are one concept of more or less abstractive precision. The case is exactly parallel with that of Genus to its species. There is no concept common to these two, save Genus itself as the Undetermined in the Determinate. Suarez illustrates this truth by a very apt example. In Ethical Science it is not unusual to meet with the word, *Disposition*; which may mean either, in general, any quality disposing the will to elicit moral acts of a particular kind with facility, or such quality as merely inchoate and imperfect. In the former case it is a Genus, including within its limits habit and disposition specifically so called. In the latter case, it represents a determined species. Yet no one would say that these two grades of Disposition are in such contra-position as to constitute two distinct concepts which could become opposite members of a higher universal. The one is, in fact, nothing but a more determinate representation of the other.

This established, the question recurs, What is this Essence after all, of which so much has been said? Can anything like a definite notion of it be given? Essence is that Form by which Being is Being (*esse, ens, essentia*); and real Essence is that Form by which the intellect conceives real Being to be constituted; so that Being is apprehended as the *Quod*, Essence as the *Quo*. So far, so good; but these in themselves are mere words, and it is of the highest importance to know what is meant, first of all, by *Essence*, then again, by *Real*.

Anything like a definition of Essence is impossible; for, as a Transcendental, it has no material and formal parts,—in logical phrase, it can have no Genus and Difference. It can only, therefore, be explained or described either according to the relation it bears to its properties and effects; or in order of cognition. Considered in its relation to its properties and effects, the Essence of a thing is the foremost, fundamental, intrinsic principle of all the properties and actions, or operations, which naturally belong to it; in other words, its nature. It is that which, by virtue of the act of being, is understood to be primarily in anything,—that which

makes it to be fundamentally what it is,—that which intrinsically constitutes it in its own special order. Measured by its relation to thought, it may be described as that which is expressed by the Definition.

There is precisely the same difficulty in regard of the word, *Real*. Definition is impossible. Nevertheless the term may be described *positively* as well as *negatively*. *Negatively*, a real Essence may be said to be that Essence which includes no self-contradiction, or is not a mere creation of the intellect. *Positively*, it may be described either *à posteriori* or *à priori*. *À posteriori*, real Essence is the principle or root of real operations. *À priori*, it may be explained as an Essence that can be produced by God and made actual. Hence it may be represented as Essence which of its own nature is fitted for being or existing. Such is the teaching of Suarez; and it has been adopted from him almost word for word¹.

NOTE II.

The following is a summary of the doctrine which has been exposed in this chapter:—

i. Being has two significations, according as it is taken nominatively or participially. In the former sense, it stands for Essence; in the latter, for *existing* Essence. These two are not contradistinct concepts, but one and the same objective concept under more or less determination. The former includes the latter in the same sort of a way as a Genus includes its Species; therefore the two are not reducible under a common and more universal concept.

ii. Being, in its nominative use, is the proper and adequate object of Metaphysics.

iii. Being, thus rendered, is one in its formal and one, therefore, in its objective concept.

iv. Hence is derived the unity of Metaphysics as a science.

v. This unity in the concept of Being is neither generic, nor univocal, but analogous.

vi. The analogy assignable to the concept of Being, as a potential or relative universal, is not an analogy of proportion, nor of the first class of attribution, in which the Form is intrinsic only in the

¹ *Metaphysica, disp. II, § 4, nn. 6, 7.*

principal analogate; but of the second class of attribution, wherein the Form is intrinsic in all the analogates.

vii. The objective concept of Being prescinds negatively from all its subordinate determinations; as a confused representation prescinds from a more distinct.

viii. Consequently, the contraction of Being to its subordinate determinations is not effected by any extraneous and differential addition; but merely by means of a greater intrinsic determinateness in the concept, which projects the mode of being, and so contracts its logical extension.

CHAPTER II.

POSSIBLE BEING.

PROLEGOMENON I.

No one will venture to deny, that the idea of possibility is common to all men in every age. There is not another, perhaps, which occurs more frequently in the practical concerns of life. Indeed, mankind in general is so habituated to it, that the term serves for a customary ejaculation of surprise. There will be no difficulty, therefore, in admitting that there must be, and is, a corresponding reality in the order of things, which serves as an objective foundation for such an idea. Every one is conscious to himself that, in gauging the possibility or impossibility, say, of some future event or course of action, he is not dealing with either a phantom of the imagination or a purely logical figment. It is a matter of prudence to determine, before undertaking a work, the possibility of accomplishing it. So again, the credibility of a witness, or even of witnesses, to some unwonted occurrence, is frequently measured by the supposed possibility or impossibility of the story. But it is mere folly to contend that, in these and like cases, possibility and impossibility are simple creations of the mind, and that they are destitute of any real foundation. It must, then, be allowed that the concept of the possible has some sort of an objective basis. The question is, what may that objective basis be?

PROLEGOMENON II.

It will be well to see, whether the derivation of the word can assist towards a clearer and more precise understanding of the nature of possibles. The word, *possible*, virtually includes the idea of some Power or Faculty (*posse, potentia, possibile*). Now, Power is either active or passive; and both kinds find their place, only

after a different fashion, in the concept of possible Being. For, in the first place, as a merely possible Being does not yet exist, though it might exist, *if so be*; the possibility of its future existence must depend upon some active efficient Power which is capable of actuating it. This, however, is not enough; since, if the supposed constituents of this possible Being were to exhibit in their combination a manifest contradiction, all the conceived possibility would at once cease, and the general verdict of common sense would pronounce the existence of such an entity an impossibility, quite irrespective of its referribility to an external and efficient cause. Thus, for instance, if one were to suppose a *human soul* composed partly of *granite*, partly of *certain members of a bird*, the mind would at once recognise the intrinsic impossibility of such a Being, and would never think of troubling itself with the further question (which would in the given case be otiose, nay repugnant), as to whether there was a power capable of producing it. 'It is an idle and silly question,' would be the natural reflection; 'seeing that the thing is *in itself* an impossibility.' In this second way of viewing a thing as possible, the mind conceives in the possible Being a kind of passive or receptive power, by which it admits of concordant elements in its essential constitution. This *intrinsic* possibility, regarded as inherent in the possible Being itself, is of course logical; yet it must be founded in some reality.

PROLEGOMENON III.

Possibility is, therefore, twofold; *internal* and *external*. *Internal* possibility is that aptitude or capacity of a Being for existence, which is simply due to the concord, or absence of contradiction, in the essential notes by which it would be constituted, if it were to exist. *External* possibility is the aptitude or capacity of a Being for existence, owing to the presence of a cause which is able to produce it. The distinction will be more clearly understood, perchance, by an example. Let a wall be supposed thirty feet high. A question arises as to the *possibility* of a man's jumping it. Now there can be no question as to the intrinsic possibility. For a wall five feet high has been jumped; and there is nothing in the addition of feet to make the jump a contradiction in terms. But it is externally impossible; because there are no men now existing who are able to make such a jump. But, if one of the Brobdignagians

could be borrowed for the occasion, the possibility of the feat would then admit of no reasonable doubt.

PROLEGOMENON IV.

There are two methods by which the idea of possible Being is acquired. The easiest, and first in order of time, is *à posteriori*; by considering actually existing or once existing entities. Thus: having seen a great number of cats, a man has no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of cats existing in the future. So again, as the Dodo once existed, and there are stuffed specimens to be seen in the Museums of Zoology; though it is now supposed to be extinct, there can be no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of its future reappearance. Again; there have been so many eclipses of the sun in foregone years, that no one could doubt the possibility of an eclipse next year. Hence that proverb, so well known in the Schools, derives its force; '*ab esse ad posse valet illatio*,' which may be freely translated, '*If a thing is or ever was, it is fair to infer that it can be.*' But the same concept of possible Being may be acquired also *à priori*. For the human intellect can to a certain extent measure the capacity of finite efficient causes; and knows thus much at least of the first efficient Cause, that Its energy is infinite and can, therefore, produce whatever is producible. So far, then, as external possibility is concerned, there is no difficulty. But how, on *à priori* grounds, is it possible to determine the internal possibility of a given being, as constituted ideally with such and such essential notes or characteristics? It has been maintained that, if these notes are to human ken concordant and compossible, there is herein sufficient motive for pronouncing the possibility,—if they are seemingly repugnant, for pronouncing the impossibility,—of the object. To the first member of this statement there may, perhaps, be no reasonable objection; but the second needs revision or, at least, greater precision. For the natural light of human reason is incompetent to decide on the absolute and objective repugnance of essential attributes or characteristic notes with each other; and that which appears repugnant to us, may prove quite consistent in the order of nature. The word, *repugnant*, is too vague and general. That Being alone, therefore, can be safely judged impossible, whose constitutives are absolutely *contradictory*; for then it is not Being at all, and no efficient causality, even Infinite, can terminate in *no thing*. Thus, God could not create a man to be a lobster. Why? Because it is

a contradiction in terms. If the thing is a lobster, it is *ipso facto* not a man; and the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be. Hence, St. Thomas justly remarks that it is more correct to say, *These things cannot be created*, than that *God cannot create them*.

The *à priori* concept, then, of internal impossibility is derived solely from a manifest contradiction in the essential notes of the object; where this contradiction is not apparent, the object may be deemed intrinsically possible.

PROLEGOMENON V.

It is plain that, as all finite Being is contingent and all contingent Being includes in its nature an *antecedent* possibility of Being or not Being; the mind may make abstraction of the fact of existence in any or every such case, and consider finite Being as possible. There is, accordingly, only one Being Whom possibility can in no way near; and He is the Infinite. But, in the present discussion, it is *purely* possible Being that is the direct and formal object; and the *purely* possible directly and explicitly excludes existence. And this is the reason why the *purely possible* and the *actual* or existent have been frequently treated as the primordial determinations of Being; while others have claimed that place for the Infinite and Finite. It has been deemed more conducive, however, to clearness and scientific order, as has been already stated, that the former binary should be considered here under the general question of Being: first, because all real Being includes in one way or another the idea of Existence; secondly, because after-investigations will be facilitated by an accurate knowledge of these two Transcendentals; and, thirdly, because confusion is likely to arise from the close juxtaposition of the two Binaries aforementioned, since their respective lines of demarcation intersect. Existence includes Infinite and Finite; while the Finite includes the actual and possible.

PROLEGOMENON VI.

External Possibility assumes a twofold phase, according to the nature of the referribility of the possible object to its presumed efficient cause. For, it is either *physically* within the reach of that cause, and then it is said to be possible *de potentia absoluta*; or it is likewise *morally* within the reach of that cause, and then it is said

to be possible *de potentia ordinata*. In like manner, a thing may not be morally within the reach of a cause, it is then said to be impossible *de potentia ordinata*; if it is physically out of the reach of the cause, then it is impossible *de potentia absoluta*. It remains to explain what is meant by the expressions that a thing is morally within, or morally beyond, the reach of a cause. If a free efficient cause can, or cannot, do a thing, having regard to the moral order, the fitness of things, or the principles of right and justice; that thing is said to be morally possible, or impossible, for the given cause. Consequently, a thing may be possible *de potentia absoluta*, which is impossible *de potentia ordinata*. Thus, a man can steal physically, but not morally. So again, God *de potentia absoluta* could make a man with his head where his feet ought to be; but He could not do it *de potentia ordinata*. So, a king, or his minister, can seize the territory of a less powerful neighbouring state without cause *de potentia absoluta*; he cannot do it *de potentia ordinata*. But no cause, Infinite or other, *de potentia absoluta* can produce an extended spirit.

PROLEGOMENON VII.

The doctrine developed in the preceding *Prolegomena* corresponds in every particular with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, save in the comparatively unimportant point of terminology. That which here goes by the name of intrinsic Possibility, St. Thomas calls *Absolute*; while extrinsic Possibility is denominated by him *Relative*, forasmuch as it includes the idea of relation to an efficient cause. A summary of what he has taught on this subject shall be given by way of confirming and elucidating the preceding pages, following as nearly as possible the order of the *Prolegomena*. 'The Possible has a twofold signification, as the philosopher teaches (Metaphys. V). One includes relation to some power; as that which is subject to human power, is said to be possible for a man. The other is absolute, having regard to the simple congruity of the terms. . . . A thing is said to be absolutely either possible or impossible on account of the relation of the terms to each other. It is said to be absolutely possible, forasmuch as there is no repugnance between the Predicate and Subject; as, for instance, that *Socrates is seated*. On the other hand it is said to be absolutely impossible, forasmuch as there is a repugnance between the Predicate and Subject; as for instance, *that man is an ass*¹. St. Thomas

¹ 1^o, xxv, 3, in c.

understands by *repugnance* contradiction; as will be seen by the following quotation. 'According to the philosopher (Metaphys. V) there are three meanings of the words Possible and Impossible. One is in relation to some active or passive power; as it is said to be possible for a man by virtue of his locomotive power to walk, but impossible for him to fly. The second has no relation to any power, but is inherent in the thing itself; just as we call a thing possible, whose existence is not impossible, and call a thing impossible, which necessarily cannot exist.' (The third meaning is omitted, as belonging exclusively to Mathematics.) 'Be it known, then, that in the sense in which no relation to any power is connoted but there is exhibited that which is simply inherent in the thing itself, an entity is called impossible, by reason of a certain discoherency of the terms. Now, all dis coherence in the terms exhibits some sort of opposition. But in all opposition are included affirmation and negation; (as is proved in Metaphys. X). Hence, in every Impossible of such kind, there is implied an affirmation at once and a negation. But nothing of this sort can be attributed to an active power; as is proved. For, every active power or faculty follows the actuality and entity of the being to which it belongs. Now, every agent naturally produces action like itself; hence every action of an active faculty is terminated to Being. . . . But the existence of affirmation and negation has neither the nature of Being nor of *no* thing; because the *Being* does away with the *not* Being, and the *not* Being does away with the Being. Hence, neither primarily nor consequently, can it become the term of any action whatsoever of any active power¹.' This is explained more clearly in the following passage. 'Whatever cannot have either the nature of thing or of no thing, cannot be possible; and, therefore, that anything should at the same time be and not be, is in itself impossible; because what is at once thing and no thing, is neither thing nor no thing².' In the words that follow St. Thomas applies the idea of antecedent possibility to the existing universe; in accordance with the doctrine contained in the fifth Prolegomenon. 'For it was possible for created Being to have existed before it really did, by the power of that Agent by which it began to be, or by reason of the connection of the terms in which no repugnance is

¹ *De Potentia*, a. 1, a. 3, in c; cf. 1st, xlv, 1, ad 1^m; 1 *Sentt. d.* xlii, Q. 2, a. 3, in c.

² 1 *Sentt. d.* xlii, Q. 2, a. 2, 3, in c; cf. *De Potent.* Q. iii, a. 14, in c.

found. In this latter sense, it is not called possible in reference to any power. . . . For the predicate, *Exists*, is not repugnant to the subject, *The World or Man*, . . . and so it follows that it is not impossible to be, and, consequently, that it is possible for it to have been before it was, even though there were no power in existence¹; i.e. its intrinsic possibility would persist. Lastly, St. Thomas thus explains external Possibility *de potentia absoluta* and *de potentia ordinata*, though with special reference to God, as the nature of his subject-matter demanded. 'Since, in those who act with liberty of will, the action of the power follows the mandate of the will and order of reason, it behoves us to consider, when anything is ascribed to the Divine power, whether it be attributed to that power considered in Itself,—for then It is said to be capable of that (*posse illud*) *de potentia absoluta*; or whether it be attributed to It in relation to His Wisdom and Foreknowledge and Will; for then It is said to be capable of that *de potentia ordinata*. One must necessarily, then, attribute to the power itself absolutely regarded, (seeing that It is Infinite), the possibility of whatever is in itself *something* and does not imply a deficiency of power. I say advisedly, *What is in itself something*, because a union of affirmation and negation is nothing; and (to take an example), to say in one breath that something is at the same time a man and not a man, does not excite any intelligible idea. Wherefore, the power of God does not extend to the point of causing that an affirmation and negation should be verified at the same time. And the same may be said of all those cases which include a contradiction. . . . When, then, to this power absolutely considered is attributed anything which He wills to do and His Wisdom has it in intention to do, then He is said to be capable of that *secundum potentiam ordinatam*; but when His power extends itself' (i.e. is conceived as extending itself) 'absolutely considered, to that which is attributed to It, although His Wisdom and Will have it not in intention that it should be so done, then It is said to be capable of it *de potentia absoluta* only².'

Suarez has the same teaching; but he calls external, *positive*; internal, *negative* possibility³.

Having thus defined the nature and species of possible Being, it

¹ *q. Gent. L. II, c. 37, v. f.*

² *3 Sentt. d. 1, Q. 2, a. 3, in c.* The whole *corpus articuli*, as it is called, is worth consulting.

³ *Metaphysica, Disp. xxx, § 17, nn. 10-14; Disp. xlii, § 3, n. 9.*

is now time to institute a careful examination of the concept, and to determine the ultimate basis on which it rests. This will be done with greater scientific precision, if the progressive analysis of the idea is presented to the reader under the form of a series of Propositions.

PROPOSITION VI.

**The concept of merely possible Being is partly negative,
partly positive.**

A simple declaration of what is meant by *merely* possible Being will suffice to render the truth of this position evident. For all men understand, by merely possible Being, something which is capable of existing, but does not actually exist. The former part of this description is positive; the latter, negative.

Now, as the object of the present inquiry is, to discover what a merely possible Essence is, ontologically and independently of the mode of conceiving it, that is, what is its objective basis, if there be one; the negative part of the concept may be laid aside. Wherefore,

PROPOSITION VII.

**The positive concept of merely possible Being is partly real,
partly logical.**

I. To begin with the proof of THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition, viz. that *the positive concept of merely possible Being is partly real*. It is plain that a concept which either directly or indirectly exhibits real Being, must be in part real itself; for the formal is determined in its nature by the objective concept. But what does the mind in fact represent to itself, when it conceives anything as really possible? Does it not represent that entity, ideally constituted with its essential characteristics, as really capable of being produced into the external world and of taking its place among existing things? If it were really to exist, its internal constitution would be real in every sense of the word. So then, it is now real as an objective concept; because it is impossible that it should be a mere creation of the intellect. For, if it were; then it would follow, that everything which a man might conceive in his intellect could exist. The existence of an evil God would be a

possibility; the existence of Second Intentions, of negations and privations, of collective ideas, would be possible. Besides, nothing is made out of nothing, logical Being is made out of logical Being, reality out of reality. If, therefore, that possible essence is conceivable as real and as really existing, its constitutives must be somehow real; in other words, it must have a real basis. So again, if that possible essence is conceivably existent, and the conception of its capability for existence is not a simple toy of the intellect; the idea of possible existence must necessarily include within itself the idea of some real power capable of producing it in the order of existing things. Otherwise, it would be idle to talk of its existence as a real possibility; for there would be no more reason for attributing possible existence to it outside the mind, than there would be for attributing possible existence outside the mind to a hypothetical syllogism.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the enunciation, viz. that *the positive concept of merely possible Being is partly logical*, requires no laboured proof; if one only bears in mind the nature of a logical concept. For a logical concept is one, whose formal object cannot exist outside of the objective representation in the mind. Now, a being which is *capable* of existing, (taking the phrase *reduplicatively*, i. e. in so far only as it is capable), cannot possibly exist outside of its objective representation in the mind. It is true that the being which is capable of existing, may afterwards exist *de facto*; but then it exists at the cost of losing its capability, *as such*. It is no longer merely capable; because *it is*. So long as it is *merely* capable of existing, it neither is nor can be anything real. *Mere* aptitude for existence cannot of itself exist. This is what was intended by '*taking the phrase reduplicatively*.'

As the present investigation turns on the ontological basis and objective reality of this concept of mere possibility; once more, the logical element in the *positive* concept of merely possible Being may be dismissed. Wherefore,

PROPOSITION VIII.

The concept of merely possible Being, so far as it is positive and real, is the concept of some Being or other not possible but existing.

It will be well to recall to mind the results obtained from the

analysis instituted in the proof for the first Member of the preceding Thesis. It was there seen that, in order to be able to conceive truly of an entity as internally possible, it is necessary that there should be some sort of objective reality to justify the concept. Similarly, in order to be able to conceive of an entity as externally possible, a similar objective reality is equally necessary. Why is it that external possibility is called *relative* by the Angelic Doctor, if it be not because extrinsic possibility essentially includes a transcendental relation to some power really capable of creating or producing it into the world of existing things? The question thereupon arises, What is this reality which is necessarily included in the concept of merely possible Being? One thing is certain. That reality must itself be either possible Being or existing Being; for there is no middle term. But it cannot be possible Being. Therefore, it must be existent.

The *Major* of this syllogism is self-evident; for it is really, if not verbally dichotomic. It is the *Minor*, therefore, if anything, that must be proved. But it is inconceivable that merely possible Being should be able to supply the place of that reality which is included in the positive concept of possible Being. For possible Being is, in and of itself, nothing. It is formally a logical concept. But the non-existent cannot become cause of the Existent, nor the non-real sufficient reason of the Real. But to this argument answer may be made, that the merely possible is not supposed to be sufficient reason or cause of the merely possible in its character of a logical concept, but so far forth as it is real. Such an answer is, however, a virtual *petitio principii*; because it is precisely on this real basis in the concept of the possible, that the whole question turns.

Again, the hypothesis that possible Being is the object of the positive and real concept of merely possible Being, necessarily involves a *processus ad infinitum*,—a never ending series. For supposing it, for the sake of argument, to be true; the question would return as to the foundation of this new concept of possibility, and so on for ever. Either, therefore, the analysis would never cease; or it would at last evolve an existent reality, which would contradict the assumption with which it started.

PROPOSITION IX.

The concept of merely possible Essence, in so far as it is positive and real, implies the concept of some existing Being, that is not that Essence, but in some sort precontains it and its existence.

THE FIRST PART of this position is nothing but a Corollary from the preceding Proposition. For, if the concept of Possible Essence, in so far as it is positive and real, is the concept of some existing Being, it stands to reason that it cannot formally and numerically be the merely possible Essence itself; since this latter necessarily does not exist, for the simple reason that it *is* merely possible.

THE SECOND PART demands somewhat more elaborate treatment. It is a common proverb in the School, *Nemo dat quod non habet*,—‘No one gives what he has not to give.’ Thus, *dogs* may give by transmission the *canine* essence, because they have it themselves; but they cannot give the *feline*, for the reason that they have it not to give. In like manner, vegetable substances can give coal, because they precontain its constituents in themselves; but carbon cannot give vegetable life, because it is not in its line. So, fire can give heat to water; but water cannot give heat to fire. Hence another proverb also common in the Schools, *Nemo potest supra se ipsum*,—‘No one can do what is beyond his own nature.’ The measure, therefore, of unassisted power and, consequently, of causality, (which is a definite kind of power,) is the essence or nature of that Being to whom the power or causality belongs. The same rule applies to external possibility. The existence of any possible essence must in some way be precontained in that existing Being which is the real basis of its possibility. If, therefore, the essence and existence of the possible entity were not in some way or other precontained in such existing Being, this latter could not conceivably be the real basis of the possibility of the former; because there would be no sufficient reason for the possibility. Let an example serve by way of illustration. It shall be the idea of a possible apple. If any one should venture to assert, that in a swan could be found a sufficient reason for conceiving the possibility of the apple, he would probably be suspected of lunacy. But why? The answer is ready. There is nothing like an apple or the rudiments of an apple in the swan; and, consequently, a swan has not the power to produce an apple. But, if an apple-tree should be named,

the suggestion would at once meet with the assent of all. Again, why? Because the apple-tree does precontain the apple eminently in itself and, besides, has the natural power of producing it.

The above illustration suggests a caution which it may be well to give at this stage of the present analysis; because it has its special bearing on the question of internal possibility. Do not suppose that, in the entity which is the real basis of possibility, the merely possible essence must necessarily be precontained *formally* and *actually*; it suffices that it should pre-exist there *virtually*, *eminently*, or *ideally*. Thus, an acorn is sufficient reason and secondary cause of the oak: because the latter is virtually pre-contained in the former. So, the soul of man can vivify and develop the body which it informs; because vegetable and animal life, or the principles of growth and sensation, are eminently contained in the spiritual substance of the soul. Thus, lastly, the carpenter is sufficient *proximate* reason for the form and proportion of his table or chair; because the form and proportion were conceptually precontained in his intellect. If it were otherwise, no Being could be sufficient reason for the internal possibility of an essence which was not on an exact level with its own. In the instance of the carpenter it has been advisedly said, 'a sufficient *proximate* reason;' for it is evident, that the idea itself in the mind of the carpenter requires, and presupposes, a sufficient reason for its determination. And this holds good in all parallel instances.

PROPOSITION X.

The concept of merely possible Essence, so far as it is positive and real, implies the concept of some existence in which it is logically contained.

So far it has been shown, that possible Essence must be pre-contained in some other existing being which is the adequately sufficient reason why, independently of any human mode of conceiving, that Essence can with justice be deemed capable of existing; whether we look to its intrinsic constitutives, or to its extrinsic production.

But such judgment would be unmotivated, if that Essence were not actually apprehended by some intellect, that is, unless some intellect should know what it would be, if it should exist.

As the point now under consideration is a very subtle one, yet of primary importance to the successful issue of the present analysis;

it will be useful to pursue it under a less abstract form by an appeal to intellectual experience. It is not *absolutely* impossible.—to take a case,—that a race of men should be born with their heads where the feet now are, and the feet and legs up in the air. But no one in his ordinary senses will deny, that it is impossible *de potentia ordinata*; i.e. that, taking into account the actual constitution of man, the proper functions of his feet and of his head with its organs of sense, it would be the highest conceivable unwisdom to produce into the world, as at present constituted, a race of men characterized by such a disposition of the bodily members. But why? For greater clearness, let us imagine that a man of ordinary common sense is questioned touching the last assertion, which we will suppose to have been his own. ‘Why do you think that it is practically impossible?’ ‘Because such a man as you suppose would have the greatest possible difficulty in eating; his eyes would be comparatively useless, because they would be all but level with the ground, and his legs and feet would serve no purpose whatever, dangling in the air.’ ‘Then it is because your mind perceives these inconveniences which you have alleged, that you deem such a production practically impossible? But such an impossibility is simply ideal, for it is your own mind that makes the impossibility.’ ‘Nothing of the sort. I know it to be a practical impossibility, quite independently of what I may think about the matter.’ ‘How so? For even now you say, “*I know*,” as though your knowledge were the only measure.’ ‘Why, of course, I say “*I know*,” because otherwise I could not express an opinion about it at all: but we are not talking now of my thought, but of *the object* of my thought. Just as I also spoke of the actual arrangement of the human body as it now is; and in order to speak about it, I must think about it. Yet my thought did not make the present order of parts, limbs, organs, and so forth in the human body. They are real and objective, though I happen to understand them; and so is this practical impossibility real, though I conceive it.’ ‘Yes, but you forget that the human body really exists; whereas this supposed race of men does not exist.’ ‘I know that, of course; otherwise, I could not say that their existence was a practical impossibility. But what I asserted was, that the impossibility of their existing was real.’ ‘But how can that be? For the impossibility does not exist.’ ‘Who ever thought it did? But is not the impossibility of your jumping over the moon real,

though that impossibility does not exist either?' 'Yes, I own you are right there, but I do not see why.' 'Why! because you are real, and a jump is something real, and your power of jumping is real; so that the impossibility, though it is in itself an idea in my head, has a real foundation.' 'I see that, but now to apply it to the present case.' 'Why, I see a certain arrangement in the parts of the human body; that is real. I perceive that those parts have respectively certain duties and functions to perform; that is real. Then I perceive an order and adaptation, in the position of the former, to that which is required of them by the latter. That is real. Now, the other arrangement you have imagined would turn everything topsy-turvy; so that I say it is practically impossible, quite independently of anything I may think about the matter.' 'Wait a moment. I do not see that at all, because that supposed combination of members is not real.' 'Yes, it is though, in a way. For just as the present wonderful adjustment of parts now existing in the human body was real, before man was created; so, in some sort, is that confused medley of parts which you have supposed, not real indeed, but really impossible.' 'I must ask you to explain a little more clearly what you mean.' 'I mean this; that He Who made man must have formed an idea of him before He could create him. That idea is His type. Any other arrangement in the creation of a man which is in contradiction to that type, is *absolutely* impossible; while any other arrangement which militates against the principle of order and the due adaptation of parts, is *morally* impossible.' 'But, if there were no intellect in which this prototypal Idea was to be found, and which knew the impossibility of its opposite; where would the impossibility be then?' 'Nowhere, outside our own minds.'

And now, to put the same argument in more brief and scientific form.

If the possible Essence, as constituted by its characteristic notes, were not logically contained in that existence which is the sole basis of its reality; those notes would be deprived, not only of all actuation *properly* so called (i. e. of *existence*), but also of all actuation *improperly* so called, i. e. of *conceptional realization*. Therefore, the concept would be stripped of all objective reality. There would be no more reason for saying that such an essence was possible, than for saying it was impossible.

Furthermore, unless the given Essence were thus represented in

that existence which is the supposed basis of its reality, it could not be conceived as actually producible among existing things. For no efficient cause is perfectly prepared and ready for the production of its effect ; unless it either knows itself what it is going to do, or at least is under the direction of some superior cause which possesses the necessary knowledge. Otherwise, there would be an effect existing without a proportionate cause.

PROPOSITION XI.

In the concept of Essence intrinsically possible is included the idea of an existence, in which that Essence is at least equivalently contained.

It must be borne in mind that, throughout the series of these positions the whole question turns, not on any partial or inadequate or simply proximate basis of reality in the concept of merely possible Essence, but of its entire, adequate, and ultimate basis ; furthermore, that the concept which is subjected to this analysis is not so much the formal concept, as the objective concept of which the former is representative.

Now, it has been proved in the preceding Thesis, that a merely possible Essence, together with its essential constitutives or distinctive notes, must be ideally present to that existence which is sufficient basis of its possibility ; that is, in other words, that such existence must have an idea of that Essence according to its essential constitution. But whence the idea ? An idea, as all know, is representative of some object, by which it was determined in its genesis. An idea unrepresentative, objectively undetermined, is a contradiction in terms. The idea, then, which, as has been already seen, is necessarily present in that existence which is the sufficient basis for the concept of possible Essence, must be representative, must be objectively determined. But if this existence is, in and by itself, adequately sufficient basis for the concept of possibility, that idea cannot be determined by anything outside of the existence that claims it ; otherwise, the said existence would not be a sufficient but only partial basis, since the object of its idea would come to it from without. Therefore, that existence must somehow, and as regards something of its own, be sufficient object of its own idea. Yet, that idea is not logical, but real. For, by it the compatibility or incompatibility of the notes which constitute

the supposed possible Essence is discerned and determined. It consequently follows, that there must be something real in the aforesaid existence which is object of the tupal idea. But, if that reality is formal object of the tupal idea; it must be equivalent to the idea which represents it. If, then, the idea is representative of the possible Essence as constituted by such and such notes; the existence in question must contain in itself a reality which is equivalent to that possible Essence, or to the essential notes by which it is constituted.

PROPOSITION XII.

In the concept of Essence, considered only as internally possible, is not included the concept of an existence capable of producing that possible existence outside its causes.

The truth of this position is indubitable; if the nature of the internally possible be such as, in accordance with the common judgment of mankind, it has been defined to be in the third Prolegomenon to this Chapter. For, though it be true that possible Essence, taken *adequately* for all that is included in the concept, connotes aptitude of existence, (otherwise it would not be real); yet that aptitude itself has two partial respects which together are completive of it in its integrity. That is to say, aptitude of existence on the part of the possible Essence may be regarded either absolutely or relatively:—*absolutely*, inasmuch as that Essence in its supposed constitutives exhibits nothing that renders its existence an impossibility; *relatively*, inasmuch as it is considered in relation to a power which is capable of producing it, should that power so will.

Now, unless it is maintained that human reason cannot separate these two ideas, so as to represent to itself the one apart from the other, which would be tantamount to destroying all distinction between external and internal possibility; it cannot be denied that in the concept of internal possibility, as such, is not included the idea of a power capable of producing such possible Essence.

It would have been hardly necessary to insist upon a point so evident in itself; had it not been for the fact that Descartes, whose philosophical views have had, and still retain, a serious influence on modern thought, has maintained the strange theory that internal possibility depends upon the Divine Will. Such an opinion, spite of the intention of its author, invariably leads to

conclusions which destroy all science, and are subversive of the first principles of thought ; as will be made clear by what follows.

If the Divine Will constitutes the internal possibility of things ; then, antecedently to the act of the Divine Will, (speaking after the manner of men), there is neither possibility nor impossibility. Consequently, if God willed it, a four-sided triangle would be equally possible with a three-sided triangle, or an animal stone with an animal quadruped.

Furthermore : on this Cartesian hypothesis, nothing possible, antecedently to the act of the Divine Will, would be Being more than No Being. There would be at first simple indifference, which is tantamount to No thing. But then how could the Divine Will act ? For it is impossible that it should be terminated and, so to say, determined to No thing. Yet the Divine Will could have no object or term of Its own act in such case. For Will does not determine its own object, but only tends towards that object which has been already determined for it by the intellect ; whereas the hypothesis in question admits no determination anterior to the acting of the Will. Indeed, by logical sequence, the absolute Entity of the Divine Nature itself would, to say the least, receive a serious wound. For Infinite Being is infinitely possible, because infinitely actual ; one does not see, therefore, how *It*, likewise, does not depend on the Divine Will.

Again : Science, properly so called, is concerned with necessary truths alone ; with essences, not with existences. But such a hypothesis would destroy all necessary truth. For the Divine Will is perfectly free in all those acts which are terminated outside of God Himself. Consequently, the objects or terms of such acts, antecedently to the Divine Volition, may or may not be. Therefore, they are contingent. But all possible essences, including essences that are now, or were, actual (as having once been possible), are objects or terms of the Divine Volition. Therefore, they are contingent. But beyond these no possibility ; and, therefore, no *Thing*. Consequently, there can be no necessary truths.

Lastly, the theory in question is condemned by the testimony of common sense. For men are constantly forming ideas of internal possibility or impossibility from a consideration of the intrinsic notes by which the things contemplated are ideally constituted, without any reference direct or indirect to the Divine Will. And this they do *naturally*, i.e. under the guidance of our common nature.

PROPOSITION XIII.

In the concept of Essence externally possible is included the concept of an efficient cause, or of a cause capable of producing that Essence.

This position is a mere repetition of the definition of external possibility, as given in the third Prolegomenon.

PROPOSITION XIV.

Beings are internally possible, forasmuch as they are contained logically and eminently in God; externally possible, forasmuch as they are contained potentially in Him.

It must not be forgotten, that the object of the present analysis has been throughout, to discover the ultimate objective basis of the concept of mere possibility, independently of our manner of conceiving it, or even of the proximate and formal foundation for our conceiving this or that possible Essence in particular. It is perfectly plain to common sense, that a man may form a judgment as to this or that being possible, without making the slightest reference, direct or indirect, in his own mind to either the Divine Nature or the Divine Omnipotence. But this is quite beside the present question, which is, as has been said before, to discover the real ultimate foundation (if there be one) for the concept of merely possible Being, so far as that concept is positive and real. Evidently, therefore, the investigation is not limited to any one kind or class of possibles. It embraces all possibility and, as a consequence, all those beings which, though actual now, were once upon a time possibles, or, if not in time (supposing the *philosophical* possibility of a creation coeval with God in His eternity), at least antecedently to their actuation in order of nature. This, perhaps, needs further explanation. Even though it be admitted, then, with the Angelic Doctor, that God might have willed; had it so pleased Him, to create His Universe from all eternity; yet, since this would not diminish one iota the absolute dependence of the creature on its Creator's Will; by the very order of that dependence there would have been a possibility, known to God,—antecedent, not in time but in nature, to the creature's actuation. In a word, all created things were merely possible by the very dependence of their nature, as considered in themselves, prior in order of nature to

the act of the Divine Free Will that determined their existence. If it were not possible that they should not have been; it would never be possible that they should at any time cease to be.

I. *And now, for THE FIRST of the two positions which compose the present Proposition.*

The inquiry naturally commences with *internal* possibility. It has been seen in preceding Theses, that the concept of Essence internally possible, so far as that concept is real and positive, necessarily includes the idea of some real existence, in which is at once contained the prototypal idea of that Essence and the real object which that idea represents. Furthermore, that object, as included in such existence and in some sort one with it, must, at least equivalently, contain the essential notes by which possible being is supposed to be constituted; otherwise, there would be no sufficient correspondence between the prototype and its antitype. For, evidently, the prototypal idea is wholly determined by its object.

Now, the existence, which is the necessary and sufficient basis of internal possibility, must exclude from its own nature all possibility; otherwise, it could not be that ultimate real basis which is the object of the present inquiry. The reason is obvious. For, if it should include possibility in itself, the question would return as to the foundation of *its* possibility; so that it could not be the final basis of possibility.

But there is only one Being, viz. the Infinite, that excludes from His own Nature all possibility, properly so called. Hence it follows that God, and God alone, can be that ultimate basis whose discovery has been the one purpose of the present analysis. And, if He be that basis, then in Him is the prototypal idea; and, in such case also, He must be the Object of that Idea, that is, He must include in His own Nature, at least *equivalently*, all those essential notes which are conceived as together constituting, in each and every case, possible Being.

But, in the enunciation of the Thesis it is not said, that possible Essence is included equivalently, but *eminently*, in God. It will be necessary, therefore, in order sufficiently to understand the difference between these two adverbs in their relation to the matter in hand, that something should be stated touching the formation of these Prototypal Ideas in God, according to the imperfect notions which our limited intelligence can hope to form on such a subject. The allusion to it here, however, must be necessarily brief; because

it is a question which will require long and profound investigation in a more appropriate place.

The Infinite Mind, contemplating from all eternity His own infinitely perfect Essence, conceives it as partially imitable in infinite degrees of order and excellence outside Himself, should He so will it. His Essence is infinite Reality; so that no reality is, or can be, outside Himself, which has not its equivalent in infinite excess within Himself. He cannot, it is true, contain those possible or actual essences outside Himself, *formally* in Himself; because they are imperfect in their very nature, and imperfection cannot even near The infinitely Perfect. They are imperfect in their very nature; because they are limited, and limit is imperfection. Besides, in many of the lower degrees of that possible imitability of Himself, the essential constituents (as in the case of material being) are in their absolute nature, so to speak, imperfect,—not wholly and on all sides imperfect, otherwise they could not be *beings*; but still, beings with essentially imperfect constituents. To take an example: Matter is Being,—Substance. But that which *formally* distinguishes it from higher beings and substances is its imperfection; such imperfection as composition of parts, capability of division, extension or existence of part outside part, necessarily involve. It cannot therefore be formally in God; but, like all the higher orders of possible or actual being, is in God *eminently*; that is, the Infinite is to Himself in infinite excess all the pure reality and perfection which is anywhere discoverable in any creature. It is all His, because He has given it; and no one gives that which is not his own. He contains it all eminently and in infinite excess; because all perfection in whatever grade, separate in the orders of creation and often separated within the limit of one essence, are all His in one infinitely simple Act, which is His Life, His Being,—which is, in a word (for all these are, objectively, one and the same), GOD. Thus then, for what regards internal possibility, the science of God is the Prototypal Idea, or Prototypal Ideas, which are the fundamental basis of internal possibility; the Divine Essence or Nature, containing eminently all possible notes of all possible being, is the infinite Object of those Prototypal Ideas. And all are One.

II. THE SECOND POSITION in the present Thesis is, that *God is the ultimate real basis of external possibility*; inasmuch as things possible are contained within the infinite Power of Him Who is

the First Efficient Cause. The argument in proof of this position is the same as before. No other Cause could be the ultimate basis; because any secondary cause carries along with it its own possibility, and presupposes, consequently, its own efficient cause as prior to itself. Moreover, every secondary efficient cause is either limited to a certain definite order of possible being, if it be a *univocal* cause, or, at least, to a determined sphere of possible being, if it be an *equivocal* cause; whereas the present search is for an efficient cause which may embrace the whole sphere of the Possible. Once more: everything is intrinsically possible, which does not involve self-contradiction; and intrinsic possibility is *positively* measured, as has been seen, by the imitability of the Divine Nature, which admits of a practically infinite number of grades, of orders, and of diversities within those grades and orders. Now, nothing but an Infinite Power could conceivably suffice for a real basis of the external possibility of this endless variety of Being. Therefore, it is God, and God only, Who can satisfy the demand. From the doctrine developed in the above chain of Propositions two Corollaries are deducible, which are of some importance.

COROLLARY I.

Every real essence either exists itself, or exists implicitly in its exemplar, proximate as well as remote, and in its efficient, cause. Accordingly, speaking of things according to our way of conceiving, it may be said, that all real essence exists either *formally*, or at least *virtually*, *eminently*, *typally*.

COROLLARY II.

No real essence that is merely possible, exists *formally*. For, those beings or entities are said to exist formally, which exist in their own proper Form. But the existence of a thing in its own proper Form, is existence absolutely such, which is formally excluded from the concept of the purely Possible.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It has been objected against the doctrine just exposed, that it is Pantheistic. For we have been told that all finite Being, i.e. all Being that is not God, is included under the category of Possibles. But then, on the other hand, it has been maintained, that all which is real in possible Being is either the Divine Nature,

the Divine Idea, or the Divine Omnipotence, which are, each and all, God Himself. Hence it follows that there is nothing real but God; or, which is the same thing, that God is everything. But this is sheer Pantheism.

ANSWER. This objection would be undoubtedly well founded, if it had been asserted that Possibles *formally* considered, (i.e. considered in their proper and essential notes by which they would be constituted, were they to exist), were really the Divine Nature, the Divine Idea, or the Divine Omnipotence. But to assert that Possibles *logically* considered, are the Divine Ideas,—*fundamentally* considered, are the Divine Essence,—*potentially* or *causally* considered, are the Divine Omnipotence, is not Pantheistic. On the contrary, the last member, forasmuch as it links on the doctrine of Possibles to causal Efficiency, is openly opposed to Pantheism. For a Pantheistic evolution excludes the possibility of real effective causation.

II. Against this answer it is urged that Possibles, *logically* considered, cannot be the Divine Idea; neither can they, *fundamentally* considered, be the Divine Nature or Essence. Therefore, such a solution only raises a fresh difficulty.

ANSWER. There is an equivocation lurking in the *Antecedent*. If it be meant that the concept of Possibles, as it exists in our mind, i.e. *formally* considered, is not *logically* the Divine Idea nor *fundamentally* the Divine Nature, the truth of the *Antecedent* is patent; for, under such a point of view, the concept is *logically* a form or act of our mind; *fundamentally*, either notes of existing things, or intuitions of the understanding. If, however, it should be intended that, independently of our manner of conceiving and, as it were, objectively, possibles are not *logically* the Divine Idea, and *fundamentally* the Divine Essence, the assertion is erroneous.

III. In face of this distinction it is further urged that, even independently of our manner of conceiving Possibles, they cannot *logically* be identified with the Divine Ideas nor *fundamentally* with the Divine Essence; because neither the Divine Ideas nor the Divine Essence can admit of possibility, whereas possibles are possibles, in whatever way they are considered.

ANSWER. Here, again, there is need of a distinction. If it be meant that the Divine Ideas or the Divine Essence cannot be merely possible, or admit of possibility, in their own Being, i.e. *as* the Divine

Idea and *as* the Divine Essence, the assertion is willingly granted; but if it is meant that the Divine Idea cannot be *logically* possible, i.e. cannot be representative of possible Being, the statement is not true. Similarly, if it be declared impossible that the Divine Nature should be *fundamentally* possible, i.e. should be the object determining the Divine Intellect, in the manner already explained, to the representation of possible beings, the declaration is gratuitous and false. So much for the *Major*. But the *Minor* likewise must not be allowed to pass without a distinction. For, albeit possibles are possibles *formally*, since in such sort they are negative, logical, subjective concepts; yet possibles are not possibles *fundamentally* and in their Exemplar. On the contrary, considered in such wise, they necessarily exist.

IV. The argument of the last, or fourteenth, Proposition has a fatal flaw in it. For it is based on the supposition, that all created Being is included in the category of Possibles. But this cannot be admitted; for it involves a patent contradiction, as will appear thus. To presuppose the possibility of anything, it is plainly necessary that its essence should be presupposed; otherwise, from the nature of the case, it would be equally indifferent to possibility or impossibility. But creation does not presuppose the essence of the thing about to be created. On the contrary, the idea of creation formally excludes it. Therefore, created things could not have been possible before their creation.

ANSWER. Here, again, there is need of a distinction which, nevertheless, is obvious enough. It may freely be granted, that the presupposition of possibility carries along with it the presupposition of the *logical* Essence; but, as to *real* Essence, there is need of a subdistinction. That the presupposition of Possibility involves the presupposition of the real Essence *fundamentally* and *eminently*, is true; but, that it presupposes the real Essence of the Possible already formally existing, is false. To explain these distinctions: In order that created things may be truly considered as mere Possibles antecedently to the act of creation, it is necessary to suppose that the Essence of those things had, prior to their creation, a logical existence in some pattern idea, and a real existence *fundamentally* in some existing nature which contains, *eminently* in itself, the constitutive notes of the Being about to be created. And all this is verified in fact; as has been already evinced. But

to maintain, that the Essence of the Possible must *formally* exist in order to be conceived possible, is a manifest absurdity. As well might it be said, that a mechanic could not conceive a new machine as possible, and so invent it, till it had been made; or an artist conceive a possible picture, till it was already painted.

V. According to the theory developed above, the reality in the concept of Possibles altogether depends upon God. But this is contradicted by the universal testimony of experience. For, if there be such an unconditioned dependence as is pretended, it would be impossible to think Possibility without thinking God. But all know that such is far from being the case. On the contrary, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, when we judge anything to be possible or impossible, the idea of God neither directly nor indirectly enters into the mind.

ANSWER. In answer to this difficulty, it is necessary to bear in mind that, as has been clearly stated at the outset, the inquiry in this chapter was directed to the discovery of the *ultimate* basis upon which whatever is real in the concept of Possibility rests. Such a discovery is not the result of vulgar, but of philosophic, thought. Neither is it necessary to the existence of an objective dependence, however absolute it may be, that it should always be explicitly present to the subjective consciousness. Thus, for instance, the truth of every Judgment entirely depends on the fundamental principle of contradiction; yet, who would venture to say that it manifests itself explicitly to the mind in every act of judging? Though, therefore, it must be allowed that the idea of some possible Being may constantly be formed, without an explicit consciousness of the dependence of that idea of possibility upon God; yet, that dependence is always implicitly in the idea, and can be exhibited by scientific analysis.

VI. There is another difficulty which opposes itself to the doctrine proposed. For one thing cannot be said to depend in its essential nature upon another, if the latter presupposes the former. Now, it has been asserted that the internal possibility of things essentially depends upon the Divine Idea. Yet,—to speak after the manner of human intelligence,—the Divine Idea necessarily presupposes the internal possibility of Possibles; otherwise, there would be no sufficient reason for Its determination.

ANSWER. Here, more than ever, there is need of distinction. For, albeit it is most true that, if one thing presupposes another, that other cannot be said to depend on the former in the order, or after that particular mode, according to which it is presupposed; yet it is equally true that what is presupposed in one way, may itself presuppose in another, and consequently admit of legitimate dependence. To come to the point: if the Divine idea presupposes the essence of the Possible formally constituted in its own proper existence, the objection is invincible. But then, the supposition itself is absurd. If, however,—and it cannot be denied,—the Divine Idea presupposes only the *virtual* constitution of the possible Essence, (which is nothing more nor less than the constitutive notes of that possible Essence eminently contained in the Divine Nature); then it must be said, though the virtual constitution of possible Essence, *as* virtual, does not depend on the Divine Idea—for how could the Divine Nature depend upon the Divine Idea, seeing that the Two are infinitely one?—yet, that the formal realization of that Essence within its own definite limits, does depend on the Divine Idea. For the Divine Intelligence conceives the Divine Nature as imitable in such or such a definite grade and within such and such limits; and, so conceiving, forms to Itself the Prototypal Idea in each given case.

VII. But, it is once more urged, this reply does not exhaust the difficulty. For it is undeniable that every idea presupposes its formal object. Now, the formal object of the Divine Idea, as representative of any possible essence, is not the Divine Nature, but such and such notes constitutive of a given possible Being. Wherefore, the internal possibility of Possibles cannot depend on the Divine Idea, seeing that it is the object of that Idea.

ANSWER. In reply it is to be observed, that every idea presupposes its primary object; not, however, necessarily the secondary object which is virtually or eminently contained in the former. But the internal possibility of things is not the primary object of the Divine Intelligence; for that is the Divine Nature itself. Internal possibility is virtually included in this latter and, as a secondary object, need not be presupposed.

This reply will be more clearly understood, when the Nature of the Divine Knowledge is considered *ex professo*. Now, however, it may be illustrated by an example drawn from ordinary life.

Take the case of a painter, who has purposed to paint an historic picture. He must begin with his idea, which shall guide his pencil and his brush. But whence can he get his idea? Not from the existing picture evidently. He gathers the notes or characteristic constituents of his design from existing objects,—from models, say, from nature, from existing buildings. These are presupposed; and, in them together, the idea is virtually contained. But the picture itself entirely depends upon the typical idea, such as it may be, in the mind of the artist.

CHAPTER III.

EXISTING BEING.

IN the fifth of the Prolegomena which head the preceding Chapter, it is stated that Possible and Existent have been accounted by some, foremost among the primary determinations of Being. Now that the nature of Possibles has been carefully sifted and is more clearly and scientifically understood; it will be well to retrace our steps for a while, in order to realize the precise sense in which such a statement must be understood.

It will appear from the analysis which has been made, that Possibles, considered *formally*, are mere logical entities having no pretension to other than psychological reality, which they claim for themselves by virtue of their being real acts of the soul. But, regarded in their ideological aspect, i.e. as concepts representative of an object, they are *formally* a mere creation of thought, *directly* representative of nothing; in that they exhibit a positive *exclusion* of existence. *Fundamentally*, however, they are real; in other words, they are concepts of the mind built up on a real foundation. That foundation is God. All that is real in possible Essence is of God; partly the Divine Prototypal Idea, partly the Divine Nature as imitable outside Itself, and in part the Divine Omnipotence. Not that These, or any of Them, are necessarily represented in the human concept of the Possible; but They are the sole sufficient Reason for the measure of reality belonging to such concept. Consequently, possible and existent Being cannot stand in correlation as two *positive* determinations of Being; neither is such the nature of the distinction between them. They are rather distinguished from each other, as Some thing from No thing. For possible Being is not Being, save in the Wisdom and Power of God; existent Being is something real in itself.

What, then, is Existence? Its grammatical form suggests, that the idea embodied in the word is abstract and representative of a certain Quiddity, by virtue of which things are truly said to exist. But what is that Quiddity? It is impossible to define it; for Existence is a Transcendental, embracing, as it does, all the Categories and *beyond*. Can it, then, be declared or described? This, too, is difficult; because, as in the instance of Essence, the idea is so simple, that any attempt at description runs the risk of creating obscurity. However, the attempt must be made. Existence, then, is that by which any Thing is formally and immediately constituted in itself and, if it be not self-caused, *is*, outside its causes, —that entity by which the *no* thing of mere possibility ceases, and *some* thing begins to be.

This declaration or description mainly and, as regards a portion of it, exclusively applies to finite Existence. For, in the Infinite, Essence and Existence are on all sides identical. He is Being, essentially Being; and *is*, because He *must be*. But the doctrine touching the Existence of God will occupy us later on; the question that awaits us now, embraces finite Existence only. And it is here that all the difficulties crop up, which beset this recondite subject.

Existence is the actuality of Being. Now, actuality supposes a reduction to Act, in the case of finite Being. But *Act* is the correlative of *receptivity* or *passive power*; and, consequently, Act follows the nature of that receptivity, of which it is the Act. But Receptivity is two-fold. For there is what is called an *objective*, and there is what is called a *subjective*, receptivity. Objective receptivity or potentiality is extrinsic to the Subject of actuation, which it neither really presupposes nor informs; on the contrary, subjective potentiality is intrinsic in the Subject of actuation. Thus, for instance, a watch, previous to its actual construction, is in the power of the watchmaker, relatively to whom it possesses a real potentiality or receptivity of existence; but the same watch, subsequent to its actual construction, has a subjective potentiality of being possessed by this or that person. Hence it follows, that there is a twofold actuation as well as a twofold Act; one of which is the correlative of objective, the other of subjective, potentiality. From these premisses it is demonstratively concluded that, while the actuation or Act of objective potentiality *constitutes* Being, it does not really *compose* it, or rather enter with it into actual composition. But why? Because real composition postulates, as a

preliminary essential condition, the existence of parts entitatively distinct; whereas existent Being and actual Being are not only physically, but metaphysically, identical. On the other hand, the act of a subjective potentiality not only constitutes, but, either physically or at all events metaphysically, composes Being. Again, why? Because there is the Subject and its potentiality on the one hand, and the informing Act on the other; and both are real, though partial, entities in synthesis. Consequently, we find ourselves in presence of two real parts of one composite whole. Thus, in quantitative actuation the increased bulk of a man since his childhood is something real, and the substantial individual himself is another thing real; and both constitute a *composite* whole. Therefore, there is a real composition; and not a constitution of Being only. For constitution has a wider periphery than composition. Wherever there is composition, there is a certain constitution; but not always a composition, where there is a constitution.

It follows from what has been stated, that in the notional transition of a thing from possible to actual Being, no *real* addition, by virtue of which it becomes actual, is made to the thing in its state of possibility, but only a conceptual addition. For you cannot really add to nothing; since addition presupposes something to which the addition is made. Actual Being, therefore, is distinguished from possible by its entire entity. So much is admitted by every school of opinion.

But now, a most subtile and intricate question presents itself, about which the Schools are divided. Though in itself it does not lead to very important issues, it has been decided to discuss it here for two reasons. First of all, whatever seems to admit of scientific demonstration can never be unimportant to the philosopher; more particularly, when the subject belongs to the Transcendentals. Then, again, there are certain other questions, incidentally involved in the discussion, which are of the highest moment.

The problem is this: Whether there is any real distinction of whatever kind between actual or actuated Being and its Existence. It will be seen at once, that this question is widely different from that other touching the distinction between possible and actual Being; for it concerns *actual* Being only. To repeat it under another form; Does the actual Essence of existing Being *really* differ from its Existence?

Thomists¹ generally, together with other Scholastics of name, maintain that there is a real distinction between the two; and that, as a consequence, there is a real composition between them, the term of which is existing Essence. Suarez, Vasquez, with many others, defend the contrary opinion, viz. that actual Essence and its Existence are *really* identical, and are only distinguished from each other by a conceptual distinction. This latter opinion will be sustained here, both on account of the preponderance of intrinsic evidence which it seems to carry with it, as also because it seems more consonant with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor; though it is only fair to state, that his authority has been claimed by the opposite School, and in fact constitutes what may be called their palmary argument. The reasons for their opinion will be more conveniently given in the shape of objections to the following propositions.

PROPOSITION XV.

Actual Essence is constituted by a certain real entity which is really identical with that Essence and likewise with its Existence.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this position, which declares that *actual Essence is constituted by a certain real entity*, needs no proof by reason of its immediate evidence. For Essence is Being in its primary signification; and Being is that which has entity, or is constituted by its entity. Real or actual Essence, therefore, is constituted by real entity. Besides, actual Essence is essentially distinguished from merely possible Essence, in that it has a real entity of its own, which the latter has not.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER asserts, that *this real entity by which its actual Essence is constituted, is really identical with that Essence*; so that there is nothing like a real composition between the Essence and that entity by which it is constituted. This assertion is illustrated,—for it is too plain to admit of proof,—by a comparison between actual Essence and the same Essence in its former state of mere possibility. In this latter state it *was* Nothing; *now* it is Something real, and Something real by the sole virtue of its own entity. Its entity is *all* its Something. Therefore its entity is

¹ The name *Thomists* has been given to the illustrious and learned Doctors in Theology and Philosophy who belong to the Order of St. Dominic.

really itself, though considered by logical abstraction of the mind, or conceptionally, as the form by which it is constituted. Hence, Essence as *actual* differs really and immediately from itself as *possible*, by its entity and by nothing else.

Further: either actual Essence is really distinguished from its Existence, or it is not. But, under either hypothesis, it must be conceded, that actual Essence is identical with its own entity. For, in the latter hypothesis, there are no two real terms of composition; since there are only two conceivable entities (*esse*),—that of Essence and that of Existence, which are supposed to be really one. In the former hypothesis, actual Essence is really distinguished from actual Existence. Therefore, the entity of actual Essence is not really distinguished from that Essence, otherwise there must of necessity be a *processus ad infinitum*; since the question will recur as to the actuation of that entity itself by which the said actual Essence is constituted; and so on for ever. For it is plain that a so-called entity, unactuated itself, cannot become sufficient reason of actuation in another.

III. IN THE THIRD MEMBER of the proposition it is declared, that *the entity by which actual Essence is constituted, is identical with the Existence of that Essence*. So far, there could be no divergence of opinion. But the present point is the one which has been so warmly contested.

The first argument in favour of this position, is derived from the testimony of common sense. For, in the judgment of men in general, the possession of this real entity by anything, is supposed to afford sufficient grounds for the assertion, 'This Being or Essence *is*, i. e. exists.' Nay more: take any man of ordinary common sense, and endeavour to persuade him that his existence is one thing and his actual nature or manship another thing quite distinct from the former; he would either think that you were treating him as a fool, or he would have serious doubts about your sanity.

Again: That which alone distinguishes actual from possible Being, is the fact that the former is in act or actuated; and that actuation is its own proper entity. But who does not see, that this actuality of Being outside its causes is enough to verify the enunciation, *Such a Thing is?*

Once more. Each one of the commonly received attributes of Existence concurs in this actuated entity; therefore, the principal

intrinsic reason, on which those who maintain a real distinction between Essence and Existence rely, is deprived of all weight. For, they urge that, while Essence is necessary, eternal, immutable, Existence on the contrary is contingent, temporal, subject to change; and that, such being the case, it is necessary to admit a real distinction between the two, in order to justify this opposite predication. Whatever may be the true answer to this difficulty, (which will receive its solution later on in the chapter); it suffices to say now, that the institution of a real difference between Essence and Existence does not diminish the proposed difficulty, while it creates fresh ones far more serious. For the entity by which actual Being is constituted, (remember once more, that the present question concerns *finite* Being only), is contingent, not necessary,—temporal, not eternal,—mutable, not immutable. It is contingent, because before its creation, it was not and might never have been; while, now that it is, it may afterwards cease to be. It is temporal, for the same reasons; and, for the same reasons, subject to change. More than this, there is no conceivable condition, necessary to Existence of Being, which is not verified in the entity of actual Essence. But if so, what possible grounds are there for insisting on a real distinction between the two?

Lastly: What is finite Existence? Surely, it is no other than that being by which a thing really is in itself, and is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes. But this it is precisely, by which Essence becomes actual, and ceases to be merely possible. There is no imaginable intermediate between these two states. Essence passes from being merely possible, or (itself nothing) from being objectively in the Wisdom and Power of God, to a state of actuation, by a proper entity communicated and preconceived by the Creator as the First Efficient and Exemplar Cause.

The limits, however, of this discussion have not as yet been reached. For it may be admitted, that actual Being is *de facto* existing Being, in the sense that actuation of Essence postulates Existence as its natural and naturally inevitable term; and yet it is open to doubt, whether that completive term be identical with actuated Essence, or really distinguished from it as an accident or mode of the latter. It is one thing to say, that they are never apart and mutually postulate the one the other; it is another to assert, that there is no real distinction between them. One can scarcely see how the opinion of a real distinction can be reconciled

with the third conclusion in the preceding Thesis. Yet the question cannot be left here; if only on account of the authority of those grave Doctors who have strenuously combated the doctrine developed in this Chapter.

To clear the way for the discussion upon which we are about to enter, it is to be observed (and it is a point of the greatest importance), that the question turns on the existence of finite Being, in the full extension of its Transcendental Universality. The object of investigation is, not the Existence of Substance or the Existence of Accident, but Existence as common to Substance and Accident,—or, in other words, the Existence of Being. In proportion as Being becomes more contracted by cognate determinations, *conditions* of Existence begin to multiply. And those conditions may be really distinguishable from the conditioned Actual Being. Thus, for instance, Substance requires *Suppositality* as a natural condition of its existence; Spiritual Substance, *Personality*; Accident, a *Subject* of inhesion. Furthermore, these *natural conditions* (so to call them) are (as will be seen later on) really distinct from the Beings which are thus conditioned. But the question now under discussion treats of the Existence of Finite Being in general.

There is no one who will not be ready to admit, that Existence is that by which a Thing becomes formally and intrinsically existing. Consequently, it is undoubted that actual Essence, as such, includes in itself, formally and intrinsically, the Being of Existence. Nevertheless, it is at least conceivable that it may naturally require some further *term*, or *mode*, or *union*, in order to exist among the things of Nature. It is on this point that the controversy between the two Schools may be said to turn. For there are some who maintain that, although Essence by its own real Entity is *true actual Being*, yet it requires some other real and distinct actuality, in order that it may properly *exist*. This ulterior reality is, according to them, Existence. Against such theory, the following Proposition is directed.

PROPOSITION XVI.

Between actual Essence and its Existence there is no real distinction, but only a logical distinction founded on a reality.

I. THE FIRST PART of this Thesis is proved by the following arguments.

i. If there is to be a real distinction between actual Essence and its Existence; evidently, some other entity must be supposed super-added to actual or individual Essence, in order that it may be able really to exist in the nature of things. But this is unnecessary; and therefore superfluous.

The proof of the *Minor* will rest in considerable measure on a truth, to which attention has been already drawn in the proximate introduction to this Proposition. It is true that certain real entities or modes, really distinct from actual Essence, are required, in order that this or that kind of Essence may connaturally exist. Thus, Substance demands for its natural Existence in the order of creation a mode, distinct from its own Essence, by which it becomes its own master, so to say, and *substantially* incommunicable to another. So in like manner, Accident connaturally requires a mode really distinct from its *own* Essence,—a union with, or rather inherence in, its Subject. So, imperfect or incomplete Substance, such as the human soul, postulates, as a condition of its natural existence, a real mode of union with its correlative. But these conditions apply only to the existence of Essence in such and such kind, not to the existence of Essence, *as such*. On the contrary, they presuppose, at least in order of nature, the existence of Essence, *as such*; of which the clearest perhaps, and easiest instance, is that of the human soul. In fact, the presupposition is based on a philosophic necessity. For *nothing* cannot be made really incommunicable to another; *nothing* cannot actually inhere in a subject; *nothing* cannot be really united as a part with its correlative part. In all real composition the parts must exist prior, if not in order of time certainly in order of nature, to the composite itself. Therefore, none of these modes give existence to actual Essence as such; seeing that they presuppose it. But there are no other conceivable modes of Being besides these; and the arguments in favour of the opposite opinion are derived from the admitted necessity of these modes. Moreover, if there be any other need to be supplied,—if there be any necessity, or advantage even, in some further mode, let it be stated. Surely, such a position should be supported by some probable reason or argument. Yet no such reason has as yet been given. So far, therefore, the assertion is justified, that such a real addition to actual or individual Essence in order that it may exist, is superfluous. But if superfluous, it is to be rejected; because, according to the philosophical axiom, *Entities are not to be multiplied without a necessity*.

ii. This distinct Entity of Existence is not only superfluous, but it is impossible. For it is impossible that a real form should be added without a proper formal effect. But there is no real formal effect which this supposed Entity of Existence could claim to itself. The *Minor* in this syllogism requires some explanation. It must be remembered, then, that it is not now a question of any mode extrinsically added to actual or individual Being, for its ornament or greater perfection. Many such modes are conceivable; and not only conceivable, but discoverable. The Mode or Entity which is now under discussion, is an Entity intrinsic to the actual Essence and added to it; so that it may exist in the order of natural things outside its proper causes. But here there is no room for it. The existence of Essence, *as such*, is provided for by its actuation; the existence of such and such an Essence is provided for by those modes of Suppositivity, Inhesion, Union, &c., of which mention has been already made. Where is there a hiatus? What further effect is needed or even possible? Therefore it remains, that this supposed form would have no formal effect; which is absurd.

Heretofore, the arguments have dealt with the subject generally, and have been directed against a real distinction of any kind. Now, however, by way of confirmation, it will be well to consider the matter more specifically, by proving that *any kind* of real distinction is equally inadmissible. To this end it will be necessary to borrow from the doctrine of Distinctions, which is reserved for the next Book. There are two species of real distinction,—real major distinction and real minor distinction. The former includes all those cases in which the terms of distinction are *de potentia absoluta* physically separable, such as are Substance and Substance, Substance and Accident. The latter comprises cases in which the terms of distinction are not in such wise separable, even *de potentia absoluta*; because it forms part of the essential nature of the inferior term, that it should inhere *actually* in the superior term. Such is the distinction which exists between Substance or Accident and its Mode. A clearer and more detailed explanation of these different kinds of distinction will be given in its proper place. At present it suffices to say, that between actual Essence and its Existence there can be neither real major nor real minor distinction. Wherefore;

iii. It is impossible that there should be real major distinction. The only supposable hypothesis is, that, between actual Essence and

its existence, there might be such a real major distinction as is to be found between Substance and its Accident; for no one has ever dreamed, or will ever dream, of turning Existence into a Substance. Existence, therefore, in the hypothesis now under consideration, can only be regarded as an accidental Form, which gives to actuated individual Essence that last complement by which it exists in the natural order outside its proper causes. In such wise, actual Essence will be in a state of proximate capacity to exist; and this accidental form of Existence will be at once necessary and sufficient to reduce that mere capacity to act. But this is wholly inadmissible; for,

a. First of all, it supposes real composition between actual Essence and its Existence,—to repeat a former argument. Therefore, the existence of actual Essence must be presupposed, and is independent of any supervening form. If the two were really distinct, they would together compose one composite, viz. This existing actual Entity; so that although, as regards the entire composite, Existence would hold the place of an intrinsic and formal Act; yet, if referred to its correlative component, viz. actual Essence, it could in no way constitute or compose it, for the reason that the one would be really contradistinguished from the other, as a simple Entity from a simple Entity.

b. It would follow, that all finite Being exists, not by its own Entity, but by the help of an Entity extraneous to it. Therefore, nothing would exist of itself and, as it were, by its own right; but in virtue of a created form, distinct from itself and superadded to it. But this is entirely repugnant to our intimate sense of things,—nay, is scarcely conceivable.

c. It would further follow, that Existence would necessarily be an accident, not to finite Being only, *as such*, (for this is not only admissible but capable of demonstration); but to *actual* finite Being. And this is, indeed, hard to conceive. The *Antecedent* is plain; for, as soon as ever any Essence is actuated, there can be nothing wanting to that Essence or Entity in its essential notes; so that every after addition must be accidental.

d. In particular, if actual Essence be considered, (so far as the present question is concerned), as a mere subjective power or faculty receptive of Existence, but requiring a formal act of Existence in order to the actuation of that faculty; the difficulty remains unchanged. For that subjective power is either something real, or it is not. If the latter, the question is settled. There is only one

Entity which is Existence and Essence, in accordance with the enunciation of the Thesis. If it be something real, *it is*; and if it is, *so far as it is*, it exists. Consequently, Existence cannot be the formal cause or act of its real Entity.

To this argument an ingenious answer has been given. For, it is said, a formal cause may be regarded under two different aspects. First of all, it may be considered in its relation to the whole composite which it constitutes; in which relation it is the intrinsic formal cause of the composite, but does not in any way constitute the Entity of the Subject which it informs. But it may also be regarded in its relation to that Subject; under which aspect it, as it were, extrinsically comforts or strengthens its Subject in Being, by informing it. Wherefore, it may be truly said, that the Form or Act is not only the formal cause of the whole composite, but also of the Matter or Subject. And the truth of this reply is confirmed and illustrated by the instance of Primary Matter. For, let it be informed by whatsoever Form; while the direct action of that Form principally intends the constitution of the composite, it is, nevertheless, undeniable that its action extends likewise to the Entity of the Matter which is subject to it; since it sustains the existence of primordial Matter, which cannot exist of itself, but can only co-exist with some Form.

This answer, however, really leaves the difficulty untouched; however plausible it may at first sight appear. For there is in the case of existing Essence no composite constituted, and no formal cause required. This is precisely the point of contention, and must not be assumed, at all events, till a satisfactory solution has been given to previous difficulties. A Being is either merely possible in the objective power of God, or it is actually in existence. There is no middle term. Consequently, if Essence is actual, it is *ipso facto* existing; and stands in need of no formal cause to constitute it existent. Again: in composite Being the form is primarily for the sake of the whole composite; and is only necessary to the other component part, inasmuch as this latter cannot naturally exist outside of the composite. But actuated Essence already *is*; because it is in act. And it is here principally that the illustration from Primordial Matter fails. For Primordial Matter is a pure power or subjective receptivity, so to speak; it excludes all independent and perfect Act of whatever kind. Actual Essence, on the contrary, is in essential act; though not essentially in act. Hence, Primordial

Matter is wholly passive or receptive,—all but *nothing*,—being truncated and, if it may be allowed to coin a word borrowed from Latin usage, *dimidiate*. It cannot exist by itself, but only co-exist; whereas actual Essence *is in act*, and completely constituted in its own proper Entity, outside its causes.

iv. It is impossible that between actual Essence and its Existence there should intervene any real minor distinction; or, in other words, that Existence should be a real mode of actual Essence.

The arguments already brought forward to prove, that there cannot possibly be any real major distinction between the two, are equally valid as applied to the present question. For, like those more general arguments which preceded them, they all lead to the conclusion that actual Essence exists by virtue of its own actual entity. Besides, all the conceivable modes of Being have been passed in review; and no place, no function, has been discovered for this additional mode. Therefore, it is presumably superfluous.

Nevertheless these previous arguments admit of further confirmation. For there is an apparent self-contradiction in the hypothesis itself, as shall be shown. If there is a real distinction between the Subject and its supposed mode; that Subject, apart from its mode, must be an actual and real being, already constituted outside its causes; otherwise, there would be nothing but a logical distinction between them. Therefore, actual Essence, apart from its mode of existence, and prior to it, would be a real, existing entity. This being so, the ulterior supervening mode would constitute, together with this existing Essence, a third something which would be a composite of both; neither of whose parts would enter intrinsically into either the constitution or composition of the other. Whence it follows, that this modal existence could in no wise affect the *actual entity* of the Essence.

The position may be further confirmed by an *argumentum ad hominem*. For this modal distinction has been introduced to meet a supposed difficulty, which, in fact, it indefinitely increases. The supposed difficulty is this. It is an undeniable fact, that it is possible for finite Essence to exist or not to exist. Therefore, say some, it requires a determining mode, in order that it may be determined to existence. The true answer to the difficulty will be given, in considering the objections which have been made to this Proposition. Meanwhile, it must be owned that the introduction of this Modal Existence does not serve its purpose. For, as created or finite

Essence is possible to be or not to be ; so is Existence itself possible to be or not to be. If, therefore, a determining mode is for this reason requisite in the one case ; it must, by parity of reason, be requisite in the other. Therefore, Existence will require its determining mode, whereby it, too, shall be determined to be. But what about this second mode ? Is it not, likewise, possible that it should be or not be ? A new mode therefore will be required ; and so on, without end.

II. THE SECOND PART of this Proposition declares, that *the distinction between actual Essence and its Existence is logical or conceptual, yet founded in reality.*

The mere proof of this position is not difficult. For, on the one hand, if the distinction in question be not real, it must be logical ; on the other hand, one's own consciousness, and the universal judgment of mankind, combine in assuring us that such a distinction is not a pure plaything of the intellect, but that there is something in it.

The difficulty begins, so soon as the inquiry turns upon *the nature* of the reality which serves for foundation of the conceptual distinction ; and the difficulty must not be left unsolved. At the outset of this investigation, it must be borne in mind, that we are not in search of the *proximate* foundation, or of the foundation on which the intellect *consciously* builds its distinction in this or that order of cognition ; but of that supreme reality which, in ultimate analysis, affords of itself sufficient reason for the distinction. It is with the greatest diffidence that the author enters upon the question ; because it is his misfortune to have arrived at a solution of it which is opposed to the teaching of Suarez. The extrinsic evidence of such an Authority carries with it a more than ordinary weight ; yet, after all, the point must be determined on its own merits, in accordance with the preponderance of motives, or of intrinsic evidence, on the one side or the other.

The arguments which that Author brings against the ensuing explanation will be examined in their order.

There is one point about which there can be no controversy ; however the terms differ, by which it is explained. Merely possible Essence is distinguished from its after existence as not-Being from Being ; and the distinction may be expressed by the formula, *Thing is really distinct from No thing.* Some may call this a *logical* distinction ; others, *real negative* distinction. But,

however they may differ in terminology; all are agreed upon the nature of the distinction as well as of its foundation.

But it is the distinction between actual Essence and its Existence, which is in dispute. Now, all actuated Essence is singular, individual. It will, therefore, facilitate a very abstract train of thought, if some individual example should be selected as a subject for metaphysical dissection. So, let us take Plato. He *was* and *is* (since the human soul is immortal) an existing being. But his integral existence, his entire composite Being, as visibly existent in the order of nature, has long ceased. Further, he *was not* in the Homeric times. *Then* he was merely possible. *Then* he could be, or he could not be. Consequently, his existence was not necessary but contingent. Again; in a certain sense, as we have just seen, he has ceased to be. If a brute animal were to be substituted in his place, its present non-existence would be unconditional. A dead lion, for instance, simply exists no longer. Thus there is a real foundation for affirming that the *existence* of Plato is conditioned, contingent, temporal, mutable. But his existence is himself. And what is he? A man. Is he so called, because he had hair of such a colour, a nose of such a form, such a height of stature, such intellectual gifts, such a history? No. He is a man, because he is a rational animal. Observe, that time with its conditions has passed; the *is* of Essence is in the present. But is not this too contingent, temporal, subject to change? No; because Plato *is* a man. But he might never have been created. True; but, whether created or no, if Plato is to be Plato, he must be a rational animal. *That* cannot change. Why? Because Plato is a man; and a man *must be* a rational animal. But might he not have been made a stone? Not so; for then he would not have been Plato, but something else. Yes, but Plato's Essence and Plato's Existence are one and the same thing. How, is it possible, then, to attribute to it properties so contrary? Because he is a finite and, therefore, wholly dependent being; and the term of that dependence, as connoting the free action of the Divine Will, that is to say, his existence in the order of Being, is the real foundation of the distinction. Without that foundation, the distinction would be a mere trick of the human intellect.

Let the analysis now proceed with more scientific precision. Finite Being entirely and absolutely depends upon the Infinite. It depends, not only for its existence but for its existing quiddity or

nature, on the Infinite. This truth receives illustration from the example of that which, most nearly of finite things, exhibits a like dependence, and has, consequently, been analogically called creation. The poem depends upon the poet; not only for its existence, but also in regard of its nature and quiddity, so to speak. But the *existence* of the finite depends upon the Infinite in a very different way from that in which the *Essence*, or *Quiddity*, of the finite depends upon the Infinite. The latter, even as actual Essence, does not depend upon the Free Will of the Creator, but on the necessary Idea of the Omniscient. Since God has willed to create the man Plato, He could not have made him other than a rational animal. He had no choice here; because the Quiddity does not depend on His Free Will. It does not depend on the Divine Free Will, because it is the realised imitability of the Divine Nature in a certain degree; and that degree of imitability is represented in the Divine Idea. But the Divine Nature, and the Divine Idea in the present instance, are absolutely immutable, even *terminatively*; therefore the quiddity of Plato is immutable, eternal, necessary, in its foundation. Nevertheless, God might have willed to make Plato that which we now call a plant. True; but then another Divine Idea, another grade in the imitability of the Divine Nature, another essence would be introduced, not that of Plato. And the question is about Plato's actual essence. If something else had been made in his place, that other essence would have been, in its turn, necessary, eternal, immutable; and for precisely the same reason. That actual essence, whatever it may be, corresponds to its Exemplar Idea; and, in its relation to that Prototype, it cannot be other than it is. God could not make the change; because that would be to deny Himself.

But, turning now to the existence of Plato outside his causes, (and such is the etymological meaning of the word *Ex-sistentia*), nothing can be plainer,—assuming the fact of creation,—than that Plato's existence was absolutely dependent on the Free Will of the Creator. He was *not*, then he *was*; he *is*, and is *not*; he might *never have been*. These are undeniable axiomatic truths. And why so? Because the Divine Idea of man does not represent, cannot represent, Existence as man's essential note; otherwise, he would be God, because his existence would be underived. But the existence of Plato is represented in the Exemplar Idea of God. True; because the Divine Idea, as practical Exemplar, presupposes

a decree of the Divine Will to create Plato; but the Divine Idea, *as such*, antecedently to the Divine Decree which was altogether free, included in itself no such representation. Moreover, as included in the Exemplar Idea, it is not there by virtue of the mere Divine Reflection on the Divine Nature and Its imitability in such a given degree; but has claimed an entrance, because the decrees of the Divine Will are infinitely true, and the Intellect of God represents to Itself all truth. It is, if one may venture to use the phrase, an after-thought. But, then, this actual Essence of Plato is mutable, contingent, temporal. Yes; but because it is *actual*, *existent*, not because it is *essence*. This answer, however, suggests another difficulty. For, if the essence of Plato be considered apart from his existence, it relapses into the merely possible. Not so: for the merely possible includes *negation* of existence; whereas the essence of Plato, thus considered, only *does not include* it, that is, prescinds from it. In a word, actual Essence may be considered by the mind *as* actual reduplicatively; and then the formal representative is Existence. Or it may conceive actual Essence as essence reduplicatively; in which case the formal representation is Essence.

To sum up what has been said. The foundation for this logical distinction, between actual or individual Essence and its Existence, is to be found in the absolute dependence of finite Being on the Infinite; which gives rise to two distinct relations, as it were, of the former to the latter. The one is a relation to the Divine Idea, as a copy to its pattern; and this is hypothetically necessary and eternal. The other is a relation to the Divine Will as of an effect to its cause; and this is absolutely contingent and temporal. For this reason it is, that the same finite actual Essence may be considered by the abstracting intellect as to its actuality merely, and so is formed the concept of Existence; or, as a being constituted with such and such characteristic notes, and in this way is formed the concept of Essence. For the same reason, these two concepts admit of contrary predication; because of the diverse relations which they severally connote in one and the same object.

NOTE.

As the phraseology, expressly adopted in the foregoing proofs, would lead the reader to suppose; Existence, properly so called, is really identified with the singular and individual. Whenever, there-

fore, it is predicated of a common nature, or of a collective concept, it is used in an analogical sense.

COROLLARY I.

Since Existence is identified with actual Essence, it is not always a simple, neither is it always a composite, entity; but of such kind as is the actual Essence with which it is identified. If, therefore, the Essence is simple and complete, the Existence will be simple and complete; if the Essence be simple and partial, the Existence will be simple and partial; if the Essence be composed of Matter and Form, in like manner, Existence will be composed of the partial existences of Form and Matter. And so on for the rest.

COROLLARY II.

It is impossible that Existence should be separated from its Essence; in such wise, that the latter could be destroyed and the former remain.

COROLLARY III.

It is impossible, *de potentia absoluta*, that created Essence should be preserved in the order of things, outside its causes, without having any existence.

COROLLARY IV.

It is impossible, *de potentia absoluta*, that Essence and its Existence should be separated so, that each should continue distinct from the other.

COROLLARY V.

It is impossible, *de potentia absoluta*, that any Essence should be preserved in existence by an existence extraneous and foreign to itself.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The first great objection which has been brought against the doctrine exposed in the preceding pages is, that it is opposed to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, who constantly insists on the fact, that in finite being there is a real composition between natural Essence and its Existence, such as is known to exist between a subjective power, or faculty, and its Act. He presses the point, because, as he seems to say, in no other way can the singular simplicity of the Divine Nature be satisfactorily vindicated.

Thus, for instance, in a place where he is engaged in proving that with God Essence and Existence are identical, he says, (as if distinguishing God, in this particular, from finite Being), 'It is necessary, therefore, that Existence *should be compared* to Essence which is other than itself, *as* an act to its potentiality. But, since in God nothing is potential; it follows that in Him Essence could not be other than Existence. Wherefore His Essence is His Existence¹.' Here, then, St. Thomas seems to admit, that Essence may be something really different from its Existence, and explicitly states (as though it were the solitary exception), that in God Essence and Existence are identical; thereby manifestly implying, that such is not the case in finite Being. Again, in a little treatise on the subject of Being (i. e. Existence) and Essence, (where he is, therefore, expressly mooted the question), he has the following remarks:—'Now there is found to be in substances a threefold manner of having Essence. For there is One,—God, whose Essence is His Existence; and, for this reason, some Philosophers say that God has not Essence, because His Essence is no other than His Existence. . . . *Essence is found in another way*, in created intellectual substances, in whom their Existence is other than their Essence; although their Essence is immaterial.' (He is alluding to Angels.) 'Hence, their existence is not absolute, but received, and therefore limited and bounded according to the capacity of the recipient; but their nature or quiddity is absolute, as not having been received in any matter².' In this passage, again, St. Thomas asserts that identity of Essence and Existence is peculiar to God, and that in the Angels, and *à fortiori* in material beings, they are really distinct. But the palmary passage, which has been relied on as being utterly subversive of the doctrine here maintained, is the following:—'But it must not be thought,

¹ 'Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra Q. ii, a. 3, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse.' 1^{ae}, iii, 4, *in c.*

² 'Invenitur autem triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cujus essentia est ipsum suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet essentiam, quia essentia ejus non est aliud quam esse ejus. . . . Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia ipsarum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia; unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum, et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis. Sed natura vel quidditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia.' *Opusc. XXX (aliter XXVI), c. 6, in init.*

although intellectual substances are neither corporeal nor composed of Matter and Form nor existing in Matter like material forms, that, for this reason, they equal the Divine Simplicity; for *some sort* of composition is found in them, because in them Existence and that which exists are not identical. . . . Existence, precisely *as* Existence, cannot be diverse, but it can be diversified by something besides simple Existence, just as the existence of a stone is other than the existence of a man; therefore, that which is self-subsisting (Existence) cannot but be one only. But it has been shown that God is His own subsisting Existence. No other Being, therefore, besides Himself can be its own Existence. It is therefore necessary, in every substance except Himself, that its substance or essence should be one thing, and its existence another¹. And yet more explicitly in the next chapter:—‘Now, it is hence evident that, in created intellectual substances, there is a composition of Act and receptivity; for in what thing soever two (elements) are discovered, of which the one is the complement of the other, the proportion of one to the other is *similar* to the proportion between faculty and Act. But, in created intellectual substance, two elements are discovered, that is to say, the substance itself and its existence, which is not the substance itself, as has been shown. But Existence is the complement of existing substance; for everything is actual by the fact that it has existence. It remains, therefore, that in every one of the aforesaid substances there is a composition of Act and receptivity. Furthermore: That which is *in* anything by virtue of an efficient cause, must needs be its Act; for it is the part of an efficient cause to make something (to be) in act. But it has been shown above, that all other substances have existence from the First Efficient Cause; and it is because they receive existence from some one else, that these same substances are said to be created. Therefore, Existence in created

¹ ‘Non est autem opinandum, quamvis substantiæ intellectuales non sint corporeæ, nec ex materia et forma compositæ nec in materia existentes sicut formæ materiales, quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati adaequantur. Invenitur enim in eis aliqua compositio, ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est. . . . Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est præter esse, sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud igitur quod est subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tantum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud præter ipsum potest esse suum esse; oportet igitur, in omni substantia quæ est præter ipsum, aliud esse ipsam substantiam et aliud esse ejus.’ *q. Gent. L. II, c. 52, in intl.*

substances is a *kind* of Act in them. That, however, which is informed by Act, is receptivity; for Act, *as such*, is the correlative of receptivity. In every created substance, therefore, there is receptivity and Act. Again: Everything which participates *is compared* to that of which it participates, *as* receptivity to Act; for by that which is participated the participant is made actual. But it has been shown above, that God alone is essentially Being, and that all other things participate in Existence. Therefore, all created substance *is compared* to its existence *as* a sort of receptivity to act.

‘Lastly: The assimilation of anything to its efficient cause is produced by Act. For an efficient cause causes what is like itself in so far as it is actual; but the assimilation of every created substance to God is by its existence, as has been shown above. Therefore, Existence *is compared* to all created substances *as* their Act. Whence it remains, that in every created substance there is a composition of Act and receptivity¹.’

In these places St. Thomas asserts, over and over again, that in all created or finite Being there is a real composition and, therefore, a real distinction between Essence or Substance and

¹ ‘Ex hoc autem evidenter, apparet quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis est compositio actus et potentiae. In quocumque enim inveniuntur aliqua duo, quorum unum est complementum alterius, proportio unius ad alterum est sicut proportio potentiae ad actum; nihil enim completur nisi per proprium actum. In substantia autem intellectuali creata, inveniuntur duo, scil. substantia ipsa et esse ejus, quod non est ipsa substantia, ut ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse est complementum substantiae existentis; unumquodque enim actu est per hoc quod esse habet. Relinquitur igitur quod in qualibet praedictarum substantiarum, sit compositio actus et potentiae. Amplius. Quod inest alicui ab agente, oportet esse actum ejus; agentis enim est facere aliquid actu. Ostensum est autem supra, quod omnes aliae substantiae habent esse a primo agente; et per hoc, ipsae substantiae creatae sunt, quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum igitur esse inest substantiis creatis, ut quidam actus earum. Id autem cui actus, potentia est; nam actus, in quantum hujusmodi, ad potentiam refertur. In qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et actus.

‘Item. Omne participans aliquid comparatur ad ipsum quod participatur, ut potentia ad actum; per id enim quod participatur, fit participans actuale. Ostensum est autem supra, quod solus Deus est essentialiter ens; omnia autem alia participant ipsum esse. Comparatur igitur substantia omnis creata ad suum esse, sicut potentia ad actum.

‘Praeterea. Assimilatio alicujus ad causam agentem fit per actum; agens enim agit sibi simile, in quantum est actu. Assimilatio autem cujuslibet substantiae creatae ad Deum est per ipsum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas, sicut actus earum. Ex quo relinquitur, quod in qualibet substantia creata, sit compositio actus et potentiae.’ *c. Gent. L. II, c. 53.*

Existence; and that such distinction and composition is that of receptivity and Act. Further: the whole scope of his argument goes to show, that for this reason even pure Intelligences, forasmuch as they are finite and created, cannot equal the Divine Simplicity. And his words are so explicit occasionally, as to leave no reasonable doubt as to his meaning. Thus, for instance, in one of these passages he declares absolutely, without any modifying clause, that in finite Being '*Essence or Substance is one thing, Existence another.*' Therefore, there is a real distinction between the two.

ANSWER. What is to be said to this difficulty? It is one, of course, which is based upon authority alone; but that authority is second to none. It would not do to have the Angelic Doctor as an adversary, if it can be possibly avoided; and, in the present instance, a careful consideration of his doctrine, as a whole, touching this particular point, will (as it is confidently believed) persuade the attentive reader that the teaching of St. Thomas, so far from impugning the position taken up in these pages, from first to last, confirms it to the letter. The answer, to be satisfactory, cannot be compendious. This is, perhaps, the less to be regretted; since the process of examination will not only illustrate the nature of the Scholastic system, but will also throw much additional light on the intricate subject now in hand. For the sake of clearness it shall be reduced under three principal heads. First of all, the general meaning of this great Doctor in the above quotations and in similar passages will be stated. In the second place, this meaning will be confirmed by a careful examination of the several places quoted. Lastly, it will be still further confirmed by incidental and collateral evidence.

1. *First, then, as to the meaning and argument of St. Thomas generally.* A careful examination and collation of his teaching in these and cognate passages lead to the conclusion, that he is in no wise directly referring to the nature of the distinction between *actual* finite Essence and its Existence; but is insisting upon the metaphysical distinction between finite *possible* Essence and the Existence which it is considered as receiving, or, in other words, its actuation. Consequently, the receptivity is analogical, derived from the ideal state of finite Essence in the Divine Idea, as receptive of actuation by the determination of the First Efficient

Cause. There is, therefore, this striking difference between Infinite and finite Being: that while the latter is in objective possibility of existence, undetermined of itself to be or not to be, and receiving its determination from outside itself; the self-determined Existence of the Former is His very Essence, and therefore Both are unlimited and one. And, because finite Essence in its ideal state exists in a state of receptivity as regards real existence; its existence outside its causes is an Act, as it were, determining and completing that receptivity, so that it now is (and the name itself suggests the idea) *actual* Being. Accordingly, there is a sort of metaphysical composition between the undetermined Essence as receptive and the act of Existence as completorial, which you will in vain try to discover in the Divine Simplicity. Further: Where Existence is Essence it must be one, yet all embracing; for, like transcendental Being, it includes all reality and admits of no *differentia*. It is simply limitless Being, participially at once and nominatively. But, forasmuch as the Existence of finite Being is received, derived, caused from without by other than itself; it is not, cannot be, simple Existence (for that is proper to the self-Existing alone), but is enclosed within limits and differentiated. It is the existence of *a stone*, the existence of *a man*; not Existence pure and boundless. And thus, the very phrases suggest some sort of composition. Whatever judgment may be formed of this interpretation of the Angelic Doctor; at least, it cannot be accused of failing either to vindicate the singular Simplicity of the Divine Nature, or to establish a sufficient foundation for the contrary predication in respect of finite Essence and its Existence respectively.

2. Bearing the above explanation in mind, *we will now pass on to a separate examination of the several passages already quoted*; in order to see whether the interpretation proposed is consonant, or not, with the scope of St. Thomas and with his expressed declarations.

The first passage, taken from *the first part of the Summa*, is contained in an article that discusses the problem, *Whether in God Essence and Existence are the same thing*. St. Thomas solves the problem affirmatively; and gives two reasons for his conclusion, in what is called the *Body* of the article. The first reason may be paraphrased thus: Whatever is to be found in any being, apart from its essence, is caused. But it may be caused in two ways. For the efficient cause may be, either the constituent principles of

the essence from within, as risibility is caused by the rationality and animality of man combined : or it may be an external cause, as heat is caused in water by fire. If, then, the existence of a thing is other than its essence : that existence must be caused. But it cannot be caused intrinsically ; because then that Essence would be self-caused, as being the cause of its own existence. Therefore, it must be caused by some external efficient cause. But in God this is absolutely impossible, for the simple reason that He is the First Efficient Cause. Consequently, in Him Essence and Existence is the same.

Now, here it will be well to pause for one moment to inquire, whether St. Thomas *could* be intending to speak of *actual* finite Essence throughout the course of this argument. A little reflection will show that, if he had intended this, his argument would have been rendered nugatory. For what is its one foundation if not this, that everything in any being, *sans* its essence, is caused ? Therefore its essence is not caused. But who will venture to say,—certainly not St. Thomas,—that the *actual* essence of a finite being is not caused ?

The second reason for his conclusion is contained in the passage from which the quotation, now under examination, has been taken. The argument is as follows : Existence is the actuality of every Form or Nature (i. e. Essence. See the prefatory remarks in the first Chapter of this Book). For goodness or human nature (*humanitas*) is not represented as actual, unless it is represented as existing. Consequently, Existence, compared with the Essence that is not identified with its existence, assumes the relation of an Act to its receptivity, which is evidently potential. But in God there can be no potentiality. Therefore, in Him Existence and Essence is one and the same.

Now, it is worthy of attentive consideration, that the Angelic Doctor, at the outset of this argument, identifies actuality of Essence with existence of Essence. Therefore, he does not seem to admit, if he is to be judged by his words, any real distinction between actual Being and existing Being ; for, according to him, the actuation of Essence is its existence. But further ; he could not, with such a preface, be comparing actual essence with existence, as a receptivity determined by its Act ; because it would be in open contradiction with his previous statement. When, then, he declares that in God there is nothing potential, and that, therefore, His Existence

is no other than His Essence; the argument *must* be thus rendered in harmony with the interpretation already proposed. From God every kind of possibility is excluded; consequently, all possibility of existence determinable to Act. He is pure Act, and (as metaphysical distinction between Essence and Existence necessarily supposes a potentiality, a receptivity, because a possibility), in God there can be no such distinction. As a consequence, in Him Existence and Essence is, even metaphysically, identical.

The second passage is taken from a short *Treatise on Being and Essence*, in which the former word is taken in its widest transcendental signification for that which has essence—the concrete Subject, as it were, of which Essence is the abstract form. The entire Work, therefore, is dedicated to the consideration of Essence under its primary determinations. In the sixth Chapter, from which the passage in question has been borrowed, St. Thomas sums up the result of his examination, touching the modifications of Essence in Substance, and commences with the words in the quotation. ‘Now,’ he says, ‘there is found to be in substances a threefold manner of having essence. For there is one, i. e. God, Whose Essence is His Existence; and for this reason some philosophers say that God has no Essence, because His Essence is no other than His Existence.’ So far, the quotation goes in the objection; but mark the words which immediately follow: ‘Whence it follows, that He is not included under any Genus; for everything that is under a Genus must have a Quiddity (or Essence) besides its Existence. For the Quiddity or Nature of a Genus or Species admits of no distinction, so far as the Nature itself is concerned, in those who belong to that Genus or Species; but Existence is in the different (Subjects) generally¹.’ As the force of this argument is not apparent on the surface, it may be useful to add a word or two by way of explanation. The essential notes of any whole are common, and therefore *one* in all the inferiors that are included under that Whole, whether it be a Genus or a Species. It is only when those constituents of Essence are regarded in existing species or individuals, that the Essence is

¹ ‘Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quidditatem praeter esse suum; cum quidditas aut natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis quorum est genus vel species; sed esse est in diversis diversimode.’ *Opusc. XXX (aliter XXVI)*, c. 6.

either specifically or individually differentiated. Thus, *animal* is animal all the world over; it is only when this nature is regarded as existing, e. g. in a *cow* or a *man*, that it becomes distinguished by one or the other of the two Differences, Rational or Irrational. So man, as man, is one nature or Essence; it is only when Human nature is considered as existing in Plato, Socrates, and so on, that it becomes diversified by the addition of individual notes, such as size, features, complexion, character, talents, &c. Hence, Essence in itself is one; but it becomes divided off by Existence. If, therefore, Essence and Existence in any given case are identical, there is no possibility of differentiation; consequently, such Essence cannot be either generic or specific. It can, however, be individual; because the Essence *is* Existence, and all Existence is individual.

Now, who can fail to see that, in pursuing such a line of argument, St. Thomas *could* not have been referring to actual Essence? For, by the mere fact that the finite Essence actually *is*, outside its causes, it is *ipso facto* differentiated. Even if Existence be considered as a real completorial mode necessary, as they say, to give to actual Essence the power of persevering in existence; nevertheless, as soon as Essence is actuated, it is individualized, and therefore receives its differentiation. But, in this argument of St. Thomas, the existing individual is one term of distinction; generic or specific nature, the other.

The other portion of the extract from the same treatise is still more clear. For, speaking of Angelic substances, St. Thomas draws a contrast between their Essence and their Existence; in that the former is absolute and not received from the First Efficient Cause, whereas the latter is so received, and, consequently, limited to the capability of the Nature that receives it. But it is manifest that *actual* Essence is as much the result of the Efficient Cause as Existence; nay, according to the hypothesis of our adversaries, more so. For actuation of Essence would be the formal term of Causation; while Existence would follow as a supplemental mode.

And now, in the last place, for the two Chapters in the Angelic Doctor's Philosophical *Summa against the Gentiles*.

In the former, or fifty-second Chapter, he is occupied in proving that, although the Angels are immaterial subsisting Forms; yet, that their simplicity does not equal that of the Divine Nature, because in them Essence and Existence are not the same. And his

first argument in proof of this last position is, that wherever Existence is the very Essence, it admits of no differentiation; because Existence in itself is always one and the same. Wherever, therefore, it is differentiated, the Essence is not the same as Existence, for the Difference is added; as in the examples adduced,—the Existence of *a stone*, the Existence of *a man*. From this first argument it must be confessed that no conclusion can be drawn in favour of either opinion.

The second argument is *à minori ad majus*, in this wise. There can be but One Whose Existence is self-subsistent, His own Essence. All others, therefore, receive their existence from without; consequently, in them Existence is other than Essence. The *Antecedent* is thus proved. Every common or generic nature, or Essence, if it were to subsist of itself, would be one only; for it could only be multiplied through its division by Differences which would constitute different Species. If this be the case in generic wholes; how much more must it be verified in the case of a Transcendental whole, which admits of no division, but only of contraction or determination. The whole force of this argument depends upon the assumption, that finite Existence is received from without, whereas Essence is not; and that, therefore, in the creature the one is different from the other. But, if St. Thomas meant *actual* Essence; there would be no difference in this respect, inasmuch as both would be received.

The fourth argument (for the third has no bearing on the present question) is derived from the relation of efficient causation to Being, and may be thus stated. No being which receives its existence from another is essentially its own existence; consequently, its Existence is other than its Essence. But all created or finite Being receives its existence from another. Therefore, &c. The *Major* is thus demonstrated. He, whose Essence and Existence are identical, cannot admit of anything which is accidental to Essence. But the receiving existence from another is accidental to Essence. Therefore, &c. The same inference which has been drawn from the second argument, applies with equal force to this fourth.

The fifth argument is wholly inexplicable, if St. Thomas is supposed to treat of actual Essence. The substance (i. e. substantial essence) of a thing is Being in its own right, not by the causality of another. Hence, *actual* lucidity is no part of the essence of air,

because it receives it from another. But the Existence of every finite or created Being is received from another; otherwise, it would not have been created. Therefore, in no created essence or substance is Essence the same as Existence¹.

The sixth argument is somewhat obscure by reason of its brevity; but it is of great weight in the present controversy. It will be well, therefore, to develope it into somewhat more explicit form. Every agent or efficient cause acts, in proportion as it is *itself* in act. Wherefore, it behoves that the First Efficient Cause should Himself be in act, i. e. actual after the most perfect manner. But that which is itself essentially *pure Act*, without admixture of potentiality of any sort, is more perfect than that which receives actuation. For this latter, plainly enough, receives its Act from the former. But this Act is Existence; wherefore, the First Efficient Cause must be Himself simple Existence. Thus, His Existence is His Essence. But, in the causes of all secondary efficient causes, the act of existing is received from the First Efficient Cause; and every such Form and Act is in receptivity, till it exists. Consequently, it is not pure Act; for the Essence is, before actuation, potential or receptive of Existence. In God, therefore, as the First Efficient Cause, and in God alone, Essence and Existence are the same². Now, in this argument, actuation is identified with Existence; otherwise it is a patent paralogism. Consequently, when Forms and Acts are said to be *in potentia*; it cannot but be, that the Angelic Doctor means *in potentia objectiva*, i. e. in their state of objective possibility in the Divine Idea and fundamentally in the Divine Nature. For, what sort of an Act would that be, which would be actual and, at the same time, possible in relation to itself?

¹ 'Amplius: Substantia uniuscujusque est ens per se et non per aliud; unde esse lucidum actu non est de substantia æris, quia est ei per aliud. Sed cuilibet rei creatæ suum esse est ei per aliud; alias non esset creatum. Nullius igitur substantiæ creatæ suum esse est sua substantia.' The meaning of the word *substantia* is determined by the problem proposed in the heading of the Chapter.

² 'Cum omne agens agat in quantum est actu, primo agenti, quod est perfectissimum, competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo. Tanto autem aliquid est perfectius in actu, quanto talis actus est in via generationis posterior, actus enim est tempore potentia posterior: in uno et eodem quod de potentia ad actum procedit. Perfectius est quoque in actu, quod est ipse actus quam quod est habens actum; hoc enim propter illud actus est. His ergo positis, constat ex supra ostensis quod Deus solus est primus agens. Sibi ergo soli competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo, ut scilicet, sit Ipse actus perfectissimus. Hoc autem est esse, ad quod generatio et omnis motus terminatur; omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia, antequam esse acquirat. Soli igitur Deo competit quod sit ipsum esse; sicut soli competit quod sit primum agens.'

The last argument tells equally in favour of the interpretation advocated in these pages. It is as follows. That which belongs to anything by participation from another, is not its essence. But Existence belongs to all finite Being by participation from the Self-existent, as First Efficient Cause. Wherefore, in finite Being Existence is other than Essence¹. Is then *actual* Essence in the creature no participation from the First Efficient Cause?

Turn we now to the succeeding, or fifty-third, Chapter. As the whole of it has been already given to the reader in an English dress, it may be more summarily treated. Therefore, in the first argument St. Thomas identifies actual with existent Essence in the words, '*everything is actual by the fact that it has existence.*' Of the second the same may be said. For he argues that in created substance there is receptivity and Act, because the existence of created Being proceeds from the First Efficient Cause; and it is the office of an efficient cause to make a thing *actual*. Of the third argument, again, the same may be said; for the only difference between it and the preceding consists in a change of the Middle Term. In the preceding it was *Efficient Causation*; in this, *Participation*. Lastly, the fourth argument exhibits precisely the same features, its Middle Term being *Assimilation*. In each and all, therefore, the Angelic Doctor identifies actual with existing Essence; consequently, he could not have intended to contrast them together as receptivity and Act. Accordingly, he must be speaking of finite Essence in its state of objective possibility. But, if St. Thomas were speaking of this real negative distinction between possible Essence and its Existence; would he have spoken absolutely of their being in relation to each other as receptivity and Act, and of a composition arising out of their union, which excludes all finite Being from the possibility of equalling the Divine simplicity? Would he not have qualified his assertions? Would he not have expressly used some modifying phrases, by means of which he might direct our attention to the fact? This is precisely what he has done in every passage. Thus, in the passage of the *Summa*; '*comparetur . . . sicut actus ad*

¹ 'Amplius: Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam; esse enim Dei est ejus substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem competit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis, sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem quamdam. Quod autem competit alicui per participationem, non est substantia ejus. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis, praeter agens primum, sit ipsum esse.'

potentiam;' in the short treatise on Being and Essence, 'non est in eis *omnimoda* simplicitas—illud esse receptum est *per modum actus* . . . propter hoc a quibusdam hujusmodi substantiae *dicuntur componi* ex quo est et quod est;' in the fifty-second Chapter of the *Philosophical Summa*, '*Aliqua compositio—per participationem quamdam*;' and in the fifty-third Chapter, 'proportio unius ad alterum est *sicut* proportio potentiae ad actum, . . . ut *quidam* actus earum,—*comparatur* substantia omnis creata ad suum esse *sicut* potentia ad actum—*ipsum* esse *comparatur* ad omnes substantias creatas *sicut* actus earum.' Now, are not all these phrases, 'a sort of Act,' 'like an Act,' 'like the proportion between Act and receptivity,' and the rest, exactly what might have been expected, if the interpretation suggested in the present answer were true? If St. Thomas had intended to represent *actual Essence* as receptive of Existence, there would have been in such case undoubted real composition; because there would have been composition of two real components. Why, then, should he say, 'Accordingly, these intelligent substances are said by some to be composed of Existence and Essence (*ex quo est et quod est*)'? Moreover, St. Thomas never once asserts or implies anything like real or physical composition between the two; the whole of his phraseology tends in an opposite direction.

3. *It is now time to confirm the interpretation which is here vindicated, by two cognate passages taken from other writings of the same Doctor.* In his *Questions de Potentia* occur the following words: 'By the mere fact that Existence is attributed to Quiddity (or Essence), not Existence alone, but the Quiddity itself is said to be created; because, before it has existence, it is nothing, save perchance in the Intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature but the Creative Essence¹.' Now, in this place St. Thomas expressly denies any middle term between existing and merely possible Essence. If it does not exist, it is in itself nothing; and *is*, only in the Divine Idea. How can this be reconciled with any interpretation of his doctrine on this head, which supposes *actual Essence* outside its causes to be something really distinct from existing Essence?

The same doctrine is still more explicitly stated in another passage, which we *only* quote in confirmation, (whereas it might otherwise have justly claimed the first place), because the fragment

¹ 'Ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur; quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia.' *De Potent. Q. iii, a. 5, ad 2^m.*

is 'very corrupt'¹. Nevertheless, the part of it here given is fortunately quite plain and clear. 'Since everything which has anything not from itself, is *possible* in respect of such particular Quiddity; seeing that finite beings have existence from another, they will be possibles in respect of that existence, as also in respect of Him from Whom they have it, in Whom is no like potentiality. Accordingly, in such Quiddity is found receptivity and Act; for the reason that the Quiddity (or Essence) is itself possible, and its Existence is a composition of receptivity and Act, (de quo est et quod est)².' If any reliance may be placed on this passage, there is no room for further doubt about the matter. For St. Thomas herein distinctly explains, that the receptivity, to which he attributes Existence as act, is merely possible Essence; since he calls it possible, and explicitly alludes to its internal as well as external possibility. So much for the objection based on the supposed authority of the Angelic Doctor.

II. THE SECOND DIFFICULTY is the first of a series of arguments which are based on purely intrinsic evidence. They are partly *elenctic*, i. e. directed against the doctrine maintained in the present proposition, partly *apologetic*, i. e. offered in support of the contrary opinion.

The existence of finite Being must be contracted; otherwise, it would be without limit and, therefore, infinite. But Existence can only be contracted by its reception in some receptivity, or passive faculty, really distinct from itself. That receptibility can be no other than the actual Essence; because possible Essence in itself is not real and cannot, consequently, be really distinct. Therefore, there is a real distinction between actual Essence and its Existence.

ANSWER. It is not true that Existence can only be contracted by some receptivity really distinct from itself. For finite Existence has its determined bourn, partly in itself as being *received* Existence, partly in itself as actuated Essence. To explain: All finite Existence is from the Infinite as its Efficient Cause; from Him it is derived. Now, derivation connotes dependence; and dependence connotes

¹ Note of the Editor of the Roman edition, 1570.

² 'Quia omne quod habet aliquid non a se est possibile respectu illius hujusmodi quidditatis, cum habeant (*sic*) esse ab alio, erunt possibles respectu illius esse et respectu ejus a quo habent, in quo nulla eadem potentia; et ita in tali quidditate invenitur potentia et actus, secundum quod ipsa quidditas est possibilis, et est esse ejus compositio potentiae et actus, de quo est et quod est.' *Opusc. LIV (aliter LXVII)*.

superiority. But that which is superior, of *itself* gives a limit to its inferior. Moreover, as antecedently a mere Possible; finite Existence is subject to the will of the First Efficient Cause and, therefore, limited. But it is also limited under its aspect of actuated Essence. For, though each Essence or Quiddity, *within its own proper periphery* as a common nature, is only limited by Existence which individualizes it; yet, as a Quiddity, it is limited in the Divine Idea, since it is the realized imitability of the Divine Nature *in a certain definite grade*, and that grade limits it off from every other grade actual or possible. Thus, finite Existence can be limited without reception in any passivity distinct from itself; and the objection is, therefore, inconclusive.

III. THE THIRD DIFFICULTY attacks part of the proof which has been offered in support of the present Thesis. It has been asserted that, if Essence is actual, it must exist. On the contrary, there is nothing repugnant in the idea that Essence should be actual, and yet really distinguished from the Mode or Form of Existence by which it is made actual. Thus, antecedently to its information by such Mode or Form, it is actual in comparison with merely possible Essence, potential with regard to the act of existence.

ANSWER. This argument involves a contradiction in terms. For an actual Essence is Essence in act; and the first fundamental act of Essence is its Existence. If it be actual, outside its causes, it exists; if it is not outside its causes, it is not actual; and, in such case, it is merely possible. There can be no middle term; for Existence is indivisible, and in itself *in actu exercito* admits of no degrees. A thing either exists or it does not; if it does not, it is merely possible. Therefore, it is a contradiction in terms to say that a being is actual, and at the same time receptive of Existence.

IV. THE FOURTH DIFFICULTY pursues the preceding argument. A middle term *is* possible between existent Essence and merely possible Essence. For there is such a thing as subjective possibility, i. e. something real which is receptive of its perfection. Actual Essence, therefore, is an entity, and so, distinguished from merely possible Essence; yet it is receptive of that Mode or Form by which it exists. Precisely similar is the case of Primordial Matter; which is something, yet cannot exist, save under the actuation of some Form.

ANSWER. All subjective possibility *presupposes* the existence of that entity which possesses this receptivity of an ulterior Form. Therefore, it exists; and, consequently, of whatever other real perfecting mode it may be capable, certainly it is not capable of that which it possesses already, viz. Existence. Existence is the first act of Being; it cannot be really receptive, before itself is. If, therefore, an Essence possesses *actual* Existence; *de facto* it exists. It is an insult to common sense to affirm, that a being is outside its causes, its creation willed, itself distinguished from mere possibility; and, at the same time, to maintain that it requires some real Mode supervening in order that it may exist. Neither is the confirmation added from the example of Primordial Matter of any weight. For Primordial Matter is not integral Being, but half-Being. It neither has, nor can have, in itself integral Existence; but only in partnership. Hence, its actuation by some primitive Form is a necessary condition of its *co-existence*; for *exist* it cannot, in and of itself. Its separate existence, therefore, involves us in a Metaphysical contradiction. That which is peculiar to it by reason of its imperfection is, that its *formal* actuation is its Existence; because it cannot *be*, save in company. But no such peculiarity is to be found in those Essences which are conceived in the Divine Intellect, and only attend the *Fiat* of the Divine Will to become real, existing entities.

V. THE FIFTH DIFFICULTY. In order that Being may be truly said to exist, it is not enough that it should be constituted outside its causes as a passivity receptive of the act of existence; but it must be constituted outside its causes, as something actual and complete in the order of Being. Therefore, there can be a middle term between merely possible and existent Essence.

ANSWER. It is probable that the author of this argument must have meant by '*actual and complete in the order of Being*,' actual and complete in the *act* of being or existing; because if he means that a receptive faculty, or an imperfect substance, cannot exist till the one and the other is actual and complete in its actuality, facts are against him. For, what is to be said of the sensitive, volitive, and intellectual faculties in a foetus? What of the human soul after death? It may not be useless to call attention to this distinction; as it serves to elucidate the solution of the difficulty. It is

impossible, then, that actuation should be potential relatively to itself. But the first act of Essence is Existence; actual Essence, consequently, exists, and cannot be potential relatively to its non-Existence. But, even if it could, the difficulty would remain. For the question would arise, What is this faculty receptive of Existence? Is it something or nothing? If something, it is outside its causes; because it is really distinct from merely possible Essence, and actual. But if outside its causes, God has created it. Therefore, it *is*; for the Divine power cannot be terminated to nothing. But, if it *is*, it exists. All other supervening mode of Existence, therefore, would make a composite Existence other than the first and, as it were, accidental to it.

VI. THE SIXTH DIFFICULTY owes its origin to a misapprehension of the doctrine of St. Thomas. For it is objected that the doctrine maintained in this Chapter fails to vindicate the singular and incommunicable simplicity of the Divine Being; since, in the hypothesis that there is no real distinction between finite Essence and its Existence, the Angels would have the same simplicity of nature as God Himself.

ANSWER. In answer it is maintained, that a metaphysical composition, such as is enunciated in the present Proposition, suffices to vindicate the singular simplicity of the Divine nature. Nor can it be urged in reply, that a physical composition would be more effective for the purpose. For such a line of argument would carry its advocates further than they themselves would wish to go; seeing that composition out of material and physically distinct parts would draw a yet more effective line of demarcation between the Creator and His creature; and, consequently, all creation should be material. Moreover, so far is this objection from being true, that a purely metaphysical distinction seems especially fitted to illustrate the Divine simplicity at once and the Divine wisdom. For, as in creation there is a continuous chain of Being, each one of whose links is an imitation of the Divine nature, proceeding upward from the remotest to the nearest and noblest, though still limited and imperfect, copy; so is it well that, as the chain reaches higher, the composition should grow less and less, till the creature reaches a simplicity which only stops short at the incommunicable simplicity of God, in Whom, as there is no physical, so neither is there even metaphysical, composition.

VII. THE SEVENTH AND LAST DIFFICULTY is one, not directed against the Thesis itself, but against the explanation given as to the real foundation on which the logical distinction between actual Essence and its Existence is said to rest. It is the objection of Suarez, alluded to in the proof for the second part¹. This great philosopher argues that the Divine Ideas are not the foundation of finite Essences, but rather that the Essences are, so to speak, the foundation of the Divine Ideas; i.e. that those Essences are not such and such, because the Divine Idea so represents them, but the Divine Idea so represents them, because the Essences are such and such. The Divine Ideas, therefore, cannot be the foundation of finite Essences as such.

ANSWER. But in reply it must be observed, that possible Essence, or finite Essence *as such*, (abstraction made of its Actuality or Existence), depends on the Divine Idea *formally*, on the Divine Nature *fundamentally*. The Divine Idea, as such, does not determine the necessity and immutability of finite Essence; *as neither is it determined by the finite Essence itself*. It is here that Suarez would seem to have made an erroneous assumption, which is fatal to his argument. The Divine Idea is determined by the Divine Nature, Which eminently contains within itself that definite degree of Its own imitability *ad extra*, which is the real foundation of such possible Essence. Supposing, therefore, the Divine Decree for the creation of this Essence; the Divine Idea becomes the Prototype or Exemplar Idea, according to Whose measure it is created. The finite Essence, therefore, *is* such and such, because it is so represented in the Divine Idea; but that representation itself in the Divine Idea has for object the Divine Nature, as imitable in such a definite grade. This question, however, will recur in the following Chapter.

¹ *Metaph. Disp. xxxi*, § 6, n. 17.

CHAPTER IV.

POSSIBLE AND EXISTING ESSENCE CONTRASTED.

NOTE. Again, in this Chapter, the inquiry is limited to *finite* Essence. Possible Essence is assumed as equivalent to *merely* Possible Essence.

PROPOSITION XVII.

Possible Essence, formally regarded, is distinguished from existing Essence by real negative distinction, which is properly conceptual.

THE FIRST MEMBER of this Thesis is sufficiently established by simply defining the term, *real negative distinction*. Such a distinction is said to exist between two members, one of which is real, the other purely conceptual; as e.g. between *Being* and *not-Being*, *something* and *nothing*. As, therefore, Existing Essence is **real**, and Possible Essence formally considered is, (as has been shown in the third Chapter), purely logical; the distinction between the two is one of real negative distinction.

THE SECOND MEMBER is equally plain. For, as distinction from nothing is no distinction; so, distinction from nothing real, is no real distinction. It must, consequently, be logical or conceptual merely.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

Possible Essence, fundamentally regarded, is really distinguished from existing Essence.

This Thesis is clearly a mere Corollary of the doctrine concerning possibles, which has been established in the third Chapter of this book. For it was there demonstrated, that the real foundation of the concept of Possible Essence is the Divine Nature as imitable outside Itself; and the Divine Nature is really distinguished from all existing things.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Possible Essence, logically regarded as it is in the Divine Intellect, is distinguished from existing **Essence** either really or by a real negative distinction, in accordance with a twofold aspect under which the Divine Idea may be considered.

The Divine Idea or Reason, which is representative of Possible **Essence**, may be regarded in two ways, according to a twofold representation which It may be said to embody. For It may be considered as something subjectively real and existing; and under this point of view it is no other than the Divine Idea, representing with infinite perfectness the nature of that Possible **Essence** as it would exist, should it seem good to the Divine Will to create it. Or, on the other hand, It may be considered as something purely conceptual; that is, as the *formal term* of the Divine Idea; and under this point of view It is nothing real formally, but, after a manner, corresponds with the formal concept of the merely Possible in the human understanding. To put it more clearly:—the Divine Idea in the given case may be taken either for the Exemplar Idea, as representative of the Divine Nature in such a definite grade of imitability; or for the Divine concept of a possible Being, not as yet existing. If, then, the Divine Idea of possible **Essence** be regarded in the former way, It is on all sides God, and is, therefore, really distinguished from the creature; if in the latter way, it is as evidently distinguished from actual **Essence** by a real negative distinction.

PROPOSITION XX.

Possible Essence, causally regarded, that is, in relation to its supposed efficient cause, is really distinguished from existing **Essence**.

The reason, again, is patent; for possible **Essence**, thus considered, is nothing more nor less than the omnipotent Will of God.

PROPOSITION XXI.

Possible Essence is absolutely immutable and eternal; not in itself formally, but fundamentally and logically in another.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition it is asserted that *possible Essence is neither immutable nor eternal in itself formally*; which admits of easy proof. For, that which in itself is nothing,

can claim to itself neither immutability nor eternity, nor any other real attribute whatsoever. But possible Essence, in itself formally considered, is nothing ; because it includes in its concept the formal exclusion of its existence.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER is to the effect, that *possible Essence, considered as fundamentally in another, is immutable and eternal* ; which is proved in this wise. The imitability of the Divine Nature in such or such a definite grade, and the omnipotent Will of God, which *can* all things not in themselves contradictory, are together the adequate foundation, as has been already shown, of merely possible Essence,—the One giving to it its internal, the Other its external, possibility. But the imitability of the Divine Nature in such a grade, and the omnipotent Will of God, are alike immutable and eternal. Therefore, possible Essence, considered fundamentally in another, is immutable and eternal.

The *Minor* needs declaration as touching both its members. The imitability then of the Divine Nature is absolutely immutable and eternal, because the Divine Nature is Itself so. For, as It contains those grades of imitability wholly in Itself ; the eternity and immutability of the One is the eternity and immutability of the others. Thus, for instance, if God is spiritual Substance, He can never cease from being spiritual Substance ; and, consequently, if He is ever imitable as spiritual Substance, He will eternally and unchangeably be imitable as spiritual Substance.

Again, His omnipotent Will is eternal and immutable, not in Its termination outside Himself really and effectively, because *there* It is infinitely free ; but in Its Omnipotence as It is in Itself. In other words, in the production and conservation of the creature, the Divine Will, though entitatively immutable and eternal, is mutable and temporal in Its term ; otherwise, all actual creatures would be immutable and eternal. How these two are reconcilable, will be discussed elsewhere. Meanwhile, it is enough to notify the fact. But, when that Will is simply considered in the infinity of Its range, apart from *actual* termination outside Itself, It is eternal and immutable on all sides. Now, the one only foundation of external possibility is the power of God to do whatsoever He pleases, provided it be *do-able*, i.e. provided the thing does not involve a self-contradiction. But the power of God to do whatsoever is *do-able*, is eternal and immutable ; although the actual production of the thing is not so.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of this Proposition asserts that *possible Essence, considered logically in another, is immutable and eternal*; which is thus shown.

The Divine Idea, representing all possible Essences, is eternal and immutable, not only subjectively as the Divine Act, (for It is evident enough that under this point of view It is eternal and immutable), but also objectively, or terminatively. It is necessary here to interpose for one moment, in order to avoid all possibility of confusion. There are two objects of the Divine Wisdom or Science; to wit, the primary Object which is God Himself, and the secondary object which He sees *in* Himself. When, then, it is said, that the Divine Idea is objectively or terminatively eternal and unchanging, it is to the *secondary* object that the expression refers. Having premised thus much, the *Major* may be thrown into a somewhat different and more explicit form; as thus. The Divine Idea, representing each and all possible Essences, represents them as eternally and immutably capable of existing as such and such Essences, constituted by such and such characteristic notes, and no other.

But Possible Essence, considered conceptually in another, is really no other than the Divine Idea objectively regarded in this manner.

Therefore, Possible Essence, considered conceptually in another, is immutable and eternal.

The *Major* of this syllogism is proved in such wise. The concept of any secondary object entirely founded in the concept of another primary object, which is itself absolutely immutable, and bears an immutable relation or habitude to that same secondary object, is immutable as representative of its secondary object, or in other words, represents that object as absolutely immutable.

But the Divine Idea, representing possible Essences as Its secondary object, is founded on the primary Idea of the Divine Nature as imitable; and, (if extrinsic possibility be included), of the Creative Will of God, Which are both immutable and eternal, not only in Themselves absolutely, but also respectively in Their relation or habitude to Their term, (so to say), or the secondary objects of the Divine Cognition. Therefore &c.

The last part of the above *Minor* may need further declaration; not touching the Imitability of the Divine Nature, which has been already fully considered and does not present any grave difficulty,

but for what regards the Creative Will. This point, too, has been touched upon before; but because of its importance it may be well to recur to it, if only to establish what has been said before, by throwing it into a more scientific form.

Wherefore: an absolutely immutable and eternal power, which is considered antecedently to all or any *real* relations of any beings to itself, is eternal and immutable also respectively to those beings, or in other words, extrinsically.

But the Creative Will of God, as the foundation of external Possibility, is considered antecedently to all or any *real* relations of any beings to Itself. Therefore, It is eternal and immutable also extrinsically.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Finite existing Essence is only conditionally immutable.

The following is the proof. For,

I. Such Essence is only immutable for such time as the Act of the Divine Will is terminated to its conservation in existence. But the conservation of existing finite being is terminatively conditional; that is, it is dependent on the Free Will of the Creator.

II. For so long as that condition is verified, the existing Essence is, plainly enough, immutable. For what does essential change imply? It means that this Essence should be another Essence, that is to say, that it should at the same time be itself and not itself. But this is impossible, even *de potentia absoluta*.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The present Proposition is not reconcileable with the principles on which the preceding Proposition has been established. Therefore, if the one be true, the other must be false. For the existence of created Essences is predetermined in the Decree of the Divine Will. But the Decree of the Divine Will is really no other than the Divine Will Itself, which is eternal. It was therefore true from all eternity that these Essences would exist. Consequently, finite existing Essence is *absolutely* immutable, and not conditionally only.

ANSWER. The *Antecedent* is denied. There is no real opposition between the two Propositions. And now, let us proceed to investigate the alleged proof. It will be willingly granted, that the existence of created Essences is predetermined in the Decree of the Divine

Will; and that the Divine Will, and, therefore, any Decree of the Divine Will, is eternal and immutable *entitatively*, i. e. as It is in Itself, because it is really identical with the Divine Nature. But, if It is considered *terminatively*, i. e. as terminated by such and such an object outside Itself, It is neither immutable nor eternal. For, though Itself, in the luminousness of Its own self-existing Being, remains always unchangeable, always one Act; yet the external secondary objects change before It, and come and go, as It wills, like objects passing across the field of a telescope. In the *Minor* of the second syllogism, in which it is affirmed, *it was true from all eternity that those Essences would exist*, there is an apparent ambiguity. For the truth of a Judgment is one thing; and the truth of the entity that is the subject of the Judgment, another. Yet, in the above Premiss these two are confounded. Once suppose the Divine Decree; it is an eternal and unchanging truth, that such a being will exist at such a given point of time. But it is not true, that the existence of such being is itself eternal and immutable, or that its *actuated* essence is absolutely immutable.

II. The doctrine enunciated in the above Proposition gives rise to a much more serious difficulty; since it threatens to subvert the very foundations of human science. For Science is conversant only with realities; and if those realities are not necessary, eternal, unchangeable, there can be no Science, properly so called. Now, it has been already stated, that actual finite Essence is produced by the First Efficient Cause; just as its Existence, with which the former is really identified, is generally acknowledged to be. Besides, actual finite Essence can cease to be, as the Thesis evidently supposes. But if so, there can be no such thing as immutable and eternal truths within the sphere of finite Essence, and, consequently, no Science of it. For whatever is enunciated of finite Essence, is only verified for so long as it exists; and, therefore, before its creation, there *was* no truth about it either way. In like manner, after its destruction or corruption, there *will* be no truth. So also, since all knowledge of God in the natural order is derived from the truth of His created works; it follows that anything like a scientific knowledge of God's Existence or Nature is impossible, because a conclusion cannot carry beyond the strength of its premisses. Thus, that *man is a rational animal*, for instance, is only true while a man exists; before and after, it is

a mere conceptual figment. So, likewise, that *three and four make seven*, is only verified for such time as four things exist and three things exist. There is, at the most, but a subjective necessity; consequently, such propositions are Categories of our reason, or synthetical *à priori* Judgments, and nothing more. They can have no objective nature; and belong to Logic rather than to Metaphysics, which, under the circumstances, would be an impossible Science.

ANSWER. This difficulty has been felt and has been variously treated by different Doctors of the School. Some moderns have gone the length of admitting, that these enunciations concerning finite Essence are not eternal and immutable. But such an opinion is exceptional and contrary to the persistent teaching of the Peripatetics, Pagan as well as Christian. Others, while agreeing as to the fact of their eternal unchangeableness, have differed in their way of explaining the intimate reason why they are so. The following Proposition offers a solution of the question, according to the mind of St. Thomas.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

The immutable and eternal truth of enunciations in which essential attributes are predicated of finite Being, depends, not on finite Being in itself, nor ultimately on an abstract necessity arising out of any ideal identity between Subject and Predicate; but, fundamentally on the Divine Nature, formally on the Divine Intellect.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Thesis, in which it is asserted that *the immutable and eternal truth of these enunciations does not depend on the finite Being itself*, is too plain to require elaborate proof. For, in such case, it must depend on finite Being, as purely possible, or as actual, or, lastly, as including both its merely possible and actual state. But purely possible Being may at once be put out of the question; because, in itself, it is nothing, and all reality in the concept is derived from another. There remains, therefore, nothing but actual finite Being. The immutable and eternal truth of these propositions, however, cannot depend on finite Being in its actual state, for the reasons already given. If they could, the contingent, temporary, and changeable, would be a sufficient reason of the necessary, eternal, and immutable; which is absurd.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is denied, that *the immutable and eternal truth of these enunciations depends ultimately on an abstract necessity arising out of any ideal identity between subject and predicate.*

The opinion herein rejected is that of Suarez¹. He says that the absolute necessity and, consequently, eternal and immutable truth of such Judgments depends, not on the Divine Intelligence, but on the objective identity of the Subject and Predicate. Thus, in the proposition, *Man is a rational animal*, the Predicate *Rational animal*, is objectively identical with the Subject, *Man*. So, in like manner, in the judgment, *Twice three make six*, the Predicate, *Six*, is identical with the Subject, *Twice three*. In accordance with this theory, he makes the eternal and immutable truth of negative enunciations to depend on a necessary diversity of the Extremes. Thus, *a stone is not an animal*, is eternally true, because the Predicate, *Animal*, is necessarily diverse from the Subject, *Stone*. This necessity, moreover, according to Suarez, arises from the unity common to all Being, which postulates that a thing should be identical with itself and distinct or diverse from all other.

Now, it can scarcely be denied, that this identity on the one hand, and diversity on the other, between the two Extremes or Terms of an immediate analytical Judgment, in the order of human cognition, are a proximate and *pro tanto* sufficient reason for its eternal necessity. But, that the necessity, eternal and immutable truth, of these enunciations should *ultimately depend* on such a motive, is open to serious objections. For,

i. What *constitutes* this necessary identity or diversity? Why is it eternally necessary that *a man* and *a rational animal* should be identical, or that *three* and *three* should be identical with *six*? Why is it eternally necessary, antecedently to all induction of experience, that *a stone* should not be a *living thing*? It cannot be said that the *two subjective ideas*, holding the place respectively of Subject and Predicate, are precisely identical; for, in this case, the Judgment would be a mere barren tautology. Besides, Consciousness teaches that the two ideas, as *ideas merely*, are not precisely the same. Nevertheless, they essentially agree in the representation of one object; so that, in the idea of the Subject, on account of this essential unity, is implicitly contained the idea of

¹ See *Metaph. Disp.* xxxi, § 12, nn. 38-47.

the Predicate. So far, so good. But *whence* this unity? *How* is it that eternally, immutably, the Predicate, antecedently to all experience, is implicitly contained in the idea of the Subject? Surely, it is plain that no one can stop here, who is in quest of the sufficient reason, in ultimate analysis, of the eternal truth of these enunciations.

ii. The opinion in question seems to imperil the objectivity of truth in its very sanctuary. For all scientific demonstrations are derived from these immediate analytical enunciations, or axiomatic principles; and they cannot give to their conclusions that which is not theirs to give. But this theory reduces the necessity of these axioms to a mere *subjective* necessity; for it is acknowledged that it does not depend on actual Being, it cannot depend on possible Being as such, it is strenuously maintained that it does not depend on the Divine Intelligence: what remains, therefore, but that its necessity should be a subjective form of human conception,—one of the Kantian Categories of the Understanding?

iii. It identifies the necessity of such enunciations with the necessity contained in the third signification of *Is*, as given us by the Philosopher; and, therefore, makes the necessity of metaphysical, to be nothing different from the logical necessity of purely conceptual, truths. Thus, for instance, that a *chimera* is a *fabulous monster* is eternally true—the Predicate in this Judgment is objectively identical with the Subject—the idea of the Predicate is simply contained in the idea of the Subject; what more is required to place this Proposition on a par with, e.g., the *Principle of contradiction*? The same may be said of the judgment, *Blindness is a privation*. Yet these two Judgments have for their object, not real Being, but fictions of the reason; wherefore, their necessity and consequent eternity and immutability are so far identical. The theory of Suarez does not seem to distinguish in anywise the one kind of necessity from the other.

iv. To make the eternal truth of these enunciations depend in ultimate analysis on the identity between the two Extremes, is to release these truths from their dependence on God. But, if this were once allowed, then God would not be the one only Source of all necessary truth. It would also seem to follow that, in the creation of finite Essences, He would be limited by a unity or identity which is independent of Himself. But neither of these

conclusions are compatible with His infinite and infinitely perfect Being.

v. This theory would seem to make the Divine Science partially dependent on that which is outside and independent of God Himself. Indeed, Suarez apparently admits the consequence. For he says that these two enunciations are not eternally true because they are known to the Divine Mind, but rather God knows them because they are eternally true; and they are eternally true because of the identity between the Subject and Predicate. Nor can it be urged against this powerful argument, that these truths are not the only truths known to God which are self-determined; because the free actions of the creature are known to God because they *are*, not *are*, because they are known to God: and that it suffices, in order to save the supremacy of the Divine Wisdom, that these truths, like the free actions of the creature, should be known to God in His own Essence as an infinitely perfect Mirror of all truth. The cases are altogether different. It is of metaphysical necessity, that the free action of a being should not be determined by another; for such a determination would be a contradiction in terms. But, as regards finite Essence, God is absolute Cause in all respects. He is Cause, so to speak, of its possibility; He is Exemplar and efficient Cause of its actuation. It follows, therefore, that He is also absolute Cause of all truths necessarily and absolutely identified with those Essences.

For these intrinsic reasons, and, in particular, because it is opposed to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, we are compelled to reject this opinion of Suarez.

III. In THE THIRD MEMBER of this Proposition it is asserted, that *the immutable and eternal truth of enunciations, in which essential attributes are predicated of finite Being, (and the same may be said of negative enunciations on the same subject-matter), depends fundamentally on the Divine Nature, formally on the Divine Intellect or Idea.*

This part of the Thesis is a Corollary from the preceding parts and from the twenty-first Proposition in this Chapter. For, (supposing that there are such necessary Judgments), if the immutable and eternal truth of these enunciations does not depend on finite Being itself, however regarded,—if it does not depend on an abstract necessity derived from the identity of their extremes, it follows that it must depend somehow on God; for there is nothing else

remaining. Again: In the twenty-first Proposition it has been shown, that there is a true sense in which possible finite Essence is absolutely immutable; while, on the other hand, it has been made equally clear that, by the actuation of finite Essence, it is brought under the Categories of Time and Space—subject to succession and, therefore, to change, with a beginning and end, or at least a beginning, which excludes it from the fulness of eternity. Therefore, it is through possible Essence that we must pass, in order to discover the eternity and unchangeableness of these truths, if we would hope to find the one or the other. But possible Essence is absolutely eternal and immutable—not in itself, for in itself it is nothing—but both *fundamentally* and *logically* in God.

Furthermore: God is the only real Truth, existing from everlasting to everlasting, and infinite in Its comprehension. Therefore, no truth can be outside of Him in any difference of time, which *is* not ever in Him through the infinite Present of His Eternity. As St. Thomas says, ‘The Truth which remains after the destruction of true Beings is the First Truth which, amid the change of things, is Itself unchanged¹.’ No truth can be independent of Him. For either it *is* absolutely, because He *is*; or it is momentarily independent, *after a sort*, of Him, (as in the case of the free action of the creature), because He has willed to create an independence which He foreknew in all the minutest details of its free determination, and even of its free determinability, in order that the truth might return to Him from Whom it sprang. But this latter class of truths does not at present enter into the question, which is concerned only with the truth of finite Essence, and has no connection with the free determinations of the creature. It follows, therefore, that the eternity and immutability of these truths reposes wholly on God.

Again: The Divine Wisdom is the measure of all finite Being, and, therefore, the measure of its truth. God is its measure, because He is the Efficient Cause; for the measure of a thing produced, the measure of its truth, is the exemplar or prototypal Idea in the mind of the Maker. As St. Thomas remarks, ‘The Divine Intellect is the Cause of finite Being, whence it must of necessity be

¹ ‘Veritas quae remanet, destructis rebus veris, est Veritas Prima, quae, etiam rebus mutatis, non mutatur.’ *De Veritate*, Q. i, a. 6, ad 3^m.

measured by the Divine Intellect, since everything is measured by its first principle¹.

Yet again: The pattern of all finite Being is the Divine Nature; so that, though created things exist individually outside God, yet there is no reality in the creature which is not contained either formally or virtually, and in all cases eminently, in the Creator. The Being of the finite is an imitation, more or less remote, of the Infinite Being. Hence, the *nature*, so to say, of the former is in the Latter, and as eternal as, and no more subject to change than, the Divine Nature; so that the eternal and immutable truth of finite Essence is an echo of the eternity and unchangeableness of God.

Once more: In the *past* eternity, (to speak after the manner of men), there could be no real truth but God; seeing that nothing else was, whereas He *is*.

The doctrine here contended for is unequivocally the teaching of St. Thomas. Indeed, Suarez confesses to it. Accordingly, we come across it repeatedly, up and down the various works of the former. Thus, in the *Summa* he says, 'In this way, therefore, things true and necessary are eternal; because they are in the Eternal Intellect, which is the Intellect of God alone².' So, again, in his *Commentary on the Sentences*: 'Necessary things are eternal only in the Divine Mind; as likewise the truths of enunciable propositions have been eternally in God³.' Again, in one of his *Opuscula*: 'Definitions and certain propositions are said to be unchangeable by reason of the necessary relation of one Term to the other. Thus, *Socrates* is mutable, and in like manner *his running* and *movement* are mutable; nevertheless, the following is immutable:—*If Socrates runs, he is in motion*. This unchangeableness, however, does not make the proposition eternal, save inasmuch as it is in the Eternal, i. e. in the Divine Intellect⁴.' In

¹ 'Intellectus Divinus est causa rei. Unde oportet quod res mensuretur per intellectum Divinum; cum unumquodque mensuretur per suum primum principium. In 1 *Sentt. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 2, ad 2*.

² 'Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus Divinus solus.' 1^o x, 3, *ad 3*.

³ 'Necessaria sunt aeterna tantum in Mente Divina; sicut etiam veritates enuntiabilium fuerunt ab aeterno in Deo.' 1 *Sentt. d. viii, Q. 2, a. 2, ad 5*.

⁴ 'Et definitiones et propositiones aliquae dicuntur invariables propter necessarium ordinem unius termini ad alium; sicut *Socrates* variabilis est; et similiter cursus ejus et motus. Et tamen hoc est invariable, Si currit, movetur. Haec tamen invari-

this passage, the Angelic Doctor admits that the necessity and consequent invariableness of certain propositions arises proximately from the identity of the two Extremes, but he does not end there as Suarez does; for he goes on to say, that they are eternal, and so, *absolutely* necessary and *absolutely* immutable, only as they are the object of the Divine Idea. And, in another place, he expressly adds, (having again stated, that as only One Being is eternal, so the one Divine Truth is alone eternal), 'In like manner, the same is to be said of the immutability of truth as of the immutability of Being; for there is no other Being that is absolutely immutable save the Divine. Therefore, there is no truth simply immutable save the Truth of God¹.' Once more, he declares in another place, 'When a true thing perishes, the truth perishes so far as regards the being which it has in that thing. But, nevertheless, the truth conceived may remain, either according to the being which it has in another thing, or according to the being which it has in the Soul. And, if all these are abstracted, the truth will remain only in God².' It will be of service to consider these words of the Angelic Doctor with some curiousness, and to elucidate them by a concrete example. Let a stone be presented to the intellect by sensible perception. The mind recognizes it to be a substance, and forms (let it be supposed) the following Judgment:—*Stone is a substance*. Now, we will suppose that the stone has been destroyed. The real truth perishes with the stone, so far as the original object is concerned: yet the truth somehow remains. Why? Because there are other stones. Destroy every stone; still it remains. But where? In the created intellect. Then, sweep away all finite intellect. The truth still remains in the Divine Idea. Thus, therefore, a truth may live, even when the finite being which gave birth to its cognition in the mind of man has perished. Thus, Zoologists have a true idea of the nature of a *Dodo*, although

abilitas non facit propositionem aeternam nisi secundum quod est in intellectu aeterno, scil. Divino.' *Opusc. IX, (aliter VIII), Q. 18.*

¹ 'Similiter de mutabilitate veritatis idem dicendum est quod de mutabilitate essendi; ut enim supra dictum est, simpliciter immutabile non est nisi Esse Divinum. Unde simpliciter immutabilis veritas non est nisi una, scil. Divina.' *In 1 Sentt. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 3, in c.*

² 'Pereunte re vera, perit veritas quantum ad illud esse quod habet in re illa.' Sed tamen potest remanere intentio veritatis secundum esse quod habet in alia re, vel secundum esse quod habet in anima. Quae omnia si auferantur, non remanebit veritas nisi in Deo.' *In 1 Sentt. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 3, ad 6.*

it is now extinct; and they clearly recognize that, if it should ever be reproduced in the actual order, it *must* exhibit such and such characteristic and essential notes. But, if the idea be really and objectively true; that idea, whether it be human or even Divine, must be determined by some object which is sufficient reason of the concept and of its truth. Was it eternally and immutably true, before ever man was created, that '*Man is a rational animal?*' Then there was no Intellect but the Divine, no real object of the Divine Idea but the Divine Essence. And now, after this digression, to conclude the quotations from St. Thomas:—we find it stated in the *Summa*, that 'The nature of the circle and that Two and Three are Five have their eternity in the Divine Mind¹.' These two instances will prove of service in the discussion of the question, which alone remains, touching the way in which such truths are objected to the Divine Intelligence in the Divine Essence.

To begin with what is the easier:—The essential entity of finite spiritual Being, which is least remote of all from the Infinite Being by reason of the excellence of its nature, is *formally*, though *eminently*, precontained in the Divine nature. For God is a Spirit; and God is Substance in a way in which nothing else is, or can be, either spirit or substance. There is no difficulty, therefore, in understanding how, from God's contemplation of His own Essence, the Divine Intellect can form to Itself (speaking after the way of men) the Exemplar Idea of pure spiritual substances or angelic natures. But, descending down the scale of Being, the difficulty grows. As soon as *Matter*, *Extension*, *Quantity* continuous and discrete, *local Motion*, *Composition of parts*, either enter into the constitution of Essences or flow from the Essence as essential properties; it seems hard to understand how the Exemplar Idea of such Beings can be derived from the Divine nature. Nevertheless, it may be possible, by a little further thought, to *lessen*, at all events, the mysterious obscurity of this problem; though it must always be remembered, that God would not be God, the Infinite, and infinitely Perfect, if the bottomless depths of His Being were of easy apprehension to the finite understanding.

A more perfect finite Being may virtually at once and eminently contain in itself inferior Essences, which do not formally enter into

¹ 'Ratio circuli et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente Divina.'
1^o xvi, 7, ad 1^m.

its constitution, because of those imperfections or defects in its nature, which follow from its having been fashioned in a lower grade of likeness to the Divine nature. Thus, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the soul of man is one and simple; yet, in its spiritual entity, it virtually and eminently contains both vegetable and animal life. But it includes neither the one nor the other formally; because vegetable life, as such, formally postulates the absence of sensitive,—animal, the absence of purely spiritual faculties. It need not surprise us, therefore, if the Infinite Being should include all that is or can be, virtually and eminently in Himself. Indeed, it must be so. For, if He be the sufficient reason of all possibility and the efficient Cause of all actual Being that is not Himself; He must know beforehand His own work and, to know it beforehand, must somehow precontain it in His own nature; for no one can give that which he has not to give. But how can the Infinite, Who is pure Spirit, most simple Act, immutable *Now*, wholly omnipresent by Essence, precontain in Himself Matter, Composition, Quantity continuous and discrete, Extension, local Motion, and the like? It is most evident that He does not contain them *formally*, though they are His handiwork; because it would be a contradiction in terms. But cannot He contain them *virtually* and *eminently*? They carry along with them, it is true, by their very nature, a defect of ulterior reality,—a boundary of nothingness (so to say), which cannot be in God. But they have their own perfection too; otherwise, they could not be real Beings with energies and operations of their own. This must be in God, *simply because it is perfection*. Thus, Matter in itself is not Being, but Being in halves, or, rather, half-Being; so that it cannot exist without its substantial Form. Yet, it has a partial entity that is its own; and, so far, must be *somehow* precontained in Him Who is Infinite Essence. Again: composition supposes parts, and the priority of the parts to the composite whole; therefore, the want of self-sufficiency. This is defect of Being,—its limit, which cannot be in God, though God knows it. But composition, likewise, connotes order, unity; and these must be in God. So, Quantity, as an accident, has no power of itself to exist absolutely in itself; but requires some other Being as the Subject of its inhesion. This is defect of Being,—Nothing; and, therefore, is not in God, though it is known by God. For even the mind of man can cognize Privatives and Negatives. But Quantity gives to Substance

its capacity for being in place, or being localized. This is a mixed perfection; for it means Presence, but Presence with a limit. The Presence is in God without the limit. Therefore the *Where* of material Being is virtually and eminently contained in the Divine Omnipresence. But this *Where*, which is correlative with the limits of continuous Quantity, supposes those limits. And those limits take form and are subject to laws of form, which regulate the circumjacent *Where*, and are themselves concomitants of the prescribed degree of likeness to the Divine Image in the nature of the creature; and that degree fixes the position of the creature in the scale of creation. Hence, the figures and laws of geometry are contained virtually and eminently in the Divine nature. So much for continuous Quantity. Discrete Quantity results from the mutual separation or division of continuous quantities; and its form or law is Number. But all number proceeds from Unity, as the Pythagoreans so perseveringly remind us; and Perfection is said to consist in unity under a sort of multiplicity. For those, then, who profess the Nicene Faith, there is no difficulty. Predicamental Number is *eminently* precontained in that transcendental Number of Three in One. A similar analysis of the rest will conduct us to precisely similar conclusions.

But, there still remains a point to be cleared up. Whence the necessity and immutability of these Essences and Laws or Forms? It is easier now to apprehend, how all these realities are included eminently, whether formally or virtually as the case may be, in the Divine Essence; but it is by no means so clear, why one Essence might not glide into another, or a law admit of variations.

a. First then, we will take the Essences of things. Why, for instance, is it a necessary and immutable truth that, *man is a rational animal*? It will not do to say, because the two terms are identical; for this is simply to beg the question. We are in search of the sufficient Reason for this identity. What guarantee is there, that this supposed identity may not be a mere conceit of the human understanding, having no objective reality? Neither, again, is it enough of itself to say, that these Essences are necessary and immutable, because they are so conceived immutably and necessarily in the Divine Prototypal Idea. For, then arises the ulterior question, why the Divine Idea is so determined; and we are at once confronted with the assertion of Suarez, that finite Essences are not necessarily such, because the Divine Idea so represents

them, but rather that the Divine Idea so represents them, because they are necessarily such, and no other. The answer to the question is virtually contained in the doctrine which has been developed in the preceding paragraphs. For the one primary object of the Divine Prototypal Ideas, is the Divine Essence as indefinitely imitable outside Itself in various grades of Being. Hence, in the Divine Essence, there is that definite grade of imitability, which is represented in the Divine Prototypal Idea, e.g. of Man. As this imitability is nothing else than the infinite fulness of the Divine Being, considered (so to speak) partially and under limits; it is as immutable and necessary as God Himself. For instance, *that a man should not be a rational animal*, is tantamount to God not being God. His imitability in such or such a grade of perfection has its own defined limits. Beyond those limits, this particular grade ceases; and another supervenes. Wherefore, it is no longer *this* finite Essence, but another. Such a definite perfectness as is in the type is likewise in the Prototype, and infinitely beyond; but, once gone beyond in the former, and the nature will be specifically other. The same, somewhat modified, however, by the nature of the subject-matter, may be said of the limits of continuous quantity, which constitute geometrical forms. All these forms are virtually and eminently contained in the Divine Reality, whence, the Divine Intellect conceives the prototypal ideas of material Being which, as being material, is necessarily subject to quantitative forms. Hence, *that the circle, for instance, is a figure wherein all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal*, is a necessary and immutable truth; because those material entities, of which it is the figure, are Images of God in a certain definite grade of reality, and, within that grade, bear an infinitesimal resemblance to His Omnipresence.

b. The question of the geometrical forms of continuous quantity naturally leads on to that of analytical Principles; for the former are on the border-land, as it were, between natures and laws. Here, again, it must be said, that those Principles are fundamentally contained in the Divine Essence. That *three and two make five*—that *twice three make six*, are principles founded on Unity in its necessary and transcendental relation to Plurality, and have their prototype in God. All the principles of Number are echoes of the Divine Harmony. The Principle of contradiction, in like manner, is ultimately based on the Divine Perfection. For God *is*; and, according to the fulness of the meaning of Being, it is impossible

that He should not be. The Principle of efficient causality is in Him, and in His most excellent and perfect nature. For, imperfect imitation implies two things, viz. a limit and an original. But nothing can be self-limited; and that other which limits it, is its Cause. No imperfect imitation can be its own original; and that other, which is the original, is its Cause.

DIFFICULTY.

There is only one objection, urged by Suarez against the doctrine maintained in this last Proposition, which has not already received an answer in the declaration of the Thesis; and that one is not of much force against the doctrine as a whole, but only against a part of it. Nevertheless, it must not be passed over. If, says this illustrious writer, the eternity of these enunciations were determined by their being in the Divine Intellect; it would, for the same reason, follow, that contingent enunciations, v. g. that there *was* an eclipse of the sun on such a day, would be able to boast of a like eternity; for their truth was always present to the Divine Wisdom.

ANSWER. This difficulty is solved by a distinction. Such contingent propositions would be *subjectively* eternal, i. e. they would be eternally included in the Divine Knowledge. So much is undeniable. But, *objectively*, they would not be eternal; because the Infinite Wisdom would know them as now *not being* and afterwards *being*, according to succession of time. But the enunciations, which are at present under discussion, God *eternally* knows as *eternally* and *necessarily* true, i. e. they are both subjectively and objectively eternal.

BOOK III.

ATTRIBUTES OF BEING.

CHAPTER I.

ATTRIBUTES OF BEING IN GENERAL.

PREVIOUSLY to commencing the momentous discussions which will occupy us in the present Book, it will be necessary to offer certain Prolegomena touching the nature of the subject-matter in general and of the terms employed. More than half the difficulty in understanding a metaphysical question may be traced, in the majority of cases, either to an utter ignorance, or to a confused apprehension, of the point in dispute and, in particular, of its technological expression.

PROLEGOMENON I.

What is an *Attribute*? The name suggests that it is something which is attributed or ascribed to another thing. Hence, in its most generic signification, it is equivalent to Predicable; and, indeed, it *nominally* suggests so much of a logical element, that it is not the word one would have selected, if the English language could have supplied a better. The Latin word ordinarily employed is *Passio* or *Passion*; and, though it cannot be so conveniently made use of in our own tongue in such a sense, because it already serves by general consent to express another widely different idea, it will, nevertheless, assist towards a more definite cognition of the subject in hand, to analyze the meaning of *Passion*, when thus employed in connection with *Being*. *Passion* may be taken participially, as it were, or nominatively. In the former case it signifies the receiving of something; in the latter, the *Something* received. In either case it presupposes the some Thing which receives or is affected, and it also,—particularly in its second signification,—formally connotes something somehow received and, therefore, a sort of addition to the thing receiving. Whether it be

understood participially or nominatively, it does this; but in the latter instance *in recto*, in the former *in obliquo*. For, *The being affected by something*, puts that *Something* in an oblique case; but, *The something affecting something else*, puts the *Something* in the nominative or direct case. Now, that *Something* should be affected by another, presupposes this *Something* as already constituted in its own essence; because a thing must first *be*, before it can be affected. Therefore, the Passion which is received or added, cannot form, in any way, part of the Essence of that thing; or, at least, does not enter into the notion of its Essence. Still, if it be a real Passion, it must be a real addition to the Essence; and it would seem, at first sight, as though it must be really distinct from the Essence to which it is really added. It looks, therefore, very much like what Logicians call a *Property*; and, indeed, that word has been often employed by the Latin Metaphysicians promiscuously with *Passion*. But, if the former word is to be limited to its strict meaning, as it appears in the list of Predicables; it always stands for the Attribute of a Genus or of a Species. While, then, the same objection must be made against it, only with greater reason, which has been already brought against *Attribute*, viz. that it is a logical term, there is the further objection that it belongs exclusively either to Genus or Species; and Being, as has been shown in the preceding Book, cannot possibly be one or the other, seeing that it is a Transcendental. Notwithstanding, if it be abstracted from such limitation, the term *Property* will help to give a clear idea of what is meant by the term, *Attribute*, as here employed; and *Attribute* itself under analysis offers the same elements as *Passion*, though under a logical form. For the preposition which enters into its composition, seems to advert to a sort of addition made to the Subject; which, accordingly, that Subject, (already constituted in its essential notes), is considered to receive.

To sum up, then: the term *Attribute* is intended to signify something added to an Essence, which is not either that Essence itself or any part of it, but is in some way or other received by that Essence as its *Property*.

PROLEGOMENON II.

Four conditions are requisite in order that a thing may be a real and true attribute or property of something else:

a. It must itself be a real something; that is, it cannot be a mere logical entity. Otherwise, how could there be a real receiving or addition?

b. It must be somehow in its real nature distinct from that Essence of which it is a property. If it were not so, it would be the thing itself,—a part at least of its Essence and, therefore, not its mere attribute.

c. It must be convertible with it; i.e. taking S for Subject and A for Attribute, these two enunciations must be eternally verified:—All S is A, and All A is S.

d. The subject must not enter into the essential and intrinsic constitution of the Attribute. Otherwise, it would be possible for an Essence to become in part an accident to itself; seeing that the Attribute is an accident to its subject. This last condition is unequivocally implied, if not expressed, by the Philosopher in his *Metaphysics*. These are his words: ‘As concerning that which is predicated under the form of accident (for instance, the being *musical* or *white*) it is not true to say, because it has a double signification, (or two significates included under the term), that therefore the Essence and the Accident are the same. For, although that to which the accident of *white* belongs, is *de facto* that accident, so that there is in one sense an identity; nevertheless, not an identity of Essence and Accident. For, *to be a man* and to be a *white man* are not one and the same thing; but, by the information of the Passion or Attribute, they become one and the same¹.’ Aristotle’s meaning in the above passage amounts to this: Accidents in the concrete include two things, viz., the Subject informed and the Accident informing. Thus, *White* means a white *Something*; that *Something* is the Subject, *Whiteness* is the Accident. Hence there is an objective identity; for, *this man is white*, and *this white object is a man*. But for the mere reason that a concrete accident includes the two, it is a mistake to suppose that the Accident is identical with the Essence; though there is an identity of *supposit*, because, from the nature of Accident, it inheres in that thing which is its Subject. And the identity of Supposit arises

¹ Τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταῦτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὥστ’ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταῦτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταῦτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταῦτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταῦτό. *Metaph.* vi, 6, v. f.

from the actual inhesion of the Accident in *that* other, according to the exigence of its Being.

PROLEGOMENON III.

All scientific knowledge, or Science considered as an intellectual habit, is the result of demonstration. But all pure demonstration proves the attribute of the given Subject by means of the efficient and material cause of the former, which is the Essence or Nature of the latter. Hence, the Middle Term of pure demonstration is the definition of the Subject. For, seeing that every property flows from the Essence of the Subject; it follows that this Essence will be the efficient cause of the Property or Attribute. But, if this be so, it is necessary to the possibility of Science that its object, whatever that may be, should have certain Attributes; and, moreover, that those Attributes should in some way or other be able to be demonstrated of their Subject. Since, then, in the preceding Book, the subject of Metaphysics has been accurately defined; the inquiry into the existence, number, and nature of its Attributes follows in natural order. This Prolegomenon, (which could more accurately have been described as a *Scolion* from the treatise on Demonstration in applied Logic), is of considerable importance to an understanding of the discussion on which we are about to enter.

The first question, then, that confronts us in the present inquiry, is this: Can Being have any Attributes? It is a sufficiently grave problem. For, since Being is the adequate object of Metaphysics; it will follow that, if Being has no Attributes, there can be no such thing as Metaphysical Science. Yet, at first sight, it would seem as though Being could not possibly have any real Attributes; for this reason. If the supposed Attributes or Properties are real, they are *Some* thing; but if they are *Some* thing, they are Being. If they are Being, Being enters essentially into the nature of its own Attributes; such Attributes, therefore, violate the fourth condition of an Attribute, as given under the second Prolegomenon. Furthermore, if Being enters essentially into the nature of its Attribute; the second condition, mentioned in the same Prolegomenon, will be violated, viz., that the Property must in its real nature be distinct from the Subject of which it is the Property. For, if such Attribute be not Being; it is no Being or Nothing, and *ipso facto* ceases to be a *real* Attribute. But, if it is Being; what real distinction can be discovered between it and its Subject?

If, however, it should be asserted that it is a Logical Attribute, then, the first condition is violated, which requires that it should itself be a real something. Besides, in such case, Metaphysics would be a doctrine of mere concepts, not of things, — would justify but its name, as the theory of reasoning says for those to whom concepts and reality are one and the same, — and would become a mere province of Logic.

On the other hand, if the common sense of mankind is a worthy guide, (and wise to Philosophy if she reject it); there is something real in *Unity*, *Truth*, and *Goodness*. Most men will own, that these properties are no mere figments of the mind. Yet, they are reckoned in common estimation as Attributes of Being.

Such is the difficulty which imperatively demands a solution. But, before entering upon the investigation, it may be well to interpose a remark which will anticipate certain objections that might otherwise prove troublesome. It is one thing to maintain that an idea is representative of nothing outside the mind; it is another, to maintain that the objective reality, thus represented, is really distinct from the objective reality represented by another idea. Again: it is one thing to assert that the essential representation in an idea does not include this or that; it is another to assert that the object represented is not essentially included in, or does not include, that other. In a word, there are distinctions of reason, or logical distinctions, which have a real foundation and are expressive, after their manner, of a reality.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

Being, as such, cannot have any true positive Attributes really distinct from itself.

So much is willingly granted to the objection which has served for an introduction to this and the following Propositions. It is obvious, that there cannot possibly be any real Attribute of Being, into which Being does not essentially enter; consequently, it cannot be really distinct from Being.

Such is unequivocally the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. For instance, in discussing this subject *ex professo*, he says, 'There is a distinction of reason between the True and Being, in that there is something essentially contained in the notion of the True which is not essentially contained in the notion of Being; not however

in such wise, as that there should be anything essentially contained in the notion of Being which is not essentially contained in the notion of the True. Neither do they differ essentially, nor are they distinguished from each other by opposite Differences¹. Here St. Thomas plainly declares, that there is no real distinction between Being and the True, which is one of the Attributes of Being; but only a distinction of reason. He further asserts, that the True essentially includes Being; but that the idea of Being, as such, does not essentially include the True. Whence it may be gathered, that the True is a certain determination of Being, not by any contraction of its periphery of extension, but by a determination of its significate. Accordingly, he adds, yet more clearly, immediately afterwards, 'The True is not of wider periphery than Being²;' in reply to the objection that the True includes No thing, as, for instance, in negative judgments. Again, with still greater distinctness, in answer to the first of the contrary arguments: 'It is not nugatory to speak of true Being; because there is something expressed by the word True, which is not expressed by the word Being, *not because they really differ*³." Again, in discussing the same question as to the identity of Being with the Good, another of its Attributes, he says, 'Since Being is said absolutely, but the Good adds, over and above, the referribility of a final cause, the mere Essence of the thing, absolutely considered, is sufficient for pronouncing it by reason of such Essence Being; but it is not sufficient for pronouncing it, because of that Essence as such, Good⁴." Hence, 'by reason of the aforesaid referribility it comes to pass that the Good is said, according to a distinction of reason, to determine or inform Being⁵," in the way already mentioned. Yet it does not inform or determine Being by the way of real additions, for,

¹ 'Verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis; non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; nec per essentiam differunt, nec differentiis oppositis invicem distinguuntur.' *De Veritate*, Q. 1, a. 1, ad 6^m.

² 'Verum non est in plus quam ens.' *De Veritate*, Q. 1, a. 1, ad 7^m.

³ 'Ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter quod re differant.' *Ibid. contra*, ad 1^m.

⁴ 'Cum ens dicatur absolute, bonum autem superaddat habitudinem causae finalis; ipsa essentia rei absolute considerata sufficit ad hoc quod per eam dicatur aliquid ens, non autem ad hoc quod per eam dicatur aliquid bonum.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 1, ad 1^m*.

⁵ 'Ex habitudine praedicta contingit quod secundum rationem dicatur ens determinare vel informare.' *Ibid. ad 7^m*.

'although the Good expresses a certain referribility' (or habitude), viz. 'that of a final cause; nevertheless that referribility belongs to every possible being, and does not add any reality to Being¹.' Finally, in order to make it quite clear that he does not take the Good for a real Property of Being, but excludes the assumption in the sense in which it is excluded by the present Proposition; he adds elsewhere, 'The Risible, albeit it is logically convertible with Man, nevertheless adds, over and above Man, a sort of extraneous nature, which is something really added to the Essence of man.' Thus he introduces a real specific Property by way of contrast, and then adds, 'But in such wise nothing can be added to Being².'

These extracts will suffice to show that, according to the Angelic Doctor, Being has no true positive Attributes really distinct from itself. All the Attributes, save one, which the Philosophy of the School is wont to predicate of Being, have had judgment passed upon them in the above quotations; and, lest Unity should perchance be deemed the solitary exception, it will not be amiss to forestall the discussion concerning its nature by the following quotation from St. Thomas: 'The One adds nothing real to Being, but simply the negation of division. For the One means nothing else but undivided Being. . . Hence it is manifest that the being of everything whatsoever, holds together by its indivision; whence it is that everything, in the same manner as it preserves its being, so preserves its unity³.'

PROPOSITION XXV.

Being, as such, has certain Attributes which are really and truly predicated of it.

The truth of this Proposition is established by the testimony of common sense alike and of individual experience. For it is indisputable that the One, the True, the Good, are universally predicated

¹ 'Quamvis bonum dicat aliquam specialem habitudinem, scil. finis; tamen ista habitudo competit cuilibet enti; nec ponit aliquid secundum rem in ente.' *Ibid. ad 9^m.*

² 'Risibile, quamvis convertatur cum homine, tamen addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem, quae est praeter essentiam hominis; sic autem nihil potest addi super ens.' *Ibid. ad 10^m.*

³ 'Unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis. Unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. . . . Unde manifestum est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est, quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.' 1^o xi, I, c.

of beings; and it is equally sure that by such predication some *reality* is expressed and meant to be expressed, and not a mere figment of the mind. Thus, for instance, when people speak of *true* gold, while on the one hand no one supposes that they mean to express any real addition to the nature or essence of gold; all, on the other hand, would agree that some real perfection is attributed to the gold when it is called *true*, and would never allow that the epithet is a mere logical designation. So again, when the soul of a man is said to be *one*, that unity forms no real addition to its nature; but, for all that, it is no mere phantom of a conceptual caprice. In like manner, air may be called *good*; nor would any one dream that its goodness was a real addition made to the nature of the air. Nevertheless, we are all conscious that, in conceiving the air as good, there is something more in the thought than when it is simply conceived as air; and that the *something more*, in the former concept, is expressive of a reality which, somehow or other, the air exhibits.

The quotations, made from the Angelic Doctor in the previous Proposition, are equally confirmatory of the position here maintained. For, when he declares that 'it is not nugatory to speak of true Being,' and when he distinctly states that the referribility of a final cause is that which *Good* adds to Being; he evidently considers these Attributes to be more than logical figments. Further statements of his doctrine, which will appear in the succeeding Propositions, will put the question beyond all doubt.

Notwithstanding, it will not be amiss, for the sake of obviating difficulties which might otherwise arise, to subjoin that, speaking loosely, these Attributes may be called in a way logical entities; forasmuch as they do not connote any positive and really intrinsic entity in their Subject, and the distinction between them and Being is not real, but a distinction of reason founded in reality.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

These Attributes of Being formally add to the idea of Being either a negation or an extrinsic referribility. Nevertheless, they manifest the real positive perfection of Being, not by way of addition, but as expressive of its essential nature.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition follows, as a Corollary, from the doctrine already established. However, the connection

between the two is not so evident at first sight but that it requires and, therefore, shall receive, explicit evolution.

It has been shown, that the aforesaid Attributes make no real addition to Being; yet that, in themselves, they are expressions of reality, and moreover are said to inform and determine Being. Now, there are two ways of determining Being. In one way, it is determined by contraction of its periphery; and it is thus that this Transcendental is determined to the ten Categories, or Supreme *Genera*. But in such cases Being is, so to say, divided up, and is not convertible with each or any of its determinations, taken by itself. Thus, for instance, that *all Substance is Being*, is true; but not that *all Being is Substance*, for Accident is likewise Being. Now, it is obvious that such determinations of Being cannot be considered in any wise as Attributes; because one of the necessary conditions of an Attribute is, that it should be convertible with its Subject, or, as the Schoolmen say, *dici ad convertentiam*. For an Attribute in its nature accompanies its Subject wherever it goes, and is discoverable nowhere else. Therefore, the Attributes of Being must be as Transcendental as Being itself.

If, then, Being cannot be determined by its Attributes in this way of contraction; there must be some other mode of determination which shall not contract its extension. Yet the determination in question does not make any real, positive, intrinsic, addition to the entity of Being, as we have already seen; and, notwithstanding, it is not a mere logical determination, but is representative of a reality. But, if it cannot be a positive addition, it may be an addition *by way of negation*; and, if it cannot be an intrinsic, it may be an *extrinsic*, addition. This is the only conceivable way in which these Attributes can satisfy the various positions already established. Now, it is precisely after this manner that the aforesaid Attributes offer themselves to our contemplation. For *Unity* represents the negation of division in Being; while *Truth* represents its referribility or relation to the intellect; *Goodness*, its referribility or relation to the will.

There is, it need hardly be said, another way of determination and contraction, by the addition of something real which is not of the essence of the Subject; for example, when a *rose* is conceived or represented as *red*, and, generally, in the case of all Accidents. But any one can see, that such sort of determination satisfies hardly one of the conditions of an Attribute or Property.

The above exposition is scarcely more than a paraphrase of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. As, however, a mere difference in the way of putting it may serve to illustrate an obscure problem; the passage of St. Thomas, to which allusion is here made, shall be given in full. It runs thus:—‘In three ways something may add to another, over and above. First of all, in that it adds some reality, which is not of the essence of the thing to which the addition is made; as, for instance, *White* adds to *Body*, because the essence of Whiteness is not of the essence of Body. Another way in which one thing is said to add to another is, by mode of contraction and determination; as, for instance, *Man* adds to *Animal* something over and above; not in such sort, as that there should be in Man some other entity which is wholly foreign to the essence of Animal, (otherwise we should be compelled to admit, that not all that is Man, is Animal; but that Animal is only a part of Man), but *Animal* is contracted by *Man*; inasmuch as that which is *determinately* and *actually* contained in the nature of Man, is *implicitly* and, as it were, *potentially* contained in the nature of Animal. Thus, it appertains to the nature of Man that he should have a rational soul; and it appertains to the nature of Animal that it have a soul, without determining whether it be rational or not. Nevertheless, such determination, by reason of which Man is said to add something over and above to Animal, has a certain foundation in reality. Thirdly, something is said to add to another according to ordering of reason only; when, that is to say, something is explicitly contained in the idea of one, which is not explicitly contained in the idea (or definition) of the other. But that addition does not exist in the nature of things, but only in ordering of reason; whether the thing which is said to receive the addition be thereby contracted or not. For,—to give an instance,—*Blind* is a sort of addition made to *Man*, viz. the addition of Blindness. But Blindness is not anything in nature, but in ordering of reason only; forasmuch as *Being*, (in its participial signification), ‘includes privations. By this blindness Man is contracted; for it is not every man that is blind. But, when it is said that a *Mole* is blind, no contraction is made by the addition;’ because all moles are blind.

Here, let a temporary break be made in the quotation, in order to leave room for the insertion of two remarks. St. Thomas is speaking of *additions*, as such. When, therefore, he mentions this third mode of addition, and most justly asserts that ‘the thing

added does not exist in the order of nature, but only by ordering of reason,' he is principally referring to it *as an addition*, though doubtless he also alludes to the *formal* and explicit concept. This last clause will be best explained by the second remark which it seems necessary to interpose. It may, at the first glance, strike one as strange, that St. Thomas should deny the reality of Blindness, and should assert that it is, on the contrary, a logical entity; for what can be more painfully real than Blindness? Yet, a little thought will suffice to evince the truth of his assertion. For what is Blindness, if not a privation of sight? But all privation is negative. It is the absence of something which ought to be present. Therefore, the *formal* and *explicit* concept of any privation is the concept of a Nothing. *Fundamentally*, however, it is most real.

And now to pursue the quotation:—'But it is impossible that a thing should add anything over and above to Universal Being in the first way, albeit addition may be made in that way to some particular being. For there is no entity in nature which is outside the Essence of Universal Being; although there may be something outside the essence of this particular being. In the second way, some things are found to add to Being; because Being is contracted by the ten *Genera*, each one of which adds something to Being;—not any accident or any Difference which is outside the Essence of Being, but a determined *manner* of Being, which is founded in the very essence of the thing. But in no such way does the Good make any addition to Being; since the Good is, equally with Being, divided into the ten *Genera*' (or Categories). 'Wherefore it follows, as a necessary consequence, either that it should make no addition to Being; or that, if it adds, the addition should be in order of reason only. For, if anything real were added; it must needs be, that Being, by the form of The Good, should be contracted to some special *Genus*. But, since Being is that which primarily offers itself to the apprehension of the mind, as Avicenna remarks; it follows, either that all such denomination should be synonymous with Being, (which cannot be said of the Good, since it is not nugatory to say that a thing is good), or that it should add something in order of reason at least. Wherefore, since the Good does not contract Being; it must make some addition to Being, which is a purely conceptual addition. But a merely conceptual addition can be only of two kinds. For all absolute position' (or affirmation of a positive) 'signifies something

existing in the order of things natural.' This last sentence needs explanation. The attribution of anything positive at once and absolute to the Subject, must be a real, and not a merely conceptual, attribution. Consequently, in the hypothesis that it is conceptual merely, if it is positive, it must be relative, not absolute; if it is absolute, it must be negative, not positive. Hence, an addition of reason is of two kinds only. To resume:—'After this manner, then, over and above Being which is the primary concept of the intellect, *One* adds that which is in order of reason only, viz. a negation; for the *One* stands, as it were, for *undivided* Being. But the True and the Good are predicated *positively*; wherefore, they can but add a *relation*, which is merely conceptual. Now, a relation, according to the Philosopher, is said to be a merely conceptual relation, when the independent Term in a non-mutual relation is said to be related to that to which it is referred; but the other way about,' i.e. when what is referred does depend on the other to which it is referred, it is not of reason only, but real, 'since the relation is itself a sort of dependence. This is plainly apparent in the instances of knowledge and the Knowable, Sense and the Sensible. For knowledge depends on the Knowable; but not the other way about. Hence, the relation by which Knowledge is referred to the Knowable, is real; while the relation by which the Knowable is referred to knowledge, is a relation of reason merely. For the Knowable is said to be referred, according to the Philosopher; not because itself is related, but because another thing is related to it. And this is the case with all other things which are in the position of measure and measured, or of perfective and perfectible. The True and the Good must needs, therefore, add to the concept of Being the relative idea of the Perfective. Now, in all being whatsoever, two things may be considered; to wit, the simple nature of the Form or Species, and the existence itself by which something else subsists under that Form or Species. And so, Being admits of perfection in two ways. First, according to its specific nature alone; and it is in this way that the intellect is perfected by Being, because it is perfected by the essential idea of Being. Yet, Being is not in the intellect in its own existent nature. And it is this manner of perfecting, which the True adds to Being. For the True is in the mind, as the Philosopher observes; and every being is said to be true, in so far as it is either conformed or conformable to the intellect. Wherefore, all who give a right definition of the True,

include intellect in their definition of it. In another way, Being is capable of perfecting another, not only according to its specific essence or nature, but also according to the existence which it has in the real order of nature. In such way is the Good perfective; for *Good* is in things, as the Philosopher remarks¹.

¹ 'Tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem, quæ sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est præter essentiam corporis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid addi super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal; non quidem ita quod sit in homine alia res quæ sit penitus extra essentiam animalis (alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo, esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis); sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis; sicut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, et de ratione animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista tamen determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scil. aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius; quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum; sive per illud contrahatur cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scil. caecitatem, quæ non est aliquid ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio.

'Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale aliquid addat aliquid primo modo; quamvis illo modo possit fieri aliqua additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturæ est quæ sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam huius entis. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens; quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquid accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quæ sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei. Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens; cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens. Et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel si addat, quod sit in ratione tantum; si enim adderetur aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione mentis, ut dicit Avicenna; oportet quod omne illud nomen vel sit synonymum enti, quod de bono dici non potest, cum non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum; vel addat aliquid ad minus secundum rationem. Et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum. Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat.

'Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scil. negationem; dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed *verum* et *bonum* positive dicuntur. Unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quæ sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio secundum Philosophum dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur; sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit. Sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso. Unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile est realis; relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad

From this elaborate exposition of the Angelic Doctor, which will be a frequent object of reference in future Chapters, it will be seen that he insists upon the position enunciated in the present Thesis. For he denies that the Attributes determine Being by contraction of any kind, whether it be Differential or Accidental; and concludes in consequence, that the addition is a logical one, or according to ordering of reason only. For any real additional determination would either contract it to a Genus, or contract it accidentally.

No *real* addition can *anyhow* be made to Being; and a real additional *determination* must limit its extension and contract it into opposites. Wherefore, seeing that these Attributes are not mere nugatory concepts but expressive of a real perfection, and that they can make no real addition to the entity of Being, if either of them is intrinsic to Being, it must be expressive of a negation; if any of them are *positive*, they must have a sort of relation *ab extra*. For these are the only possible ways in which an Attribute of Being may represent a reality which is not included in the formal entity of Being, and yet make no real addition to it. Such is the case. For Unity is intrinsic and negative; Truth and Goodness are extrinsic in their connotation, and respective or referrible, because positive. But these Attributes, it should never be forgotten, are expressive of a real perfection in Being. In what way they are so, will be best understood by that separate consideration of each one, which is immediately to follow. It will only be necessary here to remark, in order to a distinct apprehension of the doctrine of St. Thomas, that the special perfection of Being, represented by the concepts of the True and the Good, is a *respective* perfection

scientiam, est rationis tantum; dicitur enim scibile referri, secundum Philosophum, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus aliis quæ se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile.

‘Oportet igitur quod *verum* et *bonum* super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare; scil. ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa. Et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei tantum: et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale. Et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit *verum* super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut Philosophus dicit; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur *verum*, in quantum conformatum est vel conformabile intellectui. Et ideo omnes recte definientes *verum*, ponunt in ejus definitione intellectum. Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam se undum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum *bonum*. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit.’ *De Veritate*, Q. xxi, a. 1, o.

which is to be found in the capacity, possessed by every being whatsoever, of perfectionating another; but that respective perfection has its source, as will be seen, in the *intrinsic* excellence of Being.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition, viz. that '*these attributes manifest the real positive perfection of Being, as expressive of the essential nature of Being,*' is included in the declaration that has occupied the preceding pages. The fact is, that the human intellect is too narrow, in a sense, and too feeble, to embrace under one point of view the totality of its object; especially when that object is so far removed by abstraction from all sensile perception. It is therefore compelled to acquire science, by a careful demonstrative synthesis of partial and imperfect, (because not adequate or exhaustive), representations. In this way it first seizes on that which is the primitive and fundamental idea of its object, expressive of its Essence; and then proceeds to fill up its idea by a demonstrated composition of Attributes or Passions with that Essence or Subject. Nor can it, in the present instance, be objected, that a negation or extrinsic denomination cannot represent any real perfection in Being. For, first of all, it must be observed as to negations, that, though they are *formally* logical, they may be *representatively* most real; that is, the idea may be logical in its structure, owing to the difficulty under which the intellect labours in representing simple perfections. Yet the objective concept, which is neither more nor less than this simple perfection, is most real. It is plain, that the denial or negation of an imperfection is the virtual position of a perfection. Thus, for instance, seeing that *mortality* is an imperfection, the negation of mortality which is expressed by the word *immortality* is a real perfection; although, by reason of its simplicity, it is conceived under the logical form of a negation. Hence it is that, as the Fathers are wont to declare, our least imperfect concepts of the Divine Perfection are negations. Then, in the next place, for what regards extrinsic denominations, it must be remembered that the True and the Good are not mere extrinsic denominations. Indeed, it argues some looseness of speech to call them extrinsic denominations at all. True it is, that, in their case, the perfection of Being is made known to us by its capacity for perfectionating that which is considered as extraneous to such Being; but that capacity is itself an intrinsic perfection, though it connotes an extrinsic term. Furthermore; Since it

certainly is not a predicamental relation (as St. Thomas has explained in the passage last quoted), such capacity or referribility argues no dependence of any sort on its term; so that it remains as an intrinsic perfection of Being, whether that extrinsic term exist or not.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of the Proposition, viz. that *these attributes do not manifest the real positive perfection of Being 'by way of addition,'* has been already sufficiently declared.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

The universal Attributes of Being are three, Unity, Truth, Goodness; for it can be shown that this enumeration is adequate.

PROLEGOMENON.

As this Proposition will immediately recall us to the teaching of St. Thomas, which is exhaustive on the present subject; it will be useful, at the outset, to confront a difficulty which would, otherwise, have found a more fitting place among the objections at the end. This Doctor, in a passage which will be presently quoted, enumerates six Transcendentals; to wit, *Being, Thing, Something, The One, The True, The Good*. Making, therefore, abstraction of Being, five remain. How, then, can *three* be an adequate enumeration? Such is the difficulty.

It is obvious to remark, by way of reply, that St. Thomas is giving a catalogue of Transcendentals; since Being is itself included. It does not follow, therefore, that the rest, exclusive of Being, are *Attributes*. This animadversion is confirmed by the fact that, whenever St. Thomas is expressly treating of the Attributes of Being, he limits himself to the three mentioned in the enunciation of the Thesis. Nevertheless, there is a point which still wants clearing up; and it is this. Why has the Angelic Doctor included in his list, as distinct Transcendentals, *Thing* and *Something*? As will be seen from the passage when quoted, St. Thomas, following in the footsteps of Avicenna, makes a distinction between Being (*Ens*) and Thing (*Res*), identical with the distinction already mentioned between Being in its participial, and Being in its nominative, signification. The former he here reserves for *Being*, the latter he assigns to *Thing*: so that *Being* expresses something

as existing; *Thing*, its quiddity, nature, or essence. Consequently, *Thing* is evidently not an Attribute. But what about *Something*? The question is in itself no more difficult of solution than the former, more especially in the English language. For *Something* is identical with *Thing* and Being. But the Latin word, *Aliquid*, introduces a fresh perplexity. For St. Thomas seems to derive *Aliquid* from *Aliud quid*, and explains it as that which is distinct from, other than, everything else. But even this use of the word will not enlarge the catalogue of Attributes; for it will then be included under *Unity*, not as its formal equivalent, but as its connotative, in a way which will be explained afterwards. The enunciation, therefore, of the Thesis remains undisturbed.

This Proposition is little more than a Corollary, inferred from the doctrine already established in the preceding Thesis. It may, however, be further confirmed by the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, who supplies us with the following elaborate proof. 'That which the intellect primarily conceives as best known, and into which it resolves all its other concepts, is Being. . . . Hence it must needs be, that all other concepts of the intellect should be taken for additions to Being. But nothing can be added to Being in the shape of a nature extraneous to it, in the way, e.g. that Difference is added to Genus, or Accident to its Subject; because every nature, of whatever kind, is Being. Accordingly, the Philosopher uses this as a proof, that Being cannot be a Genus. But some things are said to add to Being, inasmuch as they express some Mode of it, which is not contained in the simple name of Being. This takes place in two ways; in one way so, that the Mode expressed is a special modification of Being,' i.e. by contraction to the Ten supreme Genera, &c., as explained in the previous quotation. . . . 'In another way so, that the Mode expressed is the universal consequent of all Being. And this Mode can be understood in two ways; either as the consequent of all Being, considered absolutely as it is in itself, or as the consequent of every Being in its referribility to that which is other than itself. If it be taken in the first sense; its predication expresses a something in Being, either affirmatively or negatively. But you cannot discover any affirmative predication admissible in the case of Being *as a whole*, save its essence, according to which it is said *to be*. It is in this sense that the word *Thing* is applied to it; which differs from Being, in that Being is taken from the act of *being*, while the word

Thing expresses the essence or quiddity of Being. On the other hand, negation which is the consequent of all Being, absolutely considered, is indivision; and this is expressed by the word *One*. For the *One* is no other than undivided Being. But, if the Mode of Being be taken in the other way, i. e. according to its referribility or respect to something else; this is possible in two ways. It may first be taken for division of one from another; and this is expressed by the word *Aliquid*; for *Aliquid* is as though *aliud quid*. Hence, just as Being is called *One*, because it is undivided it itself; so it is called *Aliquid*, because it is divided from others. Secondly' (it may be taken) 'for the proportion which one Being bears to another. This, however, is out of the question; unless something is apprehended as having a proportion of nature to all Being. And such is the soul, which in a manner is all things; according to the words in the third Book *de Anima*. Now, in the Soul there is the appetitive, and there is the cognitive, faculty. The word, *Good*, then, expresses the proportion of Being to the appetitive faculty; accordingly as it is said at the beginning of the *Ethics*, "The Good is that which all things desire." But the word, *True*, expresses the proportion of Being to the intellect. Now, every concept is perfected by an assimilation of him who conceives to the thing conceived: so that the aforesaid assimilation is the *cause* of cognition; just as sight, because it is disposed by the sensible Form (*species sensibilis*) of colour, perceives colour. Hence it is, that the first referribility of Being to the intellect consists in a proportionate correspondence of Being with the intellect. And this correspondence is called an adequation, an equalling, of Being and intellect. It is precisely this by which the Essence of the True is formally completed. Such, then, is the addition which the True makes to Being, viz. a conformity or adequation between the thing and the intellect; and on this conformity follows, as has been said, cognition of the thing. Thus, therefore, the entity of a thing precedes the formal mode of Truth; while cognition is an effect of Truth¹.

¹ 'Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens; ut Avicenna dicit in principio *Metaphysicæ* suæ. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subjecto; quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens. Unde etiam probat Philosophus in 3. *Metaph.*, quod ens non potest esse genus. Sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum exprimunt ipsius modum,

Setting on one side, then, the three Transcendentals, *Being, Thing, Something*, as virtually identical and as not belonging to the Category of Attributes or Passions; the three remain, which are enumerated in the enunciation of the present Thesis. The argument by which St. Thomas proves that there are these attributes of Being, and these only, shall be resumed in brief. Because Being is Transcendental, outside of which it is impossible that there should be any reality, (for every real thing, be its nature what it may, is Being); there can be no determination of Being, which shall add anything that is extraneous to it. Furthermore, as an Attribute does not determine Being by contraction, it cannot add to the concept of Being a differential evolution of its nature, which shall reduce and, implicitly at least, divide it into Genera; for an Attribute or Property is mutually convertible with its Subject. Consequently, it remains that, if either of these Attributes modify Being *absolutely*, i. e. considered as it is in itself; it must be by way

qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo, ut modus expressus sit aliquis *specialis* modus entis. . . . Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo, secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; alio modo, secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc dicitur, quia exprimit in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit ancepi in omni ente, nisi essentia ejus, secundum quam esse dicitur. Et sic imponitur hoc nomen, *res*; quod in hoc differt ab *ente*, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaph., quod *ens* sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen *rei* exprimit quidditatum sive essentiam entis. Negatio autem, quae est consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio. Et hanc exprimit hoc nomen, *unum*; nihil enim est aliud *unum* quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus entis accipiat secundum modo, scil. secundum ordinis unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero. Et hoc exprimit hoc nomen, *aliquid*; dicitur enim *aliquid* quasi *altud quid*. Unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se; ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud. Et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiat aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, sicut dicitur in 3^o de Anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen, *bonum*; ut in principio Ethic.: dicitur, *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen, *verum*. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam; ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis; sicut visus, per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est, ut ens intellectui correspondeat; quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur. Et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scil. conformitatem, sive adaequationem, rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei. Sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis; sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.' *De Verit. Q. i, a. 1, o.*

of negation. Such is *Unity*, which is the negation of division. If any of these Attributes modify Being *positively*, it must be respective. For it cannot be absolute; otherwise, Being would be capable of real addition to itself. But if these Modes are respective, they require a term equivalent to themselves, i. e. as far-reaching as Being; because this respect is a sort of relative, and requires the possibility at least of its correlative. Every Being has this referribility; and such referribility requires, accordingly, something to which all Being may be referrible. This (since God is omitted, and *that* for obvious reasons, from the question) can only be the human soul; or, if God and pure Intelligences are to be included, Spirit. The reason is, because all that is not Spirit is limited in its energies and powers to a definite order of Being; all Being, therefore, is not referrible to it. But the soul of man, by its innate faculties and energy, can extend itself to all things; which causes the Philosopher to declare, that 'the soul after a manner becomes all things.' This it does by its two spiritual faculties, Reason and Will. If Being, then, is regarded in its referribility to the intellectual faculty, it is called *True*; if in its referribility to the appetitive faculty, it is called *Good*. But these are the only possible ways in which Being can be modified, by way of an Attribute. Therefore, *Unity*, *Truth*, *Goodness*, (and these three only), are Attributes of Being.

SUMMARY.

Of the doctrine concerning the Attributes or Passions of Being, this is the sum. Being cannot, from the very nature of the case, have real positive Attributes, distinct from itself. Nevertheless, it is equally true, that Being has some so-called Attributes which are not mere logical figments, but are really and truly predicated of it. These Attributes neither contract Being nor do they make any real addition to it; but they formally add either a negation or a referribility to something extrinsic. There are three such Attributes, and three only; to wit, *Unity*, *Truth*, *Goodness*. *Unity* adds a negation, viz., the negation of division. *Truth* and *Goodness* add a referribility;—*Truth*, to the intellect, *Goodness*, to the will. These Attributes are *ex parte rei* identical with Being. But there is a distinction of reason between the latter and the former; inasmuch as these Attributes are not explicitly included in that which is conceived by the intellect as the quiddity or essence of Being,

but are considered as certain Properties, so to speak, flowing from the nature of Being. It is, moreover, indubitable that these three Attributes of Unity, Truth, Goodness, are real, and real perfections of Being, though not really distinct from it; for the truth of the assertion is attested by common sense and the general verdict of mankind. By means of them the real perfection of Being is revealed to thought; as a consequence, their synthesis by demonstration with their Subject is productive of Science, properly so called. It remains to examine the nature, kinds, and perfection of each separately, following the natural order. For Unity, as an absolute Attribute, precedes Truth and Goodness, which are respective; and of these latter, the one which is referrible to the intellect claims precedence over the other which is referrible to the Will, since nothing is *loved* till it is first *known*. Hence St. Thomas: 'If, then, the True and the Good are to be considered as they are in themselves, in such manner the True is prior to the Good according to its nature, since it is perfective of something else according to the nature of its Form (or *species*); but the Good is not only perfective of something else after the nature of its Form, but according to its real entity. Thus the nature of the Good contains within itself more than the nature of the True, and in a manner is constituted by addition to it. Wherefore, the Good presupposes the True, but the True presupposes the One; since the nature of the True is perfected in the apprehension of the intellect, and a thing is intelligible, in so far forth as it is One, according to the Philosopher in the fourth Book of the *Metaphysics*. Hence, this is the order of these Transcendentals, if considered as they are in themselves. After Being comes Unity; then Truth; lastly, after Truth, Goodness¹.'

¹ 'Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfectivum alicujus secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re; et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur. Unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum. Qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in 4. Metaph. Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur: 'quod post ens est unum, deinde verum, deinde post verum bonum.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 3, c.*

CHAPTER II.

UNITY.

ARTICLE I.

On Transcendental Unity, its cognates, and their opposites.

PREVIOUS to entering upon an inquiry into the nature of Transcendental Unity and of its primary divisions according to the more generally received doctrine of the Schools, it is of importance to have a clear notion of the object which will for the present occupy the attention of the reader, as also of the other terms which will frequently recur. To this end, the nature of Transcendental Unity, of its cognates, and of the opposites of each, will be considered in order; so far as may be necessary for a clear understanding of future discussions.

I. WHAT IS UNITY? *Unity* is, in the abstract, that which *One* is, in the concrete. As, therefore, *One* is undivided Being; so *Unity* is *Indivision of Being*. This indivision, or negation of division, is absolute and intrinsic. It is formally equivalent to this; that Being is not divided within itself, so that it should be in part not itself. It is true, that from this *absolute* indivision flows what may, for want of a better term, be called a Property which is *respective*. For, inasmuch as Being is undivided in itself, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that it is divided off from everything else; otherwise, it might *not* be undivided in itself. And this consequent phase of Unity is equally universal with Unity itself; but it does not enter into the formal concept of Unity. Thus, God would be intrinsically One; even though nothing else existed save Himself. Undeniably, this division from everything besides itself would be *fundamentally* and *potentially* in even solitary Being; but, fundamentally and potentially, it is really identical with Unity, or

undivided Entity. If, however, a distinction of reason with a real foundation be admitted in such case between the indivision of Being in itself and its potential division from any possible other; even then, as the former is absolute, the latter relative, *this* must yield the first place to *that*, because every relation presupposes an absolute foundation in some sense, and at all events presupposes the absolute. Lastly, let it be well understood that this indivision in Being does not exclude *divisibility*; for *actual* unity is quite compatible with *potential* multiplicity. All that Transcendental Unity excludes, is actual division in Being; for, if there were such division, it would no longer be Being, but Beings. This is implied by St. Thomas, where he says, '*One* means nothing else than undivided Being. Hence, it is apparent that One is convertible with Being. For all Being is either simple or composite. Now, that which is simple is both actually undivided and indivisible; while that which is composite has no being as long as its parts are divided, but only after those parts constitute and compose the composite itself. Hence, it is manifest that the being of everything whatsoever consists in indivision; whence it follows that everything, in proportion as it preserves its being, so in like manner preserves its unity¹.'

II. A cognate to Unity is IDENTITY, which may be said to be the correspondence or agreement of Being with itself. As Unity, therefore, is the indivision of Being *in* itself, so Identity is the indivision of Being *from* itself. As distinguished from Unity, it is conceptual rather than real; and the objective concept adds nothing to the perfection of Being as objectively evolved by its Unity. *Chronic* Identity, as it may be called, is the persevering correspondence of a thing *now* with itself in the past, and is really nothing but the Unity of Being under the condition of time. There is a division of Identity which must not be omitted here. Identity is either *Physical*, which is the perseverance of real, physical, unity in Being; or *moral*, which is the perseverance of unity in Being according to human estimation. Thus, the body of a man is

¹ 'Unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens aut est simplex aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet esse, quamdiu partes ejus sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est, quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione; et inde est quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem.' 1^o xi, 1, c.

commonly considered one and the same body in youth and old age; although it is said to be wholly changed after a cycle of seven years, or thereabouts.

III. Another cognate to Unity is EQUALITY, which is a sort of unity in Quantity—unity, that is, of *measure*. But the discussion of this Attribute will find a more appropriate place under the Category of Quantity. It may be described as *the correspondence or agreement in quantity of distinct things*.

IV. Another cognate to Unity is SIMILARITY, which is a sort of unity in Quality, but, for the same reason, its consideration will be reserved. It may be described as *the agreement in quality of distinct things*.

V. Yet another cognate to Unity is UNICITY, which consists in the *negation of multitude*. A unique being is one not only undivided in itself, but excluding any other like it. It is the sole of its kind, not *one* simply, but the *only* one.

VI. MULTITUDE or MULTIPLICITY is the opposite of Unity. It may be said to be *a collection of distinct unities or entities*. It therefore presupposes that each of the entities is one in itself, and that one is not the other. The collection may be purely conceptual or real. It may be causal or fortuitous, natural or artificial; but that which Multitude formally denotes is division of entities from each other. Accordingly St. Thomas says that multitude ‘adds to those things which are called *many*, that each one of them should be *one*, as well as that no one of them should be the other; and in this latter consists the essential idea of distinction¹.’

VII. DISTINCTION is opposed to Identity, and is the foundation of Multiplicity, as St. Thomas sufficiently intimates in the last words of the passage just cited. It may be described as the *Otherness* of Being, or that which causes it to be not the same as any other; and is, therefore, as it were identified with that consequence of Unity, to which reference has been already made. Not unfrequently it is identified with DIVISION in its passive signification; but, formally considered, it would seem as though the latter were the effect of the former as its cause. It is obvious from what has been said, that Distinction and Division, like Multitude, presuppose Transcendental Unity.

¹ ‘Multitudo . . . addit supra res quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera; in quo consistit ratio distinctionis.’ *De Potentia*, Q. ix, a. 7, c. v. ff.

VIII. To Equality is opposed *Inequality*; to Similarity, *Dissimilarity*.

IX. UNIVERSAL (Generic or Specific) UNITY is opposed to Unicity.

After these preliminary observations, it follows now to pursue the inquiry touching the nature of Transcendental Unity and the position which it occupies face to face with its opposites. These questions will be resolved in the following Propositions.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

Transcendental Unity is a negation after the manner of a privation.

It has been already shown that an Attribute of Being can make no real, positive, intrinsic, addition to its Subject. Either, therefore, it adds absolutely, and then by way of negation; or it adds positively, and then by way of referribility to something other than the being of which it is predicated. But Unity includes no referribility to something extrinsic to itself; and in this precisely it is distinguished from its fellow Transcendental Attributes. Therefore, if an Attribute at all, it must add to Being by way of negation. And this is precisely what St. Thomas teaches. For he says, 'The *One* does not carry along with it any idea of perfectionating another' (which is respective), 'but merely that of indivision, which appertains to everything whatsoever by reason of its essence¹.' Accordingly he adds in another place, 'Wherefore, it is evident that *The One*, which is convertible with Being, *posits indeed Being itself*; but adds nothing, over and above, save a negation of division².' So far is sufficiently plain. But the student may find a difficulty in that modifying clause of the Proposition, '*after the manner of a privation*.' Why is it not a mere negation? What is the reason which compels one to consider such negation, as it were, under the form of a privation? And, if it be after the manner of a privation, why is it not a real *bona fide* privation? These are the questions which naturally confront us at the outset. The answer to these problems depends for the most part upon an accurate and distinct

¹ 'Unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam essentiam.' 1^o vi, 3, ad 1^m.

² 'Patet ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis.' *De Potentia, Ibidem. v. fi.*

notion of the difference between a pure negation and a privation. Now, a pure negation is *Nothing*. It is true that the negation of a negation is a position, according to the old adage, that *Two negatives make an affirmative*. But then it cannot be called a *pure* negation. Besides, it remains to be seen, whether Transcendental Unity be the negation of a negation or not. But even if it should be, the difficulty is the same. For the simple negation of a negation may represent a perfection, but not an Attribute; unless it ceases to be a simple negation, that is, unless it includes something directly positive to which it is referred. Moreover, a real position in the case of an Attribute of Being, is a contradiction to the doctrine already established, that no Attribute of Being can add anything positive and real to its subject. But what is a privation? It includes two significates, to wit, an absent Form, and a present Subject of such Form. Thus *Blindness*, as a privative, includes the Form of *seeing*, which is absent, and the Subject of that Form,—let it be, by way of illustration, a *man*. Furthermore, if it be a *real* privation, two other elements must enter into the concept. First of all, the absent Form must be a real perfection; secondly, that Form must be *due* to the Subject which is deprived of it. It is by virtue of this latter element, that *Privation* is distinguished from mere *Wanting* or *being without*. Thus, *Blindness* is a privation to a *man*; it is a simple *being without* to a *stone*. Why? Because a stone has no right to eyesight.

Hence, it is easy to deduce, that Transcendental Unity is not a real privation. For the negation which it adds is no absence of a real Form. There is no absence of anything real; but the absence of self-division. Then again, *self-division* is not due to Being; on the contrary, it is essentially excluded. Lastly, in real privation, the superinduction of the missing Form would not only remove privation, but would add a positive perfection to the Subject. But self-division, i. e. division within itself, would be so far from adding by its presence to the perfection of Being, that it would utterly destroy it. Therefore, it is plain that Transcendental Unity cannot be a real privation. Why not, then, a simple negation? Why should it be described as a negation *after the manner* of a privation?

The reason is, that 'The One,' as St. Thomas puts it in the passage last quoted, 'posits Being itself.' Therefore it is consignificative of two things, absence of division, and the Subject from which division is absent. This is why the negation is after the manner of a

privation. But, as such consignification is a capital element in the nature of this, as of the other two, Attributes of Being, it merits closer consideration. Wherefore,

PROPOSITION XXIX.

Unity in its formal acceptation is not a pure negation, but includes Entity as the Subject of such negation.

PROLEGOMENON.

In the case of Properties, truly so called, and of Accidental Attributes, there are three acceptations of the word, which are distinguishable from each other, viz., *the formal*, *the material*, and *the adequate*. To speak logically; in all accidental denomination there is the denominative Form, the Subject denominated, and the entire denomination as representative of the Subject actually modified by the Form. Thus, in *White Man*, *Whiteness* is the denominating Form, *Man* is the Subject denominated, and *White Man* is the adequate denomination. In like manner, the Transcendental Attributes may be considered in their formal acceptation, i. e. as exclusively representing that so-called addition which they make to Being; or they may be taken materially for the Subject of their Attribution; or they may be assumed as adequately representing the Subject as informed, so to say, by its Attribute. Now, there can be no question that these Attributes include Being in their material, and in their adequate, signification. The only subject of dispute is, whether they include Being in their *formal* acceptation.

I. The present Proposition shall, first of all, be proved by an analysis of accidental Forms in their several kinds. For the sake of clearness, it will be as well to anticipate the argument, whose premisses the present analysis is intended to confirm. Negative Attributes properly so called, as distinguished from all other Attributes, necessarily include the Subject in their formal signification. But Unity is a negative Attribute, properly so called. Therefore, it necessarily includes Being in its formal signification. And now, for the promised analysis. In the case of essential Properties, i. e. of Accidents (using the word *generically*) which flow from the Essence, there is a reality, represented formally by the Property, which makes a real addition to the Essence of the Subject. In like manner Accidents, specifically so called, are a reality in themselves, apart

from their Subject ; though they have an essential referribility to it. Even Modes, which essentially postulate actual inhesion in their Subject, have, notwithstanding, a reality of their own, which makes a real addition to the Subject, or Subjects, of modification. Thus, a *sitting position* is something real, and a real addition to *Caius* ; although his sitting position cannot *de potentia absoluta* be separated from himself. In all these cases, therefore, there is no doubt but that the Accident not only *can*, but *must*, exclude the Subject in its *formal* signification. Now let us look to privative Forms. They are *directly* negative, and so far forth logical ; but indirectly they are real, that is, if they are themselves real *bona fide* privatives. Consequently, their Form consists of a double element, as it were ; for it is partly logical, partly real. It expresses the want of a certain real something which is due to the Subject and which, if present, would form a real addition to it. Hence, because of this reality indirectly represented, Privatives in their formal signification can stand alone, and do not necessarily include their Subject. But what of pure negatives ? Plainly enough, they can make no real addition,—not even an addition of reason, to the subject of which they are predicated. For instance, *A is nothing*, or *John is not James*, or *a point is not motion* ; what possible addition can such negations make to their respective Subjects ? And what reality, or Form conceived as a reality, could they represent ; unless their Subject were included in their formal signification ? Yes, it may be objected, this is all very true of pure Negatives, but there are Negatives which are *negations of negations* ; and these surely represent a reality which may stand alone, without inclusion of the Subject in their formal acceptation. Thus, *Immortal*, *Immutable*, *Simple*, (which last is really a Negation,—the negation of composition), can stand alone, and represent something real, which is a conceivable addition to their Subject, in their formal signification. But *Indivision* is the negation of a negation ; for Division is a negation. Therefore, Indivision represents a real perfection and, in consequence, needs not the inclusion of its Subject *formally*. Without determining for the present, whether Indivision is, or is not, the negation of a negation ; let it be supposed, for the sake of argument, that it is. If so ; then it is an absolute, intrinsic, real, perfection. But it has been already shown, that this is an impossibility in the case of Being. Either, therefore, it is a pure negation, or it is no Attribute of Being. Again, if it represents a real perfection under the form of a double

Negative, it is Being and, consequently, by the very fact, the Subject must enter into its formal signification.

II. Unity is something real. This may surely be taken for granted; since its truth is accepted by the common sense of mankind. But it could not be something real, if in its formal acceptation it included nothing but a negation. The very expression, *real Unity*, would be in such case an anomaly and a contradiction.

III. The preceding argument receives confirmation from the fact, accepted by all the Doctors of the different Schools, that Unity is not predicated univocally of real Being and of logical Being, but according to analogy of proportion. Now, this could not be, if Unity stood, according to its formal signification, for a mere negation; seeing that it is the formal significate which principally determines the signification of a word. For mere negation would indiscriminately and equally apply to logical, as to real, Being.

IV. Yet again; the Unity of Being is not an adjacent Form, as it were, (like *Soft* or *Red*), which is outside the sphere of the Subject and informs it with some accidental perfection. On the contrary, it is the very Entity of Being in its own state of real Indivision. It has no meaning, no reality, save in that Being whose intrinsic perfection it represents under the conceptual form of a negation; but a negation which objectively is a phase of Being itself.

V. The truth of the present Proposition is confirmed by the authority of the Angelic Doctor. There is one passage where he is expounding the question, disputed from of old by the Philosophers, whether Transcendental and Numerical Unity are identical or not. He here takes occasion to insert the universally admitted doctrine concerning Transcendental Unity in the following words:—'*One*, which is convertible with Being, adds nothing *positively* to that to which it is adjoined; because a thing is not said to be one, because of any additional arrangement of it. Otherwise, there would be an infinite process; if that arrangement too, seeing that it is one, would be one by some other arrangement (or disposition). Wherefore, they say that *One* includes in its concept universal Being, and adds, over and above Being, the Form of a sort of privation or negation, that is, of indivision. Hence *Being* and *One* are convertible, as being *really* the same, and differing only in concept; forasmuch as *One* adds, over and above the idea of Being, a negation. Hence, if the form of *The One* be considered as regards that which it adds over

and above Being, it expresses a negation only¹. Suarez gives it as his opinion, that St. Thomas is speaking in this passage of *One* in its adequate acceptation; but, to say the least, the expression, '*One includes in its concept universal Being*,' coupled with the fact that the whole passage treats of *One* as distinct from Being, seems to indicate, on the contrary, that he is taking Unity in its formal signification.

In a parallel passage, where the Angel of the Schools is dealing with identically the same question, he expresses himself in the same way; though Suarez, without sufficient reason, (if one may say so), asserts that, like the quotation just given, it 'plainly' treats of Being in its adequate acceptation. These are the words of St. Thomas:—'*One which is convertible with Being*,' (which expression, by force of the logical separation involved, would seem to imply that he is considering *One* as contradistinct from its Subject), 'makes no addition to Being save a negation of division. Not that it means *indivision* itself only,' (how could it, if the adequate sense were in question?), 'but the essence of Being with it' (the *indivision*), 'for *One* is the same as undivided Being².'

But there is a third passage, which helps to interpret the rest, and is admitted by Suarez himself as unquestionable. The subject is still the same; and St. Thomas takes occasion to remark, 'Since *One* is that which is undivided in itself and divided off from other things, and every created thing is distinguished from other things by its essence; the essence itself of created Being, regarded as undivided in itself and distinguishing from others, is its unity³.'

It is manifest, therefore, from these quotations that, in the judg-

¹ 'Dicunt ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, nihil positive addit ad id cui adjungitur, eo quod res non dicitur esse una per aliquam dispositionem additam; quia sic esset abire in infinitum, si ista etiam dispositio, cum sit una, per aliquam aliam unitatem una esset. Unde dicunt, quod unum claudit in intellectu suo ens commune, et addit rationem privationis vel negationis cujusdam super ens, id est, *indivisionis*. Unde ens et unum convertuntur, sicut quae sunt idem re, et differunt per rationem tantum, secundum quod unum addit negationem super ens. Unde si consideretur ratio unius quantum ad id quod addit supra ens, non dicit nisi negationem tantum.' *In 1 Sentt. d. xxiv, Q 1, a. 3, c.*

² 'Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, non addit supra ens nisi negationem *divisionis*. Non quod significet ipsam *indivisionem* tantum, sed *substantiam* ejus cum ipsa; est enim *unum* idem quod, ens *indivisum*.' *De Potentia, Q. ix, a. 7, c.*

³ 'Cum enim unum sit quod est *indivisum* in se et *divisum* ab aliis, cum unumquodque autem creatum per essentiam suam distinguatur ab aliis; ipsa essentia creati, secundum quod est *indivisa* in se et distinguens ab aliis, est *unitas* ejus.' *In 1 Sentt. d. xix, Q. 4, a. 1, ad 2^m.*

ment of St. Thomas, *One* which is convertible with Being, considered consequently as *formally* its Attribute, 'posits Being.'

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The doctrine indicated in this Proposition seems to be incompatible with the claim of Unity to be an Attribute of Being. For the formal acceptance of an Attribute is that which distinguishes it from its Subject. But that which distinguishes Unity from Being is Indivision. Therefore, Indivision alone can be included in the formal signification of Unity.

ANSWER. In answer it may be said, with Suarez, that Unity is distinguished from Being *radically*, as it were, by this negation of division, but that it is not *formally* so distinguished, but by *Entity as undivided*: so that Being formally stands for Entity *as such*; Unity, for Entity *qua* undivided. But this distinction requires elucidation. It is admitted, then, that Indivision, as expressed by Unity, is the *foundation* of the distinction between the Attribute and its Subject. But what is this Indivision objectively? It is Being in its own perfectness,—not, be it remarked, a superadded perfectness, but a perfectness which is identical with itself. The difference between Being and its Attributes is *conceptual*, and consists in this, that Being is conceived as representative of that purely which is necessary to the position of Being as a reality in thought,—*that* without which it would be impossible to think of it as Being; whereas Unity determines this concept by the superaddition of a characteristic, intimately imbibed in the nature of Being and objectively identical with it, yet not included in the first undetermined concept of its Essence. The foundation, therefore, of the difference is the added negation of division; while the formal signification of Unity necessarily includes Being, as an integral part of the objective concept.

II. Every Property or Attribute *formally* expresses that which it adds to its Subject, and that only. But Unity adds Indivision to Being, as St. Thomas repeatedly declares. Therefore, Unity in its formal acceptance expresses Indivision, and that only.

ANSWER. The assertion is true of Properties and Attributes strictly and truly so called; but it does not hold good in the case of

the Transcendental Attributes of Being, for the reasons already alleged in the first Chapter of this Book.

III. If *One* expresses *anything* save simple negation, *that anything* must be either Being or something else. But the latter cannot even be imagined. For, if it is not negation, it must be *positive*. Now, it cannot be a conceptual positive. For, first of all, no one has ever dreamed of such a significate in Unity formally considered. Besides, this putative *positive* is either respective or absolute. But it cannot be respective; for Unity is *absolute*. Take the opposite alternative: and suppose that it is a conceptual *absolute* positive. Let us be told in plain terms the precise nature of its objective concept; for as yet the task has been unattempted. If, then, *One* expresses anything positive, it must be real; and, therefore, Being. But, in this case, it would follow that Being and Unity are even conceptually one and the same, which is, to say the least, inconvenient. Besides, such a theory involves an *infinite process*. For that something positive, included in the formal signification of Unity, must be *One*; *One*, therefore, as inclusive of something positive and absolute, which, in turn, must be *One*; and so on, for ever. Again; it would follow that there is no difference between the *formal* and the *adequate* Acceptation of Unity. Lastly, it would follow, as a necessary consequence, that this Attribute of Being would *formally* include all the perfection of Being; so that an Attribute would be of, at least, equal perfection with its Subject.

ANSWER. The answer to this nucleus of objections is nearly the same as that which has already been given to the second difficulty. It is manifest from all which has been said in confirmation of the present Proposition, that it is Being which is included in the formal acceptation of its own Attribute. Nor is there in this any inconvenience, such as the first argument in the present difficulty assumes. For these Transcendentals are not real Attributes or Passions, but are represented conceptually after the fashion of Attributes. As a fact, they are determinations of Being, not by contraction, but by explicit evolution of Entity. The object is really the same in the concept of Being, as in the concept of *One*; but in the latter instance the concept is more complete, so to say, and determined. Neither is it true that, if the doctrine here maintained be correct, there would be an infinite process; because Being

and *One* are *ex parte rei* precisely the same as regards all that is positive, and only differ even conceptually in this, that *One* adds to the concept of *Being* a negation of division. Consequently, *Being* is one by its own Entity, and *One* is *Being* by its own Entity, and *One* is one, because it is *Being*. Lastly, it is willingly conceded that *One* includes not all the perfection *in actu exercito* of *Being*, but exhibits a further perfection which is not *formally* represented in the concept of *Being*; while, on the other hand, it is also true that *in actu signato* it does not attinge what is conceived to be the essential perfection of *Being*, *as such*. For it explicitly exhibits *Being* under the determining form of *indivision*.

PROPOSITION XXX.

Unity is an adequate Attribute of Being.

This Proposition is at once so evident and maintained with such unanimity by Philosophers of every School, that it may be regarded as axiomatic. No one, indeed, can fail to see, that every *Being* or *Thing* is one, by the mere fact that it is a *Being*. The Angelic Doctor shall be spokesman for the whole School. In passages already quoted in the two preceding Theses, he thrice refers to the mutual convertibility of *Being* and *One*, as to an indisputable fact; while, in another work, he states that ‘Everything is in so far forth *Being*, as it is *One*; wherefore, *Being* and *One* are convertible¹.’ So much is plain; so plain indeed, that it would only suffer by addition of proof.

But this doctrine, indisputable as it is, gives rise to a considerable difficulty; and an opportunity is offered of discussing it in the present Proposition, which has been introduced mainly on this account. For, according to the Philosopher, whose assertion has been accepted generally by the School, *One* is opposed to *Many*, *Unity* to *Multitude*; and these two divide *Being*. But it is impossible that one member of a division should be convertible with the divided Whole. Consequently, *Unity* cannot be an *adequate Attribute of Being*.

Now, in the first place, it concerns us to remark that *Many*, purely as such, is not *Being* but *beings* and, therefore, can form no member of a division of which *Being* is the divided Whole.

¹ ‘Unumquodque, in quantum est unum, in tantum est ens; unde ens et unum convertuntur.’ *Quod. vi, Q. I, a. I, c.*

Wherefore, *Many* can only be included under Being, in so far forth as it puts on the form of unity. Now, this unity of *Many* may be fourfold. For either it is purely conceptual, or it arises from contiguity, accumulation, conglomeration, or it owes its origin to physical mixture and combination, or it is the result of physical and entitative union. Again, the unity arising out of contiguity, accumulation, or conglomeration, may be either fortuitous and unordered, or with design and ordered. Thus there are, in all, five kinds of Unity which *Many* may exhibit. An apposite instance of conceptual unity is to be found in the very notion of *Multitude*; for, whether the *Many* included be determinate or indeterminate in number, they are gathered together by the mind into a sort of logical unity. In a *heap of stones*, the unity of the concept arises from contiguity; and accumulation, from conglomeration, in fossiliferous *strata*. But these are, so to say, fortuitous. The bricks, stones, mortar, timber, &c., which compose a house, are one, by a contiguity and accumulation which are ordered and designed. Nearly the same may be said of such concepts as an *Army*, a *State*, a *Society*, a *Committee*, &c.; or, to add a significant word which would include them all, a *Union*. Wine and water, nay wine itself in the present condition of the trade, are examples of physical mixture. So are *soda-water* and *poplins* for dresses. Instances of physical and entitative union of many are the *limbs of a body*, a *red rose*, where there is conjunction of accident and substance; *the union of oxygen and hydrogen in water*, *the union between soul and body*.

Now, throughout each and all of these categories of multitude, there is unity of some sort; there is, therefore, *proportionally* Being. Hence, since *Many*, as such, cannot come under the category of Being, but *beings*; it follows, that *Many* can only be said to divide Being, inasmuch as it is conceived as *Multitude*, i. e., as in some way or other collected into one. Therefore, it cannot contravene Being with unity as the other member of division; but only divides *Being*, after precisely the same proportion as it divides *Unity*. Consequently, it offers no hindrance to the adequation of Unity with Being.

Thus, then, the difficulty is solved, and the truth of the present Proposition is established. Nevertheless, as the doctrine touching the relation of Multitude to Being and Unity has not as yet been exhaustively treated, it may be well to subjoin some further observations.

It is easy to perceive that *Multitude*, which is only conceptually gathered together into one, is purely logical Being and, therefore, only logically one. So likewise, in the case of union by contiguity and accumulation, whether fortuitous or designed, there is *really* not Being, but beings; not One, but *ones*. Under such form of constitution, therefore, Multitude is only Being and One, by an act of the intellect which has something of a real foundation for its concept. Such multitudes, consequently, are justly called *entities of reason* or conceptual entities, as distinguished from real Beings. Hence, Multitude, in both these cases, is conceptual, not real; and cannot in any sense be said to divide real Being, which is the adequate object of Metaphysics. So soon, however, as there is real physical union, there is also real Being. Considered under this point of view, Multitude is twofold. For its multiplicity is either actual or merely virtual. If it is actual, then its Being and its unity are *accidental*; in other words, it is Being and One in a way, but it is *simply* manifold. If it is virtual merely, it is *simply* Being and *simply* One, and manifold *in a way*. Accordingly, *mixtures*, *Substance taken together with its informing Accident*, are Being and One *by accident*, while they are *simply* Multitude; whereas, integral parts of an existing whole,—*oxygen and hydrogen in water*,—*soul and body in a living animal*,—are simply Being and One, while they are manifold *by accident*. In other words, virtual multitude is really Being, really One; and real actual Multitude is *virtually* Being, *virtually* One.

Two questions suggest themselves, in view of the doctrine here propounded, which shall be considered under the form of Corollaries.

COROLLARY I.

Of what nature, it may be asked, is this Division of Unity and Being by these Forms of Multitude? Is Being or Unity (for they are convertible) predicated of these two primary determinations,—viz., Being, One, *simply*, and Being, One, *by accident*,—univocally, equivocally, or analogously? In order to give an exhaustive answer to this question, it will be necessary to recall to mind the different kinds of Multitude already enumerated; omitting, of course, the first whose unity is purely conceptual. They shall now, however, with the Angelic Doctor for a guide, be represented, not under the form of their multiplicity, but under their form of unity. ‘In three ways,’ he writes, ‘a certain unity is constituted

out of two or more. First of all, out of two (or more) which remain integral and perfect. But this cannot be effected, save in the case of component elements whose form is either collocation, or order, or shape. Thus, out of many stones brought together without any order, a heap is made by mere collocation; but, out of stones and timber disposed in some definite order and likewise reduced to a certain shape, a house is made. . . . Secondly, a sort of unity is made out of perfect (components), but transmuted; as a composite is made out of simple elements. . . . Thirdly, it is made out of certain (components), not commingled or transmuted, but imperfect; as man is made of soul and body, and in like manner one body is made up of different members^{1,2}. It is plain, then, that to ask whether the division of Being into *One* and *Many* is univocal, equivocal, or analogous; if it mean any thing, is identical with the question, whether the division of Unity into simply *One* and *One* in a *Way* (*secundum quid*) is univocal, equivocal, or analogous. Now, no general answer can be given to this question, on account of the different forms of unity which constitute the afore-mentioned classes of composite Unity. Each must be considered separately. Wherefore,

I. Between simple unity (which is Transcendental) and that unity of composition which arises from fortuitous adjacency or aggregation, there is, at the most, a distant analogy of proportion; for the Forms in each are simply distinct.

II. The same may be said of that unity of composition which arises from designed or orderly aggregation. For, in such cases, the Unity is not entitative or natural, but conceptual only.

III. Where the Unity is the result of natural commixture, while the Matter and substantial Form of the commixed remain unchanged; the analogy approaches to that of attribution of the second class. For, though the two or more entities which are mingled together preserve their integral unity; yet there is a real,

¹ 'Tripliciter aliquid unum ex duobus vel pluribus constituitur. Uno modo, ex duobus integris perfectis remanentibus; quod quidem fieri non potest, nisi in iis quorum forma est compositio, vel ordo, vel figura; sicut ex multis lapidibus absque aliquo ordine adunatis, per solam compositionem fit acervus; ex lapidibus autem et lignis secundum aliquem ordinem dispositis, et etiam ad aliquam figuram redactis, fit domus. . . . Alio modo fit aliquid unum ex perfectis, sed transmutatiis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum. . . . Tertio modo aliquid fit ex aliquibus non permixtis vel permutatis, sed imperfectis; sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo; et similiter ex diversis membris unum corpus constituitur.' 3^{ae} ii, 1, c.

physical, quantitative, union between them, which is sometimes qualitative also, as in the instance of *hot negus*.

IV. Much more plainly is this analogy of proportion seen to exist in the case of Substance informed by its accidents; since, although Accident has an Entity and, therefore, Unity of its own, as distinct from the Substance which it informs; nevertheless, it is of its essence to be inherent in its Subject.

V. With regard to natural transformations or transmutations, and the conjunction of imperfect substances which mutually complete each other, it may be said, that they are *univocally* one, for they are only potentially many, and constitute severally one real Entity.

Hence it may be inferred, that the last three classes are included either univocally or analogously under Transcendental Unity, while the former two are excluded.

COROLLARY II.

The second question which awaits solution is this. How are Unity and Multiplicity opposed? What sort of opposition, in other words, exists between the two? The answer to this inquiry will depend upon the point of view under which Multiplicity is regarded. For it may be considered either formally, i. e. as exhibiting some form of unity; or *materially*, i. e. precisely as many, or more than one. If it be regarded *formally*, Multiplicity is opposed to Unity either as disparate or as the imperfect to the perfect:—as disparate, where there is no physical union; as the imperfect to the perfect, where such union subsists. If the question regards Multitude or Multiplicity, simply as being many, it may be understood in two ways. For it may be understood of *Many* either positively or negatively; because *Many* may be regarded in either of these two ways. If the question is understood positively, viz., of *Many* as simply so many distinct entities; then it is opposed to *One*, as a whole is opposed to its part. If it be taken *negatively*, i. e. with regard to the negation included in Unity and the negation included in Multiplicity; then they are opposed *privatively*. For unity expresses the negation of division, which division within itself is of the essence of Multitude; while Multitude expresses the negation of identity which is of the essence of Unity.

But here arises a difficulty, which has occasioned what seems

like a serious misunderstanding of the teaching of St. Thomas in this matter. It has been already stated in the explanation of the word *Multitude* given at the commencement of this Chapter, that, according to St. Thomas, Multitude supposes the Unity or Indivision of each of its constituents. The same Doctor asserts as much, if possible, more unequivocally, in a passage which will appear later on. Yet, on the other hand, he says in another place, 'There is a twofold Whole; one homogeneous, which is made up of parts that are similar; the other heterogeneous, which is made up of parts that are dissimilar. . . Now, in every heterogeneous whole, each part is destitute of the form of the Whole; for there is no part of the house' (for instance) 'which is the house, and no part of man which is man. And such a whole is Multitude. Forasmuch, then, as no part of it has the form of Multitude; Multitude is composed of unities, as a house is composed of things which are not houses. Not that Unities constitute Multitude by reason of that attribute of indivision which is theirs and by which they are opposed to Multitude, but by reason of their Entity; just as the parts of a house constitute a house, in that they are material substances, not because they are not house¹.' Similarly, in another place he says, 'Unity does not constitute multitude by virtue of its privativeness' (i. e. of division), 'but by virtue of its entity².' Therefore it would seem, according to the tenor of these passages, as though St. Thomas was at variance with his own previous declaration, that Multitude supposed indivision in its components. This apparent discrepancy will, however, disappear, if we examine the matter with attention. There are three ways, as Suarez reminds us, of regarding Multitude, which are familiar to us already in the previous discussions on Unity. We may consider Multitude *formally*, or *materially*, i. e. as to its material part; and this latter

¹ 'Duplex est totum; quoddam homogeneous, quod componitur ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneous, quod componitur ex dissimilibus partibus. . . . In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo quaelibet pars caret forma totius; nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. In quantum ergo pars ejus non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus. Non quod unitates constituent multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini, sed secundum hoc quod habent de entitate; sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.' 1^o xi, 2, ad 2^m.

² 'Unum non constituit multitudinem ex parte privationis, sed ex parte illa quae ponit eam.' *De Potentia*, Q. ix, a. 7, ad 10^m.

under a double aspect, i.e. as inclusive, first, of its *positive*, secondly, of its *negative* element. Let us commence by looking at Multitude in its *adequate* acceptation. It includes the Many which are, as it were, its *material*, and their union, which is its *formal* part. It may, therefore, be described as *the union of two or more entities*. Now, the two or more entities, *as such*, constitute the material part, considered under its *positive* aspect; and the existence of two or more entities answers to the idea of *Plurality*. But Plurality necessarily presupposes Distinction, or the negation of identity in regard of the several entities; and this is the material part according to its *negative* element. This Distinction, then, or negation of identity, presupposes the unity and identity of each separate entity with itself. Wherefore, Unity, or indivision of Being, is an essential prerequisite of *Many*; i.e. *the many* cannot be, unless each constituent of the *many* is one and undivided in itself. But this Plurality is reduced to Unity by *Union*, which is the *formal* part of Multitude. Now, in the process of uniting the *Many* into One, the Indivision of each member in itself can play no part; if anything, it would rather be in the way. For this union requires that the several members should part, as it were, with their autonomy, so as to become members one of another and thus to constitute a whole. That which in each member promotes this union, is its Entity which, forasmuch as it is finite, can be perfected by conjunction; and thus, the union causes each entity to forget the distinctiveness of its own Being, in order to form a part in the constitution of a new Entity. Here its power of cohesion comes into play; not the repelling force of its unity. Thus, to adopt the illustration of St. Thomas, it is not because bricks are not timber, nor timber mortar, nor any of these a house, that they can combine to form a house; but because each is an Entity capable of conjunction with the other, and so, of contributing its part to the constitution of a house. In like manner, it is not because the soul of man is undivided in itself and distinct from the body, or because the body, in its turn, is undivided in itself and distinct from the soul, (*though both these are necessarily presupposed*, as has been seen), that they together constitute man; but it is because of the imperfect entity of both, which seeks mutual conjunction for the required perfection of each.

Multitude or Multiplicity, then, has a sort of composite Indivision proper to itself; for it cannot lose a part, without ceasing to be the same Multiplicity which it was before. Therefore, its

composite entity is incapable of division, and it is identical with itself. But this Unity is not entitative or essential, but composite and accidental; with the exception of transformations and the union of imperfect substances, such as soul and body, which are not included here, because they come under the category of Transcendental Unity. Consequently, it still remains true, that Unity and Multitude are privatively opposed. For Unity includes negation of division within itself absolutely and completely; whereas it is of the essence of Multitude, that it should be divided within itself, for the reason that *materially* it is *Many*, and, therefore, is deprived of intrinsic indivision. On the other hand, Multitude essentially postulates negation of oneness in its constituents, of which negation Unity is essentially deprived. Accordingly, St. Thomas observes—‘There is a twofold Unity; one of which is convertible with Being, and adds nothing to Being, over and above, save Indivision. And this Unity excludes (*privat*) Multitude, inasmuch as Multitude is caused by division. Not that it excludes *extrinsic* Multitude of which *One* constitutes part; but *intrinsic* Multitude, which is opposed to Unity. For it is not because a thing is said to be one, that therefore the existence of anything outside it, with which it may constitute Multitude, is denied; but what is denied is, its own division into many¹.’ From these principles the Angelic Doctor deduces elsewhere another distinction between Unity and Multitude. For, ‘In Multitude,’ he observes, ‘there is negation, in that one thing is distinguished from another by negation. Hence, in Multitude there is *real* negation or privation, in that one thing is said not to be another. And it is such a distinction by negation, that the negation contained in the nature of Unity negatives. Wherefore, I remark that the negation in which the nature of Unity is completed, is only a *conceptual* negation; for every relation of Being to negation and Not-Being is only conceptual. Hence, the relation of Being to Not-Being is only conceptual; and in like manner *the privation, by which Not-Being is denied of Being*, is only conceptual, as being the privation of a privation, or the negation of

¹ ‘Duplex est unum; quoddam scilicet quod convertitur cum ente, quod nihil addit supra ens nisi indivisionem. Et hoc unum privat multitudinem, in quantum multitudo ex divisione causatur; non quidem multitudinem extrinsecam quam unum constituit sicut pars, sed multitudinem intrinsecam quae unitati opponitur. Non enim ex hoc quod aliquid dicitur esse unum, negatur quin aliquid sit extra ipsum quod cum eo constituat multitudinem; sed negatur divisio ipsius in multa.’ *De Potentia*, Q. iii, a. 16, ad 3^m. Cf. 1^o xi, 2, ad 4^m.

a negation¹. One slight difficulty yet remains, whose solution will bring this Corollary to a close.

It has been maintained that Substance, as informed by its accidents, transformations of substances *most probably*, and *certainly* union of imperfect substances, are included among entities which are transcendently one. But if so, Unity does not necessarily express Indivision; for such entities are, clearly enough, divisible in themselves. Thus, in a *red rose* there is the entity of the *rose* and the entity of *redness*; and these are physically separable from each other. Similarly, in a *man* there is *soul* and *body*, which are also really separable; and in *water* there are *oxygen* and *hydrogen*, which in like manner are distinct entities. But these three represent their respective classes.

The answer is as follows. First of all, as to substances informed by their accidents, it must be granted that the substances, distinct from their accidents, are complete entities; which is the reason why their inclusion under simple unity and simple being is less certain. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that Accident is not simple being, but, as St. Thomas describes it, *Being of Being*. It is of its nature to postulate inhesion in some Subject, and, consequently, its entity is not naturally separable from that Subject. As to water, the oxygen and hydrogen are only *potentially* there, not actually; and when these are again evolved by chemical decomposition, the one entity of water ceases to be, and the two entities of oxygen and hydrogen take its place. Water, therefore, *as water*, is *entitatively* undivided. Much the same may be said of all substantial transformations. As regards imperfect substances, they are not complete entities, but Beings *halved*, so to speak; as they are essentially constituted to form one complete substance, by a substantial union that gives due perfection to each. This holds good equally in the case of integral parts, or members, that go to the formation of an organized whole.

¹ 'In multitudine negatio est, secundum quod una res distinguitur ab alia per negationem. Unde in multitudine est negatio vel privatio realis, secundum quod una res non dicitur esse alia. Et hujusmodi distinctionem per negationem negat negatio importata in ratione unitatis. Unde dico, quod negatio ista in qua perficitur ratio unitatis, non est nisi negatio rationis tantum. Omnis enim respectus qui est entis ad negationem, vel ad non ens, non est nisi rationis. Unde relatio qua refertur ens ad non ens, non est nisi tantum in ratione. Et similiter privatio, qua de ente negatur non ens, est in ratione tantum, ut privatio privationis, vel negatio negationis.' *In 1 Sentt. d. xxiv, Q. 1, a. 3, ad 1^m.*

PROPOSITION XXXI.

Unity is prior in order of nature to Multiplicity.

A little consideration will suffice to show that this Proposition is self-evident; for components must, in order of nature, be prior to the composite;—parts must, in like manner, be prior to the whole. Composition presupposes components; otherwise, it would be a composition of Nothings, which would be no composition at all. But unities are components of the composite Multitude,—parts of Multitude, considered as a whole: hence it is that, as St. Thomas more than once remarks, ‘Unity or One enters into the *quasi* definition of Multitude; whereas, Multitude does not enter into the definition of Unity.’

PROPOSITION XXXII.

Division is prior, not in order of nature but in order of cognition, to Indivision, and, therefore, to Unity.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition, in which it is asserted that ‘*Division is not prior in order of nature to Indivision,*’ is equally self-evident; for, how can there be division, unless there is something to divide? And that something must be undivided, prior to its division.

II. But THE SECOND MEMBER, which declares that ‘*division is prior in order of cognition to Indivision and, therefore, to Unity,*’ requires much more careful examination, especially since it introduces us to the whole question touching the genetic order of these Transcendental concepts.

It will be well that the Angelic Doctor should lead the way. He says in one place, ‘According to the Philosopher’ (in the *tenth Book of his Metaphysics*), ‘Multitude is prior to Unity in *sensile perception*, as a whole is prior to its parts, and the Composite to the Simple,’ (i. e. in *sensile perception*, because all things material and sensible are composite and integral wholes); ‘but Unity is prior to Multitude in order of nature and of cognition. . . . Division is the cause of Multitude, and is conceptually prior to Multitude. Now, Unity has a privative signification in relation to Division, since it is undivided Entity; but not as regards Multitude. Hence, Division is prior in order of cognition to Unity, while Multitude is posterior. The following is the explanation:—For

that which first comes into the mind is, *Being*; and the next is, *the negation of Being*. Now, from these two results, in the third place, the concept of *Division* (for, from the fact that something is understood to be Being, and that it is apprehended not to be this Being; the concept ensues, that it is divided from this Being). Then there follows, in the fourth place, the concept of the nature of *Unity*; forasmuch, that is, as this Being is understood not to be divided in itself. Then, in the fifth place, follows the concept of *Multitude*; forasmuch, that is, as this Being is apprehended as divided from the other, and each of Them as in itself one. For, however much certain things may be apprehended as divided, Multitude will not be apprehended, unless each of the divided entities be apprehended as one.¹ He speaks much in the same way in another place. ‘Division,’ he remarks, ‘is prior to Unity; not simply, but according to the nature of our apprehension. For we apprehend things simple by means of things composite: hence, we define a point to be a *thing which has no part, or the beginning of a line*. But Multitude conceptually comes after Unity; because we do not conceive things divided to have the nature of multitude, save for the reason that we attribute unity to each of the things divided. Hence, Unity has a place in the definition of Multitude; but not Multitude in the definition of Unity. But Division occurs in the intellect from the mere negation of Being, so that Being is first conceived; secondly, that this Being is not that Being. Thus, in the second place, we apprehend Division; in the third, Unity; in the fourth place, Multitude².’

¹ ‘Secundum Philosophum (in x. Met.) multitudo est prior uno secundum sensum, sicut totum partibus et compositum simplici; sed unum est prius multitudine naturaliter et secundum rationem. . . . Divisio est causa multitudinis, et est prior secundum intellectum quam multitudo. Unum autem dicitur privative respectu divisionis, cum sit ens indivisum, non autem respectu multitudinis. Unde divisio est prior secundum rationem quam unum; sed multitudo posterior. Quod sic patet. Primum enim quod in intellectum cadit, est ens; secundum vero est negatio entis; ex his autem duobus sequitur tertio intellectus divisionis (ex hoc enim quod aliquid intelligitur ens, et intelligitur non esse hoc ens, sequitur in intellectu quod sit divisum ab eo). Quarto autem sequitur in intellectu ratio unius, prout scil. intelligitur hoc ens non esse in se divisum. Quinto autem sequitur intellectus multitudinis, prout scil. hoc ens intelligitur divisum ab alio, et utrumque ipsorum esse in se unum. Quantumcumque enim aliqua intelligentur divisa, non intelligetur multitudo, nisi quodlibet divisorum intelligatur esse unum.’ *De Potentia*, Q. ix, a. 7, ad 15^m.

² ‘Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius unitate, non simpliciter sed secundum rationem nostrae apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita; unde definimus punctum, *cujus pars non est, vel principium lineae*. Sed multitudo etiam

These declarations of St. Thomas give rise to a difficulty, which shall be examined presently. Meanwhile, let us elaborate his doctrine touching the genetic order of the Transcendentals at present under consideration. The concept which first comes into the mind, is that of Being. There is no room for doubt here; consequently, all the Doctors of the School are of accord. But now comes the puzzle. For Unity expresses Indivision, or the negation of division; consequently, the concept of Unity presupposes the concept of Division, viz. of that of which it is itself the negation. But it seems impossible, at first sight, to understand Division; unless there be divided things, i. e. more things than one. So then, according to the theory proposed, it would be impossible to intue the Unity, i. e. of God; unless there were some other Being besides Himself. Yet such a conclusion is hardly consonant with right reason; and, consequently, the theory must be rejected. The easiest answer to this difficulty will be found in a careful analysis of these primary concepts. If the mind conceives Being, it will hardly be disputed that it can consequently conceive not-Being, or the negation of Being, which will form a sort of ideal *outside* to Being. Contrasting this ideal *outside* with Being previously conceived, the mind perceives that Being is not Not-Being. It may make a difficult subject somewhat easier of comprehension, if it be represented under a symbolical form. Therefore, let it stand thus:—First *A*; then not-*A*. The mind consequently conceives that *A* is not Not-*A*. Therefore *A* is all *A*; or better, All *A* is *A*. Therefore *A* is undivided in itself. Thus the division between Being and its negation is sufficient for the genesis of the essential idea of Unity, without any intervention of plurality. But Unity also expresses, by consequence, that The *One* is distinct from all others. How is this evolved in intellectual consciousness? To pursue the question under a symbolical form:—*A* is not Not-*A*, which is the same as to say, that it is wholly *A*. Therefore *A* is not *x*, assuming *x* as the expression of indefinite *otherness* to *A*.

secundum rationem consequenter se habet ad unum; quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis, nisi per hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur in definitione multitudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non sit illud ens. Et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio unum; quarto multitudinem.' 1^o xi, 2, ad 4^m.

Posit *B*; that is, some definite being. *B* is evidently *x*, and, consequently, it is not *A*. Therefore, *A* is not *B*. And now to escape from the symbols,—it appears that the formal concept of Unity is generated by the division of Being from Not-Being. In the formal concept of Unity is *virtually* included the separation of that being, which is *one*, from all other conceivable being, supposing that such being should be. If such a being is, the virtual division becomes *ipso facto* actual. If that plurality of distinct beings really is, sufficient material for the concept of Multitude has been provided¹.

It now only remains to explain an apparent difficulty in the exposition of the Angelic Doctor, which, however, will cost little trouble, after the analysis just given. St. Thomas, then, asserts that the idea of Unity arises from a previous divisive judgment, that *This Being is not that other*; thereby, as it would seem, presupposing *Multitude* in the concept of Unity. But he is evidently considering *Unity* in its adequate, and not in its formal, signification; for at the same time he gives for a sufficient foundation of the concept, the division of Being from not-Being. Consequently, he seems to mean, that the idea of One is consequent on the judgment, that *Being is not otherness from Being*; for it is manifest, as may be seen above, that for the *actual* separation of one Being (not, observe, the *aptitudinal*) from another, it is necessary that there should be more Beings than one. There is, however, another solution which is perhaps preferable, because more satisfactory. The words of St. Thomas, *ex hoc enim quod aliquid intelligitur ens, et intelligitur non esse hoc ens, sequitur in intellectu quod sit divisum ab eo*, may be translated, *For from the fact that something is understood to be Being, and that this (whatever it may be) is understood not to be Being, it follows conceptually that the former is divided from the latter*. This rendering is more in accordance with the immediate context.

¹ 'Sic igitur patet quod pluralitatis vel divisionis ratio prima sive principium est ex affirmatione et negatione, ut talis ordo originis pluralitatis intelligatur; quod primo sint intelligenda ens et non ens, ex quibus ipsa prima divisa constituuntur, et per hoc sunt plura. Unde sicut primum ens, in quantum indivisum est, statim invenitur unum; ita post divisionem entis et non entis statim invenitur pluralitas primorum simplicium. . . . Quamvis autem divisio præcedat pluralitatem primorum, non tamen diversitas; quia divisio non requirit utrumque condvisorum esse, cum divisio sit per affirmationem et negationem; sed diversitas requirit utrumque esse ens, unde præsupponit pluralitatem. Unde nullo modo potest esse quod pluralitatis primorum causa sit diversitas, nisi diversitas pro divisione sumatur.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Boetii L. de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. I, c.*

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

Transcendental Unity is neither convertible nor identical with Quantitative Unity; though this latter in itself absolutely is a special determination of the former.

PROLEGOMENON.

Numeric Unity has received two meanings. By some it is identified with Quantitative Unity; by others, with Individual Unity. The question involved in this diversity of acceptation will offer itself for consideration, later on, under the Category of Quantity; and does not concern us now. The object at present is to show, that Transcendental Unity is neither convertible nor identical with Numeric Unity; whether this latter be understood to stand for Quantitative or, on the other hand, Individual Unity. The present Proposition undertakes to distinguish it from Quantitative; the succeeding, from Individual Unity. It would almost seem, so far as one can form a judgment on a matter so obscure, as though the prominence of Number in the Pythagorean Metaphysics were due to this identification of Transcendental with Quantitative Unity. St. Thomas accuses Avicenna more than once of this confusion of the two, and maintains against him the doctrine which it is the purpose of these two Theses to establish¹.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition, viz. that *Transcendental* is not convertible or identical with *Quantitative Unity*, is so self-evident as scarcely to require proof. For, if all Unity were Quantitative, one of two things must follow; either that there is no other Being but material Being, or that no Being which is immaterial is one.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER, which declares that Quantitative Unity in itself absolutely is a special determination of Transcendental Unity, needs declaration.

Quantity, (we presume now what will afterwards be discussed, viz. that Quantity has a distinct entity of its own, apart from the substance or Subject which it informs), may be considered under three aspects; first, as it is in itself; secondly, in its relation to the subject which it informs; thirdly, in its relation to the entire composite, that is, to the substance as informed by itself, out of which

¹ See 1st xi, 1, ad 1^m; in 1 *Sentt. d.* xxiv, Q. 1, a. 3, 0; *De Potent. Q.* ix, a. 7, 0; besides passages already quoted, where the opposite opinion is maintained.

union arises an integral whole. The present question concerns the Unity which it has, or bestows, under these several aspects. These points shall be separately discussed, in the order which has been already adopted.

a. The first point, then, is to determine the nature of the Unity which Quantity, in itself and absolutely considered, possesses. Some have maintained that it is of a character altogether distinct from Transcendental Unity; and that it adds something positive to Quantity, by virtue of which it becomes the principle of number. But this opinion is singular, and rests on no solid foundation. Let it suffice to say, with St. Thomas and most of the Doctors, that the Unity of Quantity itself is simply Transcendental Unity, determined to this particular Category; for, like real Being, Unity also is determined to the ten Categories. In other words, Quantitative Unity, thus considered, is Transcendental Unity in Quantity. Hence, Quantitative bears to Transcendental Unity the relation of the contained to the containing, of the determined to the undetermined. So then, Quantitative is Transcendental Unity, yet is not convertible with, but a special determination of, it; since Transcendental Unity is to be found in the other Categories, as well as in that of Quantity, and beyond all the Categories, besides. Such is the doctrine of St. Thomas, as it is given in the following passage: ‘Since Division is the cause of Multitude, and Indivision of Unity; one must form one’s judgment of the *One* and the *Many*, according to the nature of the division. Now, there is a certain division which entirely transcends the Category of Quantity; one, that is, which arises out of a sort of formal opposition that has nothing to do with quantity. Hence, the Multitude which follows upon this division, and the Unity which consists in privation of this division, must necessarily be of wider universality and extension than the Category of Quantity¹.’

b. The next point is, to determine the nature of that Unity which Quantity, as a form, confers on the Substance which it informs. A little consideration will suffice to show that the Unity, thus conferred

¹ ‘Cum divisio multitudinem causet, indivisio vero unitatem, oportet secundum rationem divisionis de uno et multo iudicium sumi. Est autem quaedam divisio quae omnino genus quantitatis excedit, quae scilicet est per aliquam oppositionem formalem, quae nullam quantitatem concernit. Unde oportet quod multitudo hanc divisionem consequens et unum quod hanc divisionem privat, sint majoris communitatis et ambitus quam genus quantitatis.’ *De Potentia*, Q. ix, a. 7, c. v. ff.

on Substance, is purely adventitious and extrinsic. For Substance of its own proper nature has its own Entity and its own Transcendental Unity, which is incapable of any alienation or change by accidental addition of whatever sort. Further confirmation is derived from the fact, that the same continuous Quantity may give an extrinsic and accidental Unity to two Substances, whose Entity and Transcendental Unity remain severally intact and mutually distinct. Thus, to adopt the example of Suarez, a stick may be cut from the hedge, and the said stick may be partly living, partly dead. In such case, there are two substantial forms and, consequently, two distinct Substances in different parts of the stick. Yet it is called *one* stick (i. e. it is *sensibly* one), because of the adventitious Unity which it has received from its information by one continuous Quantity. The Unity, then, which Quantity gives to Substance is entirely distinct from the entitative Unity of this latter. But it may be asked, What is the nature of this Unity which Quantity gives to its subject? Is it mere Indivision, or does it include something positive which has been added? The Unity which Quantity communicates is its own Transcendental Unity. So far is plain enough. Now, it has been shown that Transcendental Unity includes, in its formal concept, the Being of which Division is denied. Therefore, every determination of Transcendental Unity must include, in its formal concept, the *determined* Being which is undivided. Consequently, Quantity bestows its Unity on Substance by bestowing itself. Indeed, there is no other imaginable way in which it could do so. But what is that positive perfection which Quantity adds to material Substance? This is a question which will be discussed in its proper place. Suffice it now to say, that Quantity gives to material Substance its local extension and the localization of part outside part. From what has been said it will appear, that the Transcendental Unity of Quantity and the Transcendental Unity of Substance are essentially differentiated by their separate determination; so that the former cannot be imbibed into the latter by virtue of its communication, but, remaining Transcendental in Quantity, is extrinsic and accidental to Substance.

c. The third point is, What sort of Unity results to the whole Composite, as such, from the information of material Substance by Quantity? The answer has already been implicitly given, in a previous discussion a few pages back. In accordance with the more probable and more received opinion, it must be said, that such

Unity is Transcendental. For there is real physical conjunction and mutual completion between material Substance and its Quantity, which results in the constitution of a real new Entity that is undivided in itself. Nevertheless, this newly constituted Entity must be included under the category of Being by accident, and of Unity by accident; for the reason that the Quantity, even as component part of the quantified Substance, claims no place in the Essence of the composite, but remains an Accident supervening. Accident does not enter into the definition of Substance; although Substance, after a sort, enters into the definition of Accident.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It is objected against the second member of this Proposition that Quantitative Unity, absolutely regarded, is not the mere determination of Transcendental Unity to a certain Category, but is specifically distinct. For it is of the nature of Transcendental Unity to add nothing to the Entity of which it is the Attribute, save Indivision. But Quantitative Unity adds to Quantity something positive; by virtue of which it becomes the principle of Number, and is invested with the faculties of a measure. Unless this be admitted, there seems to be no sufficient reason why Number should be limited to the Category of Quantity; since Transcendental Unity in all the Categories would supply a sufficient basis for numeration. Then, as to measure, unless Quantitative Unity adds something positive to Quantity; there is no reason why that Unity should be a measure, rather than any other Unity.

ANSWER. There is no necessity for the introduction of anything Positive into Quantitative Unity, beyond that inclusion of the Entity itself which has been shown to enter into the common concept of Transcendental Unity; and for this reason. Almost the only difference discoverable between Transcendental and Numerical Unity is to be found in this, that the latter is limited to Quantitative Being, not the former. Hence the determination of Being to Quantified Being is sufficient reason of itself for the determination of Unity to Quantified or Numerical Unity. It must be observed, however, that this answer, equally with the objection, supposes the identification of Numerical with Quantified Unity. Then, as to its functions as a Measure, it must be remarked, first of

all, that Measure is not Unity, but a *consequent* of Unity. Then, (to answer the argument directly), the conclusion is just; but it has no relevance. For it is freely admitted that Transcendental Unity is just as much the Measure of Multitude, as Quantitative Unity is the Measure of Number. If an appeal be made to common usage, and it should be contended that *Measure* is limited to Quantified Being; it suffices to reply, that this arises from the practical necessities of life and the derivation of our ideas from sensible perfection; while, on the other hand, it is most true, in the highest of senses, that God is the Supreme Measure of all things.

II. Again: it has been objected that Transcendental Unity expresses Indivisibility. But it is of the nature of Quantity, and therefore of Quantitative Unity, that it should be capable of division. Therefore, Quantitative Unity cannot be a mere determination of Transcendental Unity.

ANSWER. The reply to this objection is given by a simple denial of the *Major*. It is quite untrue that Transcendental Unity consists in the indivisibility of Being. If this were so; no composite Being could be entitatively One. Moreover, it has been sufficiently shown that Unity is *actual indivision* of Being; and equally belongs to Being that is capable, as to Being that is incapable, of Division.

III. A third objection has been brought against the same member of the Proposition; and it is this. There must be something more added, by the informing Quantity, to a Substance than the mere actual division which is the Transcendental Unity of that Quantity. For, suppose some material Substance informed by a definite continuous Quantity. Then, let that Substance be divided. The Quantity remains the same as before; but, nevertheless, the Substance, still under the information of its Quantity, loses its Unity and becomes two Substances. Hence it is plain, that Quantity gives to Substance a Unity which is quite distinct from its own Transcendental Unity.

ANSWER. This argument is based upon a false assumption; and the false assumption is due to an amphibology. For 'the same Quantity' may express *identity of measure*, or *entitative identity*. In the instance adduced there may be identity of measure, but most certainly there is not identity of Being. But why? The answer to this question necessitates a careful analysis of the concepts

which more immediately enter into the question, What is meant by continuous Quantity? Continuous Quantity is that which is united within one common limit. Within that limit there is unbroken continuity; but the continuity stops at the limit. Now, if Transcendental Unity adds nothing to Being but actual Indivision; it is manifest that the Transcendental Unity of continuous Quantity will consist in undivided continuity within the one common limit. If that continuity be broken, Quantitative Unity is broken. Now, to apply this brief analysis to the example brought forward in the objection. If that Substance be divided, informed as it is by its own special Quantity, the continuity of its Quantity is broken. The quantity no longer remains continuous under one common limit, but is divided off under two limits. Thus the quantity loses its Transcendental Unity, and becomes *many*,—not quantity, but quantities which are to any distance separable from each other. Therefore, the *entitative* Unity of Quantity does not remain, and cannot, therefore, be the same. To take an illustration: There is a worm crawling before our feet. It is one Substance and one continuous Quantity, whose limit gives the animal its sensible configuration. Now cut it in two. There are two distinct living Substances; but there are also two distinct continuous Quantities under two limits, which give to the two animals respectively, their external form. So separate are they now, that one may remain in England, and the other find its way to China. Thus, after the operation, the previous Substance (i. e. the worm) has lost its Transcendental Unity, and has become two Entities and two Unities. The continuous Quantity which informed it has lost its Transcendental Unity, as well as Entity; and has become two Entities, two Unities. Consequently, the Unity which it conferred on the Substance of the worm has ceased, and is replaced by two Unities, extraneous and accidental to the substantial Essence of the two worms.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

Transcendental Unity is not limited to Individual Unity, but extends to all Unity which is discoverable in Real Being.

PROLEGOMENON.

In the preceding Proposition, *Numerical* Unity was considered according to its usual acceptation, viz. as Quantitative Unity; in

the present, it is taken in a wider sense, and is identified with *singular* or *individual* Unity as opposed to *generic* or *specific*. It is called singular or individual; because it is not communicable to many inferiors, as generic or specific Unity is. The term, *Numerical*, is applied to it; because it is, as it were, the measure of Multitude, or of Transcendental Number. It has been maintained, then, that Transcendental Unity is identical with Individual Unity; and it is against this opinion that the present Thesis is directed.

I. The proof is drawn from the nature of Transcendental Unity. For, as it has been repeatedly shown, Transcendental Unity is convertible with real Being. Hence, whatever kind of real Unity can be discovered in real Being, must find a place under Transcendental Unity. But there are other kinds of real Unity, discoverable in real Being, besides Individual Unity. Therefore, Transcendental Unity must not be limited to this latter.

That there are other forms of Unity, besides Individual, which are to be found in real Being, will be plainly seen after attentive consideration. For in the concept formed, for instance, of human nature, there is an intrinsic absence of division, and, therefore, a Unity which distinguishes and divides it off from all other natures of whatsoever kind. Nor is this notion so purely conceptual as to have no real objective concept corresponding with it. It is plain to common sense that the human mind, in forming the concept of *human nature*, represents something real and objective; although it is true that this objective reality is only to be found existing in singulars. So again, in the concept of *human nature* and other like Forms as relative Universals, i. e. as formally capable of being in many inferiors, though the logical element predominates; there is still, even here, an entitative reality, which distinguishes such concepts from Second Intentions, or *mere* creations of the intellect. The nature of the distinction between the conceptual and objectively real elements, discoverable in these two classes of concepts, will be considered in those Chapters of the present Book, which treat of these two kinds of Unity *ex professo*.

II. There is another confirmatory argument for the truth of this Proposition, which is derived from the nature of an adequate Attribute. For such an Attribute does not belong only to the inferiors that are contained under the common Subject of Attribution, but to the common Subject itself as well. Wherefore, Transcendental Unity is really predicable of Being itself, as well as of the inferior

determinations contained under Being. But Being, as such, is not individual. Therefore, Transcendental must not be limited to Individual Unity.

DIFFICULTY.

Since Transcendental Unity is a proper Attribute of real Being, it follows that it likewise must be *real*. In the light of the doctrine already established by the earlier Thesis of this Chapter, the above conclusion becomes yet more apparent. For it has been shown that Transcendental Unity essentially includes Being in its formal concept, and only adds negation or privation of division; so that *objectively* Unity is identified with real Being. But all real Being, whether existing or possible, is singular; therefore, the Unity which is objectively identical with Being, must be singular or individual. Besides, as a fact, in the whole world of real Being there is no real Unity discoverable, save Individual Unity. Even possible Entity is conceivable as proximately and immediately capable of existence, only as individuated. Therefore, it would seem as though Transcendental were convertible with Individual Unity.

ANSWER. It may be conceded, (for it is undoubtedly true), that there is no real Being, existing or immediately capable of existing, which is not singular or individual. And yet there are other *real* Unities existing in those individual Beings, besides their individual Unity. And such other Unities, though not *physically* distinct or separable from that individual Being, are yet *metaphysically* and really, though not *existentially*, distinct. Take an instance: Napoleon is an individual Being. If he is considered existentially, or in the concrete, during any portion of his life; he exhibits a composite of many things, which at that given time are an integral, inseparable, part of himself. He has his height, weight, knowledge, aims, colour, habits, which are physically one with himself. Contemplate him now at an earlier period of his life. His height, weight, knowledge, aims, colour, habits, etc. are altogether different; yet for the time being they also are an integral, inseparable, part of himself. Besides all these, there is something which remains the same all the way through; otherwise, there would be no objective reason for knowing, and asserting, that it is the same Napoleon in both cases. There is, therefore, a real Unity here, which is in some

way or other distinct from that concrete Individual Unity, designated in both instances, Napoleon. Yet such identity of Essence is at no time physically separable from that congeries of Accidents which, at any given time, really forms part of the individual entity, known by the name of Napoleon. So much will suffice, till the opportunity occurs for a more intimate investigation.

ARTICLE II.

Individual Unity.

There are three forms of Unity which are discoverable in real Being; to wit, Singular or Individual, Formal, Universal Unity. Of these the first is co-extensive with all Being, either as existing or as *immediately* capable of existence; the second is co-extensive with all finite Being, while the third is in no wise co-extensive even with finite Being. These will form respectively, in the order just given, the subject of this and the two succeeding Articles. The present inquiry, therefore, will be exclusively confined to Individual Unity.

Individual, is a simple determination of Transcendental, Unity. It, therefore, expresses in its formal concept indivision and, as a consequent of such indivision in itself, division from every other Being whatsoever. So far, nothing has been stated, which in any way distinguishes it from Transcendental Unity. But there must be an additional element, by virtue of which the latter is determined to Singular Unity. What is it?

Let it be remembered, that Transcendental Unity includes in its formal concept Being itself; for here will be discovered the first traces of the determination sought for. All real Being is either existing or capable of existence; yet it need not be considered as such, or, at all events, not in its proximate determination to existence. Now, individual Being either exists, or is *immediately* capable of existence. Just as it is, without any mediate change or modification of what sort soever, it could exist in nature. The notion is so simple in itself, that it is most clearly realized by illustration. *Man, humanity, human nature, rational animal, a body informed with a soul*,—these and the like are not immediately capable of existence. They must go through an intermediary state, so to speak, before they are producible outside their causes. No one has ever seen *human nature*, or *man* or *body informed by soul*, among the world of existing things. The mind cannot even conceive their immediate

creation. They must become *this man*, *this* rational animal, *this* body informed by *this* soul. In such case, they are immediately createable, even if they do not already exist. This, then, is a part of the determination which is included in the concept of Individual Unity. But there is something additional in the nature of the intrinsic indivision and the division from every other, which completes the determining Mode. For these Attributes, in the instance of individual Being, include an incapacity on the part of such Being to communicate itself, such as it is, to others; so that they should be precisely and identically that which it is. Thus, Julius Cæsar, as Julius Cæsar is so one, that he is incapable of becoming many Julius Cæsars who, as a class, are containable under him. Hence St. Thomas says, 'A Singular, for the very reason that it is a singular, is divided off from all others. Wherefore, every name that has been imposed to denote an individual, is both really and conceptually incommunicable; for a plurality of *this individual* cannot be conceived. Hence, no name which denotes an individual is communicable to more than that one properly speaking, but only in way of similitude; just as some one may be metaphorically called an Achilles, forasmuch as he has some one or other of the characteristics of Achilles, for instance, his bravery¹.' Though the Angelic Doctor, in accordance with the subject of which he is treating, directly deals with the nomenclature rather than the concept; yet he plainly includes both in the words just quoted, and notably confirms the explanation of individual Unity here given. Indeed, the usage in speech is itself an argument; for, as all are aware, words follow concepts of which they are the conventional expression; and concepts are representative of things.

This singular Unity of Being is commonly called by the School, *Hæcceity*,—the *thisness* of a thing. The name is sufficiently appropriate; since the addition of the demonstrative pronoun, from which the word is coined, invariably expresses the individuality of that nature, (whether in the concrete or abstract), to which it is prefixed. Thus, *this man*, is some man in particular; thus, again,

¹ 'Singulare, ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare est incommunicabile et re et ratione. Non enim potest in apprehensionem cadere pluralitas hujus individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, in quantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achilles, scil. fortitudinem.' 1^o xiii, 9, c.

this human nature, this body united to this soul, and so on. It is to be hoped, therefore, that it will not be deemed outlandish if, after the explanation given, the term is introduced into the English vocabulary.

There is one more preliminary observation which remains to be made. Individual, is opposed to Common or Universal, Unity in two ways, viz. *relatively* and *privatively*. It is relatively opposed, as a unit to its Species. But, besides this, it includes a privation of that communicability which essentially belongs to Universal Unity. For this latter is such as to be communicable to many as included under, or subject to, it. Thus, *man* is a some one thing which is communicable to many individuals included under that Species. Now, it is precisely this self-communicability to others as subject to it, of which Hæcceity expresses the privation. Being, under that form by which it is individually one, is not communicable to others.

According to the convenient division of the subject-matter adopted by Suarez, there are three points which claim examination. First, *Does this Unity belong to all existing things?* Secondly, *What is it precisely in itself?* Thirdly, *What is the foundation of this Unity in material and immaterial substances, and in accidents?* Wherefore,

I. DOES INDIVIDUAL UNITY BELONG TO ALL EXISTING THINGS? IN OTHER WORDS, ARE ALL THINGS EXISTING OR IMMEDIATELY CAPABLE OF EXISTENCE, INDIVIDUALLY ONE?

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Every being, either existing or immediately capable of existence, is individually one.

I. This Proposition is first of all proved by an appeal to the testimony of common sense, which no philosophy, worthy of the name, can afford either to ignore or to hold cheap. Nobody can close his eyes to the universal fact, which is now as it ever was before, that everything existing is one thing, undivided in itself, and divided off from everything else, even from such things as are specifically identical with it; so that it is not, in its actual individual nature, communicable to others. Thus, Coriolanus is one, and Tullus Aufidius is another; and neither of them is, or can be,

the other. Nor can there be many Coriolanuses, or more than one Tullus Aufidius. In like manner, the red which inheres in this particular damask-rose, is one in itself and is, *naturally* at least, incommunicable to any other rose or any other thing in the world. So, the position in which a man is sitting is incommunicable to any other man throughout all time. There may be many other men who may adopt a *similar* position, in the course of time; but that entitatively identical position is absolutely untransferrible. Furthermore: the mind fails in the attempt to conceive a thing as existing, which is not invested with this singularity of Being. The idea of a Universal, existing apart in and by itself, carries with it an inevitable sense of self-contradiction. Hence, the Philosopher in his Nicomachean Ethics introduces the Platonic ideas, *as he understood them*, merely to indulge in a quiet laugh at their expense; as though they were practically unworthy of serious consideration, because antagonistic to the common judgment of mankind.

II. The Thesis is further proved on philosophical principles. For whatever exists, or is immediately capable of existence, necessarily has a certain and determined Entity. But such certain and determined Entity must be undivided in itself, and divided off from every other determined Entity, by virtue of its own Transcendental Unity. Therefore, it is incommunicable, as such Entity, to any other; or, in other words, is individual. The reason for this conclusion is, that since it is undivided in itself, it is incommunicable. For, if it were communicable to another, it would be in itself and it would be also in another; so that its Entity would be divided in itself. Hence it follows, that it cannot conceivably be otherwise than incommunicable; because, if a real existing Entity be not individually one, it must be at once one and many by virtue of the same real Entity. This, however, is repugnant to reason.

III. The above argument is confirmed by the following dilemma. Existing Being must be either Individual or Universal. But it cannot be Universal. Therefore, it must be singular or individual. And why cannot it be universal? Because Universals cannot exist as distinct from individuals. The evolution of the argument in proof of this *Antecedent* will be more clearly and easily understood, if presented under a concrete form. Let *Plant*, therefore, be a Universal, and *this fuchsia* and *this particular chrysanthemum* be two singulars. If *Plant* existed as a Universal, it would either

exist also in the fuchsia and chrysanthemum, or it would exist entirely distinct and separate from both. In this latter hypothesis, it would *ipso facto* not be a Universal, but an individual entity incommunicable to any other. Besides, the fuchsia and chrysanthemum would not be plants; seeing that they would be entitatively distinguished from *Plant*. It is necessary, therefore, to take refuge in the other hypothesis, and to suppose that it exists also in the fuchsia and in the chrysanthemum; in which case *Plant* will either be really and entitatively the same in the fuchsia and chrysanthemum, or it will be entitatively distinct in each. Suppose the first member of the dilemma; then the fuchsia and chrysanthemum will not be two plants, but one. Take the second horn of the dilemma; the consequences are equally fatal. For then, *Plant* will either be an Entity distinct in each, or it will be the same Entity in each. In the former case, it ceases to be a Universal; in the latter it is divided in itself and is, consequently, no longer Being, but beings.

II. WHAT IS THIS INDIVIDUAL UNITY? WHAT DOES IT ADD TO THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL NATURE, AS ABSTRACTEDLY CONCEIVED BY THE HUMAN MIND?

There is one point in this question, upon which all are agreed. It is impossible to doubt, that Hæcceity adds to the essential or specific nature negation of communicability to any other, after the manner which has been already explained. Indeed, one may proceed further, and say that Hæcceity adds this negation or privation not only to the common nature, but to the singular entity itself, considered not as singular, but purely as positive Being. For this entire entity is not considered as singular or individually one; till it is conceived as incapable of communicating itself to any other, in the manner aforesaid. The whole difficulty is to be found in determining what *that special something* is, which is at the root of this negation; for all real negation is founded in some reality. *That something* cannot be discovered in the specific or common Nature; for this is of itself indifferent to Individuation and cannot, therefore, (so to say), individuate itself. The following Propositions are directed to the solution of this question.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

Hæcceity adds to the formal or specific and undetermined Nature some reality, by virtue of which such Nature is individuated, as exhibiting an incapacity of division into many of a character precisely similar to itself.

I. The first argument in proof of this Thesis is implicitly contained in the following observation of the Angelic Doctor. 'Where-ever,' he remarks, 'there is found, in a multitude of Entities, anything common' (to them all), 'it behoves us to search for some principle of distinction¹.' For, if there were nothing in these entities but what is common to them all; they would be *One*, not many. There must, therefore, be something in each, which is not common to all, by virtue of which each is distinguished from its neighbour; and that something must be real, otherwise, the distinction would not be real. To put this argument in another form: The primary difference between that which is conceived by the human mind as a common or specific nature, and that same nature contracted to the Individual, consists in this; that the former has not, while the latter has, an incapacity of division into many of the same identical nature with itself. Now, incapacity of such division belongs intrinsically and of necessity to individual Being, wholly apart from, and independent of, human concept. James is himself and nobody else, not merely because we think him so; rather, we think him such, because such he really and truly is. Therefore, this negation of communicability must be founded in something positive, as all negation must be; and this something positive must be real, because the privation which constitutes Individual Unity is real.

II. This argument is confirmed by a sort of *à posteriori* proof, derived from daily experience. Take William and Henry, as representative of two men (we will say) personally known to us. They both have one common nature, otherwise we should not call them *men*; and that common nature distinguishes them from every other Species. They have, each of them, a soul united to, and informing, an organized body. In this they agree. But, so far, there is no apparent reason why William should be distinguished

¹ 'In quibuscumque pluribus invenitur aliquid commune, oportet quaerere aliquid distinctivum.' 1^o xl, 2, c.

from Henry; nevertheless, we know full well that they are distinguished from each other, and that the distinction is not a creation of our own mind, but is something real and objective to us. Nay, what is more, we are able to discern certain points of difference, certain distinguishing characteristics, which mark off the one from the other; such as difference of height, build, feature, hair, disposition, habits, knowledge, virtue, and so on. Now, though these are the results, or the exhibition, of Hæcceity rather than Hæcceity itself; yet are they more than sufficient evidence that this individual difference is something real, which we might express by saying that William has *this* soul, Henry *that*, and that William has *this* particular body, Henry *that*. Consequently, the Hæcceity in each is real, and constitutes the individuality of each under that essential or specific nature of humanity in which they are both one.

III. A third argument is drawn from an axiom, universally admitted by all Philosophers, properly so called, of whatever School, which declares that of *singulars there is no science*; because Science deals with universals, and with universals only. But, if there were no real addition made by Hæcceity to the common or universal Nature, such a distinction would be superfluous; since *really*, (and in this way only, could either the one or the other be an object of Philosophy), the two would be identical.

IV. A similar argument is deducible from the nature of definitions. For all definitions, truly such, i.e. proper and essential definitions, are of common or specific Natures and not of individuals; which would imply, as in the preceding argument, that there is a real distinction between the two.

V. A fresh proof of the truth of the present Proposition is to be found in the distinction of properties belonging to men. For some there are, which belong to them *as* men, and are, therefore, common to them all. Such are, for instance, locomotion, sensile perception, speech, capability of laughter, and so forth. Others, again, there are which belong to some men and not to others, to one man and not to another. Thus, a talent for mimicry, an irascible temper, red hair, colour of the eyes, such or such stature and build, are evidently distinctive, not common; accidental, not essential. Hence, it has been justly observed, that the former class of properties belong to the individuals through the medium of their common Nature; whereas the latter class are predicable of the common or specific Nature, only through the medium of the In-

dividual. Thus, William has the gift of speech, because he is a man; but men are red-haired only because Henry, Martha, &c., are red-haired; and *a man* is running, because James is running. But, if there be this real distinction of properties, as evidently there is, and some are direct and immediate attributes of the common or specific Nature, while the others are direct, and immediate attributes of the Individual, or individuals, *as such*; it follows that there must be a real distinction between them and, consequently, that Hæcceity or individual Unity makes some real addition to the specific Nature.

VI. A further proof, (and this shall be the last), is to be found in the relation of Hæcceity to the specific Nature. *Man*—to put the argument in the concrete—is not essentially anything individual; if he were, his multiplication into many would be a sheer impossibility. On the contrary, he could not be conceived save as an individual; for we cannot form a true concept of a thing, which does not represent that which is of its essence. Yet there is no one who is not aware, that *man* is truly conceivable without any individual determination. If, then, man is not essentially individual; when he becomes individual, he must receive some addition which is outside the limits of his essence. Therefore, that addition must be something really distinct from *man*, considered simply as such. The consequence is sufficiently plain. For all will acknowledge that individual Being is something really existing in nature, and that we are supremely conscious of the fact ourselves. But this Hæcceity is not essential to the specific Nature; nay, it is not essential even to the Individual himself, considered merely as a positive Entity. Therefore, some real addition must be made to the specific essence; for, that there is that which is essential and that which is not essential in a Being, necessarily involves a real distinction, nay, as it would seem, a real distinction of the most pronounced kind.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

Hæcceity does not add anything really distinct from the specific Nature, considered actually as it is in the Individual, so as to form anything like real composition with that Nature.

PROLEGOMENON.

A clear understanding of the meaning of the Enunciation here given, is absolutely necessary to a due appreciation of the proofs

that will be offered ; and, perhaps, an example will explain it most easily. Take the case of some particular dog. In the preceding Proposition it has been shown, that its Hæcceity is a real addition to the specific nature of a dog. But, in the present, it is further asserted, that if that specific nature be considered as it is actually in *Carlo*, (to give the dog a name), there is no *real* distinction between it and the Hæcceity by which it is individually one. Nor should it reasonably afford matter for surprise, that two entities should in the abstract be really distinct from each other, and yet should lose all such real distinction in the concrete. For the instances are so numerous, that the student of Philosophy soon gets habituated to the fact. Thus, for instance, who will deny that vegetable, animal, and spiritual or intellectual, life are really distinct from each other ? *As a fact*, they are physically separate. For a plant has vegetable life, and no other. A brute has vegetable and animal life, but not spiritual. An angel has spiritual life, but neither vegetable nor animal. There can, therefore, be no doubt that, in themselves, they are really distinguished from one another. Yet, in the soul of man, according to the more received opinion, they are all three really one and, consequently, only admit of conceptual distinction. Subsequent discussions touching the nature of Distinctions will throw additional light on this subject.

I. The first argument in proof of the present Proposition is based on the inconsequences that would follow from any other hypothesis. For, if Hæcceity does add anything really distinct from the specific Nature existing in the Individual ; it follows, that there is a real distinction between the principle of individuation in the Individual and his actual specific Nature. The Hæcceity, for instance, of *John Smith* will be a distinct entity from his manhood. There will therefore be two distinct entities, to wit, the Hæcceity of John Smith and his human nature. But, if his human nature be a real entity, as distinct from his individuation ; it follows that this human nature will be one. But, if one ; then either of individual or of universal unity. The former it cannot be ; because, according to the hypothesis, it is denuded of its Hæcceity. The latter is impossible ; for (as has been shown already, and will appear more clearly hereafter), universals, as such, cannot really exist.

II. The preceding argument is further developed and confirmed in this wise. Anything like a real distinction between the in-

dividuation and actual nature of a given individual, is simply impossible. For, if there were a real distinction between these two; either they would be two distinct entities, or the Hæcceity would be a Mode of the specific Nature. But both suppositions are untenable. To begin with the former:—If they are two distinct entities in themselves, they must afterwards become *one* by composition. But real composition between two distinct entities presupposes, at least in order of nature, the constitution of each entity in its own individual Nature; because a thing must first be in itself, before it can be joined to, or united with, another. Therefore, the specific nature must be individual, before it receives its individuation. Besides, each entity would be, apart from the other, individually one; and the question would arise as to these two Hæcceities, and so on for ever. Take now the other supposition, viz. that the Hæcceity is a Mode of the specific Nature in the Individual. In this case again, the specific Nature must be individually one, to admit of its real composition with its Mode. In other words, either its individuation is essential to that Nature, and then it is not a Mode; or it is not essential and, in that case, it presupposes the specific Nature constituted in its own individuality.

This argument is further confirmed and illustrated by a practical example. Take two men, *William* and *Henry*. Now, the human nature in William, apart from its Hæcceity, is either distinct from the human nature in Henry, apart from its Hæcceity; or it is not. If it is not, then the human nature in both is identical; so that *body and soul*, apart from *thisness* of body and soul, are really one and the same in both. Such a hypothesis is palpably absurd. But, if there is a real distinction between the two natures, then each nature, independently of its Hæcceity, is already individually one; for the two, as being included under one and the same Species, can only differ numerically.

III. The third argument is based on the insufficiency of the presumed foundation for a real distinction between the Hæcceity of an individual Being and the specific Nature. The whole of such supposed distinction is due to the fact, that there are some things in which individuals are like each other, while there are some other things by which they are distinguished from one another; which gives occasion to the intellect of forming one concept that embraces the points of similarity, and another distinct

concept representative of the element, or elements, by which the individuals are mutually distinguished. But, that, in any given individual, there are some notes which are similar to those belonging to other individuals and other notes peculiar to itself, distinguishing it, consequently, from all other individuals of the same Species,—is no sufficient reason for establishing a real distinction between these two classes of notes themselves, as existing in the same individual. For that which proves too much, proves nothing. But, if this were sufficient ground for admitting a real distinction between the Hæcceity and the specific Nature in an individual; it would have equal force to introduce a real distinction between specific and individual Hæcceity. For it seems impossible to deny that there is a similarity between the Hæcceity of William and that of Henry, which does not exist between the Hæcceity of William and that of *ageranium* or of a stone. Whence it would follow, by parity of reason, that there is a real distinction between the specific and personal Hæcceity of William.

IV. The last argument in favour of the present Proposition is derived from the absolute inseparability of the two. For, in the case of an individual, the Individuation is inseparable *de potentia absoluta* from the specific Nature; and the specific Nature is inseparable *de potentia absoluta* from its Individuation. But, wherever there is this mutual inseparability *de potentia absoluta*; anything like a real distinction is clearly inadmissible. For to God all things are absolutely possible, which do not involve a contradiction in terms. But, if there be a real distinction, either greater or less, there is no contradiction involved in the separation of the two elements; and, therefore, such separation would be possible, at all events to God.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Hæcceity adds to the formal, or specific, and undetermined Nature, as considered in the Individual, something conceptually distinct from it, belonging to the same Category with it, and entering into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual, as an individuating Difference, which contracts the Species and constitutes the Singular.

THE FIRST PART, OR MEMBER, OF THIS PROPOSITION is a simple Corollary from the two preceding Theses. For, in the former, it

has been shown that Hæcceity adds something real to the specific and undetermined Nature; and, in the latter, it has been proved that Hæcceity does not add anything which is really distinct from that same specific Nature, as actually existing in the Individual. Yet, in the Individual alone it really is, or can be. Consequently, there is a distinction; yet not a real distinction, though a real foundation for the distinction. But this is what Metaphysicians call a conceptual distinction, or distinction of reason, founded in reality; of which elsewhere.

THE SECOND MEMBER, which declares that the *Hæcceity belongs to the same Category as the Specific Nature*, is likewise a mere Corollary from the doctrine already established. For, if there is no real distinction between the Hæcceity and the specific nature in the Individual; it will follow that the Hæcceity must be of the same kind as the Nature to which it belongs. Consequently, if the Nature be in the Category of Substance, the Hæcceity must be in the same Category of Substance; if in the species of spiritual Substance, so in like manner the Hæcceity; if the Nature be a Quantity, the Hæcceity will be Quantitative; if a Quality, Qualitative; and so on.

THE THIRD MEMBER, in which it is said that *Hæcceity enters into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual*, is thus declared.

There is no *physical* composition, as is plain, between the individualized Specific Nature and its Hæcceity or Individuation; first of all, because this would involve a real distinction between the two, which has been already disproved; then, in the next place, because Hæcceity is predicated of the Individual in a way which is incompatible with physical composition. For, if there were physical composition, Hæcceity would physically form a part of the Individual. Now, no physical part is predicable of its whole. No one, for instance, would dream of affirming that *Peter is his nose*, or *This geranium is its root*. But Hæcceity is predicated of the Individual, as expressive of its whole Essence. Therefore, it cannot be a physical part and, consequently, there is no *physical* composition. But neither is there *mere* logical composition, which denotes an unmotivated or foundationless union of concepts; because it has been shown that Hæcceity does add something real to the concept of the specific nature,—which reality is the foundation of a conceptual distinction. But to admit this, is to admit, in other words, a Metaphysical composition,—to say nothing of the fact, that there is no

other kind of composition left; while a composition of some sort there undoubtedly is.

THE FOURTH MEMBER, which asserts that Hæcceity enters into such composition *as an individuating difference*, is easily shown.

For Hæcceity, by itself, does not claim a direct place in any Category. If *This* is conceived, the question, *This what?* must be first answered, before the *This* can be classified. In like manner, *Material*, could not be reduced to its proper Category; till it has been settled whether the material Entity is a Substance or an Accident, and what sort of Accident. It follows thence, that Hæcceity enters into the Metaphysical composition of the Individual, as a sort of difference, after a manner similar to *Material* in Material Substance.

THE FIFTH MEMBER of the Thesis asserts, that this individuating Difference *contracts the Species and constitutes the Singular*.

This part of the Enunciation only stands in need of further declaration; for it is self-evident and, therefore, defies demonstration. In any given individual Being, then, there are, (as we have had occasion to remark before), certain notes similar to notes in other individuals of the same class; which together constitute the Essence or, speaking logically, the Species of that, and other like, individuals. The concept which embraces these notes and these notes only, is a common concept and, virtually at least, a universal; because it is predicable of each and all the individuals, possible as well as actual, included within its periphery. But there are also, as has been said, other notes in the same individual, which are, certainly collectively, proper to him, and not communicable to another. These are indicative of the Hæcceity of that individual; and, therefore, the concept of these contracts the Species by determining it to one individual of the class, and so constitutes the Singular. Thus,—*Who was a Corsican and Emperor of the French at the beginning of this century, dying an exile in St. Helena*,—added to *Rational Animal*, determines the species *man* to the individual Napoleon, and excludes every other.

DIFFICULTY.

It would seem to follow from the doctrine established in the preceding Theses and, more particularly, in the last, that there is an infinite Process in the objective concepts touching this subject-

matter, which, nevertheless, is universally rejected as inadmissible. The *Antecedent* is thus proved. The Individual is said to add to the specific Nature something conceptually distinct from it; because it agrees with other individuals in its specific Nature, and differs from them in its individuality. But then, precisely the same distinction is applicable to the Hæcceity itself. For it, too, has its notes of similarity with other Hæcceities, as well as its distinctive notes which add something conceptually distinct from the common Hæcceity. Wherefore, the question comes back again touching the foundation of this last addition; and so it goes on indefinitely.

ANSWER. The *Antecedent* is denied; although the proof, with the exception of the last clause, viz. *And so it goes on indefinitely*, is willingly granted. An explanation will be embodied in the two following observations:—

a. The human mind, when it conceives the Individual as composed of its specific Nature and its Hæcceity, conceives of this latter as a perfectly simple and irresolvable Difference, which constitutes the Singular; because it conceives of it simply as a Difference, not as included under some ulterior generalization. Similarly, when the mind conceives of *Rational*, as a specific Difference determining *Animal*, it does not represent that Difference to itself as composed of other Differences; but accepts it as immediately and simply distinguishing this species of animals from every other.

b. If it be further urged that, at least in mental analysis, this infinite Process must be admitted; the answer will still be in the negative. For, though it cannot but be admitted that there is this quasi-specific Hæcceity, possible as a term of thought and founded to a certain extent in reality, yet such a universal assumes the characteristics of a Transcendental; so that the individual Hæcceity is not a perfectly distinct concept, but rather the same concept, only more express and determined. Wherefore, as Substance does not add anything extraneous to Being, and does not determine it by anything adventitious to it, so that Substance should be resolvable into two distinct elements of which Being should be the material part; in like manner, individual Hæcceity, or the Hæcceity of *this* Being, adds nothing to the quasi-specific or undetermined Hæcceity which is adventitious to it, and is, consequently, irresolvable into prior and more simple elements.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

Hæcceity adds to the specific Nature, considered absolutely, something distinct from that Nature, not only in material Substances and Accidents, but likewise in all immaterial Entities that are created and finite.

I. The first argument, by which the truth of this Proposition is established, has more of an elenctic than of an absolute cogency; and may be thus stated. The only reason why it has been denied by some Philosophers, that Hæcceity adds to the specific nature of purely spiritual Beings something distinct from that nature is, that they consider *determined Matter* in material Substances to be the adequate principle of individuation. But this opinion is destitute of any solid foundation, as will be seen by the Theses which are immediately to follow, wherein the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor touching this point will be fully discussed. But, even supposing for the moment, (though by no means granting), that the aforesaid opinion is true; it would not follow that the present Proposition is untenable or false. For, if determined Matter be the adequate principle of individuation in material Substances, this does not hinder, but that there may be some other principle of individuation in Substances that are not material. Distinct Natures and Entities have distinct principles, accommodated to their own peculiar Being. Angelic composition is not the composition of material Beings; just as the substantial constitution of human beings is not that of irrational animals. Wherefore, it is not impossible that the principle of individuating difference in pure Spirits may be other than that which constitutes the Individual in material Substances.

II. The truth of this Thesis is confirmed by an argument, whose premisses are borrowed from Natural Theology. For God essentially includes in His Divine Nature His own positive Individuation and Self-incommunicability to inferiors, (after the manner in which a specific Nature is communicable to many included under it), simply by reason of His infinity. Whence the conclusion may be safely drawn, that it is not intrinsically impossible for any specific Nature to be in such manner communicable to inferiors. But, if so; that by which the specific Nature is determined to a given individual, or, in other words, the Hæcceity, must be something really distinct from the specific Nature. Nor can it be urged in reply that, albeit the created nature of purely spiritual Beings is not *absolutely* infinite;

nevertheless, it is infinite *after a sort* and *in a certain definite order*. For such infinity must be either extensive or intensive. Now, to assert the first of an Angelic nature, is simply to beg the question; while the second cannot be demonstratively shown and, even if it could, would not hinder the possible multiplication of individuals under that specific Nature. It cannot be demonstratively shown; on the contrary, the reverse is more consonant with reason. For the whole intensive perfection of an angel is contained within the limits of a definite Species, which is an effectual bar to its infinity. And, if it could be proved; there is nothing to hinder this intensive infinity from being participable by many.

III. A third confirmatory argument is derived from the nature of the human soul. For it is an immaterial and spiritual Substance, and yet its specific essence is determined to this individual by a real addition; consequently, its Hæcceity is something really distinct from the specific Nature, as such. To this it may be answered that, though the soul of man is a spiritual Substance; yet, that it is incomplete, and has a Transcendental relation to the body which it informs, by reason of which it is individuated. But such an evasion will not serve its turn. For it must be remembered that the human soul, *specifically* considered, has a relation to the human body, also *specifically* considered. It is only *this* soul which has a Transcendental relation to *this* individual body; consequently, the Hæcceity of the soul is, in order of nature, prior to the said Transcendental relation, which cannot, accordingly, be the adequate principle of such Hæcceity.

IV. A further argument may be drawn from the instance of spiritual *Accidents*. For it is beyond all controversy, that the successive thoughts or volitions of a pure Spirit are individual; so that Angelic thought becomes *this* or *that* thought in the concrete, by some real addition made to Angelic thought, specifically considered, —to say nothing of the individual difference between the thought of one Spirit and that of another; which might possibly be laid to the account of a distinction in the persons who think. Now, if, in the same Subject or Angel, thoughts are numerically or individually distinct and *really* distinct; it is obvious that, in the instance of these thoughts, there must be a real principle of individuation, by which one thought is really distinguished from another. But, if this is manifestly true of the *acts*; why not, in like manner, of the faculty that gives birth to such acts? Both are immaterial and

spiritual ; and both are *de facto* individuated. Therefore, if acts of thought and of volition are individually determined in the same Subject, by something real added to the specific Nature of both ; it is, to say the least, presumable, that the faculties of thought and will and, consequently, the specific Nature, should likewise be determined, in this individual Angel, by something real added to the said specific Nature.

V. The rejection of the present Proposition would involve an unreasonable limitation of the Divine Omnipotence. For, if the individual determination of each Angel should be identical with its specific Nature, so that no real addition should be made to the latter by such individuation ; it would follow that every Angelic Species or Order would in itself be *essentially* individual, so that it would involve a contradiction in terms to suppose that God could create more than one Angel of the same Species or Order.

Consequently, if, as Supernatural Theology teaches, a number of these Angels should have fallen from their first estate, and have become anomalies to the Universal Whole ; it would be impossible for God to repair His losses, and a vast number of Angelic Orders would be for ever lost to the heavenly Hierarchy. The Angelic Doctor, as will be presently seen, shrinks with something like horror from such a conclusion ; and explicitly affirms, that such a reparation is not outside the sphere of the Divine Omnipotence. But, if the specific Nature of a Spirit were, essentially and without addition, its own principle of individuation, nothing can be plainer than that God could not *de potentia absoluta* multiply individuals in a given Species ; for He cannot change the Essences of things, since this would be to change Himself.

III. WHAT IS THE FOUNDATION OF INDIVIDUAL UNITY IN MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES, AS WELL AS IN ACCIDENTS ?

It would seem becoming to warn the reader antecedently, that he is about to enter upon a more than usually abstruse and perplexed discussion, whose difficulties have been much increased by an answer to the above question, which is supposed to claim the authority of the Philosopher alike and of the Angelic Doctor. It does not appear, however, that the former has ever professedly treated this particular point in any of his writings ; consequently, all reference to his authority will be omitted. But the authority

of St. Thomas remains; than which nothing can be graver. Yet his teaching on this head appears, at first sight, to oppose itself to that resolution of the present question by Suarez, which will be developed and defended in these pages. That there is, however, no real contrariety between them, it will be one principal object of the succeeding Propositions to establish; and the reader will hardly blame the prolixity of the examination, when he finds that it introduces him to those primary ideas of Form and Matter, (afterwards to be examined at length in the Book on Causes), which constitute so prominent and distinctive a feature in the Philosophy of the School.

The present inquiry is not directed to the discovery of any *extrinsic* principle, or principles, of Individuation, such as its efficient or final cause; but of its *intrinsic* principle. Now, the intrinsic principle of Individuation may be understood in three different ways, *constitutively, genetically, sensibly*; and the question proposed will receive a different answer, accordingly as it is regarded under one or other of these three different aspects. The intrinsic principle, *constitutive* of Individuation, is that reality in a being which constitutes it individually one, and, accordingly, supposes that being to be, at least conceptually, really and actually complete in its own nature. The words, *at least conceptually*, have been added, because Hæcceity, like Existence, may be ideal; that is, we may conceive an individual, and we may conceive his existence, as, for instance, in the case of Antichrist. The *genetic* intrinsic principle, or root, of Individuation is that internal principle which gives birth to, or is the occasion of, Individuation in the course of generation, while the Being is in process of *becoming*. If these two significations of the question are to be compared with one another; the former may be said, after a sort, to treat the matter physically, the latter metaphysically. The *sensile* intrinsic principle of Individuation is that which offers itself to the human senses; and is, in consequence, the foundation of our sensile perception of the individual. It answers to the question, How do I *presently* (i. e. in virtue of corporal presence) know that William is an individual, distinct from everybody else? In the Theses that follow, the discussion will pursue these three paths, in the order in which they have been here given.

The investigation includes all Being, so far as the possible subject-matter is concerned. For all real, actual, Being is individual,

whether it be Substance or Accident. Yet One Being is excluded; not because He is not individual (for this He is supremely), but because with Him, and with Him alone, Essence is, in its own necessity, individual. God cannot but be individually One, by virtue of the infinity of His perfection. He is individually One, because He is. For, being what He is, He is essentially incommunicable in Himself to any other. The sole foundation of His Individuation is, that He is what He is, God the Infinite and the infinitely Perfect. The present discussion, therefore, includes only finite or created Being. Among these, Substance holds the foremost place; for Substance is absolute, Accident has a transcendental, entitative, relation to Substance. It is in consonance, therefore, with the natural order, that Substance should assume the foremost place in the present investigation. But finite Substance is of two kinds, immaterial and material. Of these, immaterial Substance is nobler in nature, and *absolutely* more intelligible, because more actual and nearer to the Prototype; but, in the case of the human mind, (forasmuch as it receives all its impressions from the senses, and conceives of nothing that is not primordially derived from the same Source), the order is reversed; for material Substance is more easily intelligible than spiritual. Following, therefore, the arrangement most consonant with human thought, the Propositions that follow will first of all treat of material, then of spiritual Substance; and, finally, of material and immaterial Accidents.

It will not be amiss to set the question once more clearly before us, as a sort of chart to direct us along our voyage of discovery. In created substances, the human intellect conceives a metaphysical composition of the specific Nature and the individual Difference. For, just as that which the Specific Difference according to metaphysical consideration adds to the Genus, is contractive or determinative of this latter and constitutive of the Species; so that which Hæcceity adds to Species numerically contracts and determines this latter, and constitutes the Individual. Now, metaphysical composition has always a real foundation in the object so conceived. The question therefore arises, What is the real foundation of that individuation of each material substance, which, together with the specific Nature, metaphysically composes and constitutes this individual substance? To put it in the concrete:—There is the dog *Fido*. It is plain that he has the specific Nature of a dog; by which he is distinguished from all other irrational animals, and

which secures for him the appellative of *dog*. But there is something more in him; for he is *this* dog in particular, as distinguished from every other dog, even of the same kind. Evidently enough, *that* something added is not anything really distinct from the dog Fido's nature; yet the intellect conceives something in that nature which is common to many, and something that is special to Fido—in other words, individual. What is more; those two concepts are true, and correspond with an objective reality. So we ask, What is there in that dog, which is the intrinsic principle constitutive of his individuality? Wherefore,

PROPOSITION XL.

Primordial Matter, considered simply in itself, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation.

The proof of this Proposition will cost little labour or space; since the enunciated truth is admitted generally by Doctors of the School, and becomes patent of itself, as soon as the nature of Primordial Matter, (or *Materia Prima*, as it is called), is explained, according to the teaching of the Peripatetic Philosophy. Primordial Matter, then, is declared to be a pure receptivity, a simple subjective faculty of receiving actuation, which is the ultimate residuum, so to speak, of all material things. As such, it is *one* in all things corporeal, undistinguished till its actuation. Its Act is its *Form*; and, by virtue of its Act or Form, it is defined and discriminated. Furthermore, it is indivisible in itself, and indivisible even as actuated by its substantial Form. The accidental Form of Quantity, supervening upon its full constitution as actual substance, gives to it its capacity of division or, in other words, its divisibility. From this brief description, which will serve for the present, it is plain, that Primordial Matter cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation. For nothing gives that which is not its own to give. But Primordial Matter is one, common, and undistinguished in all things; therefore, it cannot become a principle constitutive of distinction. It is, in itself, indivisible; therefore, it cannot serve as the foundation for dividing one from the other.

PROPOSITION XLI.

Matter, quantitatively determined, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation in material substances.

PROLEGOMENON.

Quantity is pronounced by the Philosophy of the School to be an Accident, informing material substance; and is either *Continuous* or *Discrete*. *Continuous Quantity*, with which alone we have to do at present, gives to its Subject extension, divisibility, position, and, by virtue of its limits, measure and shape. Every Accident, and therefore Quantity, presupposes its Subject; that is, in other words, the matter must have been previously, *in order of nature* at least, if not of time, actuated by its definite Form, and the substantial composite have been thus constituted. Then the accidental Forms, of which Quantity is first and foremost, supervene.

There is a question touching Continuous Quantity, which has been, and still is, much debated in the Schools; and it is necessary to the conclusiveness of the arguments which will be produced in proof of the present Proposition, that it should be referred to here. It has to do with the order, or manner, in which Quantity informs material Substance. Some Doctors maintain that it *immediately* informs the entire corporeal substance; while others affirm that, though (as all agree) it supervenes on the complete constitution of corporeal substance, nevertheless, it *immediately* informs the matter, and only *mediately* the Form and integral composite. This is obviously not the place for a discussion touching the respective merits of these two opinions. It suffices here to say that, whichever opinion is adopted, the impossibility that matter, quantitatively determined, should be the intrinsic constitutive principle of individuation, in the instance of material substances, remains the same.

First of all, therefore, to take each of these opinions by itself:—

I. If quantity immediately informs the whole Composite; Matter, quantitatively determined, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation. For,

a. According to that which has been stated in the *Prolegomenon*, the Subject of the Quantity must be fully constituted, before it can receive its supervening Accidental Form. But, according to this hypothesis, the Subject of the Quantity is the entire Composite.

Therefore, the entire Composite Substance must be already fully constituted, previous to its information by its determined Quantity. But, as all action is terminated to the Individual, not to the Common or Universal; it follows, that the composite Substance must have been constituted in its proper Hæcceity, before receiving its Quantitative Form. Therefore, Matter, as determined by Quantity, cannot be the constitutive principle of Individuation in the instance of material Substances.

b. From *this* matter as actuated by *this* form there results, prior to any information by Quantity or other Accident, this individual, material Substance, which is really one, and entitatively distinct from every other. If it were not so, *this* Quantity would essentially enter into the composition of *this* material Substance; consequently, it would not be an accidental Form, nor could it be posterior, even in order of nature, to the Substance itself. Hence it follows, that the Matter is individuated, the Form individuated, and the whole Composite Substance individuated, prior to the information of Quantity. But, if so; Matter, quantitatively determined, cannot possibly be the constitutive principle of Individuation. For it has been already proved, that Matter alone cannot be such, even germinally; and Quantity presupposes the Hæcceity of the Matter, the Hæcceity of the Form, and the Hæcceity of the entire composite.

II. If it be assumed that Quantity immediately informs Primordial Matter, and only mediately the form and entire Composite; it will still remain impossible that Matter, quantitatively informed, should be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation in material substances. For it so happens, that Matter, informed by determinate Quantity, is *de facto* subjected to different successive Forms and, therefore, remains the same in various distinct individuals. Thus, a *sapling* or a *branch* is now green, now withered and dead. In the former case it was informed by the vegetative Form which substantially actuated the living tree; in the latter case, that Form has receded into the potentiality of the Matter, and has been succeeded by another substantial Form. Yet, the determined Quantity, with its measure and shape, remains as before. The same thing occurs in the living and dead body of a man, and in a multitude of other cases.

III. Three further arguments there are that are of equal cogency, whichever of the two opinions be adopted.

i. Quantity is an Accident and, therefore, presupposes its Subject and the complete constitution of that Subject. Consequently, it cannot enter into the constitution of an individual Substance, nor into the constitution of the Individuality of that Substance. For, as has been shown, the Hæcceity is not really distinct from the Specific Nature, *as considered in the Individual*. Against this argument, however, may be urged an objection, derived from the doctrine, already stated, concerning the nature of Transcendental Unity. For it was there emphatically declared, that Unity formally consists of Indivision in Being; and that the division or distinction from every other being was not included in the formal concept of Unity, but followed as a consequence. Now, as Individual Unity is nothing but Transcendental Unity contracted or determined, the former, like the latter, will represent in its formal concept Indivision of the Individual; while its individual separation, or numerical distinction, from every other, only follows as a consequence. But if so, then, why may not the individual Unity of material Substance, formally considered, be rooted in the substantial Composite itself; and its distinction and division from every other follow, as a consequence, from the information by its definite quantity? Let it suffice for answer that, if such distinction and division from every other were the consequence of *any positive addition* to Being, the objection might hold good and the hypothesis be admitted. But it has been seen, on the contrary, that this negation of identity follows of itself, on the position simply of the other term; so that, provided there be some other, the indivision of Being in itself *ipso facto* divides it off from that other. The same must be said of individual Unity; and, consequently, its incommunicability to another is included in its own Indivision, and only requires the presence of the other term of distinction.

ii. Forasmuch as Quantity is an Accident; it is not its part to distinguish *entitatively* one Matter from another, or one part of the same Matter from another part. On the contrary, it presupposes its Subject entitatively constituted and, therefore, already individual; consequently, its partial information of the Subject presupposes the constitution of material parts in that subject. Thus, for instance, the definite Quantity which informs the body of a certain man and partially informs its separate organs and members presupposes not only the entitative constitution of the man, but likewise of his separate organs and members. Wherefore, Quantity

presupposes entitative and substantial distinction, which is the property of individual Unity; it cannot, accordingly, be the intrinsic constitutive principle of the latter. Quantity, indeed, gives *quantitative* and *local* or *situated* Unity and Distinction, but not *entitative*; and the former does not cause, but is caused by, the latter.

iii. If Matter quantitatively determined were the intrinsic constitutive principle of individual Unity; it would follow, that the same material Substance would be all but ceaselessly receiving new Individuation, and become a nucleus of individuals indefinitely numerous. For,—not to take the instances of stones or other inorganic substances changed in their quantity by attrition, compression, dilatation,—growing plants and animals are perpetually increasing in their quantity and changing in their figure. But, in this hypothesis, with every change there must be a corresponding change of Hæcceity; and thus, the plant or animal would be determined to as many fresh individuations as there were moments in its growth; to say nothing of similar quantitative changes which take place in its decline. The conclusion is manifestly repugnant to common sense.

PROPOSITION XLII.

Matter, as potentially determined to, and proximately disposed for, the reception of such or such definite Quantity, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation in material substances.

PROLEGOMENON I.

According to the hypothesis which is here combated, Primordial Matter, which is intended for the reception of a definite material Form, is predisposed by the action of the agent or efficient cause; so that the receptibility should accommodate itself, so to speak, to its after determination by such a definite Quantity. This facultative determination is effected, previously to the generation or production of the Substance, and gives that distinctive Hæcceity to the Matter, which separates it off from the rest of Primordial Matter.

PROLEGOMENON II.

By Quantity is here meant *physical* Quantity, i. e. *qualitatively* determined and disposed; not bare Mathematical Quantity, as it

may be called. A brief explanation must anticipate the doctrine which will be explained, more at length, in the Books on the Categories. According to the Philosophy of the School, then, Quantity is the sole Accident which *immediately* inheres in material substance. The rest inhere *immediately* in Quantity, *mediately*, i. e. through Quantity, in the Substance. Of these the principal is *Quality*, which includes colour, heat, cold, softness, hardness, sweetness, bitterness, smoothness, roughness, and such like. These, therefore, determine Quantity, as Quantity determines Substance. In both cases, as is plain, the determination is accidental. As Substance is antecedently receptive of any quantity; it is indefinitely quantifiable, and is purely potential in regard of Quantity, till it is actuated by this definite quantity which gives to it its quantificative Unity. So, in like manner, Quantity itself is purely potential in regard of softness or hardness, or of this degree of hardness, till it is actuated by a definite Quality. But, *physically* considered, Quantity no more exists without its Qualities, than material Substance exists without its Quantity.

PROLEGOMENON III.

This opinion obviously supposes, that Matter is not *actually* affected by the quantitative and qualitative accidents, antecedently to the introduction of the substantial Form; but only that it receives a disposition that way, by which this subjective receptivity is contracted in a certain direction.

THE PRESENT PROPOSITION IS PROVED by the three following arguments:—

I. According to the hypothesis in question, Primordial Matter looks *primarily* to its Form, and *consequently* to its Quantity, which it receives in virtue of its actuation by the substantial Form; because the Matter is not actually quantified, till after the constitution of the complete substantial composite. Therefore, its potentiality or receptivity is determined to *this* substantial Form, previous to its being determined to this Quantity. It is so far, therefore, itself individuated, by potential determination to its Form; the substantial Form or Act is plainly enough individuated, because the matter is predisposed for the reception of *this* Form and no other; consequently, the substantial composite of Matter and Form is individual, prior to its information by its Quantity. There-

fore, the Hæcceity of the Substance cannot depend on the supposed potential determination of the Matter; for such potential determination must follow the nature of the substantial Act.

II. Primordial Matter is equally indifferent of itself to one *accidental* Form as to another, and to any disposition one way or the other; precisely as it is indifferent to the reception of one particular *substantial* Form more than of another. If, therefore, its potentiality is to be disposed in some particular direction; that must be done by actuation of one kind or another, which necessarily supposes an entity superadded to it. Neither can it be urged against this evident conclusion, that, as the will is in *first* Act, as it is called, when it is moved towards some particular good, before it makes that free election which constitutes its *second* and consummate Act; so Matter in its *first* Act may be disposed towards that definite, qualified, Quantity which constitutes its *second* or complete Act. For, though this distinction of Acts is verified in an active and spontaneous potentiality which is the faculty of a living Substance; it is impossible to conceive it in a purely passive potentiality or, in other words, in a mere receptivity which is all to itself. Primordial Matter is, therefore, either indifferent to any and every Form; or it is determined by actuation of some sort. But, in the present hypothesis, in the instant of substantial generation before receiving its natural Form, it is undetermined by any accident or entity superadded to it; so that it remains, up to that moment, in its native indetermination. Consequently, it cannot be so determined, as to become the constitutive principle of Individuation in the substantial Composite.

III. Matter, in this hypothesis, is absolutely and primarily disposed and determined to the reception of this Form; and, by reason of this Form, to the determined accidents which the Form carries along with it, so to speak, in its train. Therefore, in the order of nature, the Form, which is the dominant principle of Hæcceity in material Substance, does not receive its Hæcceity from these accidents, nor by virtue of any relation that it bears to them; consequently, Matter, even if determined to the reception of such definite accidents, could afford no reasonable basis for the Hæcceity of material Substance.

NOTE.

There is a difficulty, suggested by these two latter arguments, which may possibly be an occasion of perplexity to the student. The last argument implies, that Primordial Matter can be determined to the reception of a particular Form, and thus awakened, as it were, from its universal indifference, antecedently, in order of nature at least, to its actuation by that Form. But, if this be so, according to the preceding argument it must be done by the actuation of some supervening entity, which must be accidental; because there is no room for anything substantial. But, again, the accidents are said to be posterior to the actuation of Matter by its substantial Form; therefore, they must be excluded as preparatives of the Matter. It will suffice for the present to say, by way of removing the difficulty, that the *disposition* of the Matter would not determine its Hæcceity; and that the same constituent may be metaphysically regarded, now as prior, now as posterior, according to its diversity of relation to the other constituents of the same whole. The particular explanation must be reserved for that part of the work, which will treat *ex professo* of the Material and Formal Causes.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

Matter, as informed by indeterminate Quantity, cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation in material substances.

This Proposition is so self-evident, that it only requires a brief declaration. That which is really the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation, must itself be real. But indeterminate Quantity is purely conceptual; for it is impossible that Quantity should really exist, save under definite shape and dimensions. We may *think* of a line indefinitely prolonged; but, *de facto*, there is no line which is not defined by its two extreme points. We may *think* of bulk, without precisising in the concept its boundaries and configuration; but such bulk is a pure abstraction of the intellect, and cannot exist, as such, in the world of nature. Yet, nothing is more obvious, than that a pure conceptual abstraction cannot be the constituent principle of Individuation.

PROPOSITION XLIV

The substantial Form, though the primary, is not the adequate intrinsic constitutive, principle of Individuation in material substances.

As the form of the Enunciation suggests, this Thesis consists of two parts. These will be considered separately.

I. That the substantial Form is the primary intrinsic principle of Individuation, is a truth commended to us by the authority as well of the Philosopher as of the Angelic Doctor. The former thus speaks : ' We assert, then, that Substance is one of the Categories of Being ; and that this substance is partly what is called Matter, which by itself is not this Individual ; and partly Form and specific Difference, by which a thing is at once denominated individual ; and, lastly, the Composite of both ¹.' The latter tells us that ' Every single thing, by virtue of that same constituent by which it has being, has individuation ² ;' while, in another place, he offers a *Minor* to the syllogism by adding that ' Matter receives Form, in order that, by the latter, it may be constituted in some kind of specific Being ³.' Therefore, it is the substantial Form which principally individuates the Composite, by individuating the Matter.

Furthermore, a sufficiently valid argument may be drawn from analogy. For in any given Species, the Genus, which metaphysically answers to the material part, is subordinate, indeterminate, potential ; while the specific Difference (or, speaking metaphysically, the formal part,) as the specific Act, determines and, as it were, individuates the Species. *À pari*, in the Individual Substance, the Matter is subordinate, potential, in itself indeterminate and indifferent ; while the individual Difference or substantial Form, as the individual Act, determines and individuates the material Substance.

This truth may be further confirmed by an illustration. Sup-

¹ Λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἓν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἕλην, ὃ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν ἥδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τι ἐκ τούτων. *De Anima*, ii, c. I, in init.

² 'Unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem.' *De Anima*, a. i, ad 2^m.

³ 'Materia enim recipit formam, ut secundum ipsam constituatur in esse alicujus speciei.' 1^a L. 2, ad 2^m.

pose additional Matter, in the way of food, to be received by any given animal. That Matter is assimilated and becomes part of that animal, i. e. it becomes included under its Hæcceity. On the other hand, suppose the body of that animal to be informed by another soul from what it had before; it would receive another individuation, distinct from that which it had before.

II. In THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition it is declared, that the *substantial Form is not the adequate intrinsic principle of Individuation in material Substances*. This is sufficiently plain; for the Matter enters intrinsically, essentially, into the composition of such substances. A man, for instance, is not only *this* soul, but he is likewise *this* flesh, *these* bones,—in a word, *this* body.

PROPOSITION XLV.

The existence of the material Substance cannot be the intrinsic principle of its individuation.

PROLEGOMENON.

It is supposed, in the hypothesis which is here combated, that Existence is something really distinct from the individual Essence. For, if by existence is understood *the actual entity* of each being, the statement that the existence of the individual is the intrinsic principle of its Individuation, though obscure and ambiguous in expression, is true in fact; as will be seen in the next Thesis.

I. The truth of this Proposition is proved by an appeal to an intellectual experience that is common to all men. For,—setting aside all question of existence,—Essence, remaining within the simple sphere of Essence, becomes individual; and, in this way, the specific Nature is determined or contracted. Thus, we truly conceive of Antichrist, for instance, as an individual; though he is not as yet existing. In like manner, Dramatists and Authors of works of fiction conceive individuals, who are as essentially *these* men or *these* women, as they are essentially human beings. To these illustrations and the argument which they supply, it may be urged, by way of objection, that in these and the like cases, as there is an *ideal* individuality, so there is also an *ideal* existence. This is true; not, however, because the concept of Existence is necessary to the concept of the Individual, but because it is necessary to the concept of the Individual *acting*, seeing that a thing must exist

before it can energize. But the above illustrations are intended to show, that the human intellect can truly conceive a specific Nature individuated, apart from its actual existence. And, considering the question in the abstract, is it not plain that, as the specific Difference *essentially* contracts the Genus by an intrinsic determination of the Nature; so, the Individual Difference essentially contracts the specific Nature, by an intrinsic determination to this individual? Take it in the concrete. Surely, as James and John are essentially *men* by an intrinsic determination of *Animality* to that determined Species; so, they are as essentially *this* man and *that* man, not by any adventitious addition, but by the intrinsic and necessary determination of their own actual Nature. Yet, in the theory here combated, Existence is considered as something really distinct from the actual Nature. If the idea of an efficient Cause is introduced, further confirmation will be afforded to the present argument. Take a sculptor. He must work according to the pattern idea (in metaphysical phrase, *the exemplar Cause*), which he has conceived in his mind. Is it possible to imagine him beginning to employ his scalpel on the marble, before that pattern idea has been individuated; that is, before he has conceived the height, proportion, features, pose, which he intends to give the figure? And that individuality remains conceptually in his model man, whether he ever brings his statue into existence or no: nay, it often happens that the individuality in the prototypal idea, owing to a want of skill, is quite different from the individuality of the executed work. In Art, then, the Individuation belongs to the Essence, so to speak, of the produced nature; why should it be otherwise in created Being? But the individuality is ideal in such case, and becomes actual by existence. Most true; but precisely the same may be said of the Essence. It is only on the hypothesis of Existence being something really distinct from the actual Essence of the Individual, that the present Proposition is required. If they are judged to be identical; then, the assertion that Existence is the intrinsic principle of Individuation would only be, as has been said before, a clumsy and somewhat inaccurate enunciation of the next Thesis.

II. Every individual Act, which is really distinct from that Potentiality of which it is the Act, presupposes the Potentiality to be individual. But, according to the hypothesis here considered, Existence is the Act of actual Essence, from which it is really

distinct. Therefore, it presupposes the Individuation of the actual Essence.

III. Lastly, a palmary argument is derived from the concept of Existence. For Existence itself may be considered in general, according to its specific nature, or, in particular, according to its individual determination. Thus, the old question returns,—How is Existence itself individuated? Evidently, not from the common specific Nature; for *that* is not individual, but common. Is it, then, by means of some supervening Accident or Mode? Such a supposition would be something too repugnant to common sense; to say nothing of its involving a perpetual process. Will it therefore be said, not unjustly, that it is individuated by itself? But if so, why should not the same be said *à fortiori* of Essence, which is prior to it in order of nature and of perfection; seeing that Existence is the actuation of this Essence? Whence it is easy to conclude, that *This* is rather derived from the Essence to the Existence; not *vice versa*.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

Every material Substance, whether complete or incomplete, is the intrinsic constitutive principle of its Individuation by its own actual and proper Entity.

This Proposition, though it needs declaration and, perhaps, confirmation, in its special application to particular kinds of Substance, does not seem, when accepted in its universal bearings, to stand in need of proof; for its truth has been already established by a process of exhaustion. Every other way of accounting for the Individuation of material Substance has been discussed and rejected. It only remains, therefore, either that the principle enunciated here is the true one, or that there is no discoverable principle at all. It may be permitted, accordingly, to descend at once to a consideration of the respective kinds of Substance, in order to establish the truth of this Proposition in each special case.

I. *To begin with elementary or Primordial Matter, which is incomplete Substance and, from its nature, is the first to claim attention:—it is one in itself, without need of extrinsic addition.*

It is well, however, to remark at the outset, that Primordial Matter is not here regarded in itself *absolutely* (for as such, by reason of its entitative imperfection, it hardly merits notice), but *relatively*,

i.e. in its place as an actual substantial component of the substantial composite. In other words, it is affirmed that the Matter in any given actual Substance is, by and of itself, one and individual.

This assertion is commended by the testimony of physical experience. For the Matter, which is under this Form of wood, is numerically distinct from the Matter which is under this Form of a sprat. So, again, it is generally acknowledged, that the Matter, which was under the Form of this chrysalis, is numerically the same as that which is now under the Form of this moth or this butterfly.

These examples, and innumerable others of a like nature, effectually show, that (*a*) Matter does not receive Individuation from its substantial Form; for the latter may be changed, as happens in all substantial transformations, while the Matter remains individually the same. Indeed, it must be so; otherwise, there would be no transformations whatever, but only transubstantiations, which nobody has yet been able to discover in mere natural operations. They show also that (*b*) Matter does not receive individuation from its Quantity. For, according to the one opinion which supposes Quantity to inform immediately the entire Composite, the same Matter is subject to a change of Quantity with its change of Form. Moreover, according to the same opinion, Matter receives its Form previously, in order of nature, to its being informed by Quantity; therefore, it has already become, by its Act, a complete individual Substance. And, indeed, whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which Quantity informs its Subject, it must ever remain true that individual Substance is Being absolutely in itself; whereas, if it should receive its individuation from Quantity, it would be Being by Accident. Again: Accident presupposes the constitution of its Subject and, therefore, its Individuation. Once more: The individual Difference is not really distinct from the actual nature which it constitutes; but it would be so, if Substance, even though incomplete, could receive its Hæcceity from Quantity. These same arguments, for the most part, apply with even greater cogency to any other Accidents, or accidental dispositions, of Matter. Consequently, Matter is individuated by its own Entity.

This conclusion is, however, confronted by what looks like a serious difficulty. For, it is universally admitted in the Schools,

that Primordial Matter is purely potential,—a mere Receptivity; consequently, it stands to reason that it should be individuated by its Act or Form. Such an objection would be forcible enough; if Primordial Matter were a pure *objective* Potentiality, similar to that of merely possible Being. But it is in fact a *subjective* Potentiality; and, consequently, has its own imperfect Entity and Existence and, therefore, its own Individuation, though always with a transcendental and necessary relation to its Act or Form. Who, save one who holds that material Substance is itself a mere congeries of sensible Accidents, could be found willing to maintain that, if the body of a living man were stripped of its Quantity and other Accidents, the substantial matter would have no Hæcceity, or Individuation, apart from that of the informing soul? And such a one, if he should chance to exist, will find no place for himself or his opinions in this work.

II. *The substantial Form is individually one by its own Entity.*

First of all, it is obvious that no Accidents can possibly be the intrinsic individuating principle of the substantial Form; for the latter belongs to the Category of Substance, whereas the former belong to other Categories. Then, again, the Substantial Form is either simply and entirely prior, in order of nature, to the Accidents, and is their determining cause; or, if it prerequisites some in the Matter which it informs, it is only as conditions or dispositions, necessary for the due preparation of the Matter as proximately receptive of itself. Neither can Matter be the intrinsic individuating principle of the substantial Form, because it is not an intrinsic principle of the Entity of the latter; for, as has been remarked before, that which is the principle of a thing's Entity is, likewise, the principle of its Individuation. Furthermore, it is known to physical science, that, as a fact, the same Form, preserving throughout its individuality, successively informs perfectly new and distinct Matter. It is said that gradually, by nutrition on the one hand and waste on the other, the human body is wholly changed, as regards its material elements, within a more or less definite term of years; yet, the Hæcceity of the informing soul remains one and the same. The same science supplies us with another confirmatory fact. For, in nutrition, there is a comparative indifference to the particular Matter which is to serve for food. It may be under the form of milk, or of bread, meat, water, vegetables of various kinds, and the like. Now, if the Form were individuated

by the Matter, one would have anticipated somewhat of preference in the selection, which would naturally extend itself not only to the different Species, but to different individuals under the same Species. It is a question debated by the Doctors of the School, whether these arguments can be applied with equal justice to those substantial Forms which absolutely depend for their Being on Matter, and are evolved from its potentiality. We may pass by the lower forms of animal life, such as that of worms, polypi, and others of a like nature; and limit our attention, for the sake of clearness, to those higher and more perfect animals that have distant obumbrations, or rather imitations, of intelligence and will. Now, it is maintained by many, (and the Author begs leave to include himself among the number), that the souls of these brutes are simple, unextended, indivisible Forms. If this opinion be the true one; it is generally admitted, that the aforesaid arguments apply with equal cogency to their case as to the case of man. But, according to another opinion which Suarez declares to be commonly entertained and possibly the more probable, (*ut communis et fortasse probabilior tenet opinio*), the substantial Forms of these animals are extended and divisible. Now, the relative merits of these two opinions need not occupy us here. The great point which affects the present question is this: Supposing the second opinion to be the true one, are the arguments just brought forward rendered inapplicable thereby to those animals? Suarez decides that they are thereby rendered inapplicable, for the reason that 'These Forms so inform this individual Matter, that they are entirely determined to the information of it, and cannot naturally inform any other Matter numerically distinct, since they cannot be separated from it either at once or by degrees¹.' But, with the greatest deference to this illustrious Doctor, his reasoning does not seem conclusive; and the conclusion involves difficulties of no ordinary gravity. It is plain, that the fact of these Forms depending for their Existence on Matter, may be eliminated from the discussion; because Suarez admits that the said arguments would hold good, if these bestial Forms were indivisible and, consequently, unextended. Now, extension and divisibility are the effects of Quantity; for Matter in itself is not formally extended or divisible. Therefore, the sole reason why these arguments would be invalid in the case of such Forms, is this: the Form is un-

¹ *Metaph. Disp. v. S., b, n. 9.*

alterably determined to the Matter which it first actuated : and is so determined, because, equally with the Matter, it is informed by a definite Quantity and definite dimensions. But, suppose that the definite Quantity and definite dimensions are preserved, What then ? Yet it is, to say the least, a common opinion, that the same Quantity which was in the corrupted, remains in the generated, Substance. In such case, even though the Form were extended and potentially divisible, it must remain actually one, for so long as the Quantity remains undivided. Why, then, could not Matter go and come, now in one part of the continuous, now in another ; while the Form preserves its unity of Individuation ? It may be objected, that the Matter lost divides and diminishes the extended Form. True, it divides the Form in this sense, that its extension is transferred from the desinent to the accruing Matter ; but there is no actual division. For the wasted Matter receives another Form ; and the partial Form that once was there, retires into the potentiality of the Matter ; but the residuary Form, in the remanent original Matter, extends itself over, and informs, the newly added. But this activity of the primitive Form does not postulate a change in its Hæcceity, any more than if it were unextended and indivisible. It is further urged that the form is *actually* divisible ; as can be seen in the case of worms. But the induction, in the first place, is not sure ; for it may be that the divided part, being proximately disposed, may evolve a new substantial Form. And if, in the instance of the Annelids and other lower forms of life, the possibility of division in the Form be admitted ; it does not follow that, in higher forms of life, similar division should be possible. Rather, the analogy of the natural order would incline to a contrary conclusion ; for there are probably grades in Forms, as there are grades in material organization. But this solution supposes the Form to be actually indivisible, which is contrary to the hypothesis of Suarez. Accordingly, another answer may be given. In the instance alluded to and in similar ones, there is a *division of the Quantity*, which entirely changes the conditions of the problem ; for, in the arguments whose validity is here maintained, the Quantity is supposed to remain virtually the same.

It has been further asserted, that the conclusion of Suarez involves difficulties of the gravest character. For, it is perfectly certain that the horse, the dog, the parrot, the elephant, and other like animals, are subject to the same laws of waste, and of restoration

by nutrition, as man. If, therefore, their substantial Form is so indissolubly wedded to its original Matter, that a change of the latter involves a change of the Form, and the loss of the former the loss of the latter; it would follow that the Individuation of these animals is in a perpetual flux, and that at every successive moment of the life of, we will say, the dog Carlo, one animal has disappeared, and another stepped into its place. Thus, animals would be generated without generation; and there is nothing to hinder the horse of yesterday from being the mare of to-morrow. Then, too, it is difficult to see how such animals, with their Forms extended and potentially divisible, should have that common or general sense which receives, and collates into one, the perceptions of the separate senses; or how they can have that estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), which is capable of sensible reflection and of forming a sort of sensible universal. Lastly, such a conclusion would oblige us to treat as a mere illusion, the idea of training or habituating animals, of trusting to their dispositions, or even of relying on their points and proportion; since there is no reason for expecting that these properties of the original would descend to the successors, but rather the reverse; since neither the Matter nor the Form are the same. These are some of the difficulties which arise out of the conclusion of Suarez. If some of them, or all, bear hard upon the opinion, that these bestial Forms are extended and divisible in themselves; so much the worse for the opinion in question.

III. *The intrinsic principle, constitutive of Individuation in substantial Modes, is their own Entity.*

Modes,—to repeat what has been already said,—differ from Accidents, in that *actual* inhesion, and not *aptitudinal* merely, is of their Essence. There is also another point of difference between the two; that Modes have a sort of Transcendental nature of their own, since they are to be found in the Category of Substance, as well as in the rest; whereas Accident is divided off from Substance. A substantial Mode is one which affects Substance *as* Substance. That there are such Modes and that they are real Entities, no one can doubt. Thus, for instance, the union of my soul to my body is a real, individual Entity, distinct from my body and distinct from my soul. If it were not so, the existence of the soul and the existence of the body, even though the two were separate, would of itself constitute their union; which is patently absurd. But, if it be real, one, individual; it must have its individual Difference by

which the union of *my* soul and *my* body is distinguished from that of *everybody* else's. But, if it have an individual Difference; it must have likewise an intrinsic constitutive principle of Hæcceity. That principle is affirmed to be its own Entity.

This assertion is, first of all, proved by those general principles which have been already evoked in the course of these discussions. For every Being is one by its own Entity; and, by virtue of its Unity, is individually distinct from all other. Besides, the individual Unity of simple or incomposite Being is, like its Entity, constituted by itself; by itself, therefore, it is distinguished from all other. It is proved, in the second place, by excluding every other possible principle of Individuation. It has been already virtually shown that substantial Modes cannot be individuated by any Accident; for substantial Modes, like the Matter and the Form, are in the Category of Substance, and, consequently, cannot be intrinsically constituted by anything that is outside of their own Category. But neither can they be individuated by this Matter and this Form, (to continue the illustration from the union of imperfect substances). For, although, from the nature of the case, *this* individual Mode cannot be in any other Form by reason of its real, entitative, identity with its own Form, and although it cannot be produced or preserved in any other than *this* Matter, because of its adequate termination to such Matter, (though even here some exception may be made, by reason of those material changes in living substances already alluded to); yet there are no sufficient grounds for concluding that, if the union between this soul and this body were dissolved, the same two could not be again united by another substantial Mode. Indeed, arguing from analogy, the supposition seems highly probable. For, in the instance of Accidental Modes, the distinction is verified. Take the case of a man sitting down on a chair in a certain position; and then suppose the same man some time afterwards to sit down in the same chair in identically the same position, which is surely neither impossible nor even improbable. It could not naturally be, that these two accidental Modes should be entitatively one and the same. So then, it is possible that two accidental Modes, numerically distinct, may be successively in the same Form relatively to the same Matter. Hence, it is reasonably concluded, that the Hæcceity of the Form and Matter cannot be the intrinsic principle constitutive of the Individuation of substantial Modes.

IV. Complete composite Substances are individuated by their own composite Entity, that is, by their individual Matter as united to their individual substantial Form. The truth of this last assertion is virtually included, as no one can fail to see, in the three preceding. It needs, therefore, no further proof; though it requires a little development. The Hæcceity of complete composite Substance includes within itself three partial Hæcceities, to wit, that of the Form, that of the Matter, and that of the substantial Mode, or the union of the two former. But these three do not equally enter into the composition of complete substantial Individuation, or rather into the Individuation of complete composite Substance. For the Individuation follows the Entity of a thing. But the Matter and Form are alone the essential principles constitutive of such a Composite; while the substantial Mode may be looked upon in the light of a necessary condition, or as the causality, of Matter and Form, rather than as a constituent principle. For the same reason, the Hæcceity of the Form holds a higher place than that of the Matter in the composite Hæcceity of the complete Substance. For the individual Matter is only, so to speak, inchoative, and *of itself* is not more inchoative of this than of any other Substance; whereas the individual Form perfects and determines the Substance, and is the chief principle of its Being.

THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS TOUCHING THIS QUESTION.

Hitherto, the present discussion has been limited to an inquiry into the intrinsic principle, *physically* constitutive of Individuation in material Substance. We have been looking at a material Substance, physically constituted outside its causes; we have resolved it into its essential elements; and we have determined what is the intrinsic *physical* principle of Hæcceity in each of the constituents, and then in the Composite itself as a whole. But is there no other way of looking at the question? May it not be possible to regard it metaphysically and, likewise, conceptually? And, if it be possible; is it not antecedently next to certain, that the answers to the question, regarded from this triple point of view, will not be identical? If the subject has to be treated metaphysically, all relation to Existence is excluded. The inquiry turns solely on the Essence of things. If, on the other hand, it is investigated conceptually, i. e. in its relation to the genesis of human concepts, the principle constitutive

of Individuality in material Substances will be that Entity or those Entities which generate the concept of the Individual, as Individual, in the human mind. St. Thomas has dealt with the question in both these ways last mentioned; Suarez has treated it, as has been already pointed out, only in the first way. One would be led to suppose, from their method of treatment, that the later philosophers of the School had imagined St. Thomas to be discussing the question from the same point of view as themselves. Hence, all the difficulties about determined Matter (*materia signata*), which have haunted them from first to last. Hence, more especially, their difficulty touching his doctrine concerning pure Intelligences, each of which he regards as a species in himself and, consequently, denies that in their case any multiplication of individuals under one and the same species is, *de potentia ordinata*, possible. Yet, it would appear, on closer inspection, that the respective teachings of the Angelic Doctor and of the Jesuit Philosopher are in complete harmony, (unless, perhaps, an exception is to be made as regards the last mentioned point); certainly, there is no small amount of intrinsic evidence that such is the case.

It is this conviction which has, in great measure, suggested the following Propositions; though it cannot be denied, that the desire of introducing the reader to a more intimate acquaintance with St. Thomas has contributed not a little to their appearance.

PROPOSITION XLVII.

In all material substances whose Forms are educed from the potentiality of Matter, the Matter is extrinsic genetic cause of the Hæcceity of the Form, and, as a consequence, indirectly of the whole Composite.

Matter is here considered, not in its primeval state of indifference to all Forms, but as proximately disposed for the reception of such a particular Form and, by such disposition, divided off from other Matter, and individuated according to its capacity for individuation; i. e. so far as a determined receptivity, which is only half a being, can be individuated prior to its Act. This Proposition applies to all living, material, substances save man; because, in all of them, with this solitary exception, the substantial Form is evolved by process of natural law from the potentiality of Matter, as soon as

the Matter is so ordered and disposed as to be proximately capable of substantial actuation.

The proof is not difficult. For that on which the substantial Form solely depends, in order of nature, for its existence and preservation, is extrinsic genetic cause of its Individuation. But the substantial Form solely depends in order of nature, (of course, all *efficient* Causation is excluded from our present consideration), on the Matter from which it is educed. Therefore, that Matter determines its Entity and, as a consequence, its Individuation.

PROPOSITION XLVIII.

If the question as to the Individuation of material Substance be considered metaphysically, it is true to say that fundamentally and remotely Matter as such, proximately Matter conceived as potentially disposed, is the extrinsic genetic principle by which the Form is individuated, and, consequently, the chief intrinsic genetic principle by which the entire substantial Composite is individuated.

PROLEGOMENON.

There are two ways in which the phrases, *material part* and *formal part*, or *Matter* and *Form*, may be metaphysically applied to Substances in every way complete. The words, *In every way*, have been advisedly inserted. For, according to the Philosophy of the School, after a Substance is complete and individual in all the essentials of its nature, so that it is, as a *Nature*, incommunicable to any other *Nature*, it requires, and according to the natural order receives, a substantial Mode by which it is rendered complete in *Substantiality*, that is, by which it is made its own master and absolutely incommunicable to any other Subsistent entity. This Mode is generically called *Subsistence*; and, in rational substances, has received the specific name of *Personality*. To illustrate this distinction by an example borrowed from supernatural Theology:—The human nature in Christ, according to Catholic teaching, is a complete and individual Substance; consequently, as a *Nature*, It is incapable of substantial multiplication. But Its *Personality* was miraculously arrested, and Itself united to the Divine *Personality* of the Word, which supplied in infinite excess the place of the missing Mode. Substance, then, on all sides complete, may be metaphysically considered in two ways. We may, first of all, consider

the Subsistence or *Supposit* (for so it is called) as a sort of material part, potential, indeterminate; assuming the Specific Nature for the formal part, actual, completing, and determining the Subsistence or Supposit. For, that something subsists, is very indeterminate; till we get to know what that Something precisely and essentially is. But, again, it is possible in the contemplation of Substance to consider Form and Matter metaphysically after another order. For the metaphysical Science deals with Essences; and in created Essences there is a material and a formal part, which respectively correspond to what logicians call the proximate Genus and Specific Difference. Thus, in *Man*, metaphysically considered, the material part, which is indeterminate, and potential because determinable, is *Animal*; the formal part, because metaphysically actuating, determining, completing, is *Rational*; which exactly corresponds with the physical division of Body and Soul, as united in the Composite, *Man*. Now, the Angelic Doctor sometimes considers the question of Individuation from the former point of view; sometimes, more or less, from the other. But this makes a considerable difference in the metaphysical estimate of Individuation, as will be at once seen. In entering upon the inquiry, then, touching the doctrine of St. Thomas as regards the individuation of material Substance, we will start with an instance of his treatment of the question under the former point of view, in order that we may clear the way for the consideration of his second method of treatment; since it is here we shall find the proof of the position maintained in the present Thesis.

Discussing the question whether God and Deity (or the Nature of God) are one and the same, he observes, 'In Entities which are composed of Matter and Form, there is a necessary distinction between the Nature or Essence and the Supposit; because the Essence or Nature comprehends within itself those elements only, which enter into the specific definition. Thus, Humanity comprehends in itself whatever enters into the definition of Man; and Humanity stands for that by which Man is man. But individual Matter, with all the Accidents which individuate it' (i. e. to human sense, as he explains himself elsewhere), 'does not enter into the specific definition. For *this* flesh and *these* bones, whiteness or blackness, or the like, do not enter into the definition of man. Wherefore, this flesh and these bones, and the Accidents that designate this individual Matter, are not contained in the idea of

Humanity ; but, nevertheless, they are included in *a* man. Hence, that which is *a* man, has in it a something which Humanity has not. For this reason, a man and Humanity are not altogether one and the same thing. Humanity represents the formal part of man ; because the elements which constitute the definition are, as it were, a Form, in relation to individuating Matter. But, in those beings which are not composed of Matter and Form, wherein the Individuation is not the result of individual Matter, i.e. of this Matter, but the Forms are individuated of themselves, the Forms are themselves subsisting Supposits ; consequently, in them there is no difference between Supposit and Nature¹. This passage stands in need of some little explanation. St. Thomas is here contrasting the specific or essential nature with the Subsistence, or Suppositality, which determinates that Nature in the concrete ; in other words (to adopt his own example), he is investigating the metaphysical distinction between Humanity and Man. It is worth notice, in passing, that Subsistence includes and presupposes Individuality. *Humanity* expresses the essential Nature ; *Man* expresses that human Nature, as existing in a person. Now, in the case of pure Forms, which are complete Substances, the Subsistence follows at once and independently of all union with something external to itself ; but, in the case of Forms which are imperfect Substances and are transcendently related to Matter, there is something real included in the Subsistence which is not included in the Specific Nature. What is that something ? Recur once more to the example of St. Thomas. *Humanity* is the essential Nature of man, and is expressed by the definition, *reasonable animality*, or, in the

¹ 'In rebus compositis ex materia et forma necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum ; quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei. Sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis. His enim homo est homo ; et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scil. quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis cum accidentibus omnibus individuans ipsam non cadit in definitione speciei. Non enim cadunt in definitionem hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliqua hujusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam non concluduntur in humanitate ; et tamen in eo quod est homo includuntur. Unde id quod est homo habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas ; sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis ; quia principia definiuntia habent se formaliter respectu materiae individuantis. In his vero quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuatio non est per materiam individualementem, id est, per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura.' 1^{ae} iii, 3, c.

concrete, *A reasonable soul informing a body.* But an individual, subsisting man is expressed by the quasi-definition, *This reasonable soul informing this reasonable body, and absolutely incommunicable, as such, to any other.* This last clause the Angelic Doctor neglects as irrelevant to his purpose, since here both classes of Forms are agreed; and he limits himself to the Hæcceity which is introduced into the definition of the Supposit. He contends, then, that in the second class, (viz., of imperfect Forms), the Hæcceity and, consequently, the Supposit, are determined by the Matter, as itself determining the Form. And this is the reason why he does not allude (in his example) to the Hæcceity of the soul; though elsewhere in a parallel passage he introduces it. These are his words: 'Since it is of the definition of the Species, Man, that he should be composed of soul and body, the (individual) determination of the body and soul is outside of the definition of the Species; and, accordingly, it is accidental to man, *as man*, that he should be constituted with *this* soul and *this* body. But it essentially belongs to *this* man, whose definition, if definition were possible, would express his constitution with *this* soul and *this* body; just as it is of the definition of man in general, that he should be constituted of soul and body¹.' There is one difficulty which remains to be solved touching the former passage. St. Thomas therein contrasts *Humanity* with *Man*, and declares that, in the objective concept of this latter, are included 'this flesh and these bones and the accidents that designate this individual matter.' But it would seem as though he ought rather to have said, *this man*; because these constituents or notes of individuation do not belong to man in general, but to an individual man. And yet it will be found, on further reflection, that St. Thomas is right. For *man* is the concrete of *Humanity*; that is, he is the specific nature considered as subsisting. But Subsistence necessarily includes Individuality and Incommunicability. If so, then *Man* is equivalent to *this man*; and it can never in any sense become a Universal. Yet common sense and experience combine to assure us that *Man* means *all* men, not

¹ 'Cum enim de ratione speciei humanæ sit, quod componatur ex anima et corpore; determinatio corporis et animæ est præter rationem speciei; et accidit homini in quantum est homo, quod sit ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore. Sed convenit per se huic homini, de cujus ratione esset, si definiretur, quod esset ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore; sicut de ratione hominis communis est, quod sit ex anima et corpore.' *Quol. ii, a. 4, ad 1^m.*

any man in particular. This is undeniable. But it must be remembered that Hæcceity itself may be universalized; and, in fact, it has been so used in the preceding member of the sentence. So likewise can This flesh, These bones, This whiteness; for each man and all men have this flesh and these bones, and a vast number of men have this whiteness; though it may be worth remarking that in the judgment, '*All men have this flesh and these bones,*' the demonstrative pronoun is denotative of Species, and is equivalent to saying, *All men have individuality of flesh and bones*; whereas in the judgment, *James has this flesh and these bones*, the pronoun has a reduplicatively individual meaning. It follows from these two senses of the pronoun, that the judgment first adduced, '*Man has this flesh and these bones,*' may be either true or false, according to the way in which the pronoun is understood. *That man has individuality of body*, is true; *that all men have the same individual body*, is false. Accordingly, the Angelic Doctor adopts the statement in the first passage from *the Summa*, and rejects it in the second from *Quodlibet*.

The Proposition before us consists of two parts or members, which shall be proved separately.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER it is asserted, that *fundamentally and remotely Matter, as such, may be said to be the extrinsic genetic principle by which the Form is individuated, and, consequently, the chief intrinsic principle by which the whole substantial Composite is individuated*. It is said, *Matter as such*, to exclude any conceived dispositions or determinations of Matter, whether actual or virtual, from without. It is said, *fundamentally and remotely*, because Primordial Matter of itself is undetermined and indifferent, (as has been said), to any particular Form. Matter is declared to be the *extrinsic* principle to the Form, because it is no part of the latter's Essence; *intrinsic*, relatively to the 'composite Substance, because it is an essential constituent of the latter. *This first member is subdivided into two parts*; the one referring to the substantial Form, the other to the entire Composite.

i. Metaphysically speaking, it may be truly said that Matter, as such, is fundamentally and remotely the extrinsic principle by which the substantial Form is individuated. For Individuality formally consists, as has been seen, in a negation of communicability to others, according to that respect in which it is one and undivided in itself. So long, therefore, as an Entity is in such

manner communicable, it is not individual; and that which takes away from a given Entity its communicability, is the principle of its Individuation. Now, imperfect or material Forms are in themselves essentially communicable; because it is in their nature to inform something else, which thereupon becomes the Subject of their information. Therefore they cannot but be communicable as Forms, by virtue of their Quiddity; consequently, in metaphysical consideration, they *of themselves* cannot be individual, but common. They are antecedently as ready to inform one lump of Matter as another, supposing the conditions and dispositions the same. But no sooner is any one of them united to the particular Matter which it actuates, than at once it is rendered incommunicable; because no material Form, as such, can actuate more than one material Entity. Therefore, it is by the Matter that it is fundamentally and remotely rendered incommunicable, and thus receives its individuation.

Otherwise; metaphysically speaking, that must fundamentally and remotely be the principle of Individuation for imperfect or incomplete Forms, which is the first Subject. For the first Subject is the *substratum*, so to say, of everything else. It is itself incommunicable; otherwise, it would not be the first Subject. Therefore, with it all communicability must stop. To illustrate what is meant by an example:—The quality which causes the sensation of *Redness* in the soul inheres in Quantity, and may be said to receive from Quantity its *proximate* determination; for colour is only perceptible in extension. But Quantity is not the *fundamental* principle in the determination of Redness; because itself is communicable, and is determined by the Subject which it informs. And so the analysis proceeds, till the mind arrives at that first Subject which is communicable to nothing else. But this is Primordial Matter, as such. Therefore, it will be the remote and fundamental principle of Individuation.

Such substantially are the arguments of St. Thomas. ‘It is in the nature of an Individual,’ he remarks, ‘that it cannot be in a plurality of Subjects. And this happens in two ways; first, because it is not of the nature of the Individual to be in any Subject. Thus separate, immaterial Forms, subsisting of themselves, are likewise *of themselves* individual. The other way is, because a substantial or accidental Form is naturally in some one Subject, but not in more than one; as *this* whiteness which is in *this* body. . . . Matter,

therefore, is the principle of Individuation for all inhering Forms. For, since Forms of this kind have for their part a natural disposition to be in some Entity, as in a Subject; from the fact that any one of them is received in Matter which inheres in nothing else, the Form itself, so existing, cannot be in anything else¹. So, again, elsewhere at greater length: 'In the case of Forms which have been received in Matter, it is found that there is one Species in many Suppositis. But this is not a consequence of Matter, conceived anyhow; for Matter, as actually existing in material things, partakes of the nature of the different Species; but it arises from the reception of the Form in Matter, considered in its character of first Subject. For, since First Substance, known by the name of Individual, is the Subject or the partial Subject of any given Species; that which claims the character of first Subject is cause of the Individuation and division of the Species in Suppositis or individual Subsistences. Now, the first Subject is that one which can be received in no other. Therefore it is, that separate Forms, precisely because they can be received in no other, possess the nature of a first Subject and are, consequently, individuated of themselves. And, since there is in them only Form; Form is in them, after the manner of a Form. Wherefore, since in them Supposit and Form are one and the same thing, and they are individuated of themselves by reason of their possessing the nature of a first Subject; when the individual subsistences are multiplied, the Form in them is multiplied absolutely in its character of Form, and not by anything else; because separate Forms are not received in anything else. All such multiplication, however, multiplies the Species; and, consequently, in their case, there are as many Species as there are individuals. But, in other Forms, where the multiplication of the Form arises from its reception in something else which stands in the relation to it of first Subject, and not according

¹ 'Est enim de ratione individui, quod non possit in pluribus esse: quod quidem contingit dupliciter; Uno modo, quia non est natum esse in aliquo. Et hoc modo formae immateriales separatae per se subsistentes, sunt etiam per seipsas individuae. Alio modo ex eo quod forma substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus; sicut haec albedo quae est in hoc corpore. Quantum igitur ad primum' (this refers to an earlier division in his answer) 'materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus. Quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subjecto; ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia quae non est in alio, ideo nec forma ipsa sic existens potest in alio esse.' 3^{ae} lxxvii, 2, c.

to its character of Form, the same Species takes up its abode in different Suppositis. Now, that which receives (the Form) is Matter, not understood anyhow, or in its generic signification, as has been said, (since in this way, it is considered as a Species belonging to natural Philosophy), but as bearing the nature of First Subject; whereas its *determination* consists in its existing under fixed dimensions, which cause it to be demonstrable to sense in space and time. For this division of the Form, then, no indeterminate dimension in the Matter is required. For Matter is the principle of Individuation in its character of first Subject, (as we have said), and in this way only. For, so long as anything remains which is capable of further reception, that Ultimate is not reached which, in its nature, is received in nothing. Now, if there were undetermined dimensions, these would naturally be in Matter as in their Subject. But Matter, together with its three dimensions, is not the first Subject; but Matter, of itself, and in its own nature. And, considered in this light, it has nothing of the nature of a Species; which it assumes according to the way in which the intellect conceives it, whose it is to perceive the determination, or essential constituents, of a Species. When, then, a Form is received in Matter, with all its dimensions intellectually circumscribed; it becomes an Entity existing in the Category of Substance, and an Ultimate having the complete nature of an Individual in Substance¹. These concluding observations of the

¹ 'In formis in materia receptis, una species reperitur in multis suppositis. Sed hoc non est a natura materiae qualitercumque acceptae, cum materia sit de natura specierum in rebus materialibus. Sed hoc est, per receptionem formae in materia, secundum quod est subjectum primum. Cum enim subjectum in aliqua specie, seu aliqua pars subjectiva, sit prima substantia quae individuum dicitur, illud quod tenet rationem primi subjecti est causa individuationis et divisionis speciei in suppositis. Primum autem subjectum est quod in alio recipi non potest. Et ideo formae separatae, eo ipso quod in alio recipi non possunt, habent rationem primi subjecti. Et ideo seipsis individuantur. Et cum in ipsis non sit nisi forma, est in eis forma secundum rationem formae. Et ideo cum in eis sit idem suppositum et forma, ex quo se ipsis individuantur, in quantum habent rationem primi subjecti, ad multiplicationem suppositorum, multiplicatur in eis forma secundum rationem formae secundum se, et non per aliud, quia non recipiuntur in alio. Omnis autem talis multiplicatio multiplicat speciem; et ideo in eis tot sunt species, quot sunt individua. In aliis vero formis ubi est multitudo formae per receptionem in alio quod habet rationem primi subjecti et non secundum rationem formae, manet eadem species in diversis suppositis. Hoc autem recipiens est materia, non qualitercumque accepta, ut dictum est, cum ipsa sit de intellectu philosophicae speciei; sed secundum quod habet rationem primi subjecti. Et signatio ejus est esse sub certis dimensionibus, quae faciunt esse hic et nunc ad

Angelic Doctor are not easy of comprehension; and it will not be amiss, therefore, to offer a short explanation of them, which will serve by way of introduction to the second Member of the Proposition before us. There are three ways in which Matter may be regarded. There is, first of all, simple Primordial Matter, which, though it cannot naturally exist save in Act, i. e. under some Form, has a distinct Entity of its own, is indivisible, indestructible, and wholly indifferent to the reception of any *particular* Form. Then there is Matter, actuated by its Form, which constitutes, with it, one individual subsisting Substance. Now, both these ways of regarding Matter are eminently real; because they represent it, either as it really is in itself, or as it really exists in the order of Nature. But there is a third way of regarding it, which, formally considered, is purely conceptual, and will be more easily understood by recurring to the representation of Matter, as it really exists, (actuated by its Form), in the realm of visible things. There it is always found to be circumscribed by a definite quantity, whose limits give to it its shape. That quantity, furthermore, is itself determined by certain qualitative Forms, such as colour, warmth, hardness, and the like. But Quantity is the primary distinguishing accidental Form of Matter; because it gives to it capability of division, and so, of mutual distinction, that is, distinction of one portion of Matter from another. Now, the intellect can abstract from the determinations of Quantity by qualities, as it actually does in Geometry; and it can also abstract from the dimensions of the Quantity itself, so as to leave them indeterminate. This also is of frequent occurrence in the Geometrical science; where a circle, for instance, is conceived whose radius is as yet undetermined, or where a line is conceived as indefinitely prolonged.

sensum demonstrabile. Ad hanc ergo divisionem formae non requiritur in materia dimensio aliqua interminata. Materia enim est principium individuationis ut est primum subjectum, ut dictum est, et solum sic; quamdiu enim manet aliquid ulterius receptibile, non invenitur ultimum quod in nullo natum est recipi. Si autem sint dimensiones interminatae, necessario erunt in materia ut in subjecto. Materia autem cum tribus dimensionibus non est primum subjectum, sed secundum se et in natura sua; per quem modum non pertinet ad naturam speciei, sed prout est in acceptione intellectus, cujus est determinationem seu intentionem speciei percipere. Cum ergo forma recipitur in materia, circumscriptis omnibus per intellectum dimensionibus, fit aliquid existens in genere substantiae et ultimum, completam habens rationem individui in substantia.' *Opusc. XXXII (aliter XXVIII), De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis, c. 3, v. m. Cf. Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De principio Individuationis, p. m.*

In like manner, the intellect can act with regard to material substances. It can, first of all, abstract the body from its animating principle, and then it can abstract from the organized body itself its definite dimensions, and consider it merely as a body of *such a kind* of figure and dimension; and, so abstracting and generalizing, can divide matter into distinct Species, of such kind as are to be found in books of Botany and Zoology. Thus, Matter may be conceived as *specifically* determined to the form and organization of a human body, for instance; without determining whether it be that of a child, a youth, or man, much less of *this* child or man individually. In such way, Matter is conceived as disposed and distinguished by *indeterminate* dimensions—a formally logical concept; since no such Entity exists, or can exist, in Nature.

ii. From what has gone before, it is obvious that MATTER, AS SUCH, is *fundamentally and remotely* THE CHIEF INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE BY WHICH THE ENTIRE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE IS INDIVIDUATED, IF THE QUESTION IS METAPHYSICALLY CONSIDERED. For the material Composite, substantially complete, consists essentially, (as has been already remarked), of three things, to wit, the Form, the Matter, and the substantial Union between the two; and the Hæcceity of the Composite is constituted by the Hæcceities of these three constituent parts. That, therefore, will be the chief principle of individuation in the composite Substance, which chiefly contributes to the constitution of these partial Hæcceities. But Matter is, metaphysically speaking, individual; because it is first Subject and can, therefore, be communicated to nothing else. It is the extrinsic principle, as has been declared, of the individuation of the Form; and, as a consequence, it is likewise genetically the principle of individuation to the substantial Mode which results from the actuation of *this* Matter by *this* Form, and is physically identical with the latter. Lastly, it is plain that Matter, if a principle at all, is a principle intrinsic to the Composite which it helps to constitute.

Before passing on to the second Member, it will be necessary to consider an objection, which Suarez brings, to the foundation on which all the arguments, alleged in favour of this first Member of the Thesis, are built. For he denies that 'Matter is incommunicable to inferiors;' since Matter, as such, by virtue of its specific nature, is communicable to many inferiors, which can be Subjects of which it can be predicated by way of attribution (*καθ' ὑποκειμένον*, as the

Philosopher calls it), 'though not by way of inhesion,' (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ). But Suarez must surely have forgotten, that the Angelic Doctor precisely denies, in the passage last quoted, that which the former assumes; viz. that Primordial Matter, as it is in itself, can be looked upon in the light of a Species. For it is wholly one and indifferent, till it is considered as disposed in some way or other by accidents; and then a new element is introduced out of a foreign Category. St. Thomas would almost seem to have forestalled, as he has certainly answered, the difficulty. For he says that Matter can be considered as a Species, only as physically constituting, for its part, different material Substances; and, as such, it is not the subject of Metaphysics, but of natural philosophy, i. e. of physics scientifically treated (*philosophicae speciei*). If it is considered, on the other hand, as disposed by Quantity, it is not pure subjective receptivity, nor is it the first Subject; because, as St. Thomas says, the dimensions are inhering in the Matter, and these must be eliminated, before you can arrive at the first Subject. For the same reason, it must be denied that Primordial Matter, metaphysically considered in its own essential Entity, can be predicated of inferiors; though it evidently can be so predicated, if considered *physically* as body, which is the primordial determination of Matter. The proof of this is the fact. Could any one allow that a human body, for instance, is Primordial Matter?

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition affirms, that *Matter, considered as potentially disposed, is PROXIMATELY the extrinsic genetic principle by which the Form is individuated and, consequently, the chief intrinsic principle by which the entire substantial Composite is individuated.*

It will not be necessary here to divide the Member into its parts; as the arguments are substantially the same. The present portion of the Thesis, therefore, will need declaration, perhaps, rather than proof. For it is natural to ask, first of all, why this disposition of Matter is introduced at all, in order that it may become the proximate principle; then, of what sort this disposition is, by what means it is effected; and, lastly, how this said disposition is compatible with the mutual relations of Matter with the substantial Form, and with accidental Forms. These questions shall be considered separately.

i. Why is it necessary to introduce this disposition of Primordial Matter at all, in order to justify us in considering Matter, as *metaphysically* the proximate genetic principle of Individuation?

The answer is twofold; or rather, has two phases. First of all, Primordial Matter, as being a pure subjective receptivity, is essentially one, undetermined, indifferent. It is ready, as one may say, for anything. And it needs to be roused out of its state of indifference, in order to become a principle of distinction and of individuation; otherwise, in its own nature it would be a principle of universal identity, rather than of distinction. Then, again, the old proverb has it, that *no one gives that which he has not to give*. Now, Matter, purely such, has a sort of Hæcceity of its own, but, like its Entity, of the most imperfect kind. It is the Hæcceity of an indifferent universal, so to speak; and could not, as such, become *proximately* a principle of individuation and distinction to individually distinct Forms and substantial Composites. How could that pure receptibility which, prior in order of nature to its actuation, was the same for *this stone, this geranium, this cat*, and for *William*, be of itself the *proximate* principle of individuation to these four? Moreover, the Form in no case could be evolved from the potentiality of the Matter; unless this latter were previously disposed and ordered for its reception. Hence, the natural necessity for generation in those living substances, wherein the organization of the Matter is more complex.

ii. The next question that confronts us is, What is the nature of this disposition of Matter, which is presupposed before its actuation by the substantial Form? It must be disposition by some Accident; for there is nothing else, supposeable, left. Yet Accidents, according to the teaching of the Peripatetic Philosophy, follow the constitution of the substantial Composite which is their Subject and, in consequence, follow the actuation of the Matter by its Form; how, then, can they precede it? This difficulty leads on at once to the third question. It will, therefore, be only necessary to remark here, that this argument demands the exclusion of anything like determined Accidents; because Accidents are primarily determined by the Form. This, however, does not hinder the intellect from conceiving the Matter as disposed by indeterminate dimensions, i. e. by simple quantity undetermined by any qualities, and undetermined in its limits. For the first Form, speaking metaphysically, which Matter receives, is the bodily Form, i. e. Matter under its three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness; and it is necessary that Matter should be body, before it can receive a material Form, and *such a kind* of body, before it can receive *such* a Form.

But these dimensions may be considered as individually indeterminate; just as, in conceiving the body of a man, we need not include in the concept, whether it is four, five, or six feet in height, so much or so much round the girth, and so forth.

iii. But now comes the third important question, How is this account of the predisposition of Matter to be reconciled with facts and with the order of relation between Matter, its substantial Form, and the supervening Accidents? As this discussion will recur in the Book on Causes, where it must be treated *ex professo*; it will be briefly expedited here. It must ever be borne in mind, that we are in Metaphysics, not in Physics. Physically, Matter never is, never can be, without its Form. All generation is preceded by corruption; and the Form of the corrupted Substance makes way for the Form of the new, or generated, Substance. In like manner, the Accidental Forms are always physically present in Matter; though most, if not all of them, change with a change of substantial Form. Even in the beginning, substantial and accidental Forms,—not all, of course, but some,—were concreated with the Matter. When, however, the subject is considered metaphysically, we look only to the Essences of things. But after all, it may be said, the Metaphysical science must be founded in reality, and must not go against the plain dictates of common sense; else, it will be of little or no worth. Yet, how is it possible that the same Accidents should at once presuppose, and be presupposed to, the Form? Let it suffice for the present to say, that the same thing may be at once prior, and posterior, to another, from different points of view. In the present instance, there is no priority of time; but there is a priority of nature, and a priority of order.

Having thus cleared the ground, it is time to set before the reader the teaching of St. Thomas on this head; and the quotations will be so ordered, as to give a consecutive summary of his doctrine. ‘The first disposition of Matter is Quantity; because division and indivision in Matter follow upon it, and, as a consequence, unity and multitude, which are the primary consequents of Being and are, on this account, dispositions of Matter, as a whole, not of this or that particular Matter only.’ Quantity is, therefore, the primary principle of distinction in Matter. Accordingly ‘it does not essentially include the concept of *sensible* Matter, though it does that of *intelligible* Matter¹,’ which is the formal object of the

¹ ‘Prima dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundum ipsam attenditur divisio

Mathematical Science. Again: 'Matter, subjected to dimensions, is the principle of numeric distinction, in all those cases where there is found more than one individual of a species; for such do not differ in Form¹.' Here it will be well to insert a passage, though it suggests a serious difficulty, and involves a seeming discrepancy in the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. 'As every Form,' he says, 'is for its own part universal; so, the Transcendental relation of Matter to Form induces only a *universal* cognition of the latter. But, considered in this way, Matter is not the principle of individuation; but only as it is itself regarded as individual, i. e. as Matter determined, existing under definite dimensions. For hence arises the individuation of the Form².' It must be observed that St. Thomas, in the Article from which this quotation has been made, is discussing the question whether the human intellect can gain a knowledge of material *individual* things; and he, accordingly, treats it with reference to sensible perception, in harmony with the next Proposition. But the passage has been introduced here; because, in it, the Angelic Doctor distinctly affirms, that Matter cannot be the proximate principle of the Individuation of the Form, unless it should have been previously individuated itself in some way. The reason he gives is, that the referribility of *Matter*, as such, is universal; including accordingly every Form, and not any one in particular. To proceed: 'Matter, from which its Form is conceptually abstracted is twofold; viz. intelligible and sensible Matter. And I call intelligible Matter, such as is regarded simply according to the essence of its continuity; sensible Matter, such as it is in the natural order' (or physical world). 'Now, each can be taken in two ways; as determined, or as indeterminate. It is called determined, when considered under the determination of such or such dimensions; indeterminate, when considered apart from

ejus et indivisio, et ita unitas et multitudo, quae sunt primo consequentia ens; et propter hoc sunt dispositiones totius materiae, non hujus aut illius tantum. . . . Ideo non claudit materiam sensibilem in ratione sua, quamvis claudat materiam intelligibilem.' *In 4 Sentt. d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, c.*

¹ 'Materia, dimensionibus subjecta, est principium distinctionis numeralis in his in quibus inveniuntur multa individua unius speciei; hujusmodi enim non differunt secundum formam.' *De Malo, Q. xvi, a. 1, ad 18^m.*

² 'Sicut autem omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universali. Sic autem considerata, materia non est individuationis principium, sed secundum quod consideratur materia in singulari, quae est materia signata sub determinatis dimensionibus existens; ex hac enim forma individuat.' *De Veritate, Q. x, a. 5, c. init.*

any determination of dimensions¹. Here is given the meaning of *materia signata*, according to the mind of St. Thomas.

In the above citations the following points have been made clear. Matter must, in some way or other, be disposed or determined, in order to become the principle by which the form is individuated. Now, the first disposition, or determination, of Matter is the result of Quantity, which gives to it unity and distinction. But Quantity, and Matter as informed by Quantity, may be considered in two ways. For Quantity may be taken simply for extrinsic extension or the continuous, while the intellect makes abstraction of all the Qualities by which it is physically determined; this is how it is treated in Geometry. Matter, considered as under the information of this abstract Quantity, is called *intelligible* Matter. On the other hand, Quantity may be taken for what it is actually in nature with its *qualifying* determinations; and the Matter, informed by Quantity so understood, is called sensible Matter, or Matter as perceptible by the senses. Finally, both intelligible and sensible Matter can be considered as determined or indeterminate;—determinate, when the Quantity is conceived, as it always really is, under definite measure and limits; indeterminate, when it is conceived without definite measure and limits. Such is a summary of his exordial principles, as they may be called. Next follow two passages, in which he professedly attacks the question at present under consideration. The first is taken from a little tract *On the principle of Individuation*, in which he says: ‘It should be understood, then, that the individual, as revealed to human thought, is constituted in a twofold order. For, (1) the individual, in things sensible, is absolutely the Ultimate in the Category of Substance. . . . The nature of a material Form, (because it cannot by itself be *this Something* specifically complete, whose Being is alone incommunicable), is capable, as regards its nature, of being communicated; and is incommunicable, by virtue solely of its being a Supposit, which is something specifically complete. But this is not the case with every Form. Therefore, so far as regards its essential nature,

¹ ‘Duplex est materia a qua fit abstractio; scil. materia intelligibilis et sensibilis, ut patet in 7 Metaph.; et dico intelligibilem, ut quæ consideratur in natura continui; sensibilem autem sicut materia naturalis. Utraque autem dupliciter accipitur; scil. ut signata, et ut non signata. Et dicitur signata, secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione dimensionum harum scil. vel illarum; non signata autem, quæ sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur.’ *De Veritate*, Q. ii, a. 6, ad 1^m.

it is communicable. Now, its communication consists in its being received in others. . . . And it is received in Matter, because it is a material Form. Whence it is plain, that it essentially retains its unity of nature, when communicated; and that it is rendered incommunicable by its reception in Matter. For, owing to its being received in Matter, it becomes individual, that is, incommunicable, and the primary foundation in the Category of Substance; as being the adequate or complete Subject of all else which can be predicated of it. Now, in the order of generation, the incomplete is always prior to the complete; though, in the order of perfectedness, it is just the reverse. That, then, which in order of generation is the first Subject of all and incomplete, which is predicated of nothing belonging to that Category, viz. Matter, is the first principle of incommunicability of Being, which is proper to the Individual.

(2) There is something else, by which the nature of the Individual is verified according to human cognition, viz. its determination to certain portions of time and space; because it is its property to be substantially existing *Hic et nunc*. And this determination is due to it, by virtue of its determined Quantity. And it is in this way, that Matter, under determined Quantity, is the principle of Individuation. For Matter alone is the principle of Individuation; in so far as, in it, are verified the requirements for being the first Subject in the Category of Substance. But this principle *cannot possibly be discovered*, save under the conditions of Body and Quantity. For this reason, determined Quantity *is said to be* the principle of Individuation. Not that it in any way causes its Subject, which is first Substance; but it is the inseparable concomitant of the latter, and determines it in space and time¹. St. Thomas in this passage

¹ 'Sciendum est ergo quod individuum apud nos in duobus consistit. Est enim individuum in sensibilibus ipsum ultimum in genere substantiae Natura enim formae materialis, cum ipsa non possit esse hoc aliquid completum in specie, cujus solum esse est incommunicabile, est communicabilis quantum est de ratione sua; sed est incommunicabilis solum ratione suppositi, quod est aliquid completum in specie, quod cuilibet formae non convenit, ut dictum est. Ideo quantum est de ratione sua, communicabilis est, ut dictum est. Communicatio autem sua est, ut dictum est, per hoc quod recipitur in aliis. . . . Sua autem receptio est in materia, quia ipsa materialis est. Ex quo patet quod de natura sua sibi relinquitur unitas rationis in communicatione sua, et quod redditur incommunicabilis per receptionem suam in materia. Ex quo enim recipitur in materia, efficitur individuum, quod est incommunicabile, et primum fundamentum in genere substantiae, ut completum aliorum de se praedicabile subjectum. In via autem generationis semper incompletum est prius completo, licet in via perfectionis sit totum e contrario. Illud ergo quod est primum

offers two principles, as it were, of Individuation. Primordial Matter, considered in its character of first Subject, is the one; determined Quantity, or Body, i.e. Matter under the conditions of determined Quantity, is the other. There are two remarks worth making, which severally apply to these alleged principles. The first is this. St. Thomas himself tells us that Primordial Matter is the principle of Individuation *in order of generation*; but that, in the perfectly constituted order, i.e. when the substantial Composite exists complete in itself, the same cannot be said. Consequently, he is not considering the question from the same point of view as Suarez; on the contrary, it will be seen that when he does refer to the point touching the *physical* constitution of Hæcceity, he is of one mind with the Jesuit Doctor. The other remark is this. According to St. Thomas, Quantity, or Matter determined by Quantity, is only a Principle in this sense, that it reveals Individuality to sensible perception. In plainer words, men can only distinguish one individual from another by their *visible* differences; and those visible differences are made apparent to us by the defined Quantity with its definite Qualities. For Matter and Form are wholly impervious to sense. Accordingly, St. Thomas sums up his doctrine on this head in the following words which immediately succeed the quotation just made. 'Therefore, that which comes under the cognizance of *the particular reason*' (a special faculty, similar to *the estimative power* in animals, only of a much higher order, by which man is enabled to apprehend individual material natures), 'is individual, by means of the nature of Matter; but that which comes under the cognizance of the external senses, is individual by Quantity¹.' The one looks to the Essence, and belongs to Meta-

subjectum omnium in via generationis et incompletum, quod de nullo illius generis prædicatur, materia scil. necessario erit primum principium esse incommunicabilis, quod est proprium individui. Aliud est in quo salvatur ratio individui apud nos, determinatio scil. ejus ad certas particulas temporis et loci, quia proprium est esse sibi hic et nunc. Et hæc determinatio debetur sibi ratione quantitatis determinatæ. Et ideo materia sub quantitate determinata est principium individuationis; materia enim sola est principium individuationis, quoad illud in quo salvatur ratio primi in genere substantiæ; quod tamen impossibile est reperiri sine corpore et quantitate. Et ideo quantitas determinata dicitur principium individuationis; non quod aliquo modo causet subjectum suum quod est prima substantia, sed concomitatur eam inseparabiliter, et determinat eam ad hic et nunc.' *Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De Principio Individuationis, p. m.*

¹ 'Illud ergo quod cadit sub ratione particulari, est hoc aliquid per naturam materiæ; quod autem cadat sub sensu exteriori, est per quantitatem.' *Ibidem.*

physics; the other looks to sensible perception, and belongs to Ideology. In the former case, therefore, St. Thomas confirms the first member of the present Proposition; in the latter, he vindicates the truth of the Proposition immediately to follow. But what, then, of this second Member which is now under discussion? He does not say a word about it in this *Opusculum*; but he does in another place, which is now submitted to the reader as follows. 'As Matter and Form are the constituents of Genus and Species; so, *this* Matter and *this* Form are, of the Individual. Hence, as diversity of Matter or Form, absolutely considered, causes a diversity in Genus and Species; in like manner, *this* Matter and *this* Form cause a diversity in number.' Here St. Thomas evidently admits, that the Hæcceity of the substantial Composite is physically constituted by the partial Hæcceity of the Matter and the Form. 'Now, no Form, *as such*, is this Form in its own right. (I say, *as such*, on account of the rational soul, which after a sort is This Something in its own right, but not in its quality of Form.) Accordingly, the intellect has a natural tendency to assign to many, **any** Form whatsoever which can possibly be received in anything, either as in Matter or as in a Subject. Now, this is opposed to the essential nature of that which is individual. Hence, Form becomes individual by virtue of its reception in Matter. But since Matter, considered in itself, is indefinite; it cannot be, that it should individuate Form received in it, save so far as it is itself capable of distinction. For Form is not individuated in Matter; unless it is received in *this* or *that* matter, distinct and determined in place and time. But Matter is incapable of division, save through Quantity; and, accordingly, the Philosopher says, in the *first Book of his Physics*, that if you subtract Quantity, Matter is indivisible. Hence, Matter becomes individual and definite by being under dimensions. Now, these dimensions may be considered in two ways. First, they may be regarded as under limits, by which I mean, their being terminated by limits of measure and shape; and, under this point of view, they find a place, in the Category of Quantity, as perfected Entities, and cannot be the principle of Individuation. For, since such limit of dimensions may be subject to frequent change in the same individual; it would follow, that the individual would not continue always the same. Secondly, they may be considered according to the essential nature of dimensions merely, apart from **any** such determination, although they can

never really exist without some determination; just as the nature of colour cannot exist, without its being determinately white, black, &c. In this wise, they find a place in the Category of Quantity, as something that is imperfect. Now, by virtue of these indeterminate dimensions, Matter becomes individual and definite; and thus, individuates Form. It is after such sort, that numeric diversity in the same Species is caused by Matter'¹.

In this passage, the Angelic Doctor establishes at once, and elucidates in his own consummate way, the second Member of our Proposition. For he remarks most justly, that Matter cannot be understood as individuating Form, while itself remains in its primitive indifference to any given Form in particular. It must be in a proximate disposition for the reception of *this* Form rather than another; otherwise, there is no sufficient reason for its actuation in such or such a direction. But, in order to be thus proximately disposed, it must itself be potentially individuated, i. e. distinguishable from all other portions of Matter. Now, the primary principle of divisibility and, consequently, of distinction, in Matter, is its Quan-

¹ 'Sicut partes generis et speciei sunt materia et forma; ita individui sunt haec materia et haec forma. Unde sicut diversitatem in genere vel specie facit diversitas materiae vel formae absolute; ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia. Nulla autem forma, in quantum hujusmodi, est haec ex seipsa. Dico autem, in quantum hujusmodi, propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum forma. Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam possibile est recipi in aliquo, sicut in materia vel sicut in subjecto, natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem ejus quod est hoc aliquid. Unde forma fit haec per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Sed cum materia, in se considerata, sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. Non enim forma individuat per hoc quod recipitur in materia, nisi quatenus recipitur in hac materia vel illa distincta et determinata ad hic et nunc. Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per quantitatem; unde Philosophus dicit I. Physic. quod, submota quantitate, remanet substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia efficitur haec et signata, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus. Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum earum terminationem. Et dico eas terminari secundum terminatam mensuram et figuram; et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genere quantitatis; et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia, cum talis dimensionum terminatio varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret idem numero semper. Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum; quamvis nunquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint: sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec materia signata; et sic individuat formam. Et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, c.*

tity. Therefore, Primordial Matter must be considered as somehow or other pre-informed by Quantity; before it can be accepted as principle of Individuation for the Form by which it is subsequently actuated. But it is impossible to regard such Quantity as determined in measure and figure. For its determination in measure and figure supposes the substantial Composite to be already constituted; since this determination depends upon, and follows after, the actuation of the Form. Therefore, the Quantity must be considered, prior to the introduction of the Form, as indeterminate. All that is essentially required is, that Matter should somehow be *corporal*. This is precisely what St. Thomas asserts in the same Article. These are his words: 'The dimensions, determined by their proper limits, which are founded in the Subject already completed' (because actuated by its substantial Form), 'are themselves in some sort of a way individuated by the Matter, which is in turn individuated by its indeterminate dimensions, preconceived to be in the Matter'¹.

Nothing can be plainer than that St. Thomas is, throughout, considering the whole question from a *Metaphysical* point of view. All his expressions are clearly indicative of the fact. Besides those which have been already signalized in other passages, the two quotations from his Commentary on Boetius afford ample evidence of this. For he tells us categorically, that indeterminate dimensions have no physical existence. They are in this respect like colour, which cannot physically exist, save under the form of such or such a determined colour. And, when he refers to the *physical* constitution of the material Substance, he asserts that the Hæcceity of the whole Substance is composed of *this* Matter and *this* Form; which is identical with the doctrine of Suarez. Moreover, in the words last quoted, he speaks of indeterminate dimensions as 'preconceived,' not pre-existing in the Matter².

¹ 'Ipsae dimensiones terminatae quae fundantur in subjecto jam completo, individuuntur quodammodo ex materia individuata per dimensiones interminatas praeintellectas in materia.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 3^m.*

² The form of such expressions is the more noticeable, because St. Thomas is so guarded and concise in his style. There is another remarkable passage, which is here subjoined. In it the Angelic Doctor clearly distinguishes between the physical and metaphysical view of the question. 'Those things which differ numerically in the Category of Substance, not only differ in their accidents, but likewise in the Form and Matter. If we ask, however, why this form differs from that; there is no other reason than because it is in a different determined Matter. Nor can any other reason be found, why this Matter is divided from that, except Quantity. Therefore, Matter,

NOTE.

In order to obviate a possible difficulty, the attention of the reader is invited to a seeming contradiction. At the commencement of the third inquiry regarding the foundation of Hæcceity, it was stated that we were not in search ‘*of any extrinsic principle or principles of Individuation* ;’ yet, in the present Thesis, its ‘*extrinsic genetic principle*’ forms a prominent part of the Enunciation. Let it suffice to say, that, in the former phrase, *extrinsic* means outside the entire composite ; in the latter, outside one of the components, though intrinsic as regards the entire composite.

PROPOSITION XLIX.

To sensile perception, Matter, as determined by Quantity that is definite in measure and shape, and that, consequently, presupposes the complete constitution of the substantial Composite, is the principle by which material Substances are individuated.

This Proposition has been added, in order to make the statement of St. Thomas’s teaching on this subject of Individuation complete ; otherwise, it would find a more fitting place in Ideology than in Metaphysics. The proof will naturally assume the form of a declaration, rather than of a demonstration.

No one can doubt but that what are called, in the Peripatetic Philosophy, Accidents,—such as, shape, colour, warmth, hardness, and the like,—are the formal objects of the senses. We cannot see, hear, smell, taste, Matter in itself ; *à fortiori*, the senses cannot directly perceive the substantial Form. The whole Substance of material things is out of sight, and is shrouded in a panorama of Accidents. Nay, more ; the action of *purely* material Substances (all that is, save man) is not immediate ; they energize, only through their Accidents, as by necessary instruments. The adequate formal object, therefore, of the senses, are the Accidents of material things ;

subject to dimension, is conceived to be the principle of this diversity :’ (‘*Illa quæ differunt numero in genere substantiæ, non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare hæc forma differt ab illa, non erit alia ratio nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia ratio quare hæc materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimensioni intelligitur esse principium hujus diversitatis*’). *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII), in Lib. Boetii de Trinitate, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 4^m.*

for it is the province of the Intellect alone to contemplate Natures, or Essences. Consequently, it is obvious that sensile perception of the Individual, as such, must be founded in Accidental differences; or it can have no foundation at all. And, as a fact, men do distinguish individual material substances in this way. How is it that one distinguishes this piece of coal from that; save that each is under the defined limits of its own Quantity, which give to it its shape? So, the herdsman knows his cattle one from the other, by spots, colour of the body or legs, form of the head, bend of the horn, or some such accidental differences. In like manner, one man is *sensilely* distinguished from another by his height, size, features, proportion of limbs, all of which belong to the qualities of Quantity; or by the colour of his hair, eyes, skin, which are simply included in the Category of Quality. The *Comedy of Errors* reminds us what confusion may arise when two persons are so exactly alike, as to exhibit no special notes of distinction. It is further worthy of remark, that to the perception of sense, the Accidents individuate each other, so to say, in their mutual transcendental relation. Thus,—to resume one of the illustrations just given,—the shape, or quantitative limits, of the lump of coal would not be recognized by the sight, if it were not for the blackness which informs the mass; while the blackness would be indefinite and, consequently, disappear for want of contrast, unless it were limited and defined by Quantity. After a like manner, in the case of a blind man, hardness, softness, roughness, or polish of surface, would serve to define the Quantity; and the Quantity, in turn, would supply the limit to his touch. This might reasonably be expected; since, as Quantity determines and distinguishes Matter, so Quality determines and distinguishes Quantity. Let it not, however, be supposed, that these accidental determinations constitute the individuant, or individualizing, *differentia* of material Substances. They are the *effect* of the Hæcceity of such substance, not its *cause*; though, to sensile perception, they are truly differential.

It only remains to add a caution. Be on your guard against confounding Individuation, or Hæcceity, with Identity. Identity is a persevering sameness of the Individual. This is one principal reason why St. Thomas, whenever he treats of the *sensile* perception of the Individual, introduces determination of place and time; whilst he excludes *determinate* Quantity, whether as determined by its own limits or by qualitative Forms, from the metaphysical con-

stitution of individual Substance. For a man may be at one time two feet high; at another, over six feet. At one time he may be thin; later on, fat. In the course of years, his features, the colour of his hair, etc., materially change. So again, when he was in England, he had a fair complexion; since living in India, he has become sallow or brown. But, evidently, if it is a question of purely sensible perception, a man will be recognized as this individual, and distinguishable from every other, by his appearance *hic et nunc*; not by what he may become some thirty years hence. It is precisely for the same reason, that these determined dimensions must not be allowed an entrance into the Metaphysical, or Essential, constitution of Hæcceity; otherwise, as St. Thomas sagely remarks, as often as a man grows in height or bulk, or changes in appearance,—as when does he not?—he would cease to be himself, and commence to be somebody else, in an endless succession. And now for St. Thomas. Passages, already quoted in the preceding Proposition, have indicated with sufficient clearness the teaching of the Angelic Doctor on this head. Nevertheless, one other passage shall be presented to the reader, in which he expresses himself in very explicit terms. These are his words: ‘But it’ (i. e. individual material Substance) ‘does not become *hic et nunc* apparent, without determinate and fixed dimensions, which it must necessarily have, from the fact that the Form is received in Matter; since it is impossible for it to be received in Matter, without the constitution thereby of a corporal Substance, under whose special shape or figure such dimensions are included. Wherefore, it is said that Matter, under fixed dimensions, is the cause of Individuation. Not that the dimensions are the cause of the Individual,—since an Accident does not cause its own Subject; but, because it is made *hic et nunc* apparent by fixed dimensions, as by a peculiar and inseparable sign of the Individual¹.’

¹ ‘Sed non fit hic et nunc demonstrabile sine dimensionibus determinatis et certis, quas habere necesse est, eo quod forma recipitur in materia: cum impossibile sit eam recipi in materia, quin constituatur corpus substantiæ, sub cujus propria figura sunt dimensiones ipsæ. Et ideo dicitur quod materia sub certis dimensionibus est causa individuationis. Non quod dimensiones causent individuum; cum accidens non causet suum subjectum; sed quia per dimensiones certas demonstratur individuum hic et nunc, sicut per signum proprium individui et inseparabile.’ *Opusc. XXXII (aliter XXVIII), De natura materiæ et dimensionibus interminatis*, c. 3, in fi. For the fuller comprehension of this passage, the reader is referred back to a quotation made from the same treatise in the first member of Proposition xlviii, of which the words here cited are the immediate continuation.

PROPOSITION L.

Every Spiritual Substance is the intrinsic constitutive principle of its Individuation by its own actual Entity.

It would be useless to expend elaborate proof on this Proposition; first of all, because its truth is undisputed. Then, all the arguments, which go to demonstrate that such is the principle of Individuation in Material Substances, demonstrate, *à fortiori*, that it is the same in Spiritual Substances. The reason is, that the latter are simple and complete Forms; so that they require no partner to contribute to their perfect substantiality.

But it is here that a difficulty has been made, touching the teaching of St. Thomas; to resolve which, is the motive for introducing

PROPOSITION LI.

Although St. Thomas maintains that, in purely immaterial Forms, any multiplication of individuals in a Species is naturally impossible, being moved thereto by reasons of no little weight; yet he equally admits that there is, in their case as in that of other substances, a real distinction between the Hæcceity and the specific nature.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition asserts that *St. Thomas maintains, not without reason, the impossibility, according to the established natural order, of any multiplication of individuals in the Species of spiritual Substances.* The following declaration will suffice to substantiate the assertion.

Let us begin with a brief analysis of the whole question, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. The specific nature of a Substance is *determined* by its Form; although, in its totality, it includes every element that contributes to the substantial Composite. Now, substantial Forms are of two kinds, viz. complete and incomplete. Complete Forms are perfect in themselves; and are, in their nature, free from all need of union with something else, necessary to integrate them substantially. Incomplete Forms are imperfect Substances, and, consequently, require union with something else in order to be substantially perfect. In the instance, therefore, of these latter, the perfect Substance is constituted by the union of the two, not by the Form alone; and in that union each part gives and takes. But all material Forms are incomplete. It follows, then,

that all material Forms, as such, are communicable to something else. Hence, they are not individual, but common. They are not individual, because they are communicable; and incommunicability is the foundation of Hæcceity. As a fact, antecedently to their union with their supplement, they are absolutely indifferent to this or that. That *something else*, to which these Forms are communicable and which is required for the constitution in their case of a complete Substance, is Matter. When, then, any one of them is communicated to Matter, it is *ipso facto* individuated; because it is now determined to one, and is no longer communicable to any other. Hence the origin of its Hæcceity. But the same *specific* Form, metaphysically considered, may be communicated to many distinct portions of Matter, and, in consequence, receive as many distinct individuations as there are distinct portions of Matter in which it is received. Yet, in all these, its nature remains one and the same. Hence it follows, that, in the instance of material Substance, individuals may be multiplied indefinitely in one and the same Species. Neither can it be said that Matter is in the same case; because it is primordially one, and is capable of communicating itself to an indefinite number of Forms. For it is in no way capable of communicating to, but only of becoming Subject to the communicability of, others; for the reason that it is a pure receptivity. And this is what St. Thomas means, when he insists upon the fact that Matter is the first Subject. Its commonness is nothing else but its imperfection; and it receives individuation *inchoately*, not by any active communication of itself, but by a passive attraction which it receives for the impending Form.

And now to turn to complete immaterial Forms. These have in themselves no communicability; because it is not in their nature to require union with anything else than themselves, in order to the completion of their substantiality. Hence their name of *separated* Forms. In this case, moreover, the substantial Form is everything; consequently, it is the specific nature simply and absolutely. But that specific nature is, as has been seen, incommunicable. Therefore, it only needs actuation to become individual, even physically speaking. Neither is it communicable to more than one individual; not because the nature could not be multiplied *de potentia absoluta*, but because such a Form is not naturally communicative of itself, since it stands alone and one, in virtue of its own absolute completeness. To say, however, that it does not in its own nature

require communication for its individual completeness, is one thing; and to say that it *cannot* be communicated to something else, (which may cause a multiplication of individuals in it), even by the Omnipotent Will of God, is quite another thing. The one amounts at most to a physical impossibility; the other, to a metaphysical. One may be fully justified in asserting that, looking to the Essences of things, there appears to be no sufficient reason for the multiplication of individuals in a purely spiritual species, and that, therefore, it may be concluded that there is no such thing in fact; and yet shrink from maintaining, especially on a subject so little open to human cognition, that it is absolutely impossible, even for God, to create such a multiplication. St. Thomas holds to the former, as will be seen; but he as pronouncedly rejects the other. He shall now speak for himself. 'Because the Essences of composite entities are received in determinate Matter, or are multiplied according to the division of the latter; it comes to pass, that certain things are *specifically* the same and *numerically* distinct. But, since the Essence of simple entities is not received in Matter, in their case there cannot be such multiplication. Wherefore, it is not to be expected that we should find more than one individual of the same Species in such Substances; but as many as are the individuals, so many are the Species, as Avicenna expressly declares¹.' 'Matter is the principle of Individuation in material things only because it is not capable of being shared by several things; and it cannot be so shared, for the reason that it is the first Subject existing in no other thing. . . . Separated' (i. e. purely immaterial) 'substances, then, are individual and singular. They are not, however, individuated by Matter; but their individuation is due to the simple fact that they have no natural tendency to be in any other and, consequently, to be shared by many. Hence it follows that, if any particular Form is naturally subject to participation by another, so as to become the act of some sort of Matter; it can be at once individuated and multiplied in view of the Matter².' 'But they

¹ 'Essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata vel multiplicantur secundum divisionem ejus, contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed, cum essentia simplicium non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo non oportet quod inveniantur plura individua unius speciei in illis substantiis: sed quotquot sunt individua, tot sunt species, ut Avicenna dicit expresse.' *Opusc. XXIX (alter XXV), De Ente et Essentia*, c. 5.

² 'Non enim materia est principium individuationis in rebus materialibus, nisi in

argue with marvellous simplicity in endeavouring to show that God *could* not make many intellects of one and the same Species, imagining that it involves a contradiction. For, granting that multiplication is not of the nature of an intellectual Being, it does not follow that the multiplication of an intellectual Form would involve a contradiction. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from not having in itself the cause of some' (effect), 'and yet having it from some other cause¹.'

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition asserts, *that St. Thomas admitted a real distinction, in purely immaterial Forms, between the specific nature, as such, and its Individuation or Hæcceity.*

The truth of this assertion follows, as a Corollary, from the words, of the Angelic Doctor, quoted last. For, if there be no metaphysical repugnance in the multiplication of individuals within any Species of spiritual substances, it is impossible that the Essence, or specific nature, and the Hæcceity should be really identical; otherwise, God *could* not effect such a multiplication, because He cannot change the Essences of things.

But the question deserves further examination, not merely for the sake of vindicating more thoroughly the teaching of St. Thomas, but because of its own intrinsic interest and importance. Observe then, that, according to the more commonly received opinion, the intrinsic principle of Individuation in the case of every kind of Substance, incomplete as well as complete, material no less than spiritual, is the actual Entity of that Being. Therefore, in an integral material substance perfectly constituted as such, the Form is individual by *its* actual Entity, the Matter by *its* own actual Entity, and the substantial mode of union by *its* actual Entity. So far, as regards the Substance already constituted: but now, let that Substance be considered in the order of generation,—in other words, while it is in the process of being evolved or produced. Its Matter essentially needs individuation, which it is

quantum materia non est participabilis, a pluribus, cum sit primum subjectum non existens in alio. . . . Individuæ ergo sunt substantiæ separatae, et singulares; non autem individuantur ex materia, sed ex hoc ipso quod non sunt natae in alio esse, et per consequens nec participari a multis. Ex quo sequitur quod si aliqua forma nata est participari ab aliquo, ita quod sit actus alicujus materiae, illa potest individuari et multiplicari per comparationem ad materiam. . . .'

¹ 'Valde autem ruditer argumentatur ad ostendendum quod Deus facere non possit quod sint multi intellectus unius speciei, credentes hoc includere contradictionem. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid non habere in sua natura causam alicujus, quod tamen habet illud ex alia causa.' *Opusc. XVI (aliter XV), De Unitate Intellectus, v.*

conceived as receiving by the disposition of indeterminate dimensions. Save for this, Matter would preserve its primeval indifference, would be indivisible, undistinguishable, and could not become *this* Matter. Further: the Form, (which is the principal object of inquiry for the moment), in order to become individual, must be an *actual* Entity. But it cannot become an actual Entity, save in, and by, that individual Matter of which it is the Act. In itself, it is essentially common; for it is communicable to any and every portion of Matter possible within the periphery of that vast receptivity. When, however, it has become an actual Entity by actuating a definite portion of Matter, it is no longer communicable to another; for its activity is, so to say, exhausted. Therefore, the Matter is genetically the principle, albeit extrinsic, of the Hæcceity of the Form. In like manner, the genetic principle of Individuation for the Mode of Union, are the Matter and Form. Lastly, these three partial Hæcceities, combined, are the principle by which the whole substantial Composite is individuated. It is to be observed, then, that in each case there is a sort of communication; and the Hæcceity is the result of a previous composition. But Matter, in order of generation, is the primary element; and corporal Matter (for corporeity is the first, necessary, distinguishing Form, as it were, of Matter), affords ample room for multiplication of individuals under the same Form, or under the same specific Nature.

Now let us turn our attention to spiritual Substances,—those immaterial Forms which are entirely separated from Matter. They are, what they are, entirely in themselves. There is no indigence of another and, consequently, no natural tendency towards communication of themselves to other Beings, in order to the establishment of their perfect substantial Entity. Hence, if actual, they are *ipso facto* individual, because they are naturally incommunicable; and, moreover, they are individual by their own *actual* Entity. But, for the very same reason, there are no natural elements for the distinction of more than one individual in a given Species. Why? Because, in them, the Form *is* the entire Species. But the Form, as actual, is individual. Therefore, in the natural order, to multiply the Individual, is to multiply the Form; but to multiply the Form, is to multiply the Species. As St. Thomas appositely puts it, a Spiritual Substance is one in number (*una numero*), but not one of a number (*una de numero*)¹. If such be the case, how

¹ *Opusc. XVI (aliter XV), De Unitate Intellectus, v. f.*

is it possible that there should be a real distinction between the Specific Nature and the Hæcceity? In order to answer this question, let us recur to a truth, (already established in previous Theses), that everything is individuated by its own actual Entity. Now, in order that a thing may be *actual*, it must exist; *really*, if really actual; *ideally*, if ideally actual. But Existence is not included in the Essence of created Spiritual Forms; therefore, neither is the Actuation, nor, as a consequence, the Individuality. To this it may be objected, that such an explanation supposes Existence to be the principle of Individuation, which has been, nevertheless, rejected in a preceding Proposition. The answer is, that though Existence, according to the explanation given, is not the principle of Individuation but the actuation of the Entity; yet that Existence is really (or *ex parte rei*) identical with actuation. Should it be urged that this is a distinction without a difference; we reply, that the distinction involves a considerable difference. For incommunicability is not included in the Nature or Essence of an Angel; but only the completeness of the particular Substantial Form, which causes that it should stand in no need of partnership. But by its Existence, and proportionally by its ideal actuation, it becomes *de facto* incommunicable and, therefore, individual. Fortified by these preliminary statements, turn we now to the Angel of the Schools: 'As a Form, which is in a Subject or Matter, is individuated by its being in this *Something*; so, a separated Form is individuated, because it has no natural tendency to be in Anything. For, just as the being in *This* excludes the extensive generality of a Universal, which is predicated of many; so likewise does the incapacity for being in Anything. As, therefore, *this* Whiteness is not prevented from having under it many individuals, because it is Whiteness (which belongs to the nature of a Species), but because it is in *This* (which belongs to the nature of an Individual); so the nature of *this* Angel is not prevented from being in several, by reason of its being a Nature in such an order of Being, (which is of the nature of a Species), but because it is not in its nature to be in any Subject, (which is the essential characteristic of an Individual)¹. 'Whatsoever Entity admits of accidental addition

¹ 'Sicut forma quæ est in subjecto vel materia, individuat per hoc quod est esse in hoc, ita forma separata individuat per hoc quod non est nata in aliquo esse. Sicut enim esse in hoc excludit communitatem universalis quod prædicatur de multis; ita non posse esse in aliquo. Sicut ergo hæc albedo non prohibetur habere

which is no part of its essential Nature, in it the *actual* Entity and the Quiddity, in other words, the Supposit and the Nature, differ. For, under the meaning of the word *Nature*, is included that only which enters into the constitution of the Species; but *Supposit* not only retains whatever belongs to the constitution of the Species, but likewise includes other things which are accidental to the Species. Wherefore, Supposit is defined as a Whole; but Nature or Quiddity, as the formal part. Now, in God alone is no Accident discoverable which is added to this Essence, because His Existence is His Essence, as has been said; and, accordingly, in God Supposit and Nature are absolutely one and the same thing. But, in an Angel, they are not entirely one and the same; because there is something accidental added to him, outside of that which constitutes his specific Nature. For the Existence itself of an Angel is outside of his Essence or Nature; and certain other Accidents appertain to him which absolutely belong to the Supposit, but not to the Nature¹. Once more: 'Because it' (i. e. the specific Nature of created immaterial Substances) 'is not its own Existence; there is something that is accidental to it, viz. its existence, and certain other things which are attributed to the Supposit, and not to the Nature. For this reason, the Supposit in their case is not entirely identical with the Nature².' What those '*certain other things*' are which St. Thomas had in his mind, he has not stated. It is probable, however, that he refers to various spiritual accidents which

sub se multa individua ex hoc quod est albedo, quod pertinet ad rationem speciei; sed ex hoc quod non est in hoc, quod pertinet ad rationem individui; ita natura hujus Angeli non prohibetur esse in multis ex hoc quod est natura in tali ordine rerum, quod pertinet ad rationem speciei; sed ex hoc quod non est nata recipi in aliquo subjecto, quod pertinet ad rationem individui.' *Q. unica de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 8, ad 4^m.

¹ 'Quicumque potest aliquid accidere quod non sit de ratione suae naturae, in eo differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura. Nam in significatione naturae includitur solum id quod est de ratione speciei; suppositum autem non solum habet hæc quæ ad rationem speciei pertinent; sed etiam alia quæ ei accidunt. Et ideo suppositum signatur per totum, natura autem sive quidditas, ut pars formalis. In solo autem Deo non invenitur aliquid accidens præter ejus essentiam, quia suum esse est sua essentia, ut dictum est. Et ideo in Deo est omnino idem suppositum et natura. In Angelo autem non est omnino idem; quia aliquid accidit ei præter id quod est de ratione suae speciei. Quia et ipsum esse Angeli est præter ejus essentiam seu naturam; et alia quædam ei accidunt quæ omnino pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam.' *Quol. II, a. 4, c.*

² 'Quia non est suum esse, accidit ei aliquid præter rationem speciei, scil. ipsum esse, et alia quædam quæ attribuuntur supposito, et non naturæ. Propter quod suppositum in eis non est omnino idem cum natura.' *Ibid., ad 1^m.*

belong to each of the Spiritual Forms individually; such, as these or those thoughts, volitions, successive presences. If he meant this, it must not be forgotten that these Accidents can in no wise serve towards the constitution of the Hæcceity, but, as being its concomitants, are a characteristic note of its existence.

NOTE.

If the principle of Leibnitz be admitted, that it is impossible there should be two individuals who are only numerically distinguishable from each other; it seems difficult not to admit the teaching of St. Thomas touching the Individual Unity of each Angelic Species.

There is one more important question, as regards Individual Unity, that awaits its solution. It is that which concerns the Individuation of Accidents. Here, too, a dissidence has been imagined to exist between the teaching of St. Thomas on the one hand, and that of Suarez and other Post-Tridentine Doctors on the other. Doubtless, on certain comparatively minor points which enter into the discussion, they do differ, as will be seen; but, upon the fundamental point which bears on the intrinsic principle of Individuation, they have the appearance of being in disaccord only because, as in the former case of material Substances, it has escaped observation, that the respective combatants, (for such they are imagined to be), are regarding the same subject from two different points of view. St. Thomas is considering the Hæcceity of Accidents *metaphysically* and *in order of generation* more particularly, which naturally sets him in quest of the *extrinsic* or *genetic* principle of Individuation; while Suarez considers the Accident as already *physically* constituted in its Subject, and, as naturally, searches for the *intrinsic* principle of its Individuation. With the hope that light will be thrown on an intricate but by no means unimportant problem, and with a confidence that the teaching of these two great Doctors with regard to it may be reconciled, the following Proposition is introduced.

PROPOSITION LII.

Although St. Thomas seems to admit with Suarez that Accidents, as physically constituted in their Subjects, are individual by their own actual Entity; yet he equally maintains that, considered metaphysically the Subject is the genetic, conservative, and material principle of the Being of Accidental Forms and, consequently, of their Individuation.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is clearly taught by St. Thomas, under five different points of view.

i. He insists upon the fact that, in spite of the transcendental relation of Accident to Substance and of the essential dependence of the former on the latter, Accident has a distinct entity of its own; so that, for instance, the quantity in a geranium and the qualities of red, green, and the like, are real entities, entirely distinct from the substantial entity of the plant. Hence, speaking of the Category of Relation, and contrasting finite Relations with those Divine Relations by which the Three Persons are, as it were, constituted in God, he says, 'In us Relations have a dependent existence; because their existence is one thing, and the existence of the Substance is another. Accordingly, they have their own proper mode of Existence, proportioned to their own proper nature; and such is the case with all the other Accidents. For, inasmuch as all Accidents are certain Forms superadded to Substance, and caused by the essential constitutives of Substance; it must needs be, that their Existence should be something added to the Existence of Substance, and should depend on it¹.' It may, perhaps, be questioned, whether the *esse* of the Angelic Doctor should not be translated in the above passage, wherever it occurs, *actual entity*; but, as St. Thomas usually distinguishes *esse* from *ens*, as we distinguish Existence from Essence,—as it harmonizes more completely with his whole doctrine on the subject of Accidents,—and as the word has been hitherto rendered *Existence*, it has seemed better to preserve the rendering, even at the cost of seemingly weakening the cogency of the quotation. The bearing of the

¹ 'In nobis relationes habent esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae. Unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem; sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit. Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae et a principiis substantiae causatae, oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae et ab ipso dependens.' *c. Gent. L. iv, c. 14.*

above passage on other points of his teaching, will appear later on in the declaration of the second Member. It only remains to draw the conclusion. If Accidents have their own Existence, distinct from that of the substantial Subject which they immediately or mediately inform, and an independent Existence proportioned to their nature,—independent, i. e. intrinsically, though extrinsically dependent,—and if Existence is the actual Entity of a thing; it follows that, as Accident has its own actual Entity, it must have its own Individuation distinct from the Individuation of its Subject, seeing that the Entity of Being is its Unity.

ii. St. Thomas emphatically declares that the Subject, which is inserted in the definition of Accident, is no part of the latter's Essence; wherefore, as he says, God *de potentia absoluta* could create the Accident without its Subject. In connection with the subject which he is professedly discussing, he illustrates his assertion by the examples of Density and Rarity, which give rise to a special difficulty. For, according to a definition which he seems to admit, in the passage here alluded to, Density is 'a great deal of matter under small dimensions;' so that it is at first sight difficult to understand, how Density or Rarity can exist without the Subject, i. e. Matter. But, as St. Thomas appositely remarks, this definition of Density is not its essential definition. For it is rather a property, *consequent* on such disposition of Matter under such dimensions. Matter is *in itself* indivisible, and wholly throughout, wherever it is. Quantity gives to it its divisibility and partial distribution in space; and, upon the fulness of Matter determined by smallness of quantitative dimension, follows Density as a resultant Entity. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor: 'Just as the Subject, which is inserted in the definition of the other Accidents, forms no part of the Essence of the Accident; so, in like manner, Matter, which is inserted in the definition of Rarity and Density, is no part of their Essence. For Density is not Matter existing under small dimensions; but is a certain Property which follows from such a disposition of the Matter. Hence, God can produce such a Property, even though there be no Matter¹.' But

¹ 'Sicut subjectum, quod ponitur in definitione aliorum accidentium, non est de essentia accidentis; ita etiam materia, quae ponitur in definitione raritatis et densitatis, non est de essentia eorum. Non enim est densitas materia multa existens sub parvis dimensionibus, sed proprietas quaedam consequens ex hoc quod materia sic se habet. Unde talem proprietatem Deus potest facere, etiam si materia non esset.' *In 4, d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6^m.*

if the Subject is altogether foreign to the Essence of its Accidents, it cannot be the intrinsic constitutive principle of their Individuation. Wherefore, it follows, as a consequence, that Accidents are individuated by their own actual Entity.

iii. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor, in discussing the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, with special reference to the condition of the Accidents or Species after they have been deprived of the Substances of bread and wine which they had previously informed, declares that they remain in that individual existence which they had acquired in those Substances, antecedently to the consecration¹. But, if they have acquired an Hæcceity of their own, and preserve that Hæcceity after the desition of their natural Subject; it is obvious that their Subject cannot possibly be the intrinsic constitutive principle of their Individuation.

iv. St. Thomas teaches, that Quantity does not depend on sensible Matter for its essential Nature, but for its Existence or actuation. 'Dimensive Quantity,' he remarks, 'does not depend in its own proper nature on sensible Matter, although it depends on it for its Existence. Hence, whether as Predicate or Subject, it assumes the form of a Substance as well as of an Accident. Accordingly, we say that a line is a *Quantity* as well as *quantitative*, and a *magnitude* as well as *great*².' But, if Quantity, in its own proper nature, does not depend on Matter; it clearly cannot depend upon it for its Individuation. This argument, if it be taken *physically*, (which is how the question is treated at present), applies with yet greater cogency to the other Accidents. For, as St. Thomas observes, Quantity comes much nearer to the first Subject; because it directly affects Matter and disposes it for the reception of its Substantial and, subsequently, of its Qualitative Forms³.

¹ 'Hujusmodi accidentia acquisierunt esse individuum in substantia panis et vini; qua conversa in corpus et sanguinem Christi, remanent virtute Divina accidentia in illo esse individuato quod prius habebant. Unde sunt singularia et sensibilia.' 3^{ae} lxxvii, 1, ad 3^m.

² 'Quantitas dimensiva secundum suam rationem non dependet a materia sensibili, quamvis dependeat secundum suum esse. Ideo in prædicando et subjiciendo accipit modum substantiæ et accidentis. Unde lineam dicimus et quantitatem et quantam, et magnitudinem et magnam.' In 4, d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 2^m.

³ 'Prima accidentia consequentia substantiam sunt quantitas et qualitas. Et hæc duo proportionantur duobus principiis essentialibus substantiæ, scil. formæ et materiæ (unde magnum et parvum Plato posuit differentias materiæ); sed qualitas ex parte formæ. Et quia materia est subjectum primum quod non est in alio, forma autem est in alio, scil. materia; ideo magis appropinquat ad hoc quod est non esse in alio, quantitas quam qualitas, et per consequens quam alia accidentia.' *Ibidem*, ad 1^m.

As a fact, the qualitative Forms *immediately* inhere in Quantity; just as Quantity immediately inheres in the material Substance and, according to the more probable opinion, in the Matter of such Substance. Consequently, Qualities have less imperfection of Being than Quantity; because this latter, relatively to the former, is in a state of subjective receptivity or potentiality, while the Qualities are its Forms or Acts. As, therefore, everything is what it is by its Act, it follows that there is more of distinctive Entity, (proportionally to the nature of Being), in the informing Act than in the informed Subject. If, then, Quantity has its own distinctive Essence and its own distinctive Individuation, *à fortiori* will the informing Qualities have the one and the other.

But, further, there is no need of any deduction, in order to prove that St. Thomas supposed Quantity to have an Hæcceity of its own; for he asserts as much in so many words. 'If, therefore, Quantity,' he says, 'should actually exist apart from Matter, it would have its own Individuation. For it would have, of itself, its own division by which Matter is divided; and so, one part would differ from another part, not in Species, but numerically¹.' The same, therefore, can be safely asserted of the other Accidents, for the reason already given.

v. Lastly, St. Thomas asserts that Qualitative, as well as Quantitative, Accidents have their own proper Essence and their own proper Existence². But the Hæcceity of a thing is in reality its own actual Entity; therefore, these Accidents are individuated by their own proper Entity.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition St. Thomas is said to maintain, that '*metaphysically speaking, the Subject is the genetic, conservative, and material principle of the Being of Accidental Forms and, consequently, of their Individuation.*' It is hardly necessary to remind the student, that a principle of such complexion cannot be *intrinsic*.

St. Thomas bases his doctrine touching this matter on two principles generally admitted in the School, of which one regards Accident *as* Accident, the other regards Accident *as* Form. It

¹ 'Si ergo quantitas sine materia haberet esse actu, per se haberet individuationem; quia per se haberet divisionem illam, secundum quam dividitur materia. Et sic una pars differret ab alia, non specie sed numero.' *In 4, d. xii, Q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3^m.*

² 'Cum ista accidentia habeant esse et essentias proprias, et eorum essentia non sit eorum esse, constat quod aliud est in eis esse et quod est.' *Ibidem, ad 5^m.*

is proposed, therefore, to consider the question under each of these aspects separately.

i. Considering Accident *as* Accident, it will be found that, in several ways, Accident essentially includes a causal dependence on its Subject.

a. First of all, it includes such dependence *in its own essential Entity*, formally considered; by which it is primarily distinguished from Substance. For Substance is absolutely, without addition, *Being*; whereas Accident is said to be *Being of Being*, because it has in its own Nature a transcendental relation to Substance. But, if its actual Entity is essentially dependent on another; evidently, its Individuation so far forth depends on that other. Wherefore St. Thomas observes, 'Substance is individuated of itself; but accidents are individuated by their Subject, which is Substance. For we speak of this Whiteness, because it is in this Subject¹.' So, in another place, he assigns the reason; and illustrates his position by a reference to Grammar. 'Substance,' he remarks, 'as it has Being of itself, so has it, of itself, unity or multitude. Hence, a noun substantive is taken to be singular or plural, according to the concept expressed by the noun. But, since Accidents have their Being in the Subject; so, from this Subject they receive unity or multitude. Wherefore, in adjectives, the singularity and plurality are regulated by the Supposit², or nouns with which they accord.

b. But Accident depends likewise *genetically* on its Subject; because it is evolved out of that Subject. For, in the generation of Accidents, there must exist in the Substance already constituted, (which is their Subject), a receptivity, of which the Accidental Form is the Act. The Accident, therefore, actuates its Subject, and depends for its Existence on the potentiality out of which it is educed. Moreover, it follows, as an Act, from, or rather is caused by, the essential constitutives of its substantial Subject. Thus, to take an instance, the blush upon a man's face arises from some

¹ 'Substantia enim individuat per se ipsam; sed accidentia individuantur per subjectum, quod est substantia. Dicitur enim haec albedo, in quantum est in hoc subjecto.' I^o xxix, 1, c.

² 'Substantia autem, sicut per se habet esse, ita per se habet unitatem vel multitudinem. Unde et singularitas vel pluralitas nominis substantivi attenditur secundum formam significatam per nomen. Accidentia autem, sicut esse habent in subjecto, ita ex subjecto suscipiunt unitatem vel multitudinem. Et ideo in adjectivis attenditur singularitas et pluralitas secundum supposita.' I^o xxxix, 3, c.

feeling in the soul, acting upon the heart, and producing an accelerated circulation of the blood. The emotive or lower faculties of the soul, and the body normally organized, are essential constituents of the man out of whom this redness is evolved, and who is receptive of this Accident. Further; these essential constituents are joint causes of the supervening affection. So, again, in laughter, there are required, as combining causes, an intellect capable of appreciating the ludicrous, and a peculiar muscular arrangement whose action produces those sounds which go by the name of laughter. But these two elements evidently belong to the soul and body, respectively, which are the essential constitutives of man. Now, in these cases, (and the same may be said of Accidents in general), it is perview to common sense, that the blush and the laughter are elicited or evolved out of the man; that the man was in a prior state of receptivity in their regard, i. e. that he was equally capable of blushing and laughing, as of not blushing and of not laughing. Lastly, it is plain that the feeling (say, of modesty) and the accelerated action of the heart are, together, causes of the blush; and that an intellectual appreciation of the pun together with the spasmodic action of the muscles are joint causes of the laughter.

Whereby it may be perceived, that the generic relation of the Subject to its Accident is threefold; viz. that of a pure receptivity to its Act or, in other words, the relation of a material cause; secondly, that of a necessary, determining, condition; and, finally, that of an efficient cause. It is, however, to be noted, that the last-named relation is not verified in the instance of all accidents. For some of them are, as it were, forced on their Subject by the action of an external cause, as, e. g. the Form of heat in water. From this threefold relationship it may be clearly seen, that Accident has no absolute Existence and, consequently, no absolute Unity; and that its Existence and Unity *genetically* depend on the Subject in which it eventually inheres.

But this is precisely the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. Speaking of Accident, he observes that 'it has neither absolute Existence nor absolute Unity; but its Existence and its Unity depend on that in which it inheres¹.' Then, again, in another

¹ 'Adjectivum autem significat per modum accidentis, quod non habet esse absolutum nec unitatem, sed esse suum et unitas sua dependent ex eo cui inhaeret.' *In* 1, d. ix, Q. 1, a. 2, c.

place: 'Actuality is found in the Subject of an accidental Form, before it is in the accidental Form itself. Hence, the actuality of the accidental Form is caused by the actuality of the Subject; so that the Subject, *as* potential, is susceptible of the accidental Form; *as* actual, it is productive of the same¹.' And once more: 'Shape and all other Accidents follow upon Substance, as their cause. Wherefore, the Subject holds, with regard to its Accidents, the relation not only of a passive potentiality, but also of an active potentiality²; i. e. of an efficient cause.

c. Not only is the Subject genetically necessary to, and determinative of, the Accident, but it is equally necessary, in the natural order, for the conservation of its Accident; for dependence is of the essence of Accident. Accordingly, St. Thomas assures us, that 'in case of all Accidents, universally speaking, the Subject is in some way or other their cause; forasmuch as Accidents are sustained in the actual Entity of the Subject³.'

Now, if the actual Entity of Accident is, in these various ways, dependent on the Subject which it informs,—if it is the actuation of that Subject, and is evolved out of its potentiality,—if, ordinarily speaking, in the case of Accidents generally, and universally in the case of connatural Accidents, the essential constituents of the Subject, either specific or individual, are their efficient cause,—if, moreover, the Subject is, in the natural order, necessary to the conservation of its Accident, can anything be plainer than that the Individuation of the Accident must include a like dependence, and that it is determined by the Individuation of the Subject as by an extrinsic cause?

ii. If Accident is considered as a Form, it partakes of the nature of all material Forms. Now, considering these Forms metaphysically, i. e. as they are in their essential nature, they are Acts or

¹ 'Sed e converso actualitas per prius invenitur in subjecto formae accidentalis quam in forma accidentali. Unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subjecti; ita quod subjectum, in quantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; in quantum autem est in actu, est ejus productivum.' 1^o lxxvii, 6, c. Hence elsewhere St. Thomas says more clearly, 'Accidens naturale causatur ex principiis subjecti.' *De Malo*, Q. iv, a. 2, ad 9^m.

² 'Quia figura et omnia alia accidentia consequuntur substantiam sicut causam. Et ideo subjectum se habet ad accidentia, non solum ut potentia passiva, sed etiam quodammodo ut potentia activa.' *Opusc. LX (aliter LXIII)*, in *Boet. de Trinit.* Q. v, a. 4, ad 4^m.

³ 'Omnibus accidentibus, communiter loquendo, subjectum est causa quodammodo, in quantum scil. accidentia in esse subjecti sustentantur.' *In 1, d. xvii*, Q. 1, a. 2, ad 2^m. It would be well to consult this entire answer.

Actuations of their Subject. In other words, they are the Subject *actually* being what antecedently it was *capable* of being, but was not. Hence, they should be considered as determinations of the Subject rather than as Beings, so to say, on their own account. To put it in St. Thomas' own words: 'Forms are, properly speaking, Being, not because *they* are, but because by means of them something is. So, in like manner, a Form is said to be produced, not because itself is produced, but because something is produced by it, i. e. in that the Subject is reduced from potentiality to act.' Accordingly, further on, he says; 'A quality has no existence, save that which it has in the Subject¹.' And, in another place, he draws the consonant conclusion, that 'Accidents are not individuated by Primordial Matter, but by their own proper Subject, which is actual Being; just as substantial Forms are individuated by their Subject, which is Primordial Matter².' He even applies this doctrine to the human soul. For the soul of a man, though, by reason of its spiritual nature, it is not a purely material Form, is, nevertheless, created to inform this body. Hence it may be regarded under a twofold aspect, viz. as a material Form, and as an incomplete yet spiritual Substance. Because it is a material Form, it may be said to owe its Individuation to the body which it actuates. Because it is a spiritual Substance, it does not receive its individuation from the body, nor with natural dependence on the body; so that it preserves its Individuation, after the severance of union by death. Wherefore, in answer to an objection that, after death, the human soul would cease to be individual, if the body is its only principle of Individuation, the Angelic Doctor makes the following reply: 'There is in the soul no principle of Individuation. And I assert that it receives its Individuation by reason of the body. . . . But, although the Individuation of souls depends on the body as regards their commencement, it is not the same as regards their ending; in such sort that, when the bodies cease to be, the in-

¹ 'Sicut esse non est formae, sed subjecti per formam, ita nec fieri, quod terminatur ad esse, est formae sed subjecti. Sicut enim forma ens dicitur, non quia ipsa sit, si proprie loquamur, sed quia aliquid ea est; ita et forma fieri dicitur, non quia ipsa fiat, sed quia ea aliquid fit, dum scil. subjectum reducitur de potentia in actum. . . . Non est aliquod esse qualitatis, nisi quod habet in subjecto.' *De Virt. in Communi*, Q. 1, a. 11, c. *init.* Read the whole *Corpus*.

² 'Accidentia non individuantur per materiam primam, sed per subjectum proprium, quod est ens actu, individuantur, sicut et formae substantiales per materiam primam, quae est earum subjectum.' *Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), de Principio Individuationis, in fi.*

dividuation of the souls should likewise cease. The reason is, that as every perfection' (and the substantial Act or Form is plainly enough a perfection) 'is infused into matter according to its capacity; the nature of the soul, after this manner, will be infused into different bodies, in differing grades of nobleness and purity. Wherefore, it has an existing entity, defined according to the measure of its body. But, although the soul acquires this definite actual Entity *in* the body; it does not acquire it *from* the body, nor as depending on the body. Hence, when the bodies are taken away, each soul will preserve its own actual Entity defined' (or individuated), 'according to the modifications or dispositions which attended it inasmuch as it was the perfection of such body¹.'

If, then, even substantial Forms, when metaphysically considered, are rather perfections of their Subject than absolute Entities in themselves, for the reason that they are the Acts of the Matter which they inform, and make *it* to be that which it substantially becomes; *à fortiori* must the same be conceded to Accidental Forms, in relation to their Subject. And one may appeal to the facts of experience on this point. Take *whiteness*, for instance; and let us suppose, for the sake of making the illustration clearer, equality of whiteness in two bodies. In the first place, *whiteness* is an intellectual abstraction; in the Concrete and Actual, it will be *this white thing* and *that white thing*. It is the noun, or Subject, that decides the *this* or the *that* of the white. But, letting this pass, how is *this white* distinguished from *that white*? Surely, by the bodies of which they are respectively the Act. To convince oneself of this truth, let the white things be two masses of white paint in different vessels. Pour them now into one vessel; at once there are no longer two whites, but one only. And that whiteness is not an entity independent of the paint; on the contrary, a

¹ 'In anima non est aliquid quo ipsa individuat. . . . Et dico quod non individuat nisi ex corpore. . . . Sed quamvis individuatio animarum dependeat a corpore quantum ad sui principium, non tamen quantum ad sui finem, ita scil. quod, cessantibus corporibus, cesset individuatio animarum. Cujus ratio est, quod cum omnis perfectio infundatur materiae secundum capacitatem suam, natura animae ita infundetur diversis corporibus, non secundum eandem nobilitatem et puritatem. Unde, in unoquoque corpore habebit esse terminatum secundum mensuram corporis. Hoc autem esse terminatum, quamvis acquiratur animae in corpore, non tamen ex corpore, nec per dependentiam ad corpus. Unde, remotis corporibus, adhuc remanebit unicuique animae esse suum terminatum secundum affectiones vel dispositiones quae consecutae sunt ipsam, prout fuit perfectio talis corporis.' *In 1, d. viii, Q. 5, a. 2, ad 6^m.*

moment's reflection assures us that it is a perfection or modification of the paint; something, it is true, physically in itself, but something by which the paint is perfected.

Therefore, if Accident is considered as a Form; it so belongs to its Subject, that its Individuation is rather the Individuation of the Subject whose it is.

NOTE.

Intimately connected with the subject of the present Proposition, is a doctrine of the Angelic Doctor touching Qualitative Accidents; which it would be impossible in a work like this to ignore, even if it were destitute of that interest and, it may be added, of that importance which, as a fact, belong to it. It must be remembered that, as Quantity immediately informs Matter or Material Substance, so Quality immediately informs Quantity and mediately, by means of Quantity, material Substance. Now, St. Thomas considers that there is a difference between these two classes of Accidents, as regards the necessity of *actual* information to their Existence. For he admits that Quantity can *de potentia absoluta* exist as this definite quantity of itself, after separation from its proper Subject; and he gives as a reason, that the Hæcceity of Quantity is not wholly dependent on Matter, but that it is determinable by *Place*. Thus, it is possible to conceive two lines identically the same, yet numerically distinguishable from each other by their diversity of position in space. But he denies that Quality can be sensibly individuated without its *actual* information of Quantity; so that if, *de potentia absoluta*, it were separated from Quantity, (the possibility of which he thereby admits), it would assume the semblance of a separated Form. If, therefore, it were by miracle so separated from Quantity, which is the common root of Individuation for the other material Accidents¹, it would have a Hæcceity of its own; but it would not have that sensible Hæcceity which it had originally derived from the Quantity that was its immediate Subject. It so happens that St. Thomas has professedly treated this question in an article which is an answer to the problem, '*Whether God could cause whiteness or*

¹ 'Et sic relinquitur quod, cum in hujusmodi sacramento' (scil. SS. Eucharistia) 'ponamus dimensiones per se subsistere et alia accidentia in eis sicut in subiecto fundari, non oportet nos dicere quod accidentia hujusmodi individuata non sint; remanet enim in ipsis dimensionibus individuationis radix.' *q Gent. L. IV, c. 65, in fi.*

any other corporeal quality to exist without Quantity?' and the following is his solution of it. 'In order to see whether it is possible for God to cause Whiteness to exist apart from Quantity, it should be understood that, in Whiteness and every other corporeal Quality whatsoever, two things are to be considered; to wit, the nature itself of Whiteness by which it receives its specific character, and its Individuation by which it is this perceptible Whiteness, distinct from any other perceptible Whiteness. The nature, then, of Whiteness might be made by miracle to exist without any Quantity; but such Whiteness would not be like this perceptible Whiteness, but would be a sort of intelligible Form, like the separated Forms invented by Plato. But that this perceptible Whiteness should be individuated without Quantity, is impossible; albeit it is possible for Quantity to be individuated without Substance. For Quantity is not individuated only by its Subject, as other Accidents; but, likewise, by its position in space. For this latter belongs to the nature of dimensive Quantity, which is Quantity having position. Accordingly, it is possible to imagine two separate lines of the same Species, numerically distinct by virtue of their diversity of place. Otherwise, a line would not be divisible, by the very nature of its Genus; for a line is only divided into lines. But to imagine several Whitenesses of the same Species without a Subject, is impossible. Thus it is plain, that Whiteness is only individuated by its Subject; and, on this account, it could not be' (sensibly) 'individual, unless it were in some Subject,—to say the least, in Quantity¹.'

¹ 'Ut ergo videamus utrum fieri possit a Deo quod albedo sit sine quantitate, sciendum est, quod in albedine et qualibet alia qualitate corporali est duo considerare, scil., ipsam naturam albedinis per quam speciem sortitur, et individuationem ejus, secundum quod est hæc albedo sensibilis ab alia albedine sensibili distincta. Posset ergo fieri miraculo, ut natura albedinis subsisteret absque omni quantitate; tamen illa albedo non esset sicut hæc albedo sensibilis, sed esset quaedam forma intelligibilis ad modum formarum separatarum quas Plato posuit. Sed quod hæc albedo sensibilis individuata esset sine quantitate, fieri non posset; quamvis fieri possit quod quantitas individuata sit sine substantia. Quia quantitas non individuatür solum ex subjecto, sicut alia accidentia, sed etiam ex situ, qui est de ratione ipsius quantitatis dimensivæ, quæ est quantitas positionem habens. Et ideo possibile est imaginari duas lineas separatas ejusdem speciei numero diversas secundum diversum situm. Alias linea non esset divisibilis ex ipsa ratione sui generis: non enim dividitur linea nisi in lineas. Plures autem albedines ejusdem speciei sine subjecto imaginari, est impossibile. Et sic patet quod albedo non individuatür nisi ex subjecto. Et propter hoc non posset esse individua, nisi esset in aliquo subjecto, ad minus in quantitate.' *Quol. vii, a. 10, o.*

This doctrine of the Angelic Doctor does not appear to find favour in the eyes of Suarez; the student, then, will decide the question for himself according to its own intrinsic merits. Thus much perhaps may be said, that the modern theory of light seems rather to square with the theory of St. Thomas than with that of his opponents. Take, for instance, a green leaf. It is impossible to understand how the varied undulations of ether could be restricted to a definite wave length, how the transmitted or absorbed light could be lost, how the dispersed light which makes the objects around visible could be thus dispersed and, consequently, how the sensation of green should be produced in the soul by the medium of the organ of sight and its optic nerve, if the Quality that produces these effects and inheres in the Quantity of the leaf were disembodied, so to say, and deprived of its local extension.

SUMMARY.

It will be well to recapitulate the conclusions which have been evolved in the course of this long Article.

Hæcceity is that mode of transcendental Unity, common to all existing things, by which an Entity is rendered incommunicable, as such, to any other, and becomes singularized. In finite Being, (which is here the exclusive subject of inquiry), it adds something real to the specific Nature, considered in the abstract; but is really, objectively, identical with the specific Nature, as it is actually in the individual. Nevertheless, there is a distinction of reason between the two, which has a real foundation. The principle of Individuation is twofold, accordingly as the question is considered *physically* or *metaphysically*. If the Being is regarded as physically constituted, and the question turns on the intrinsic constitutive principle of Individuation; then, in every case, the answer is one and the same. For, whether it be a spiritual or material Substance, a complete or incomplete Substance, an Accident, a substantial or accidental Mode; each Being is individually one by its own actual Entity. If the Being is regarded *metaphysically*, and the question turns on the *genetic* principle of Individuation in the Essences of things; then the answer will be different, according to the different nature of the entities. Spiritual Substance is individuated by its essential incommunicability. Of material Substance, Matter is individuated by dimensive quantity; the Form,

by its proximately disposed Matter; Substantial Modes, by the Matter and Form, principally, however, by the latter. Accidents are individuated by their Subject; with the exception of Quantity, which is partially individuated by position in space. In all, save the first, the principle is extrinsic.

ARTICLE III.

Formal and Universal Unity.

Lemma.

As the purpose of the present work is to offer to the student the fundamental principles of the Scholastic Philosophy in an English dress; it will be necessary, at the outset of this Article, to borrow from Ideology certain important theorems bearing on the origin of ideas. It is true that they have no proper place here and, therefore, they are presented under the form of a *Lemma*; and, for the same reason, they will be simply stated, not proved, and stated with that brevity which is consistent with clearness. If it is permitted to the writer, in the good Providence of God, to complete his plan by adding to the Metaphysics the Psychology and Ideology of the School, these theorems will receive their due share of attention and discussion. They are simply introduced in this place; because, without some knowledge of them, it would have been difficult to understand the questions which now claim attention.

The human soul has a higher and a lower order of faculties. The latter belong to it as substantial Form of the body; the highest it possesses by virtue of its spiritual nature. The lower order of faculties are such as, the senses (not, remark, *the organs* of sense, which belong to the body), the feelings, passions, imagination. The higher order are exclusively two; viz. the intellect and the will. Among all these it will be now necessary to signalize two only, the senses and the intellect; for these are the two great means (the one material, the other formal), for the formation of ideas and, consequently, for the acquisition of truth. To begin with the senses: Material substances are their object, and these objects become present to the senses in the soul through the organs of sense. The objects, thus present, cause a Form of themselves, (not always a formally representative Form), in the sensible faculty, which excites sensation and is (to speak roughly), as a lens through which the object itself is perceived, but never the object of sensible

perception. This form is called a *sensible species*, often also a *phantasm*. Now as these *species* or *phantasms* are produced by the action of the Accidents only of material Substance, and not by the Substance itself, (for material Substance does not energize save in and by its Accidents); it follows, that an act of sensible perception is representative only of the Accidents of Substance, not of the Substance itself. Hence it is, in every sense of the word, material in its representation, though itself the act of a spiritual nature. For this reason, it is only representative of singulars, and of *existing* singulars. With the intellect, however, it is wholly the reverse. Its proper objects are the Quiddities or Essences of things. For, since the Intellect is an immaterial faculty and ‘everything that is received, is received according to the measure of that which receives;’ it follows, that the intellect receives and, as a consequence, intues, material things immaterially, i.e. stripped of their individuating conditions. But, stripped of these, what remains of material Substance, save its Quiddity or Essence? Now, as an Essence is a potential Universal; it follows, that Universals are the proper object of the intellect¹. So strictly is this true, that, according to the Angelic Doctor, the intellect could in no wise become cognizant of the Hæcceity of material Substance, save that it has the power of turning round upon the sensible *phantasmata* which first waked it into energy². Hence, the cognition of Universals is not a concept; but, originally at least, an intuition. It is not representative, but presentative. It is here that we touch upon one of the most fundamental errors in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton; for he seems to deny the possibility of a universal concept that is not reflex.

There remains a question which is sure to be asked by the inquisitive student, and shall be answered here, though in the briefest form. If the intellect, in the beginning, is purely facultative, how do these material Entities become sufficiently present to it; since it abjures all connection with matter or material determinations? Bear in mind throughout, that the soul is entirely free from physical composition; and that all its faculties are faculties of one, simple, undivided, unpartitioned, Substance. The Scholastic answer is as follows. When the sensible *species* has been received in the

¹ Vide D. Thomam, *Opusc. XLIX (aliter XLV), De sensu respectu singularium et intellectu respectu universalium.*

² *Opusc. XXIX (aliter XXV), De principio individuationis.*

soul, it is irradiated and, as it were, transformed by the acting intellect, which is like a Magnesian light, perpetually shining within its spiritual temple. By such irradiation of intellectual light, the *sensible species* becomes an *intellectual species*; by means of which, the possible or *potential* intellect is awakened from its previous state of indifference, (as having an object now present to it), and evolves into an act of cognition. The first or germinal form in this intellectual process is called, in Scholastic phrase, the *impressed species* (*species impressa*); the second or perfect form,—the idea or concept,—is denominated the *expressed species* (*species expressa*). There is the same distinction, and there are the same phrases to express it, in sensible perception.

It only remains to add, that 'the Forms of sensible or material things have a more perfect existence in the intellect, than they have in sensible things themselves. For they are more simple and of wider periphery; since, by means of the one intelligible form of man, the intellect embraces all men in its cognition¹.' This is a truth worth realizing, more especially in the present age.

As the present Article is devoted to the consideration of Formal and Universal Unity; it will be necessary to begin by stating what these two Unities respectively mean, what are the principal points of difference between them, and, lastly, why they are grouped together under one Article.

I. To commence with their *meaning*. From what has gone before it is plain, that, according to the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, (which has been assumed not without reason as typical of the Scholastic Philosophy), Matter with its Accidents may be considered as the principle of Individuation in the case of material Substances; while the substantial Form gives to each its specific or essential Nature. The Matter, then, on this hypothesis, will give to material Substance its *individual* Unity, while the Form will give to it its *specific* Unity. What wonder, therefore, if individual Unity should be called *material*, Unity; while specific, or essential, should receive the name of *formal*, Unity? Thus the nature of this latter is clearly discerned; for Formal Unity is nothing more nor less than Unity of Essence, which is logically represented by *Species*. That such

¹ 'Formae rerum sensibilium perfectius esse habent in intellectu quam in rebus sensibilibus; sunt enim simpliciores et ad plura se extendentes. Per unam enim formam hominis intelligibilem omnes homines intellectus cognoscit.' *q. Gent. L. II, c. 50, 4°.*

Unity, as distinct from individual Unity, is recognised by the common sense of mankind, needs no other proof than the testimony of all languages, ancient as well as modern. For instance; this particular animal is called *Carlo*. But he is also called a *dog*, in common with an indefinite number of other animals to whom the same name of *dog* is applied. The one name is *individual*; the other is *specific*, and is applicable to all *possible* Beings, (as it is actually applied to all *existing* Beings), in which the same essential or specific characteristics are to be found. Each noun, viz. *Carlo* and *dog*, is in the singular, and is, therefore, representative of some sort of Unity; while the one is evidently a different Unity from the other. Individual Unity is a proper object of sensible perception; essential or formal Unity, of either intellectual intuition or cognition. Formal Unity abstracts from Individuation, as is plain from what has been already said; and, in fact, if any one conceives or speaks of *dog*, or a *dog* indefinitely, there is no element of Individuation either in the idea or in its expression. Dog in reality may be one, or it may be many; but it conceptually includes neither Unity nor Plurality. It is a specific Form which abstracts from all relation to concrete subsistence. But the specific Form, for this very reason, is *potentially* Universal, i. e. it is in such a state of indifference to individuation, while as a material Form it is so essentially communicable, that the intellect can conceive it as capable of possible extension, or as actually extended, to an indefinite number of subsisting Entities. If the intellect thus conceives it in its possible or actual relation to such Entities, it becomes a *formal Universal*. Universal Unity is, therefore, formal Unity conceived under this possible or actual relation. It follows from the foregoing explanation, that both these Unities may be called Universals, as indeed they often are; because both abstract from individuation. But formal Unity is what Logicians call an *absolute*; while Universal Unity, properly so called, is *relative* Universal, to which alone the laws of logical distribution formally apply. The former is, therefore, a Metaphysical; the latter, a Logical, Whole. It may be noticed in passing, that this distinction affords a clue to the discovery of a fundamental error in Sir William Hamilton's system of Logic, in so far as it diverges from the beaten track; and renders that original part of it (e. g. the *quantification of the predicate* and, more particularly, the *multiplication of syllogistic modes*), a work of supererogation.

These remarks serve as an introduction to the teaching of St. Thomas touching the aforesaid Unities. '*Universal*,' he remarks in a certain place, 'has two meanings. First, it means the nature simply to which the Intellect attributes a formal concept,' (i.e. of universality), 'by reason of something which it has discovered in that nature. In this sense, Universals which express the nature of things, are predicated essentially. For *Animal* is expressive of the substantial Essence of that of which it is predicated; and *Man*, in like manner. Now, in this sense there is no *Unity in many*. On the contrary, the Essence predicated is always multiplied, with the multiplication of the subjects; for as many men as there are, so many animals are there. Universal means, in the second place, the same nature, considered under the formal concept of universality which is attributed to it. And so understood, on account of the uniformity of the representation to be found in the formal concept, which is caused by the separation of the object from material conditions and every sort of diversity, there is a *Unity in many*. For, in such wise, *men* are *one Man* and *one Animal*. There is nothing, then, really common to many; for whatever really exists, is a Singular communicable to one alone. But that which is common, is a creation of the intellect¹.' There is another passage, a little further on in the same work, wherein St. Thomas develops his meaning at greater length. 'It must be understood, then,' he remarks, 'that, in a nature of itself, (setting on one side the formal concept of universality), there is sometimes a unity, independently of that which the intellect creates, and sometimes there is not.' (The Angelic Doctor is here referring to *formal Unity*.) 'For a nature, after subtracting the formal concept of Universality, e.g. the nature of *Animal*, may be regarded in a threefold light. First of all, it may be considered absolutely and

¹ 'Universale enim dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsa natura, cui intellectus propter aliquid in ea inventum intentionem attribuit. Et sic universalis quae rerum naturas significant, praedicantur *in quid*. Animal namque dicitur substantia illius de quo praedicatur, et similiter homo. Et isto modo non est unum in multis. Immo natura praedicatorum semper multiplicatur, multiplicatis subjectis; quod enim sunt homines, tot sunt animalia. Alio modo dicitur universale natura illa sub intentione universalitatis sibi attributa; et sic propter uniformitatem rationis inventam in intentione, quae fit propter remotionem a materialibus conditionibus et omni diversitate, est unum in multis: Sic enim homines sunt unus homo et unum animal. In re igitur nihil est commune multis; quia quicquid est in re, est singulare uni soli communicabile; quod autem commune est, agitur per intellectum.' *Opusc. XLII (aliter XXXIX), De natura Generis, c. 5, p. m.*

as it is in itself; and, conceived in this way, nothing is consonant with it, save that which enters into its definition; (to take an instance, *an animated sensitive body* enters into the definition of *Animal*); for anything else, from the present point of view, would be attributed to it falsely, as, for instance, that it is *white*, or *musical*, or anything like that. Secondly, this same nature may be considered as received in some one individual of its own kind; and, even yet, there will remain to it the essential Form which absolutely enters into the definition; for *the animal*, which is *Socrates*, is *an animated, sensitive, substance*. But, if it be received in several individuals, necessarily the nature itself at once and its definition will be multiplied. For *Socrates* and *Plato* are *two animals* and *two animated, sensitive, substances*. Wherefore, though, in the nature of *Animal*, there is neither unity nor plurality, as regards the natural capacity it has for being received in several inferiors, seeing that it can be equally received in one or in more than one; there is, nevertheless, in the nature itself, taken absolutely, (i. e. not considered as existing in its subjects), a sort of unity, since, (as is plain), it has one definition and its own proper name. Thirdly, this nature may be considered, as it is in the human mind. And, since everything that is in the mind, is abstracted from every sort of material division and diversity; there is attributed to such nature, by reason of the uniformity which it exhibits relatively to all things, a universal Form, which is one in many.' (The Angelic Doctor commences here to treat of Universal Unity.) 'Hence, under this point of view, such a nature is not multiplied in its inferiors. On the contrary, *many men* are *one man* and *one animal*, by participation in the same Genus and Species; for it is in this wise, that such natures are unified under the forms of Genus and Species. Therefore, there is in these natures a twofold unity; one, that is, in the absolute nature itself, and this nature belongs to each one of the Supposits. Such Unity, however, does not pass down from the nature itself to its Supposits. For instance, it is of the absolute nature of *Animal* to be *an animated, sensitive, substance*, as has been said. Nevertheless, this does not express its absolute nature entirely, but only in part. For it is in its own absolute nature, that it admits of being subjected to the formal concept of Universality; because it is only in an absolute nature that this is possible, and it is possible in every absolute' (abstract) 'nature. If we take in, then, the whole of its nature absolutely, and define it to be *an animated*,

sensitive, nature, naturally capable of being submitted to the formal concept of Universality; neither unity nor plurality of any sort enters into the concept, because either the one or the other may befall it. But this nature has another unity, conferred upon it by the intellect, in which all the Suppositis' (or Substances) 'unite together. Hence the Unity' (Universal), 'created by the intellect in such nature, is based on the Unity to be found in the Entity itself that is subjected to this' (conceptual) 'Unity¹.'

II. These two passages of St. Thomas suggest the second question that has been proposed, and, in great measure, contain the answer to it. The question has regard to *the principal points of difference between formal and universal Unity*. All Unity essentially

¹ 'Unde sciendum est, quod aliquando est unitas a parte naturae subtractae intentioni universalis praeter istam quam facit intellectus, aliquando autem non, *natura autem non.*' (Nota ad calcem, '*fortasse redundant haec verba.*') 'Natura enim quae est subtracta intentioni universalitatis, sicut natura animalis, tripliciter considerari potest. Uno modo absolute et secundum se; et sic, nihil sibi convenit, nisi quod est de intellectu ejus. Ut, puta, de intellectu animalis est corpus animatum sensibile; nihil enim aliud sibi attribui potest secundum hanc considerationem nisi falso, ut album, vel musicum, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Alio modo potest considerari haec natura prout est recepta in aliquo singulari sui generis. Et adhuc inerit sibi ratio quae de intellectu ejus est absolute. Animal enim, quod est Socrates, est substantia animata sensibilis. Sed si recipiatur in pluribus, necessario et natura ipsa et intellectus suus multiplicabitur. Socrates enim et Plato sunt duo animalia et duae substantiae animatae sensibiles. Unde, licet in natura animalis non sit unitas vel pluralitas, secundum quod est nata recipi in pluribus inferioribus, cum possit in uno recipi et in pluribus; est tamen in ipsa natura absoluta accepta, secundum quod non est in inferioribus considerata, quaedam unitas; cum definitio ejus sit una, et nomen suum, ut patet. Tertio modo potest considerari haec natura prout est in anima. Et quia omne quod est in anima est abstractum ab omni divisione et diversitate materiali, attribuitur isti naturae, ratione uniformitatis quam habet ad omnia, ratio universalis quod est unum in multis. Unde sic non multiplicatur haec natura in suis inferioribus; immo plures homines sunt unus homo et unum animal, participando genus et speciem; hoc enim modo convenit talibus naturis secundum rationem generis et speciei. In istis igitur est duplex unitas; una, scil. in natura absoluta; quae natura convenit singulis suppositis. Sed haec unitas non descendit ab ipsa natura ad sua supposita. Sicut de natura animalis absoluta est substantia animata sensibilis, ut dictum est. Sed hoc non dicit totam naturam ejus absolutam, sed aliquid ejus. In natura enim sua absoluta est, quod possit subterni intentioni universalitatis; quia solum natura absoluta hoc potest, et etiam omnis natura absoluta. Comprehendendo ergo totam naturam ejus absolute, dicendo naturam animalis absolutam esse substantiam sensibilem aptam natam subterni intentioni universalitatis, non est de intellectu ejus unitas aliqua, nec etiam pluralitas; quia utrumque potest sibi accidere. Alia est autem unitas naturae, quam habet ab intellectu, in quam omnia supposita conveniunt. Ideo unitas, quam facit intellectus in tali natura, fundatur super unitatem in re inventam, quae una est illa unitate.' *Opusc. XLII (aliter XXXIX), De natura Generis, c. 7.*

includes indivision in the Entity that is one and, consequently, as has been already seen, division from every other that is included under the same determination of Unity. Accordingly, Entities *individually* one are *individually* undivided in themselves, and divided off from every other individual Entity. *Formal* Entities are *formally* undivided in themselves, and divided off from all other formal Entities. Universal *conceptual* Entities are *conceptually* undivided in themselves, and divided off from all other universal conceptual Entities. So far, they all agree. But, besides these two constituents, Individual Unity also essentially includes *incommunicability* of nature to another; and, by this, it is primarily distinguished from both Formal and Universal Unity. For these two essentially include *communicability*, though in very different ways. This leads us to *seven* points of difference between the two.

i. Formal Unity denotes indivision of Essence or Nature, with an aptitude for communicating itself either to one or to more than one. Thus, *Human nature* may be in one man, or it may be in fifty men. Hence, Formal Unity is *indifferent* as to its singularity or multiplication, while at the same time preserving its natural communicability. On the contrary, Universal Unity is not indifferent as to the determination of its communicability; for it is not capable of communicating itself to one, but only to many. Who would not at once perceive the absurdity of the proposition *Man* (i. e. all men) *is Thomas*? Hence,

ii. Formal Unity may be *singular*; Universal Unity, never. God is *formally* one; but it is a contradiction in terms to affirm that He is *universally* one. So, to take another instance, the sun is *formally* one; and it is *potentially* universal (which God is not), for there is nothing repugnant in the idea of a multiplication of suns. Indeed, according to recent astronomical observations, it would seem as though it were of one type with other stars.

iii. A third difference between the two, (and a crucial one it is), arises out of the fact that Formal Unity, as St. Thomas has remarked, is multiplied, with the multiplication of the Subsistences which receive it; whereas Universal Unity is one in all. Hence, Formal Unity ceases, as soon as it is received in more than one Supposit. This is the meaning of those words of the Angelic Doctor at the commencement of the last quotation, ‘In a nature itself, setting on one side the formal concept of Universality, *there is sometimes* a unity, independently of that which the intellect

creates,' i.e. when the Form or Essence is considered either as absolutely free from individual determinations or as communicated to a singular Supposit, 'and *sometimes there is not*,' i.e. when that same Form is considered as communicated to more Subsistences than one. And, in fact, since Formal Unity is the unity of a real specific nature; it is plain that, whenever that nature is really multiplied, the unity must be destroyed. Thus *James* and *William* are two rational animals; not one. But in Universal Unity it is precisely the reverse. For the Species, *Man*, and the Genus, *Animal*, are one in all men.

iv. Hence flows a fourth mark of difference between the two. Universal Unity, of its very nature, includes a transcendental relation to inferiors which are conceived to be included under it. Wherefore, it is essentially *distributive*, as Logicians say. For it is a Unity conceived as existing in many. But Formal Unity does not include any such transcendental relation. To take an instance of each: '*Human Nature is partly spiritual, partly corporeal*,' is an example of Formal Unity, and includes no relation to inferiors; for it would be equally true, if never a man had been created. On the other hand, '*Every man is mortal*,' is an example of Universal Unity; for of man, considered as a common Form existing in all men, it is predicated that he is mortal. The sign of distribution has been prefixed, in order to make the illustration clearer.

v. Another difference between the two is to be found in this; that Formal Unity, when existing in many, ceases of course, (as has been remarked before), to be Unity, and is the division of many with aptitudinal indivision. For though, in the individual determinations and differences, it is many; yet, by abstraction from these individual determinations and differences, it is capable of becoming one. But Universal Unity is, in many, the conceptual indivision of many, together with aptitudinal division. For though, in itself, one Species or Genus; yet, by abstracting from the second Intention or Form of Universality, it *ipso facto* resolves itself into an indefinite number of distinct existing or possible Entities.

vi. From the preceding differences, is gathered another point of difference. Formal Unity is pre-eminently *real*; for it is the Unity of Essence. But Universal Unity is *of itself* entirely logical or conceptual, and has no place outside the objective representation of the intellect.

vii. Lastly, Formal Unity is not directly opposed to Individual Unity; whereas Universal Unity is its formal antithesis. For Individual Unity is indivision in the singular, division in the many; whereas Universal Unity essentially includes division in the singular, indivision in the many.

III. The last question finds an easy answer, in the explanations already given. *Formal and Universal Unity are discussed together in the same Article, because of their intimate relationship.* They are both included in one and the same formal object. Hence St. Thomas declares, in the second quotation, 'There is in these natures a twofold Unity.' In short, Universal Unity is nothing but the Formal, or Essential, Nature which has been subjected to the purely conceptual form of Universality. Hence, every essential Form, as St. Thomas remarks in the same passage, can be transformed by the intellect into a Universal; and nothing save an essential Form can be so transformed. For it should not be forgotten, that Accidents have their own essential nature, no less than Substances. Formal Unity, therefore, is the foundation of Universal Unity; since an absolute nature includes in its essential definition, St. Thomas notes in the same place, an aptitude for being subjected to the form of Universality. Wherefore, it is obvious that it is the same object which, as real, is invested with Formal; as conceptually informed, is invested with Universal, Unity. To the Metaphysician, then, whose object is Essence, these two are virtually the same; and, indeed, he only considers Universal Unity, which is a logical Entity, inasmuch as it is founded in, and in so far forth as it is illustrative of, Formal Unity. Moreover, it follows, as a sort of Corollary, that the constitutive principles and the elements of both, so far as they are real, are identical. It is at once, therefore, more convenient and more philosophical, to consider these two Unities together; the more so, because Universal Unity, in and of itself, is not a proper object of the Metaphysical Science.

These questions answered; the doctrine touching these two Unities will be established, in the Propositions that follow.

PROPOSITION LIII.

There is, in the **Essences or Natures of Actual Entities, a real Formal Unity**, which is conceptually, though not really, distinct from the Individual Unity of those Entities.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition is thus proved. It is sufficiently obvious, from the essential nature of Unity, that there must be as many kinds of Unity as there are kinds of division. But it is equally plain, that there are, in all Entities, material or entitative, and formal or essential, division; which exist in actual Being, antecedently to, and independently of, any intellectual operation whatsoever. Therefore, there must also be in them a material and a formal Unity, independently of all intellectual operation, i. e. *really*.

The *Minor* of this syllogism is approved by common sense, and is confirmed by the universal testimony of mankind, as expressed in the construction of all languages. For, in them all, are to be found common nouns which express a certain class or group of things, as distinguished from another class or group. Thus, *dog, cat, horse, cow, pig, tree, shrub, plant, insect, reptile*, are so many words which represent distinct groups; and common sense teaches us, that the nature of *a dog* is really divided off from the nature of *a plant*, for instance, or of *a reptile*. Moreover, we clearly perceive, under the same guidance, that the nature of *a dog* is really nearer to that of *a reptile* than to that of *a plant*; and nearer to that of *a cat* than to either of the other two. Yet, even between the two groups or kinds which are nearest akin, we recognize a substantial difference or division. No matter at present, whether the characteristic notes have been rightly estimated, or of what nature the division may be, as conceived by us; the fact remains incontestable, that common sense recognizes a substantial division between these groups of Being. When, however, it is necessary to divide numerically or individually; Language supplies us either with a proper name, or a demonstrative pronoun, or some other equivalent prefix. We call the dog *Caesar*; or we speak of it as *this dog*, to distinguish it from *that*; or we call it *the dog*, that one, viz. of which we have spoken before; or we describe it by its individual notes, e. g. *a black and tan, with a white spot on its forehead*.

This is further confirmed by individual experience. For we

recognize in *Peter* the essential unity of his manhood, equally with that individual unity by which he is himself and no other, numerically divided off from all others of his kind.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER asserts, that *Formal Unity is conceptually distinct from Individual Unity in the same Entities.*

This assertion admits of little doubt. For the Nature, or Essence, is conceived as something distinct from the individual or individuals to whom it is, as it were, communicated. But, so conceived, it has its own Formal Unity; although it has no Individual Unity. Therefore, the two Unities are at least conceptually distinguished from each other. A moderate analysis of thought will serve to show, that, in the two concepts of *Man* and of *Julius Caesar*, there is an objective unity in each respectively; yet, that the unity in the one is at least conceptually distinct from the unity of the other, even when we think *Man* in connection with *Julius Caesar*.

Furthermore: Individual Unity is not, of itself, a necessary attribute of the absolute Nature in finite Being; and finite Being is the exclusive object of the present inquiry. Consequently, something must be, at least conceptually, added, in order to determine a given Nature to the Individual; i. e. in other words, in order to invest it with Individual Unity. But Formal Unity is its own special attribute; and needs not, even conceptual, addition.

Lastly: it is impossible to conceive of an absolute Nature or Essence, without this Formal Unity; whereas, it is quite possible to conceive this same Nature without any Individual Unity. For men, as a fact, form such concepts, every day they live. Therefore, the two are conceptually distinct.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER affirms, that *these two Unities are not really distinct.*

PROLEGOMENON.

It is not intended here to enter into the vexed question, touching the Platonic *ideas*; for this is usually reserved for Ideology. Nor, indeed, is it of such necessity to offer an elaborate refutation of it in our day; seeing that the course of modern thought runs in a totally opposite direction. Perhaps it may not be inopportune to remind the student, that there has always existed a diversity of opinion as to the mind of Plato concerning these ideas. If he meant them to stand for the prototypal Ideas in the Divine Intelligence; his theory harmonizes with the doctrine that will appear in the sequel. If, as he has been more generally under-

stood, he has willed to create a Universe of substantial Forms outside the Divine Mind, eternal, immutable, of which created Essences are a sort of shadow, Aristotle's objections are irrefragable; and the theory includes within itself so many contradictions, that, apart from its uselessness in Philosophical investigation, it is deservedly rejected as a wild and untenable conceit. The proof, then, of this third assertion has been already given in preceding inquiries. For it has been shown, that, in real Being, the Specific or Essential Nature is not really distinct from the individual Subsistence. But, if this be true; since Unity follows Entity, Formal, cannot be really distinct from Individual, Unity.

Again: albeit the intellect can consider the Essence or Nature, absolutely as it is in itself, by abstraction from the individuals in which it is found; yet such Essence has no real actual Being, save in the Individual. Hence, Aristotle declares in his *Categories*, that 'if first substances' (i. e. individuals) 'did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the others' (second substances, or Genera and Species) 'to exist¹.' Therefore, a nature has no real Entity, apart from the Individual, and, as a consequence, no real Unity; and no Unity, really distinct from the singular Unity of each individual.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE THIRD MEMBER.

I. A Nature or Essence can be defined. Thus, the Nature in *William* and *Robert* has, as a fact, its proper definition. Therefore, it must have a Unity of some sort or other; for nothing can be defined that is not one. But this Unity is no mere creation of the Intellect; because, as common sense teaches and as is admitted by general consent, the Nature is real, and its definition is not a mere logical fiction. Therefore, the Unity, which is its transcendental Attribute, is real too and, consequently, really distinct from Individual Unity, which it in a manner excludes; since indifference is incompatible with determination.

ANSWER. Definition is an intellectual act, and presupposes a Unity, at least equivalent to its own nature. Absolutely, therefore, conceptual Unity is sufficient for definition; otherwise, there could be no definition of *Second Intentions*, which are purely logical. But this does not solve, though it serves towards solving, the

¹ Μη οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι. *Categ. c. 5, in init.*

difficulty. The reason why it does not solve the objection is, because the object is confessedly real, and the Unity therefore real. But, even so, it is sufficient that *the foundation* should be real and the Unity *fundamentally* real; for then, though the Entity may be *formally* Logical or Conceptual and the Unity, in consequence, *formally* Conceptual, the foundation itself is real and, consequently, the definition no mere creation of the Intellect. In other words, the object itself is real; but the mode of representing it may be purely logical. A number of individuals have certain notes in common; that is to say, there are points in which they are precisely similar to each other. This gives rise to a common notion. But the *community* or *commonness* itself is not in the notes. It is an act of the Intellect which collects them into one. The definition represents those notes, which are similar in each individual; and, so far, is real. But that it represents them as formally one nature, is purely its own handywork. Therefore, the representation is real and the definition real, because they have a real corresponding objective concept; and to such extent the unity is real. Yet neither the nature itself, so represented and defined, nor the Unity of such Nature, is *really distinct* from the Individual Entity and Individual Unity in which alone it is discoverable.

II. The second objection is as follows. Unity consists in indivision; wherever, therefore, indivision is discoverable, Unity is there. But human nature,—to take an example,—has of itself formal indivision; therefore, of itself, it has formal Unity, which is, in consequence, really distinct from the individual Unity of the Subsistence, or Supposit, in which it is found. Now, that human nature of itself has this formal indivision, is obvious. For, if it had not of itself formal indivision, of itself it would have formal division; since indivision is nothing else than absence or privation of division. Yet, if *of itself* it admitted or included formal division, it would have it always and everywhere. But, as a fact, this is not the case; for, whenever it is considered absolutely apart from the Subsistences to which it is communicated, it does not include formal division.

ANSWER. It will be necessary to distinguish the word, *indivision*. For indivision may be predicated of its subject, as either positively or negatively pertaining to it. Positive indivision in a Being excludes the possibility of division in that Being; for it is a real attribute of Being, under the form of a privation. But negative

indivision consists in an indifference to indivision or division, and, consequently, to Unity or Multiplication; being compatible with either. Thus, the absence of *rationality* negatively belongs to *animal*; because, *as* animal merely, it is neither rational nor irrational, but is indifferent to either, and nevertheless capable of either. But the same absence of rationality belongs positively to *a brute*; hence, it is incapable of the contrary. So, in like manner, it may be negatively said of a *superficies*, considered merely as it is in its own nature, that it is neither *white* nor *black*; because it is indifferent to either. But this does not hinder its becoming white or black, by subsequent determination. To answer the difficulty, therefore, in form. The *Major* must be distinguished. Unity consists in indivision; so that, if the indivision be a positive attribute, the Unity will be positive and real,—*granted*; so that, if the indivision is merely negative, (consisting in an indifference to division or indivision), the Unity will be positive, actual, real,—*denied*. Wherefore, in like manner, in answer to the proof of the *Minor*. ‘If it of itself admitted formal division’ positively, ‘it would have it always and everywhere’—*granted*: ‘If it of itself admitted formal division’ negatively, ‘it would have it always and everywhere,’—*denied*; because it may be afterwards positively determined to one.

But the difficulty is further urged. It would appear as though a Nature were not only negatively, but positively, undivided in its formal Essence. For Formal division is Essential division, and *man*, (to take an instance), cannot be essentially divided; although it is possible that he should be materially divided into many Supposits, or Subsistences.

ANSWER. This *instantia* serves to evince, indeed, that there is a Formal Unity in Beings; but, as intended to prove the common nature of this Unity and, consequently, a real distinction between Formal and Individual Unity, the argument labours under the defect of equivocation in more than one respect. For, when it is said that a Nature is of itself formally undivided, so that anything like formal division is a contradiction; this may mean that the Nature is in such wise formally one, that it is impossible for it to be further divisible by formal, or essential, Differences. If such be the meaning, it is manifestly false in regard of Generic Natures; for these have their own Formal Unity, and yet, are capable of formal division by Specific Differences. Again: though it is true

of Specific Natures ; yet, that does not tell in favour of the objection. For, though Specific Natures are not divisible by formal, they are divisible by individual, Differences ; and these cause that the Specific Nature should have, in each individual, its Formal Unity, really distinct from that which it has in any other. Or the words may mean, that a Nature is in such sort undivided of itself as to forbid all division or multiplication of its Formal Unity. So understood, it is false again, even in regard of Specific Natures. For, although in the individuals there is no essential division or distinction ; yet *there is a real division or distinction of essences*. Therefore, though individuals do not formally or essentially differ ; notwithstanding, they have distinct Formal Unities, proper to each. How comes it to pass, then, that individuals are not distinguished from one another formally or essentially ? Because it is not enough for such formal distinction, that the Subjects of distinction should have essences entitatively distinct from each other severally ; but it is likewise necessary, that those Essences or Forms should exhibit a dissimilarity of notes, such as would forbid their inclusion under one objective concept or under one definition, and that, in consequence, they should not only differ *existentially* or really, but *conceptually also*.

III. Lastly it is objected, that *human nature*, for instance, is of itself and positively Being. Therefore, of itself and positively it has some sort of Unity. But such Unity is not material or numerical, as is plain ; otherwise, it would be incapable of multiplication. Consequently, it must be Formal ; because there is no middle Term. This argument is confirmed by an example. *Human nature* and the nature of a *horse* are in themselves, apart from all individual determinations, really and essentially two distinct entities. If so, then each of them is essentially one. For, where there is no Unity, there can be no Plurality ; where there is no intrinsic indivision, there can be no division or separation from others.

ANSWER. A reply must be given to the present, similar to those already made to the previous, objections. The argument is doubtless a convincing proof that there is a real Formal Unity in each entity, pertaining to the Specific Nature ; by virtue of which, that Nature formally differs, and is divided off, from every other Specific Nature. And thus much is maintained in the first Member of the present Proposition. But it does not avail to

prove, that this Formal Unity is *really* distinct, in the Subject, from Individual Unity; so that it is *really* common to all the individuals that are included under it. Perhaps, it will not be profitless to justify and elucidate this solution by a fuller explanation. It is here maintained, then, that a Nature or Essence is not *really* common to many, but that, on the contrary, it is really identical with the individual Supposit, in every instance; so that there are really as many Natures as there are individuals. The Nature, however, is *conceptually* common to many; yet, *conceptually only*. Nevertheless, the concept is not a pure fiction of the intellect; because it is based on the similarity or equivalence of the essential notes in each. Precisely in the same manner, Formal Unity is not *really*, but only *conceptually*, common to many; and it is really divided into as many Formal Unities as there are individual Unities. Each of these Formal Unities is undivided in itself; but, taken in common, they are not *in reality* formally undivided, though they are so in the *conceptual* Unity of a common similarity, by reason of which they cannot properly be said to be formally distinct, but are Formal Unities individually distinct. Wherefore, the principle of real distinction between each individual essence and the Formal Unity of that essence, is not the Formal Nature but the individual Difference. Let this doctrine be illustrated by an example. *William* and *Henry* have each a *soul*, *animating an organized body*. In this they are precisely similar; and, accordingly, they are called *men*, and are said to participate in one common nature. There can be no doubt that this nature is real; yet it is equally plain, that the human nature in *William* is really distinct from the human nature in *Henry*, and that the nature in each is really identical with the individual Difference of each. For the soul of *William* is really *this* soul, with all its individual characteristics; and the soul of *Henry* is really *that other* soul, with all its individual characteristics. So, the body of *William* is really *this* individual body, with its special features, proportions, and the like; while the body of *Henry* is *that other* body, with its distinguishing marks. Nevertheless, it is equally true that *Henry* and *William* are equally distinguished from a *horse*; in that they each have a *rational soul*, *animating a specifically organized body*. But these essential constituents are only *conceptually* common to both, because entitatively they are distinct in each; and the real distinction arises from the fact, that *William*

is individually other than Henry. Yet, the essential notes are considered as common to both, because of their similarity in each ; which causes in the mind the concept of a specific identity. The similarity itself, however, is not conceptual ; as is manifest to common sense. On the contrary, it is pre-eminently real.

PROPOSITION LIV.

Universal Unity, as such, is not real ; nor has it any existence in real actual Entities, antecedently to the operation of human thought.

PROLEGOMENON I.

It follows, as a Corollary, from the proofs and accompanying explanations which have been given in the preceding Thesis, that those natures which are conceived and denominated Universals are real, and really exist in the entities themselves. If it were not so, it would be a bad look-out for Science. For Science is based on definitions, and perfected by demonstrations ; but both definitions and demonstrations are only of Universals. If Universals were, therefore, as some extreme Nominalists have maintained, nothing but chimeras of the brain, destitute of all foundation in reality ; Science, of whatever kind, would resolve itself into a mere logical fiction. For even the imperfect Science, (if Science it can be called), which is generated by pure Induction, must go with the rest ; since all Induction ends in a putative Universal. Moreover, all Universals are the logical clothing of an Essence ; and an Essence is eminently real. Individual determinations are for the most part purely phenomenal, so far as they reveal themselves to human perception, and are the formal object of sensation ; while the nature, which human thought robes in its garment of Universality, is the proper object of the intellect. Nay, the Universality itself is an imperfect, yet pregnant, symbol which the human mind has used, for expressing, in its own way, the order of the one Whole.

PROLEGOMENON II.

It is also here supposed and, indeed, follows, as another Corollary, from all which has preceded, that these Entities, or Natures, which are conceived and denominated Universals, are not really distinct from the individual Beings in which alone they are to be found. The absurdity of supposing really subsistent Universals, existing

on their own account, is too manifest to find acceptance with the intellects of this eminently *practical* age. For,—not to urge the patent fact that everything which *really is*, is singular,—the supposition in question is involved in manifold self-contradictions. We will imagine, for a moment, that *Man* exists,—a Being really distinct from all individual men. What would be the result? He would *ipso facto* cease to be a Universal. But why? Because it is of the essential nature of a Universal, that it should be *one in many*. But this universal Man would not be in one, much less in many; because, according to the hypothesis, he is really distinct from each and all. Yet it is a contradiction in terms to affirm at once, that he is really distinct from, yet intrinsically included in, each and all of the same individuals. Again: if *Man* is an entity really distinct from *William* and *Henry*; it could not possibly enter into the essential constitution of either. Consequently, neither of them would be men. Lastly, (for the sake of more effectually exposing the absurdity of such a theory), suppose that these subsistent Universals could enter into the intrinsic constitution of the individuals grouped under them respectively; into what a Chinese ivory ball each individual would be transformed, circle within circle, yet each independent of the other! Take the case of *William* again: There would be in him subsistent Substance, subsistent Body, subsistent Life, subsistent Animality, each independent of the other,—to say nothing of the generic and specific Accidents, which there is no just reason for excluding. And all these are thus gathered together, without either purpose to serve or functions to exercise. It is surely not necessary to discuss, at greater length, so wild and baseless a theory.

PROLEGOMENON III.

Assuming, therefore, as indubitable, that the entities, which are conceived as Universals, are really identical with the Singulars, or individual Beings, to which they owe their origin; there still remains a question that awaits solution. For though, as has been seen, the specific, is really identical with the individual, nature in each existing Being; yet, the nature is in itself real in such sort, that there is in each individual a real Formal Unity, though not really distinct from Individual Unity. In like manner the question may arise, whether

the Nature, which is denominated Universal, has a Unity, by reason of which it has received the name of a Universal, sufficient to justify us in saying, that not only the Universal Nature, but the Universality itself, is in entities, antecedently to all action of the Intellect. To give an answer to this question, is the purport of the present Proposition.

PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION.

There are only two real Unities discoverable, or intelligible, in Being; to wit, Numerical or Individual, and Formal. But neither of these is sufficient to establish Universal Unity. Therefore, Universal Unity is not real, and has no existence, antecedently to human thought.

The *Major* of this syllogism is sufficiently evident. For, as has been before remarked, Unity is indivision, or absence of division. Consequently, there will be so many, and *only* so many, real Unities in Being, as their real kinds of division. But entities are only really divided or distinguished from each other, either numerically or specifically. If there be any other real distinction, let it be produced.

The *Minor* plainly follows from the doctrine, established in the preceding pages of this Article. Singular Unity cannot be the real constitutive of Universal Unity; for the two are diametrically opposed to each other. Neither can Formal Unity be the adequate constitutive; for it may be in one, and, if it be in many, the Unity is multiplied with the multiplication of Supposits. But Universal Unity cannot be in one, and is itself essentially one in many. This second Member, however, in proof of the *Minor* requires, because of its intrinsic importance, further enucleation. Wherefore,

PROPOSITION LV.

The existing similarity of Entities to each other is neither a necessary nor, of itself, sufficient foundation of a real Universal Unity that precedes all action of the Intellect.

It has been pointed out in the fifty-third Thesis, that Formal Unity is conceived as common and communicable, by virtue of a real similarity in the essential notes of each individual included under such Nature or Specific Form. But it is one thing to say, that the Nature is considered as common, or universal, by virtue of

such similarity in the notes; and quite another thing to say, that this similarity of Nature is either necessary or sufficient, of itself, without any operation of the Intellect, to establish a real Universal Unity. It is here maintained, that such similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient.

I. PROOF OF THE FIRST MEMBER, viz. *that the existing similarity of Entities to each other, even in their essential notes, is not necessary to the constitution of a Universal.*

It is quite certain that one thing cannot be necessary to the constitution of another; if this other can be constituted and, as a fact, is constituted without it. But such is precisely the case here. For Universals are capable of being formed, and have been formed, by the human Intellect, in instances wherein a similarity of notes in distinct Entities does not exist, simply because there is only one Entity in the Species. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the mind can, and does, conceive *the sky* as a Universal. It is even spoken of as *the heavens*; yet there is but one sky. Lastly, St. Thomas maintains, as we have seen, that each Angel is a specific Nature in himself; yet that *de potentia absoluta* other individuals might be created of the same Nature. Thus, there might be many Gabriels; or rather, many Gabriel-Natures. But the Angelic Doctor could not have formed this thought, without, at the same time, conceiving the nature of Gabriel as a Universal. It is true that the universal concept *may* be formed, by this comparative abstraction, and subsequent generalization, of essential notes in distinct Entities; but it is neither necessary nor is it the more ordinary process of its genesis. Let the student recall to mind the substance of the *Lemma* which inaugurated the present Article. It was therein stated, that the Intellect, *in itself*, has the Essences alone of things for its proper object. Indeed it only embraces the material and individual determinations, by a recurrence to the sensible *phantasmata* which first provoked it to its act. By virtue, then, of that essential Form, which is its own native object, it can readily form a Universal, out of the material that one Entity affords it. What is the real underlying principle, (in such, as in every other, case), upon which the Universal Idea may be truthfully constructed, is a question which will be treated in its place.

II. PROOF OF THE SECOND MEMBER, viz. *that the similarity of entities to each other is not, of itself, a sufficient foundation of a real Universal Unity.*

The words, *of itself*, are equivalent to this; that such similarity is not sufficient, without the aid of an intellectual act. And the reason or proof is manifest enough, with a little consideration. For similarity connotes the distinctness or division of those entities which are accounted similar. If they were not distinct; they would not be similar, but identical. Therefore, the idea of similarity represents a certain number of entities, with really distinct notes, which bear a resemblance to each other, such as to create an aptitudinal indivision. But Universal Unity, which in this respect has the same nature as other Unities, requires actual indivision. Wherefore,—to sum up in few words,—Similarity is actual division, with aptitudinal indivision; while Universal Unity is actual indivision, with aptitudinal division. The former, then, cannot satisfy for the latter.

PROPOSITION LVI.

The aptitude, which any given Nature possesses, to be in more entities than one, is a sort of indifference, or absence of repugnance, which has a real foundation in the Nature itself; but, nevertheless, does not belong to such Nature really and actually, till the said Nature has been submitted to a process of intellectual abstraction.

In this Thesis the question is mooted touching the nature of that *aptitude to be in many*, which is proper to a Universal. It is obvious, from the doctrine established in preceding Propositions, that this aptitude is nothing which belongs to a nature as really and actually existing, though it may have a real foundation in the nature. It remains to determine what such aptitude precisely is.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER the aptitude of any given nature to be in more subjects than one, is described as a sort of indifference or absence of repugnance; and most justly. For, wherever aptitude of such a kind is conceived to belong to a Form or Nature, plainly enough such Form is not as yet determined to one; if it were, it would not be capable of being participated by many. But, if it is not as yet determined to one Subject; it is indifferent to being in this or that, to being in one or more. So, again, if the Nature is not as yet determined to one, that is to say, individuated; there is no repugnance in our conceiving it as participable by many. To give an instance: *Man* is a Nature which, as it is conceived by our intellect, is not as yet determined to *James*, or *Charles*, or *Henry*.

As such, therefore, it is indifferent to being in one of the three, rather than in either of the other two. Furthermore, there is no repugnance in the concept of its being in all three, and in others besides: whereas, if it were considered as it is really and formally in Charles, it would be *this* man; and the Nature, thus determined, would exhibit a repugnance of communicability to any other. For the same real, actuated, human nature, which is in Charles, could never be conceived as existing in Henry or James.

So far, the matter is clear; but the investigation must be pursued farther. Is this aptitude, or indifference, or absence of repugnance, a real positive Mode of any given Nature; or is it a negative Mode, so to speak, consequent upon conceptual abstraction? Is it something in the Nature itself; or is it the result of an intellectual operation? This question is resolved in the third member of the present Proposition.

II. But it will be necessary, before entering on this somewhat difficult discussion, to refer to the SECOND MEMBER, wherein it is stated that the aptitude, which a given nature possesses to be in more subjects than one, '*has a real foundation in the nature itself.*' This part of the Thesis need not delay us long, since it has been sufficiently evolved in preceding Propositions, coupled with the *Lemma* which heads the present Chapter; and its consideration will recur in the next Proposition. Let it suffice here, therefore, to remind the reader that, in each existing Being, there are certain essential notes, distinct from the differential or individual, which are the primary object of the intellect; and that, in the instance of many individuals appertaining to one common nature, those notes are precisely similar in each individual. Those notes which, in their combination, constitute the Essence, or certain Nature, in a definite grade of Being, and that actual similarity of notes in the case of individuals existing under one determined Species, are, both of them, a reality, and the real foundation to the intellect of man for conceiving a common nature which has an aptitude for existing in more subjects than one. Of these the former are the primary object of a *direct* Universal; the latter is rather the object of a reflex and philosophical Universal. But of these two kinds of Universals, and of the process of the mind in the genesis of each, more will be said in the succeeding Thesis.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER declares that '*this aptitude does not belong to such nature really and actually, till the said nature has been*

submitted to a process of intellectual abstraction. Such is the solution of the question proposed above; the demonstration in proof is as follows. Everything that is real in itself either actually exists or has a transcendental relation to existence; so that it could exist, if an efficient cause were ready to produce it. Yet, an aptitude to exist in many subjects, neither exists nor could exist as such; because all that is existent, is individual. But the *determined* and *singular* cannot be *undetermined* and *common*; so that an aptitude to be in many, could not possibly exist. It has been maintained, however, by the fautors of the opposite opinion, that though such aptitude cannot possibly exist in actual Being, (which the argument just given sufficiently proves), yet it may for all that be a real positive Mode; because it can belong to such Nature in its state of objective possibility, though lost when that possible Essence is actuated. But, first of all, it has been seen in a preceding Chapter, that purely possible Being is nothing intrinsically in itself, and, consequently, cannot have a real positive Mode or modification of itself, as is clear; for a Mode of nothing is no Mode. Again, the primary argument already given comes back with undiminished force, as touching such a hypothesis. For it is granted, that this supposed Mode cannot by any possibility exist; but, if it has no transcendental relation to existence, it cannot be real and positive. Moreover, it may be added, in confirmation of this last argument, that if it be a real positive Mode, essentially belonging to every Nature; it looks like a contradiction in terms to admit, at the same time, that this Mode is irrecoverably lost, as soon as it is actuated and exists outside its causes. Lastly, what is to be said as to the Unity of this positive Mode? Is it numerically one, or is it specifically one and capable of individual multiplication? The latter cannot be maintained. For, in such case, it would follow, that this Mode would be capable of individual multiplication in the individual; which is absurd. The former, i. e. that it should be *numerically* one, is simply inconceivable. For, if it were numerically one, it would have its own individual Difference; and how is it possible to conceive, that an individual Difference should be capable of belonging to more Entities than one? Hence it is just to conclude, that the said aptitude to exist in many subjects, does not really and actually belong to any Nature prior to, and independently of, all operation of the intellect.

PROPOSITION LVII.

Universal Unity is formally a simple creation of the intellect; though individual Entities contain within themselves a sufficient foundation for the concept.

Such is the unequivocal teaching of the Angelic Doctor; and, as it has been the author's intention, from the beginning to the end of this work, to exhibit before his readers not so much his own theories as the more approved Scholastic teaching, it will be well to recur, in the first instance, to the authority of St. Thomas. In the following quotation, St. Thomas principally confirms the first member of the Thesis. Taking *man* as his example, he says that 'The character of a Species attaches to human nature, according to the entity it has in the intellect. For this same nature has an entity in the intellect, which is abstracted from all individuating notes, and it has a uniform character relatively to all the individuals that are outside the mind; inasmuch as it is essentially the image of all and conducive to the knowledge of all, so far forth as they are *men*. And, for the reason that it bears such a relation to all the individuals, the (human) intellect invents the idea of Species, and offers it to itself. Hence, the Commentator (Averroes) says in his first Book *on the Soul*, that it is the intellect which creates universality in entities; and Avicenna says the same thing, in the *eighth Book of his Metaphysics*¹. In this passage St. Thomas teaches that the *relative* Universal, which is representative of the *universal* unity of a nature, is a pure creation of the intellect; though it is founded in the *absolute* Universal, which itself is based on a real foundation. The second quotation more immediately confirms the second member of the Proposition. 'When we speak of an abstract Universal,' says St. Thomas, 'there are two elements in the concept; to wit, the Nature itself of the thing, and the abstraction or Universality.'

¹ 'Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Ipsa enim natura habet esse in intellectu abstractum ab omnibus individuans, et habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua quae sunt extra animam, prout essentialiter est imago omnium et inducens in cognitionem omnium, in quantum sunt homines. Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua, intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. Unde dicit commentator, 1^o de Anima, quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in 8^o Metaphysicorum.' *Opusc. XXX (aliter XXVI), De Ente et Essentia, c. 4, in m.*

The Nature, then, itself, whose lot it is to be apprehended, or to become subject of abstraction, or of the form of Universality, exists only in singulars; but the apprehension itself, or abstraction, or form of Universality, is in the intellect. This may be clearly seen from the analogy of the senses. For the sight perceives the colour of the *apple*, without its smell. If the question is put, where the colour is, which is perceived without the smell; it is manifest that the colour which is seen, is in the apple. But, that it is perceived without the smell, is attributable to the sense of sight; because, in sight, there is the sensible species of colour, but not of smell. In like manner, *Humanity*, which is the object of intellectual perception, is only in this or that (individual) man; but, that Humanity should be apprehended without its individual conditions, [which is an act of abstraction, after which flows the form of Universality], is the result of its perception by the intellect, in which there is the species or likeness of the specific Nature, and not of the individual elements¹. In other words, as the smell and the colour (i.e. the causes of these sensations), are in the apple; but the reason why the colour is perceived apart from the smell, is to be found in the sense of sight which, so to speak, abstracts its own proper object from everything else with which that object is really united: so, the Nature is really in the individual man; though the abstraction of that Nature from its individual conditions, is attributable to the intellect, whose proper object is the Form or Essence, not the individual Differences. For these latter are the proper object of sense.

In the next quotation St. Thomas is giving a threefold division of objects, as represented by names. Some there are, as he says, which in their simple entirety are external to the mind. Others there are, in no respect external to the mind, such as a *chimera*.

¹ 'Cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur; scil. ipsa natura rei et abstractio, seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi, vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus. Sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi, vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine ejus odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore, manifestum est quod color qui videtur non est nisi in pomo. Sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, in quantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine; sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsum abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei et non individualium principiorum.' 1^o lxxv, 2, ad 2^m.

Lastly; 'There are others,' he adds, 'which have a real foundation external to the mind; but the complement of their nature, as regards its *formal* element, is the result of an intellectual operation, as we clearly see in a Universal. For Humanity is something real, but its form of Universality is not so; since, outside the mind, there is no Humanity that is common to many. But, in accordance with the mode of its apprehension by the intellect, there is added to it, by the operation of the intellect, a Form, by virtue of which it is called a *Species*¹.'

The number of similar passages might be indefinitely increased; but those already cited are amply sufficient to show the mind of the Angelic Doctor touching the nature and origin of Universals. It remains, to confirm the truth of the present Proposition by reason.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER, viz. that *Universal Unity is formally a simple creation of the mind*, is thus proved. Let us suppose for a moment, that a Nature or Essence has a real universal Unity proper to itself; alike prior to, and independent of, any intellectual operation. In such case, this Unity would appertain to it, either as it exists in the individual or individuals, or as it is conceived to be in its own absolute entity. But either hypothesis is untenable; and, therefore, the supposition.

i. Universal Unity cannot belong to a Nature, as it exists in the individual or in individuals. For, plainly enough, it is incompatible with the Nature as individuated, i. e. as existing in a single individual; since there is a manifest contradiction. But neither can it belong to this Nature, as existing in a *collection* of individuals. For, first of all, there may be a Universal Nature which is to be found in one only subject. Then, again, there is no conceivable property belonging to all, which does not belong to each individual, excepting multitude or multiplicity. But bare multitude does not constitute Unity.

ii. Universal Unity cannot belong to any Nature, considered in its own absolute entity. For, antecedently to all operation of the

¹ 'Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae; ut patet in universalibus. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re; non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis, sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species.' In 1, d. xix, Q. 5, a. 1, c.

intellect, that Nature is really undistinguishable from the individual or individuals in which alone it really exists, as has been already shown. If, however, it is not itself existing, it is a mere possible; and, as such, is nothing in itself, but exists only as an objective concept in some intellect. And, even in this state, it can have no transcendental relation to the reality of existence, till it has been conceived as individual.

There is an additional confirmatory argument, which may be put in the form of a dilemma. If universal Unity really belongs to a Nature, irrespective of any intellectual operation; then it belongs to that Nature either essentially or by accident. But neither is possible. Hence it follows, that such Unity cannot belong to a Nature *really*, but *conceptually* only.

The *Minor* is thus proved. If universal Unity really and essentially belongs to every created nature, then the nature must necessarily retain this Unity in each individual Subject; since it must ever retain its own essential property. But this involves a patent contradiction. Again: universal Unity cannot really belong to a Nature by accident; for, in such case, it would be a mere accident of that Nature. If, however, it is a mere accident; it must attach to that Nature by reason of some Singular or Individual. Further: if a positive accident, its genesis would be due to some action of a singular or individual extrinsic agent, (extrinsic, that is, to the essential Nature itself). If it be a privative accident; then, to the absence of such action. But all these cases involve individuation, which is directly opposed to Universality. Lastly, even if the thing were intrinsically possible; it would puzzle any man to explain, or even imagine, what sort of an accident it could be. Hence, we may conclude that it is not real, but a creation of the intellect.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the present Proposition needs only a passing reference; for it has been already sufficiently established in the foregoing Thesis. But it is repeated, because of its primary importance; for in it is to be found the fundamental point of difference between Peripatetic Conceptualism or moderate Realism, as it has been sometimes called, and pure Nominalism. There are, then, real notes in each and every individual, belonging to a certain definite order of Being, which are so precisely similar in each and all, as not to admit of other than numerical distinction, and at the same time to justify the concept of specific identity. Those notes,

grouped together in orderly unity, are the sole proper object of intellectual intuition; and the concept, hence arising, exhibits, in consequence, the formal Unity of its object. If, by reflex thought, that formal Unity is considered in relation to the subjects in which it is to be actually found and to the subjects indefinitely in which it is capable of reproduction, the intellect conceives a true Universal. The concept itself is evidently reflex; and is purely logical in its form as a *representative* concept, not merely by virtue of its Second Intention. Still, it is based on the intuition of formal Unity. And that formal Unity is real; though it is defined and, as it were, projected into thought, by means of an intellectual abstraction, which, (leaving on one side all accidental and individual differences), assumes, for object of intellectual perception, those notes only which mark out the definite boundary of Being.

COROLLARY.

It follows, from the doctrine already established, that universal Beings may be real; whereas Universals, *as such*, can only be logical or conceptual.

NOTE.

St. Thomas says that 'Every Form existing in an individual Supposit' (or Subject) 'by which it is individuated, is common to many either really or, at least, conceptually. Thus, *human nature* is common to many both really and conceptually; but the nature *of the sun* is not common to many really, but only conceptually. For it is possible to conceive the nature of the sun as existing in several Supposits. The reason is, because the intellect intues the nature of every kind of Species by abstraction from the individual. Hence, the circumstance of being in one individual Supposit or in several, does not enter into the concept of a specific Nature¹. These words of St. Thomas, perhaps, require explanation; since it might seem, at first sight, as though he admitted, that a Nature,

¹ 'Omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem; sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum. Potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens; et hoc ideo quia intellectus intelligit naturam cujuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari. Unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum naturae speciei.' 1^o xiii, 9, c.

qua Universal, could exist in many Supposits. For he admits, that 'Human Nature is common to many both really and conceptually.' His meaning, however, is, on reflection, plain. There are, he reminds us, cases in which similar essential notes are discoverable in a multitude of individuals, and really belong to them; whereas there are other cases in which the essential notes, (or Nature), are really discoverable in one individual only, although the intellect can conceive them as participable by many. In the instance of the latter, the Nature is only *conceptually* common to many.

DIVISIONS OF UNIVERSAL UNITY.

There are three different divisions of Universals, which it will be profitable to enumerate. For, though the last is the only true and proper division; yet the others are so habitually referred to by the Scholastics, that it would not be safe entirely to ignore them.

I. The first division includes four sorts of Universals. These are, the Universal (i.) *in causation*, (ii.) *in symbol or representation*, (iii.) *in Being*, (iv.) *in predication*. The Universal *in causation*, is a term applied to a cause, which is capable of producing various effects differing in kind. Thus, the same heat melts wax, hardens clay, evaporates water; and the soul of a dog causes digestion, growth, scent, locomotion, barking. The Universal *in symbol*, i. e. in signification or representation, is a term applied to anything whatsoever that uniformly represents or symbolizes many things; such as are *intelligible species, common terms, figures in arithmetic, algebraic signs, pictures in physical books*. Both these kinds are excluded from the present inquiry; for, in each case, the thing which is called universal is necessarily singular in itself, and receives the name of universal by an extrinsic denomination, borrowed either from the effects produced or from the objects represented. The Universal *in Being*, save to the Platonist, is a nonentity; and may, therefore, be summarily dismissed. The Universal *in predication* is applied to those *objective* concepts, or their representative terms, which include many objects within the periphery of one identical Form. These constitute the subject of the present inquiry. They differ from the second class, or universals *in symbol*; not only because these latter include other things besides concepts and words, but, more particularly, for that in the fourth class the

term, *Universal*, applies to the *objective* concept, whereas in the second it applies to the *subjective*. In like manner, as touching terms, the latter regards the *material*; the former, the *formal* supposition of the word.

II. The second division of Universals is into the *Metaphysical*, the *Physical*, and the *Logical* or *Conceptual* Universal. This same division is sometimes otherwise expressed by the School as the Universal *prior to real existence* (*ante rem*), *in real existence* (*in re*), and *consequent on real existence* (*post rem*). The first class is equivalent to the *Universal in Being* of the previous division; and must, therefore, be eliminated. The Physical Universal, (or as it is in real existence), is the Nature, as it actually exists in individual beings with its accidents and individual Differences. It is obvious that such a Nature is not formally, but only materially, a Universal; forasmuch as it affords a real foundation for the universal concept. In this way only does it present itself as a legitimate object of metaphysical or logical contemplation. The Conceptual, or Logical, Universal is the actual universal concept which has been formed by the operation of the intellect. This is a proper and formal object of metaphysical at once and logical investigation; but under different points of view. Logic deals with it purely and simply as a form or law of thought, and eliminates its matter or objective representation; while the metaphysical Science analyzes the objective representation, or the reality that is in the objective concept, and only considers the logical form in its relation to this its proper subject-matter.

III. The third is the well-known division of Universals or Predicables into *Species*, *Genus*, *Difference*, *Property*, and *Accident*. This last is the division which principally concerns us here. But the same observation, which was suffixed to the last member of the previous division, must be repeated. The metaphysician has no concern with these Predicables as formal laws of thought, with the rules of their distribution, with their properties, with their conceptual genesis. These are the proper province partly of Logic, partly of Ideology. Metaphysics will look at the objective concept of each, in order to determine the reality, and the nature of the reality, there represented. For instance, the important question at once arises; Are the objective concepts of Species, Genus, Difference, really distinct, or not, in the entities themselves whose nature is represented? Such, in fact, is the one point which will

be discussed ; for Property and Accident, *as such*, are outside the Essence or Nature, and have, therefore, no separate claims on the metaphysician. They are legitimately contained within the sphere of Physics or that of Logic, according as they are regarded subjectively or objectively ; and will, accordingly, be left to the treatment of those Sciences.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

The real intrinsic principle of Formal or Universal Unity is the essential nature of the individual Entity.

In consonance with the doctrine just enunciated, the present Thesis primarily regards Species, Genus, and Difference. But it must not be supposed that it applies only to these three classes of Universals. For, though in regard of Substance which they inform, Property and Accident are obviously unessential, forasmuch as neither of them belongs to the essence of Substance ; nevertheless, they have, each and all of them, an essence of their own, without which they could neither lay claim to the character of true Universals, nor be capable of definition. Albeit, therefore, they have so intimate a transcendental relation to substance, that this latter is necessarily included in their definition ; still, they have a nature of their own, into which substance does not enter, that secures for them a place within the sphere of Metaphysics. Their *conceptual* relation to the subject of predication is logical ; their *actual* relation to the subject of inhesion is mainly physical. But the essential nature of their transcendental relation to substance and of their own respective modifications of this latter, considered in themselves, belong exclusively to the metaphysician. Accordingly, the truth expressed in the above Proposition is applicable likewise to the last two classes of Universals ; as will be seen.

THE PROOF of this Thesis rests upon the following Premiss :—*There is no real distinction of any sort between the Genus, Difference, and Species, considered objectively in one and the same individual.* Such, to begin with, is the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. In the first part of his *Summa* he proposes an objection to his statement, that Angels are specifically distinguished from each other ; and the objection is, that since Difference is nobler than Genus, whatever Entities are alike in regard of that which is noblest in their Nature, must be alike in their ultimate Difference. But the

Angels are alike in Intelligence, which is the noblest element of their Nature. Therefore they cannot be specifically distinguished. To this difficulty St. Thomas makes the following answer :—‘ Difference is nobler than Genus, as the determinate is nobler than the undetermined,—as that which is proper, than that which is common ; but not as though they were two different Natures. Otherwise, we should have to admit that all irrational animals are of one Species ; or else, that there is in them some other Form more perfect than the sensitive Soul. As, then, irrational animals differ according to differing determinate grades of sensitive Nature ; so Angels specifically differ according to different grades of intellectual Nature¹.’ The whole argument, if carefully weighed, affords a very cogent confirmation of the Premiss proposed ; but notice, in particular, the assertion of the Angelic Doctor, that Genus and Difference do not differ, as though they were two Natures really distinct, but only as the undetermined and common differ from the determined and special. There is one element in the proof, which may seem to be wanting. At least, it is not explicitly stated in the passage. It is necessary to show that St. Thomas, in speaking of the determined and undetermined, is referring to the determination and indetermination of the *objective concept*, not of a determination or indetermination physically discoverable in the entities themselves as individual and existent. But this is fully and explicitly supplied in another place, where he is engaged in proving that there is but one soul in man. To this Proposition he objects, that *Genus* is assumed from the Matter, *Difference* from the Form. But *Rational*, which is the *Difference* of man, is derived from the *intellectual* soul ; whereas *Animal*, which is his Genus, stands for body animated by a *sensitive* soul. Therefore, the intellectual soul in man stands, *to his sensitive soul, in the relation of Form to Matter*. Consequently the two cannot be the same ; for the former presupposes the latter, as the Matter which supports it. St. Thomas replies :—‘ We must not suppose that there is a diversity in the

¹ ‘ Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod differentia est nobilior genere sicut determinatum indeterminato et proprium communi, non autem sicut alia et alia natura. Alioquin oporteret quod omnia animalia irrationalia essent unius speciei ; vel quod esset in eis aliqua alia perfectior forma quam anima sensibilis. Differunt ergo specie animalia irrationalia secundum diversos gradus determinatos naturae sensitivae, et similiter omnes Angeli differunt specie secundum diversos gradus naturae intellectivae.’ 1^o 1, 4, ad 1^m.

things of nature exactly corresponding with the different concepts and representations of the mind, which follow from the way in which the intellect regards its object; because the Reason can apprehend one and the same thing in different ways. Thus, because the intellectual soul virtually contains that which is in the sensitive soul, and more besides; the Reason can consider separately that which appertains to the faculty of the sensitive soul, as something, in a way, imperfect and material' (because potential or capable of act). 'And, forasmuch as it discovers that this is common to man with other animals, it thence forms the concept of *Genus*; while it takes that wherein the intellectual soul is in excess of the sensitive, as that which is formal and complete, and thence forms the idea of the *Difference* of man¹.' Evidently, therefore, the Angel of the Schools does not consider that there is any real distinction between the Species, Difference and Genus *in the same Nature*; but attributes the distinction exclusively to the operation of the intellect. He teaches the same doctrine, as in other places, so particularly in the latter half of his thirtieth *Opusculum de Ente et Essentia*. It remains to confirm this fundamental Premiss by reason.

i. The first Argument is derived from the doctrine of individuation, as it has been already established in the preceding Article. For, in one and the same individual, it is the same individual Difference which determines the ultimate Species and, together with it and by means of it, all the other higher and more general grades of Being. Thus, the individual Difference of *Henry*, e. g. not only determines Henry to be *this* man, but also to be *this* animal, *this* living thing, *this* substance; and it is the same identical *this* throughout. Now, it has been seen that the Hæcceity of an individual is not really distinct from the specific nature. Wherefore, it is not distinguished really from the other superior grades of Being; and, consequently, those superior grades of Being cannot really differ either from one another or from the

¹ 'Ad quantum dicendum, quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere; quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est in corp. art., anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet et adhuc amplius, potest seorsim ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivæ, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitivam excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum; et ex eo format differentiam hominis.' 1^o lxxvi, 3, ad 4^m.

specific Nature. Hence, *Substance, Living Being, Animality, Human Nature*, are in Henry one reality, represented by different concepts. Nor can it be doubted that the same individual *Difference* does determine the superior grades together with, and by means of, the ultimate Species. For the Genera, down to the last of the subaltern Species, are in a state of essential potentiality or indetermination, and require determination by a specific Difference. Till that indifference or indetermination is resolved, no one of them is proximately capable of individuation. An *animal*, as such, is incapable of individuation or of existence. It must first be determined to be a rational, or an irrational, animal. Moreover, the individual Difference determines *all* the superior grades. There can be no skipping. As, then, there is an essential order in the *Differences*, from the widest *generic* down to the *specific*; so is there in like manner between the generic, specific, and individual *Difference*. Accordingly, if *Body* cannot be determined to Animal, save through the medium of *Living Being*; so neither can Animal (the Genus) be determined to the individual *Henry*, save through the medium of the specific Difference, *Rational*. Hence, it is plain that the individual Difference proximately determines the Species, and, in and by this latter, the Genera.

ii. The second argument is founded on the Unity of the intrinsic physical principle by which the individual, e. g. *Henry*, is formally constituted. For the one simple soul of Henry is at once the unique principle of growth, sensation, thought. Wherefore, by it he is at once a living Being, an animal, and a man. As, then, there are not in Henry three souls,—one vegetative, another animal, a third rational,—but one soul, virtually equivalent to these three; in like manner, these three grades of Being, *Life, Animal, Man*, are not really distinct. The Hæcceity of the last individuates the other two, at the same time with, and by means of, the last.

iii. It stands to common sense that an *animal* e. g. cannot be individuated, or be proximately capable of existence; till it is determined whether such animal is to be a *brute* or a *man*. Who could conceive of a body coming into existence; which is indifferent as to whether it shall be living or inanimate? But its relation to existence is the measure of its reality. Therefore, its reality is determined by, and depends upon, its ulterior and specific determination. If so, it has no reality, apart from the specific

determination; and, consequently, its reality cannot be really distinct from that of the ultimate Species.

iv. The last argument is *à priori*, and it is this. There is no need of any real distinction in these graduated successions of Being; therefore, any such distinction is to be rejected. For the multiplication of real distinctions without sufficient reason is contrary to the principles of sound philosophy. There is no need of any real distinction; because we can sufficiently account for these Universals by the nature of the object and the abstractive faculty of the intellect, without supposing really distinct Forms in the object itself. There are, (as is patent even to the superficial observer), in every real Being, a certain number of essential notes which together compose its Nature. Some of these notes have a complete similarity with notes to be found in other specific Natures; and, of this latter class of notes, there are some which have a wider and more general similarity; till at last we arrive at a note or notes, which are, as it were, common, by virtue of their similarity to all things that either exist or can possibly exist. On the other hand, there are notes of dissimilarity, which grow in number and variety, in proportion as we approach nearer to the distinctive limits of the specific Nature; so that notes that are similar to those of cognate classes of Being, are dissimilar from those of more remote classes; while notes that are dissimilar from those of even cognate classes, and are, consequently, called specific, augment in dissimilarity from others, as the sphere of comparison widens. Thus the whole creation is entitatively linked together, yet pours itself forth in an endless variety. If we transcend the limits of essence or the specific Nature; there appear, over and above, individual notes, which distinguish entities within the same Species from each other, and are proper to one existing individual, and to no other. But here it is necessary to interpose a caution. It must not be imagined that these *notes*, as they are wisely and characteristically called, are like so many separate notes of music, produced distinctly one after the other. On the contrary, they are, as it were, a full chord. These elements in a given nature are truly *notes*, i. e. real elements of Being, by which the Nature is known. They are its manifestation; in themselves absolutely, the Nature itself. Thus they are one, and they are many; but their multiplicity is *virtual*, their unity is *actual*. They are *known* as many; they *exist* as one. There is a virtual

equivalence in the things that together compose the Universe, which increases in proportion as we ascend in the scale of Being. Organized Matter has virtually in itself all that there is of reality in unorganized Matter, and much more besides. Animal life contains virtually within itself all that is positive in vegetable life, and much more besides; as rational life contains virtually within itself all the reality of animal, and consequently of vegetable, life, with the addition of much that is peculiar to itself. But these realities are only equivalently and virtually there; not in their own distinct and independent Unity. Created Being is not composed of essential parts essentially distinct, which are stitched together with needle and thread. It is a facultative evolution,—a centre of forces, as some moderns would express it; but it is the evolution of unity. Thus, to repeat the illustration of St. Thomas, the human soul is to man principle of nutrition, sensation, thought; so that it is virtually equivalent to three souls. It actually does the work of three. Yet, in itself, it is devoid of all physical composition, and is simply, indivisibly, one. Care must, however, here be taken to avoid the error of confounding the metaphysical with the physical consideration of a specific Nature. In the case of all entities that are in any sense material, physical composition of distinct parts is a simple necessity of their Nature. Hence, if we define man physically, it would be said that he is a living body, composed of flesh, bones, blood, nerves, limbs, &c., which is animated by a rational soul. But what is his metaphysical definition? He is a *rational animal*. Now here, *the animal* in man is not something entitatively distinct from *the rational*; for this latter includes in man all the reality of *animal*, together with something additional of its own.

So far for the object. On the other hand, the intellect, by virtue of its abstractive power, can seize upon a certain phase of this specific Unity, and neglect the rest; in other words, it may intend to conceive, and represent in its concept, certain notes of a specific Nature to the non-inclusion of the others. Thus, to continue the illustration of St. Thomas, it may represent to itself only the nutritive and sensitive characteristics of the soul, and so conceive the Genus, *Animal*; or it may confine itself to the one distinguishing characteristic of Intellect, and thus conceive the Difference, *Rational*. The experience of every day assures us that our minds have, and constantly use, this power of abstraction.

But it is plain that this fecundity on the part of the object and this abstractive power of the human intellect, are together sufficient to account for formal or universal Unity, without supposing that the essential attributes are really distinguished from each other in one and the same individual.

It may not be amiss to illustrate this somewhat abstract doctrine by an example. Suppose two men, *William* and *James*. There are evidently certain characteristics of their nature, in which they are exactly similar to each other; others, again, in which one is manifestly distinguishable from his fellow. These latter constitute the individual *Difference*; the former, in their entirety, the specific Nature. If I assume those notes which together constitute the specific nature, and compare them with the nature of a *dog*; again I find certain notes of agreement or similarity between the two, certain other notes of disagreement. If I represent to myself the former only, I form the generic concept of *animal*. By a similar process of thought, I compare this idea with the essential notes of a *geranium*, and, assuming once more the notes of similarity alone, I arrive at the concept of *life*. Yet again, I compare this new idea with the characteristics of a *diamond*, and, by virtue of the notes that are similar in each, I at length arrive at the *summm Genus*, Substance. Now, it has been already shown that the specific Nature in any given man does not *really* differ from his individual Difference or Hæcceity; so that the notes in *William* which are similar to those in *James* are not really and objectively distinct, as being in *William*, from those other notes by which he is distinguished from *James*. Surely, it is only reasonable to conclude, that the same law holds good throughout the whole chain of abstraction.

Once more: Even between the Creator and the creature there are points of similarity and points of difference. That there are points of difference, may be taken for granted. Let us take one point of similarity, where the illustration is most clear. God is Being; the creature is Being; in this, then, they are similar. Yet this note, on the one hand, cannot in God be really distinct from other notes in His Nature; because, by reason of His super-eminent Perfection, He is infinitely simple and free from all, even metaphysical, composition. Neither, on the other hand, can this note be really distinct from the other notes of the creature; for, whatever these notes may be, they either must be Being or they

are nothing. From these examples, therefore, the conclusion inevitably follows, that the same identical reality may be the principle of similarity with, and dissimilarity from, the same others, without there being the smallest real distinction within the reality itself.

On the strength of the metaphysical principle thus demonstratively established, it will be easy to prove the truth of the present Proposition. For all Universals, whether absolute or relative, are concepts of the essential attributes of Being. Since, then, absolute Universals are representative of *formal*, and relative Universals, of *universal*, Unity; it follows, that the essential attributes (which are the one real object of those concepts), are the real, intrinsic, principle of these two unities. For the essential Attributes, as they are called, are only different modes of conceiving one and the same Nature.

The proof is plain enough as touching *Species*, *Difference*, and *Genus*; for these three confessedly fall within the sphere of Essence. But it is by no means so plain as regards *Property* and *Accident*, which are, as confessedly, outside the sphere of Essence. It cannot, indeed, be denied that the essential nature of their Subject, in their relation to which they have received their logical names of Property and Accident, is not the real intrinsic principle of their formal or universal Unity. But have they no essential Nature of their own? If not; how is it that out of the ten *Summa Genera*, nine belong to *Accidents*? It will be as well to interpose here, that in Metaphysics Accident includes Property as well as Accident specifically so called, and expresses everything real in the individual Entity which is not included in its Essence. To resume: As *Accident* has its own real Entity really distinct from its substantial Subject. It has its own Essential Nature; and this Essential Nature is the real, intrinsic, principle of formal or universal Unity to those Universals which the human intellect forms, in regard of Accidents, by its process of abstractive thought. Moreover, it will be found that, as in the instance of substance, such and such Accidents exhibit essential notes, some of which are similar to, others dissimilar from, the essential notes of other classes of Accidents. Thus, to take an instance: *Colour*, we are told, is a corporal, qualitative, Accident, by which the rays of white light that impinge on bodies, are so modified as to produce in the soul sensations of red, yellow, blue, &c. Now, compare this

Accident with *cold*. Both exist in bodies ; both produce sensations in the soul ; both affect the quality of substance. So far they are alike. But one affects the sense of sight ; the other, the sense of touch. In this they are dissimilar. Again, compare *colour* with *virtue*. They are both Accidents ; for they come and go, while their Subject remains essentially the same. They are both Qualities. Thus much of similarity there is between them. But the former affects the body ; the other, the soul. The one is the result of natural law ; the other, the result of human free-will. In these respects they differ. Lastly, compare *colour* with *size*. There is one point of similarity, in that both are Accidents ; but for the rest, they differ. You are, in fact, in presence of two Categories, the one of Quality, the other of Quantity. But who could ever imagine that the capacity of exciting the sense of sight, or the inherence in bodily substance, or any non-essential property of colour, is something really distinct from its specific Nature ? Thus the truth of the Proposition is confirmed, even in the case of Accidents.

There is, however, one difficulty, touching this matter, which demands solution. For, assuming the doctrine which has just been developed to be true, there seems no reason for asserting any difference in the application of the truth, enunciated in the present Thesis, to Substance and to Accident respectively. Yet, in the introduction to the proof, it was stated that the Proposition primarily applied to Substance. For *Genus*, *Difference*, and *Species*, in the logical Predicables belong, as is obvious, to Substance ; at least, primarily. The last modifying clause is added, because Accidents have likewise their Genus, Difference, and Species ; and there may, too, be Accidents of Accidents, as e. g. *more or less* in Qualities. Wherefore, the reason why such distinction has been introduced, is this. Substance enters into the definition of Accident. If Accident is considered in the concrete, it enters *in recto* (as Logicians say), i. e. in the nominative case ; for instance, *cold meat*, *virtuous man*, &c. If Accident is assumed in the abstract, it at least virtually enters *in obliquo*, i. e. in some indirect case other than the Nominative ; for instance, *coldness of ice*, *the virtue of Socrates*. For, even if the Subject is not expressed, it is understood ; since *virtue* cannot really exist save in *man*, and *coldness* cannot naturally exist save in *corporal substance*. Hence, Accident is not simply Being,—but is Being of Being ; that is, in other

words, it essentially includes, within its nature, a transcendental relation to the Subject which it has an aptitude for informing. Accordingly, though it has an Essence of its own, really distinct from the Essence of its Subject; yet, that Essence includes a transcendental relation to the Subject, however the latter may be conceived. This accords with the old adage, that *when Socrates was born, all the Categories were born with him*. Such is the explanation of the distinction that has been made.

PROPOSITION LIX.

The real intrinsic principle of Generic Unity is the Essence of the individual, as embracing within itself a concord or similarity with entities of another kind, and, consequently, as capable of ulterior determination.

This Thesis follows as a Corollary from the preceding; and, therefore, only needs declaration. For it has been seen that every Nature possesses certain notes of similarity with other Natures; and that these notes offer to the intellect a real foundation for conceiving each of those Natures, wherein such similarity of essential notes is to be found, as one. When the intellect so conceives, the result is a Generic Universal; or, in other words, a Universal which includes within its periphery more than one Species. A Genus is, consequently, a synthetical concept. It is essentially unitive; and its foundation is similarity of Nature. Yet, for all this, it represents the Essence or Specific Nature as a whole, though indeterminate. It needs the representation of additional notes; in order that the Nature represented may be considered as proximately capable of individuation and, as a consequence, of existence outside its causes.

PROPOSITION LX.

The real intrinsic principle of Differential Unity, is the Essence of the individual, as embracing in itself a dissimilarity from Natures of another kind, and, consequently, as capable of differentiation.

This Proposition, like the preceding and the succeeding one, is a simple Corollary from the doctrine evolved in the fifty-eighth and antecedent Thesis in this Article. It has been shown that, as a Nature has notes similar to those of other natures; so has it like-

wise distinctive or dissimilar notes which hedge it in, so to say, within its own proper limits. The human intellect can direct its intention to the representation of the Nature under the form of these notes, to the exclusion (or rather non-inclusion), of all others whatsoever; and in such wise it generates a *Differential* concept. Of course, if the Nature is confusedly or inadequately represented by a more extended *Generic* concept, the corresponding *Differential* concept will also claim a wider periphery; while, on the contrary, when the *Genus* represents only those notes of similarity which relate to proximate and collateral Species, the corresponding *Differential* concept will represent those distinctive notes alone which distinguish the specific Nature in its ultimate perfection. Hence arises the difference between, and the constitution of, *Generic* and *Specific* Difference. From what has been said it will appear, that a *Differential* Universal is an analytical concept, at least functionally; since it serves to resolve, or divide, the common concept by distinctive notes of difference. Hence it exhibits the elements of differentiation, but, taken by itself, it does not differentiate; because it is *the Differential*. Consequently, it cannot represent the nature as differentiated; because, in the *Differential* concept, nothing is represented but the *Differential Form*. So true is this, that in another line of abstraction it may become a *Genus*, as representing notes similar to other Natures; just as *Rational* or *Intellectual*, which is the ultimate *Difference* by which man is distinguished from all other animals, becomes a *Genus*, if we compare man with the Angels. Hence it follows that the *Differential* Universal, even though it be *Specific Difference*, does not adequately represent the *Specific* Nature, but requires to be complemented by the *Genus*. In a sense, therefore, it may, like *Genus*, be said to represent the Nature as capable of ulterior determination; for the *Generic* Universal acts the part, in some sort, of a *Difference*.

PROPOSITION LXI.

The real intrinsic principle of *Specific* Unity is the Nature of the entity in its ultimate essential perfection.

In the *Specific* concept, the Nature is represented as containing the notes by which it is similar to, as well as the notes by which it is dissimilar from, all other cognate collateral Natures. And these, together, contain virtually or implicitly all the notes of similarity

and dissimilarity which such Nature exhibits through all the ascending grades of abstraction up to the highest and widest Universal; so that it represents the Nature, or Essence, of the objected entity in its ultimate perfection. It is, accordingly, eminently synthetical; for it collects together, as it were, the similar and dissimilar notes, so as to represent an entire whole,—a perfected Essence. In other words, it synthesizes *Genus* and *Difference*; or, to speak metaphysically, the material and formal part. So then, the Generic and Specific Universal are both synthetical, but in an inverse order. *Genus* is *logically* synthetical, and sacrifices distinctness and adequacy of representation to a broader perfectness in the periphery of thought; while *Species* is *metaphysically* synthetical, and ignores conceptual periphery, in order to secure a perfect, adequate, representation of the reality.

OBJECTIONS TO THE ABOVE DOCTRINE.

It seems difficult to admit that *Species*, *Genus*, and *Difference*, represent, only under a different form, the same objective Nature and that, consequently, there is no real distinction between the three; for the following reasons.

I. *Species* is composed of *Genus* and *Difference*, or, as metaphysicians say, of its formal and material part. Therefore, there is a real metaphysical composition, because there is a metaphysical whole, composed of metaphysical, i. e. real, parts. Hence, it is not a merely logical composition. But, for real composition, it is not enough that there should be a virtual distinction only; there is need of a real distinction between the several components. Otherwise, there could be metaphysical composition in God. For it is certain that in Him is to be found virtual distinction; forasmuch as, by reason of His infinite Perfection, He contains eminently within Himself all the distinct and various attributes of Being, purified though they be in Him from all imperfection. But the infinite simplicity of God forbids the very thought of metaphysical composition; and the possibility of it is denied, with equal unanimity, by all Theologians and Philosophers of the School.

ANSWER. The composition between the material and formal part in any given Nature is not real, but conceptual; for, as it is justly contended in the objection, if the composition were real, it would assuredly require a real distinction in the parts. Yet, be it observed, the composition is not *simply* logical. It has been said

advisedly that it is *conceptual*; that is, that there is a real difference in *the objective concept*, though the reality represented is the same, and the objective concepts, in the object represented, i. e. in the Nature, are the same. This remark may be made clearer by an illustration. There can be no doubt whatever but that *an animal* is one thing, and that *an Intelligence* is another, really distinct from the former. Yet, in *man*, that same reality which is *animal* is also *rational*; consequently, in him there is no real distinction between the two. So, *nutritive life*, *sensitive life*, *intellectual life*, are three really distinct entities, and are, accordingly, found actually and physically apart in the creation; yet, in the human soul there is no real distinction between them. Accordingly, it is truly said, not that there is a real distinction,—because then there would be physical composition,—but that there is a real foundation in the Natures or Essences themselves for such a distinction; in that they exhibit at once a similarity with, and a dissimilarity from, other natures, whence the human intellect conceives them, now as indeterminate or *Generic*, now as determinating or *Differential*. Thus the same entity is conceived, now under the form of a material part, now under the form of a formal part,—so called by an extrinsic denomination derived from the inadequate concepts. And this is the reason why the composition is not physical, but metaphysical.

But then, as the objection urges, why cannot there be metaphysical composition in God, if the above explanation be true? It cannot be said that such composition is repugnant to the Divine Simplicity; because the human soul is simple, yet admits of metaphysical composition. Besides, a merely conceptual distinction of parts cannot interfere with entitative simplicity. And, indeed, *so far*, the argument is just and cogent. But there are two things that must not be forgotten. The one is, that the Divine simplicity is not univocal with the simplicity of even the most exalted creatures; it is *sui generis*. Moreover, the impossibility of there being metaphysical composition in God is not due *only* to His simplicity; but pre-eminently, to the boundlessness and supereminence of His Being. Hence it arises, that nothing can be predicated univocally of the Creator and His creature; and, consequently, that anything like a Genus or Difference is *actually* impossible. Hence likewise it arises, that it is a metaphysical contradiction, to conceive of His Nature as capable of multiplication; and, in consequence, anything like a Genus or Difference in God is

conceptually impossible. Furthermore, owing to His surpassing simplicity as well as His Infinity and All-containingness, you will seek in vain for any common idea or Attribute of God, which is not essentially included in each and every special and incommunicable perfection; so that in Him Will is Mind, and Mind Will; and Mind and Will, are Life; and Life, Mind, Will, are one, simple, absolute, Being.

II. The second objection is as follows. Wherever there are realities whose Essences, even though they be partial or incomplete, are anywise really distinct, *there* there must be a real distinction. But the Essences, respectively represented by Genus and Difference, are really distinct; otherwise, the received doctrine concerning the Predicables must be abandoned. For, in the first place, the essence of Difference cannot be included in the essence of *Genus*, otherwise, both would *ipso facto* be *Species*. Then, again, if the essence of the *Difference* were included in the essence of the *Genus*; seeing that *Genus* is divided by two opposite *Differences*, the essence of *Genus* would be in direct opposition to itself. Furthermore, Difference contracts and actuates *Genus*; but there is nothing that contracts and actuates itself. Lastly, it is for this reason that the Judgment, *Animality is rationality*, is false, together with other like Judgments; for, if there were no real distinction between the *Genus* and *Difference*, they would be true.

ANSWER. For the verification of the established doctrine concerning the Predicables, and for the solution of all such difficulties, it is enough that there should be a conceptual distinction between the partial Essences represented respectively by *Genus* and *Difference*. In order to render this answer perfectly intelligible, it will be necessary to refer the student to the explanation, already given in an earlier part of this work, touching the nature of the objective concept; which is nothing, more or less, than that reality in the object, which is formally covered by the subjective concept or idea itself. Now, this reality may be really identical in the object contemplated with another reality that constitutes a second objective concept; yet, if the two are considered absolutely as they are in themselves, neither enters into the essential constitution of the other. A sufficient proof whereof is, that, as a fact, each exists in other objects independent of the other. Thus, albeit in man *animal* and *rational* are one; yet in a horse there is *animal* without *rational*, and in an Angel *rational* without *animal*. Therefore, it suffices that the

realities, absolutely considered in themselves, should be really distinct; though, in the object, the distinction is merely conceptual. For the Essence of the one is not included in the Essence of the other; though the two Essences are one, in the constitution of that complete Essence which is the object of cognition. This, too, is sufficient to justify us in considering *Difference* as the act and contraction of the potential *Genus*. For such act or contraction is not real, but conceptual; since, as has been declared, the composition is conceptual, and act and potentiality are of such kind as is the composition. As to the last difficulty, it will be plain, from what has been said, that these *abstract* terms simply represent the objective concepts or realities absolutely in themselves and apart from the object in which they are one; consequently, it must be false to affirm the identity of two realities which in themselves are really distinct. In the concrete, the Judgment would be true, if it were particular, not universal.

III. *Genus* and *Difference*, taken separately, must be really distinguished from *Species*; because they stand in the relation to it of a part to a Whole. For the Whole is really distinguished from each one of its component parts. Accordingly, *man* must be really distinguished from *animal*, otherwise, neither would a *dog* be distinguished from *animal*; and thus, *man* would not be distinguished from *dog*, because things which are identical with one and the same thing, are identical with one another. Furthermore, different entities cannot be entirely similar and dissimilar relatively to the same. But two *Species* are essentially dissimilar, yet are similar in *Genus*. Consequently, it cannot be, that *Genus* should be only conceptually distinguished from *Species*.

ANSWER. The solution is evident from preceding answers. Hence briefly; i. *Genus* and *Difference* do not stand in the relation to *Species* of real parts to a whole, but of conceptual parts only. ii. It is true that *man* is an *animal* and that *dog* is an *animal*; but it does not thence follow that *man* is *dog*; because they are not one and the same animal, but have merely a similarity to one another in animal Being. iii. The assertion, that entities cannot be entirely similar and dissimilar relatively to the same, is categorically denied, for reasons which have been already given.

PROPOSITION LXII.

The proximate real foundation of the aptitude which a created nature possesses to exist in several Subjects or Individuals, is the essential limitation, at once, and intrinsic perfection of each Nature.

One important and interesting question demands consideration, before the present Article is concluded. It has been seen that there is, in the Natures of actual Beings, a formal Unity, which abstracts from all individuation and consists in Unity of Essence. It has been likewise shown, that Formal, is the foundation of Universal, Unity; forasmuch as it exhibits the Essence as indifferent to this or that individuation, and not repugnant to be in this and in that; whence arises its conceived aptitude to exist in many individuals. Further, it is well known, and has been seen, that, in each specific Nature, there is a similarity with other specific Natures as well as points of dissimilarity; and that the intellect takes occasion from the former, to conceive a wider or more extensive nature which is apt to exist not only in many different individuals, but also in distinct Species. And, though the specific and generic Nature, in the same individual, are really one; yet the Essence, or Quiddity, of the individual affords a real foundation for a conceptual distinction between them. It is only natural, then, to inquire, whence it is that there is this capacity, in every created Nature, of individual multiplication; whence also it comes to pass, that there are higher or generic Unities in which specific Natures agree, so that in a sense one Nature is truly adapted to exist in many Species. Or, —to put it more plainly in the concrete,—what is the reason why all of our race are *men*, and why their number can be indefinitely multiplied? Why is it, or how is it, again, that *all men* agree with *all brutes* in being *animals*?

The answer is to be found in the limitation, at once, and in the intrinsic perfection, of created Beings. The elucidation of this answer will form the declaration of the present Proposition. It will be easy, for the reader, if he so pleases, to throw the declaration into an argumentative form.

If an entity is limited, it does not exhaust in itself all Reality; because there must be some Reality external to itself. For that which is limited by no Reality, is limited by nothing. But that which is limited by nothing, is unlimited. If, however, it does

not exhaust all reality, if there is a reality external to itself, there is nothing repugnant in its individual multiplication. If there is one *watch*,—to take an illustration from things of art,—there is no reason why there should not be two. Whereas, conversely, it is quite repugnant that there should be two unlimited or infinite entities; because, in such case, each would be in presence of a reality external to itself, and would, therefore, be necessarily limited. There is evidently, therefore, no *a priori* impediment to the individual multiplication of a limited nature; but it is conceivable that there may be such an impediment, arising from the *nature* of the entity in question. Thus St. Thomas asserts, as has been seen, that Angelic Natures, according to the ordinary course of things, are incapable of such individual multiplication; though he admits that the multiplication is absolutely possible. The reason which he assigns for his conclusion is, that an Angelic Form or Nature is sole principle of its own individuation; and, in order to its integral actuation, stands in no need of communicating itself, (so to speak), to any element external to itself, by which it may be determined. Wherefore, it cannot have that indifference which is the foundation of Universal Unity. So again, if, by an absurd hypothesis, we could conceive that individual Beings were entitatively constituted by their Hæcceity as being their only real Nature; evidently, no one of them could be capable of multiplication. Once more: if it could be supposed that each individual was nothing but a congeries of Accidents, (a supposition which, though as intrinsically absurd as the preceding, has, nevertheless, been maintained by some), such a Nature would with difficulty admit of individual multiplication; not only because of the natural versatility of Accidents, but likewise, because they admit of indefinite degrees of *more and less*. Taking, then, into account the Nature of the individual entity in our consideration of the capacity for individual multiplication, it is justly asserted that such capacity is due to the intrinsic perfection of the Nature itself. For the human intellect perceives in each individual amidst the variety of Accidents with which it is clothed, an Essence or essential Quiddity which is the one proper object of its intuition. The essential notes which, as it were, constitute it, are represented by the intellect, or at least can be naturally represented by the intellect, apart from their individual conditions; and, thus free, they are intuitively recognized as capable of indefinite individual multiplication. Thus, that which to each entity is its

proper determination and perfection, is the foundation of its being recognized as indefinitely imitable by other individual entities; hence, of the aptitude of its Nature to be in many Subjects.

It is, in like manner, the perfection of each Nature, that is the foundation of that *Generic* Unity which the intellect conceives as existing in various *Species*. For not only is there a chain of similarities which joins together the whole creation in one, but in the ascending grades of Being it is impossible to find the distinctness of isolation; for the higher grades virtually include the lower, with the addition of something that is proper to themselves. Thus, the *Vegetable* includes a material body; the *Animal* includes vegetative life; *Man* includes animal life. Hence, that which is proper to the one, (or its Difference), becomes part of the Genus of a higher Nature. But what is all this but perfection? For it is Order; and Order is itself a main element of perfection.

PROPOSITION LXIII.

In ultimate analysis, the extrinsic cause of Formal or Universal Unity are the Prototypal Ideas in God and the Unity of the Divine Nature.

An artist has need of two things before he can commence upon his work,—not to mention other prerequisites, which do not fall within the scope of the present inquiry. He must have an object, or objects, which may supply the material elements, and form the foundation, of his concept. He must, besides, have an idea of that which he intends to produce. Without both of these, the production of any work of art is impossible. A man who has been born blind could never become a landscape-painter; because the objects from which to form his design could never be present to him. A horse could never paint a landscape; because it is incapable of forming an idea. In the supreme Artificer these two requisites are found in infinite perfection. For His own infinite and infinitely perfect Essence is the one, adequate, Object of His Intelligence. That Nature, while It is infinitely one and simple, is likewise infinite reality. There is no reality, actually or possibly existing outside of God, which is not, (so far as it is pure reality), to be found in the Divine Nature after an inconceivably perfect manner. That Nature is, as has been just remarked, infinite reality. Therefore, though there may be existences outside of God, yet there can

be no reality in them which has not its equivalent in Him ; otherwise, by virtue of such reality, He would cease to be the Infinite, being limited by it. The Divine Intellect, then, contemplating Its own Infinite Nature, conceives It as limitedly imitable outside Himself in an infinite order of degrees. These orders of possible creation It represents to Itself with an all-perfect distinctness, and thus,—to speak after the manner of men,—are formed those Prototypal Ideas in the Divine Wisdom, out of which God selects the whole plan of His creation. Hence it is, that all created things are, in their respective orders, partial imitations of the Divine Nature. Their very existence and individuation are an imitation, in the far distance, of the Divine Existence and Divine Individuality.

These Prototypal Ideas in God, are the patterns of each and every specific Nature ; so that, whenever the Creator determines to create a certain number of individuals according to one *specific* Prototypal Idea, these must be alike and specifically one, because they are all produced after the same model. Hence, too, are derived the eternity and immutability of created Essences or Natures. They are in the creature itself, considered as existences, temporal and changing ; but they are immutable and eternal in their Pattern. Hence, though *Peter* may die and change in many respects during his life ; yet, so long as he exists, he must be a *rational animal*, because he is a *man*. Since, therefore, the created Nature, considered in the abstract, prescind from all conditions of existence ; it is immutable and eternal, because it is a simple, unconditioned reflex of the Divine Idea. Again ; since these Prototypal Ideas are the Divine Concept of their primary Object which is indivisibly, infinitely, one and simple ; they represent that oneness and simplicity as governing all the multiplicity of creative beings. As, therefore, created things are imitations of the Divine Nature, it is impossible that there should be complete isolation of Essence anywhere, throughout the whole Universe. There must be a certain fraternity of Natures, which becomes more apparent as creation mounts higher, and approaches nearer to God. In the Divine Prototypal Ideas, then, and in the Unity of the Divine Nature are to be found a sufficient reason and external cause of Formal or Universal Unity.

But here we are met by a grave difficulty. For, if individuals, according to the above declaration, are created according to a Prototypal Idea which is representative of the specific Nature of

each, it would seem to follow that there is no Divine Preconception of the individual, *as such*; consequently, as its individuation is not included in the Divine design, it must be the result of hap-hazard. But, in this way, the Divine Wisdom becomes limited; which is impossible. It follows, then, that the Prototypal Idea should present the individual, not the specific, Nature. St. Thomas supplies the answer to this difficulty. 'In God,' he says, 'there exist Ideas of individuals, proper to themselves. Hence, the Divine Idea of *Peter* is different from the Idea of *Martin*; just as the Idea of a *man* is different from that of a *horse*. But, notwithstanding, the difference between a man and a horse is according to the Form, with which there is a perfectly corresponding Idea; whereas the distinction of individuals of one specific essence is according to the Matter, which has a' (corresponding) 'Idea, not perfectly. Wherefore, the distinction of Ideas answering to different Species is more perfect than that which corresponds with difference of individuals; yet, in such sort, that the imperfection is to be referred to the imitative entities, not to the Divine Essence which they imitate¹. That is to say, that the Hæcceity, or individual determination, of each Being is represented in the Divine Idea; but so, that the Prototype of the specific nature stands out, if one may say so, in the foreground, while the individual Difference subordinately completes the design. This contrast, however, between the two in perfectness of representation, is not traceable to the Divine Idea, Which is infinitely and most simply perfect; but to the nature of the object. For the Form, or Essence is perfectly intelligible; but those material determinations, (which, at least metaphysically, constitute the Hæcceity), because they are material and therefore furthest removed from the Divine Nature, are only imperfectly capable of intellectual representation.

COROLLARY.

From what has been stated it will be seen, that Philosophy, in presenting to itself the essences of things as the exclusive object of

¹ 'Particularia habent proprias ideas in Deo; unde alia est ratio Petri et Martini in Deo, sicut alia ratio hominis et equi. Sed tamen diversitas hominis et equi est secundum formam, cui perfecte respondet idea; sed distinctio singularium unius speciei essentialis est secundum materiam, quae non perfecte habet ideam. Et ideo perfectior est distinctio rationum respondentium diversis speciebus quam diversis individuis; ita tamen, quod imperfectio referatur ad res imitantes, et non ad divinam essentiam quam imitantur.' In 1 *Dist.* xxxvi, Q. 2, a. 3, ad 3^m.

its contemplation and research, is pursuing the only true path to wisdom. For the material and individual is only by accident, (as one may say), an object of the intellect at all. By the investigation of essences, the mind is ever arriving at fresh unity; till it reaches as near to the universal Unity as is possible to its finite and unaided powers. All things flow from Unity and are, therefore, interchained one with another by ceaseless affinities. To ascend upwards, through the multiplicity of an evolved creation, towards the Unity and the primal Cause of Unity, is *to know*. Science, therefore, properly so called, deals with universals, and with universals only. Facts are phenomenal truths. They are the husk and, in consequence, cannot be ignored; but Philosophy seeks the kernel. A materialistic Philosophy is a contradiction in terms.

SUMMARY.

There is to be found, in all existing things, a real and true Formal Unity, or Unity of Nature, which, nevertheless, is only conceptually distinguishable from their individual Unity; for the common Nature and the individual determination are, in them, really and undividedly one. The real foundation of this Formal Unity is the essence of the individual entity,—which the intellect intues, as being its proper object. In the case of existing individuals belonging to one Species, the intellect can recognize the nature by the similarity, in each and all, of the essential notes. But this similarity is neither a necessary nor sufficient principle of Formal Unity; for there is found to be Formal Unity in cases where there is but one individual of the class; and similarity, *of itself*, is not Unity. This Formal Unity is the real foundation of Universal Unity, which itself is a pure creation of the human intellect; since all things that exist are *individually* one. Consequently, there is no such thing as a Universal, antecedently to all operation of the human intellect. This foundation of Universal Unity, which exists in Formal Unity, is said to consist in the aptitude of any created nature to exist in several Subjects; which aptitude cannot be found in the Nature as existing with its individual determinations, but only in so far forth as it is abstracted from such determinations. It really consists in an indifference, or absence of repugnance, as regards individual multiplication. One and the same Nature is at once the object of the *Specific*, *Differential*, and *Generic*, concept;

and the difference between these concepts arises from the fact that the intellect regards the same object in a different light. Such multiplication of the same specific Nature is rendered possible by reason of the limitation of created Being. In ultimate analysis, the extrinsic cause of the similarity of existing things with one another and of the graduation of such similarity, is to be traced to the Prototypal Ideas in God and to the Unity of the Divine Nature.

ARTICLE IV.

Distinction.

Many is opposed to *one*; and, as *Unity* is constituted by *indivision*, so *multitude* is constituted by *division* or *distinction*. A knowledge, therefore, of the various sorts of Distinction will be of great service towards acquiring a clearer understanding of the various sorts of Unity. The subject is an abstruse one, and beset with difficulties; it is one, nevertheless, that could not safely be omitted, not only because, without it, this Chapter on Unity would be incomplete, but, more particularly, because of its intimate and necessary connection with the science of Essences.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

All Distinction of Being is either real or logical.

PROLEGOMENON.

In all things that are anywise distinct from one another, there is a double element; to wit, the things themselves which are considered as distinct, and the Distinction which subsists between them. The former may not inappropriately be called the *material* part; the latter, the *formal* part, of Distinction. Now, the material part of Distinction, or the entities themselves, may be *logical* or *real*. If they are logical; the formal part, or the Distinction, may be after a manner *real*, or it may be *logical*. It is said, *after a manner real*; because, though there could not be an absolutely real Distinction between two or more merely logical entities, yet the Distinction may be such that, if the entities were real, *it* would be real. It may be said, therefore, to be *imitatively* real. Thus, the Distinction between *Species* and its *Definition* is logical; that between two *Species* under the same *Genus*, real in the sense explained; for the reason that they are mutually exclusive of each other. By some Doctors, when the material part is logical, the logical Distinction

is called an *extrinsic* logical Distinction; when the material part is real and the formal part logical, an *intrinsic* logical Distinction. According to the doctrine already established when we were occupied in determining the proper subject-matter of this Science, it is not the part of a metaphysician to concern himself with logical entities; save so far forth, as their investigation may conduce to a more complete and accurate knowledge of *real* Being. Accordingly, the question of *extrinsic* logical Distinctions will find no place in the present Article.

And now for the DECLARATION of the Proposition. One real entity is not another real entity, either properly and in its own nature independently of any intellectual operation, or *improperly* and *denominatively*, by virtue alone of different concepts representative of that entity. In other words, the Distinction exists either in the nature of things between two or more entities physically separated or separable, such as is to be found between *James* and *Henry*, or between *the human soul* and *body*; or merely in the mind, which is capable of conceiving the same real entity under the form of different concepts, either logically or conceptually distinct. In the former case, the Distinction is *real*; in the latter, *logical*. (It would be as well to notice, that *logical* is used here generically, as including *conceptual*,—where there is a real foundation for the Distinction,—as well as logical *specific*, or *merely* logical,—where there is no such foundation.) Furthermore, there is no middle term. For either the entities, considered as distinct, are physically separable, at least by the absolute Omnipotence of God; or they are not. If the former, the Distinction is *real*; if the latter, it is *logical*.

NOTE I.

There is a peculiar kind of Distinction, which has been called by Doctors of the School real negative Distinction. It is supposed to exist,—to repeat that which has already found a place in these pages,—between two terms, of which one is a real entity, the other a negation; whence the name. Thus, the Distinction between *Being* and *not-Being* is said to be real negative Distinction. It is said to be real, because it is metaphysically impossible that anything could be *one* with its own simple negation; it is called negative, for the reason already assigned. If, however, such Distinction is attentively considered, it will be found to be a mere logical

Distinction. For two supposed entities cannot be *physically* separable, unless they are *real* entities. Where one term is logical, the Distinction itself cannot be real.

NOTE II.

Formal Distinction, as it is called, or the Distinction of Form from Form, is sometimes real, sometimes conceptual. By Form is here understood some essential characteristic which determines a given entity; though such essential characteristic may be only partial. Thus,—to illustrate the explanation,—the *Animality* in *William* is really distinct from the *Animality* in *Henry*. So, *Animality* in a *man* is really distinct from *Animality* in a *worm*. But *Animality* in *William* is only conceptually distinct from *Intelligence* in the same. In like manner, the intuitive faculty, the faculty of memory, the reasoning, the abstractive faculty, are in man only conceptually distinct. In like manner, in God, Intellect and Will, Wisdom and Goodness, Essence and Existence, are all individually one; and are, consequently, only logically distinguished.

PROPOSITION LXV.

All real Distinction is of two kinds.

Every real entity is physically separable from another real entity, in one of two ways; either so, that both can exist apart, at least by virtue of the Divine Omnipotence; or so, that one only of the two can continue to exist on the desition of the other to which it had previously been united. In the latter case, the two cannot be made to exist apart, even by the infinitely Powerful; because *actual* inherence in another, is of the Essence of one of the two entities. Yet, the Distinction is real; because the principal entity can exist independently of that which inheres in it. The first mentioned kind of separation or separability involves a Distinction, which is called *Real Distinction the Greater*; the last mentioned, a Distinction which is called *Real Distinction the Less*.

The Greater Real Distinction includes Distinction between substantial Beings, as it is clear to see. Such is the Distinction between *William* and *James*, between a *man* and a *dog*, between *two trees* or *two boards*. But it also includes the Distinction that subsists between Substances and their Accidents, as well as between

Accidents one with another. This may at first sight appear strange ; since Accidents have a transcendental relation to the Substances which they inform. But it will be seen later on, when the nature of Accidents is treated *ex professo*, that though *aptitude* to inhere in another is of the Essence of Accident, actual inhesion is not ; consequently, it is absolutely possible that Accidents should exist, apart from the Subject or Substance that they inform. Thus, therefore, the *Quantity, Smell, Colour, Taste, Pulpiness* of an *Apple* are distinguished from the *Substance* (or *Matter* and *substantial Form*), of that Apple by a Greater Real Distinction. In the same way, is the *Colour* of the same Apple distinguishable from its *Taste* or *Savour* ; and, *à fortiori*, the *Colour* v. g. in one apple from the *Colour* in another, because they are actually separated.

It was for a long time a subject of perplexed discussion, whether there was any other real Distinction than the one that has been just described. The question amounted to this, whether there were any traces of a Distinction which precedes all intellectual operation, (and must, therefore, be real), wherein one of the two entities, that are the subjects of the Distinction, cannot, by any exercise even of Almighty power, exist in a state of separation from the other ; in other words, where such separate existence in the entity alluded to amounts to a metaphysical impossibility. That there are, however, instances of such a Distinction, will appear on a little consideration. Thus, nobody can doubt that the *union* of soul and body in a man is something real ; if it were not, you would only have to place a body and a soul in juxtaposition, so to speak, and a man would *ipso facto* be formed. In the case of inanimate bodies, it is obvious ; for the union, e.g. of oxygen and hydrogen, in due proportion, produces a new substance. It is furthermore manifest that both soul and body can exist,—the latter, for a time at least,—without this union ; for, as a fact, they do so exist after death. Here, then, is the case of a Distinction which antecedes all action of the mind, and is, consequently, real. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally plain that this substantial union between the soul and body of man cannot possibly exist apart from, or independently of, that soul and body of which it is the union. There is no one whose common-sense would allow him to doubt this for a moment. The idea perishes in its own absurdity. Take another instance : *My body* is in a certain posture,—say, *sitting*. That posture is real, if anything sensible is real ; for it can be

seen, and it produces real effects of repose and the like. It is further clear, that my body can be separated from that sitting posture; for the next moment I may be *standing* or *kneeling*. And this separability is antecedent to any intellectual operation; for it exists in the nature of things. Yet, who would ever dream of the possibility of a sitting posture existing by itself, independently of the Being whose posture it is? These instances are sufficient to show, that there really are such Distinctions.

But now arises a question of no small importance. If this union between the soul and body and the posture of a man are real, they must be entities distinct, the one from the soul and body, the other from the man; in which case it is not easy to understand why it is a metaphysical impossibility, (in other words, why it is a contradiction in terms), that they should exist apart from these latter. And, indeed, the difficulty would be insoluble, if they were real entities distinct from their Subject; but such is not the case. They are real, it is true; but their reality is wholly contained in their Subject; in a word, they are real *modifications* of the Subject. Consequently, the Subject can do without them; but they cannot do without the Subject. Let it be supposed, for the sake of a clearer illustration of the matter, that the union between soul and body were a real entity really distinct from the entity of soul and body; what would be the result? It would itself require a union of itself with soul and body; and the new union, as being likewise a distinct union, would require a fresh union; and so on, for ever. It is for this reason that the Distinction, now under consideration, is often called a *real Modal Distinction*; for it is a Distinction between the Subject and its *Mode*, or modification. But, if its entity is only in the Subject, and is, in and by itself, nothing, it is easy to see why it is absolutely impossible that it should exist independently of the Subject; for, though real, it is only real in the Subject.

There is another question connected with the present inquiry, which it may not be unprofitable to examine. Why are these Modes introduced at all? The answer so far is plain. *There* they are in nature; and we are bound, as philosophers, to consider them, because they are facts. But to the further question, *What is the reason for their being there? What necessity is there for their existence?* a more elaborate answer must be given. The ultimate reason for the necessity of these Modes, in the instance of created

beings, is to be found in the imperfection of the latter. For it is owing to the imperfection of their Nature, that they are dependent, or composite, or limited, or changeable, according to various states of presence, union, or termination; and it is because of their dependence, composition, limitation, or changeableness, that they require Modes by which all these conditions may be accomplished in them. Thus, for instance, the body is dependent in considerable measure on the soul, and the soul on the body. Hence the necessity of union. But union, as we have seen, cannot be an entity in itself; therefore, there is need of a Mode or modification of both soul and body, by which the *immediate* union takes place, since it is that which is the union. In like manner, water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen; a Mode is, consequently, required for the combination of these two, in order to the evolution of a new substantial Form. So again, Quantity and Extension would go on for ever, if there were no limits; they would be infinite. Now, the limit of Quantity is Figure or Shape, which cannot be an independent entity in itself. It is, then, a Mode, dependent for its reality on Quantity or Extension. Once more; bodies change. They are present now in one place, now in another. They change in bulk, shape, colour, hardness or softness, and the like. Living bodies assimilate fresh external Matter to themselves, so that the entity which was before foreign to them, becomes their own. In all these and similar instances there is a real change, involving a new union, which must be a Mode. Now, in the majority of these conditions of created Being arising out of its essential imperfection, the result cannot be produced by means of entities entirely distinct from the Being that is their Subject; yet it is equally manifest that they cannot be produced by nothing. For *nothing* is produced by nothing. There remains only, then, this modification of the Subject itself, in accordance with the explanation already given.

From all that has been stated it is plain, that a Mode is a most imperfect entity; because it wholly depends for its reality on the Subject or Subjects to which it belongs and of which it is the Mode. Consequently, the Distinction between the *Mode* and the *Modified* is not simply and entirely a Distinction between entity and entity; it is more truly a Distinction between an entity and its modification. Hence, the reason why such Distinction is called the *Minor* Real Distinction; in contrast with the *Greater* Real Distinction,

wherein the two terms distinguished are, both of them, real entities in their own right.

NOTE I.

Another kind of Distinction has been introduced by some writers, which has received the name of *Potential Distinction*; but it will be found, on examination, to be included under the Greater Real Distinction. It is derived from the peculiar nature of the integral parts that constitute a continuous whole. For, in such Natures, each part, if divided from the remainder, becomes a distinct complete entity; and ceases to have the nature of a part. Thus, if there be a jug of water, the whole of the water is one mass composed of integral parts. But, if the water is poured into three glasses, it becomes three distinct entities, whole and complete; no one of which has anything of the nature of a part. In this important respect such entities differ from Matter and Form in material substance, which, even when separated, retain, nevertheless, the nature of a part. Accordingly, it is maintained, that there is a notable difference in the Distinction between the integral parts, in their mutual connection and their mutual separation. In the former case they are actually parts, potentially totalities; in the latter case, on the contrary, they are potentially parts, actually totalities. Such is the reason which has suggested the introduction of this *Potential Distinction*. Now, it is to be observed that under the term, Distinction, which is negative, two negations may be included. For, first of all, it may include the denial that one entity is another entity; and this is the formal meaning of the word, as used here in opposition to Unity. But it may also include the denial that one entity is actually united with another; and this second meaning is, as it were, adventitious. Taking the word, then, in its formal sense, there can be no reasonable doubt that the integral components of a continuous whole are really distinguished from each other as partial entities; whereas, in the latter sense, there is no Distinction at all between them, though there may be. If, therefore, it seems good to call such a future contingent *Potential Distinction*, so let it be; for it is profitless to quarrel about words. One can only say, that it is unnecessary; and that there can be no real actual Distinction, which is not included in either the Greater or the Modal.

NOTE II.

Another objection to the completeness of the division contained in the present Proposition, is founded on the separability of different Modes,—sometimes in the same Subject of modification, sometimes in different Subjects. Thus, *Subsistence* and *local Presence* are two Modes existing in one and the same Subject. Now, the Distinction between the two cannot be called a logical Distinction; for they have different principles and affections. Moreover, they are really separable; for, the one ceasing to be, the other can continue. But, again, it cannot be called a Greater Real Distinction; because this latter can subsist only between real entities, and Modes are not in themselves entities. Lastly, it cannot be said to be a Modal Distinction, first of all because, as is supposed, one is not a Mode of the other; secondly, because the two are often mutually separable from each other. Accordingly, it would seem as though there were sufficient reason for admitting a new kind of Distinction. If, however, the nature of a Mode, as it has been explained above, is duly realized; it will be seen that these cases of Distinction are embraced under the division given in this Thesis. To begin with really distinct Modes in one and the same Subject,—it cannot be, that they should be otherwise than modally distinguished. For, since they have no proper entity of their own, *in themselves* they afford no element of the Greater Real Distinction. On the other hand, they cannot find any foundation for such Distinction *in their Subject*; seeing that the Subject of both, according to the hypothesis, is the same. Then, as to Modes existing in different Subjects, it is sufficiently clear that they must be distinguished by the Greater Real Distinction. For, since their entity is not separable from the entity of their respective Subjects; such as is the nature of the Distinction between the Subjects, such likewise will be the Distinction between the Modes. But the supposition is, that the Subjects are divided from each other by the Major Real Distinction; therefore, so will the Modes be also, whether they be homogeneous or heterogeneous.

NOTE III.

Yet another sort of Distinction has been conceived, as between *the Including* and *the Included*; in fact, the Distinction which

subsists between a whole and any one of its parts. For the two Subjects of Distinction are not wholly the same, nor yet wholly different; because the whole is its part, and something more. It is observable, at the outset, that Distinction of such a nature is to be met with in Logical, as well as in the Greater Real, and in Modal, Distinction. Thus, not only is a human body distinct from its arm or leg, and subsistence from the substance which it terminates; but *Genus* is thus separate from its *Species*; i. e. as a whole from its part. In Real Distinction, which alone is at present under consideration, the examples range themselves under the Greater or Less Distinction, according to the nature of the case. Thus,—to take the first instance given,—there is a Greater Real Distinction between the whole human body and the leg; because the entities of the two are really distinct, and they are also physically separable. For, though it is true that if the leg were cut off, the whole human body, (i. e. the integral body), would not remain; yet there would still be a human body. And this sufficiently shows that there is a real entity in the whole, which in no wise belongs to the part. Nor can it be said, that this supposes a disruption of the whole and, therefore, a change in the hypothesis. For a whole, *qua* whole, is conceptual, rather than real; albeit it has a real foundation in the entity, which is conceived as a whole.

NOTE IV.

It may be asked, What are practically the signs by which Real Distinction generally, and then the two kinds of Real Distinction, can be recognized? In answer to this question, the following canons, borrowed from Suarez, are given.

i. If two objective concepts are of such a nature that they are really separable in one and the same individual, it is a sign of Real Distinction between them; for that which is individually one, cannot be divided in itself, and therefore cannot be separated from itself.

ii. Two canons are given, whereby to ascertain the existence of the Greater Real Distinction between two objective concepts:—

a. If both can be physically preserved in being, without real mutual union; it is a sign of the Greater Distinction between the two.

b. If the one can be immediately, i. e. without the intervention

of a third entity, preserved in existence independently of the other, and conversely; it is a most sure sign of the same Distinction.

iii. When one extreme can be physically separated from the other extreme, but *not conversely*, i. e. when the separability is not mutual; it is sufficient evidence of the presence of Modal Distinction.

Spite, however, of these canons, grave difficulties may not unfrequently occur touching individual cases. For it may be, for example, that instances of the permanence of one extreme, after its separation from the other, have never as yet been met with, and the mind has, in consequence, no foundation for judging that the distinction is more than Modal; whereas the said extreme may be capable of separate existence, by the action of the Divine Omnipotence. Under such circumstances, we must do our best, by a careful examination of the essential nature of the entities, their grade of perfection, the office they are intended to fill, and the like; and, with such materials, form a conclusion as to the particular instance.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

Logical Distinction is of two kinds.

In every instance in which no real Distinction is discoverable but only a Distinction of concepts, there is either a difference between the objective, as well as the subjective or formal, concepts; or there is no difference between the objective, but only between the formal, concepts. If the former, the Distinction is *conceptual*; if the latter, it is a *specifically logical* Distinction. An explanation of these terms will afford a sufficient declaration of the Thesis. The intellect can at its pleasure evoke and duplicate its concepts, and may exhibit them under different logical forms; even when the representation in each concept is precisely the same, and the object one and the same. Thus, *when Henry is predicated of himself*, or when the Judgment is formed that *he is identical with himself*, there is the same adequate concept of the same entity repeated. The only Distinction between the two concepts is, that the one occupies the place of Subject, the other the place of Predicate in a Judgment. Perhaps the same may be said of the two ideas, *Good and Goodness*; which can scarcely be said to differ, save as the *abstract* and *concrete* representations of the same object.

For, though the Transcendental relation to a Subject of inhesion is more explicitly represented in the concrete than in the abstract; still, it is necessarily included in the latter as well as in the former. Thus the only Distinction between the two would be reduced to a difference of the mould or form in which the two concepts were cast; and it is, accordingly, resolved into a piece of intellectual play. Such a Distinction is said to be *purely logical*.

But again, the intellect can, and repeatedly does, represent to itself the same object under different aspects; in which case the representations and, in consequence, the objective concepts, are conceptually distinguished from each other. For it must not be forgotten that, when the concept is real, the objective concept is that reality in the object, which is covered by the subjective or formal concept in virtue of its representation. Thus, when the mind pronounces Judgment that *man is a rational animal*, it is plain that the two concepts which occupy the places respectively of Subject and Predicate in this Judgment, though they represent the same object and represent it wholly, nevertheless differ in their representation. For the one exhibits the object as a whole; the other exhibits the essential constituents of that whole. So, when a *dog* is cognized as a *quadruped*, the same object is represented, now as a whole, now exclusively under the form of a particular property or attribute. Once more; when we say that the *intellect or intuitive faculty differs from the reason or ratiocinative faculty*, the Subject and Predicate are really representative of the same object; and the Judgment is only justified by the fact, that the same faculty of the soul is represented, in the two concepts, under two partial forms which correspond with its two distinct manners of operation. Lastly, it is theologically true to affirm that *the Divine Mercy is not the Divine Justice*; yet these two concepts are representative of the same infinite, indivisible Reality. There is not, there cannot be, any real Distinction of the sort in the Object. Nevertheless, the two representations are not the same; for God, conceived as *Mercy*, is not the same as God, conceived exclusively as *Just*. This is called *Conceptual Distinction*, to distinguish it from the preceding, which, in conformity with the Kantian precision of the term, has been called *logical*, or *purely logical*, Distinction.

It follows from the preceding declarations that, in the latter kind of mental Distinction, the object represented affords grounds,

in some way or other, for those different representations of itself, which are the foundation of Conceptual Distinction. The diversity of the concepts is not, as it is in purely logical Distinction, a mere difference in the form of thought; it is not, therefore, a simple fabrication of the intellect. It is motived; and the motive is to be found in the reality represented. This may account for the two terms respectively applied by the School to these two species of Distinction; viz. *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* and *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, which it would be difficult to represent in an English dress. The nearest approach to it perhaps would be to call the former a *Distinction of the mind motiving*, the latter a *Distinction of the mind motived*. In the one case, the Distinction is solely a product of the mind's activity; in the other case, the mind is *first* acted upon by the nature of its object, and is in some way moved by it to form the differing Concepts. There is, in the reality presented for thought, something which justifies the distinct representations. Hence, this kind of Distinction has received the name of *mental Distinction with a real foundation*, to distinguish it from the former, which is designated as *purely mental Distinction*.

In order to avoid possible confusion it may be necessary to add, that, in the case of a Distinction which is *rationis ratiocinantis*, the difference between the two concepts is to be found solely in the logical form, or mode of thought, not in the representative or material element of each concept. But, in the case of a Distinction *rationis ratiocinatae*, the representative or material element of each concept is different; and, as the object of itself is supposed to be one and the same, the reality in the object which is formally represented by one concept, is distinguished from the reality which is formally represented by the other concept; i.e. the objective concepts differ. This is the reason why I have called the former, logical; the latter, conceptual.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

Conceptual Distinction is of two kinds.

Purely mental Distinction, or *rationis ratiocinantis*, does not concern the metaphysician. It suffices, therefore, to mention it, and so to pass it by. But Conceptual Distinction, which has a real foundation, is of great importance to metaphysical inquiry. It concerns us to know, more or less precisely, what that real

foundation in the object is, upon which the Conceptual Distinction is founded; then, besides, how it comes to pass that the human intellect should require two or more concepts, in order to represent to itself one and the same reality, and how it is that the Distinction between these concepts can be other than false. The latter question will find an answer in the subsequent Proposition; the former, in this present one.

It is here declared, that Conceptual Distinction is of two kinds. Now, these two kinds are simply distinguished from each other, by virtue of an essential difference in their respective foundations; or, in other words, by an essential difference in the nature of the object represented. They shall be considered separately.

i. In one kind of Conceptual Distinction, the foundation exists in the *perfection* of the object. This perfection may present itself under a twofold aspect. For there may be, in the object, an eminent reality which is *at least* equivalent to, even if it does not surpass, several realities that are actually distinct in other Beings. By virtue of such equivalence, the mind is able to represent the object by different concepts, each one of which figures it under the form of one or other of those realities which it eminently includes in itself. Thus, *the soul of man* may be represented, now under the form of *vegetative*, now under the form of *animal*, life; because it virtually and eminently includes both. Moreover, those two realities are *in themselves* distinct; for, inasmuch as *the vegetative* exists alone in plants, while in animals it is only contained virtually in the higher form of animality, the two, as a fact, exist separately. So, again, in *God* the foundation for conceiving His *Intelligence* as distinct from His *Ideas*, His *Will* as distinct from His *Intelligence*, His *Being* as distinct from *Both*, is His own infinitely perfect Reality which in Its indivisible oneness is equivalent to, and infinitely exceeds, these several realities which in the creature are distinguished. After a somewhat different manner, Distinction is made between the *Existence* and *Essential Nature* of God; inasmuch as the Divine Being infinitely transcends, in its boundless Simplicity, all the reality which is represented by the Essence and Existence of His creatures. There is, however, a difference between this and the former examples; for the reason, that not even in the creature is there any real Distinction between Essence and Existence. But the foundation of such Distinction in God is His supereminent Perfection; whereas the

foundation of the same distinction in the creature is, (as will appear presently), the imperfection of this latter. Thus the Conceptual Distinction between Essence and Existence, originating with the creature, (as all our thoughts do in their primary formation), is transferred to God.

There may be likewise in the object a perfection which enables it, though one, to produce widely different effects, or acts. In consequence of this, the mind under one concept can represent the object as capable of producing such or such acts exclusively; and, under another concept, such other acts or effects. Thus, the human intellect may be represented, now as an intuitive faculty, now as a ratiocinative. In a like manner, men are accustomed to distinguish between the *Creative Power*, the *Mercy*, the *Avening Justice* of God, (though in Him there cannot be any such Distinction really); because His Essence is equivalent, and more than equivalent, to one simple *Faculty*, (as we conceive it), which is able to elicit all these diverse acts.

ii. In another kind of Conceptual Distinction, the foundation is to be discovered in the *imperfection* of the Object. For an imperfect Being is limited and, consequently, is wanting in ulterior reality; whence it arises, that either it admits of comparison with that higher reality which is wanting to it, or it requires *de facto* to be perfected by several distinct realities. This statement will be made clearer by illustration. It is certain, as has been seen, that there is no real Distinction between the *actual Essence* and the *Existence* of a creature, yet a Distinction is made; and, on the strength of such Distinction, contrary attributes are respectively predicated of the one and the other. Plainly enough, there is here a Conceptual Distinction, i. e. one that has a real foundation. The question, then, arises, What is that foundation? If one compares created being with God, there immediately appears a marked deficiency in the former. God is self-existing; while the creature owes its existence to another. Hence, its existence is contingent; whereas the Creator exists essentially. Further; though the Essence and Existence of the creature are equally dependent upon God; yet, considered separately, the two depend in a different manner upon Him. For the Essence, (which is, as it were, the type in which the Being is cast), depends on the Intellect of God; whereas its Actuation, or Existence, depends on His Freewill. By virtue of this comparison, the mind conceives a

Distinction between the two. Now, to take an instance or two of the second sort of foundation derived from the imperfection of the creature:—A Distinction is made between the vegetable, animal, and intellectual, life in the human soul; whereas it is impossible to make any such Distinction in an Angel, who is of a much higher nature. Why is this? It arises out of the composite quiddity of man, who is partly body, partly spirit; and, consequently, his soul is an incomplete substance, as being essentially the Form of the body. But the body needs a principle of growth and of sensitive perception. Hence, the human soul, because it is lowest among spiritual beings, postulates at least three classes of distinct acts,—the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual; whereas a pure spirit requires, and is capable of, *the last* only. So, again, Intuition, in the intellectual faculty, is conceived as distinguishable from Reason. Why is this? Because human intelligence is so weak and imperfect, that it cannot intue all truths; since there are many truths, latent to it, which it can only reach by the circuitous process of reasoning.

It will be observed, that once or twice the same example has been adduced in illustration of both these kinds of Conceptual Distinction; nor should this afford matter for surprise. For the same entity, considered under one relation, may become a subject of Distinction by virtue of its perfection; considered under another relation, by virtue of its imperfection. Thus, if man is compared with plants and brute animals, the Distinction of lives in his soul is based upon his perfection; if he is compared with Angels, on his imperfection.

NOTE I.

It is necessary to call attention to an error which is not uncommon. When the phrase, *Logical Distinction*, is employed, it is often imagined that the members of such Distinction must be *Second Intentions*, or logical entities. This is, however, so far from being true, that in Conceptual Distinction it is simply impossible; unless the Distinction is applied to such entities by an extrinsic denomination. Thus, there may be said to exist a Conceptual Distinction between *Genus* and its *Species*; but, in this case, the denomination is borrowed from the Natures which stand in such relation to each other. And, even in purely logical Distinction, the

members may be First Intentions, although the Distinction itself exists only in the form.

NOTE II.

There are many varieties in Conceptual Distinction. Such are (a) that which exists between the *determined* and *undetermined*, as, e.g. between Substance and Being; (b) between *whole* and *part*, as between the Specific Nature and the Generic or Differential; (c) between *corresponding parts*, as between the material and formal part of an Essence; (d) between the *including* and *included*, as between Generic and Specific Natures; (e) between *two realities*, each mutually exclusive of the other, as e.g. between two Differences that divide the same Generic Nature.

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

Conceptual Distinction implies an imperfection in our intellectual apprehension; but it neither supposes nor exhibits that which is untrue.

THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is sufficiently clear. For, though it is true that there is a real foundation for the Distinction in the object; yet the Distinction is itself made by different concepts of the mind which, only in a partial manner, abstractedly, imperfectly, and often confusedly or indistinctly, represent the object. Wherefore, the Divine Intelligence coins no such Distinctions Itself; though It knows the Distinctions which can be made by our mind, and knows likewise most perfectly what is the real foundation, in the object, of such Distinctions.

THE SECOND MEMBER is thus proved. The mind, first of all, forms these distinct concepts, and then predicates the distinction so obtained, of the object. But, in neither of these two acts, does it suppose or exhibit that which is false. These, however, are the only acts possible; so that it may be concluded absolutely that, in making these Distinctions, the human mind neither supposes nor exhibits that which is false. It is manifest that it cannot do so in the mere simple Apprehensions themselves; because, as we know from Ideology, it is impossible that there should be any untruth implied or contained in simple ideas. But neither is there any implied or expressed untruth in the subsequent Judgments; because, in such Judgments, the intellect neither supposes nor

predicates a real Distinction in the object itself; but it only affirms that the object considered, by an inadequate concept, exclusively as such a reality, (which it actually is), is distinct from itself considered, by an inadequate concept, exclusively as such another reality, (which it likewise actually is). Thus, for instance, when it is affirmed that *the Divine Justice is distinct from the Divine Mercy*, no one intends thereby to assert that there are two distinct Realities in God, to wit, His Mercy and His Justice; but *that God conceived as merciful*, is not the same as *God conceived under His Attribute of Justice*. Accordingly, it is quite true to say that the same infinite Being, incomprehensibly One and Simple, saves the good and punishes the wicked; but it would be theologically erroneous to say, that the Mercy of God punishes the wicked, or that the Justice of God saves the good. Yet it would be most true to say, that the Divine Nature, which we conceive as Justice, is the same Divine Nature which we conceive as Mercy. When, then, the intellect predicates any such Distinction of its object, it does not intend to do so absolutely, but only as represented by its own distinct concepts, which, though imperfect and inadequate, are, nevertheless, true as far as they go; since the Conceptual Distinction has a real foundation in the object so represented. But, in predicating a Distinction after this manner, it is obvious that the intellect neither supposes nor represents that which is false.

NOTE I.

By what signs can it be discerned whether a given Distinction is a Conceptual Distinction or not? Two canons are given, the one *positive*, the other *negative*.

i. Whenever there is a Distinction in the objective concepts, and there is no sign whatsoever of real Distinction, either greater or less, it may be taken for granted that it is a Conceptual Distinction. Such is the *negative* canon.

ii. Whenever it certainly appears that the two realities, represented by two distinct concepts, are really so united and conjoined as to be actually and individually inseparable, as well mutually as not mutually, as well supernaturally as naturally, and as well in their existence as in their real union with each other; it is a very strong and all but certain reason for judging, that they are only conceptually distinguished. Such is the *positive* canon.

NOTE II.

It is necessary to subjoin a brief declaration concerning the nature of *Identity* and *Difference*; since they are considered by the Philosopher in the fifth book of his *Metaphysics*. *Identity* includes in its concept a double element; accordingly as it is regarded *formally* for what it is, or *fundamentally*, viz. as supposing a foundation in the entity itself for the formal idea. Formally considered, it expresses a logical relation,—the relation, namely, of a thing with itself. If considered fundamentally, it hardly differs from Unity. The only discoverable difference is this; that, while Unity expresses indivision in Being, Identity expresses the indivision of Being *from itself*, or from that with which it is said to be identical. The opposite of *Identity* is *Difference*. But it is worthy of careful notice, that there is no such necessary opposition between the two; unless the Identity and Difference are predicated within the same sphere of thought. For, as the two are common to logical as well as to real entities, and to collections of entities as well as to individual entities, one with another; Identity in the real object does not exclude Difference in the concepts representative of that object. Hence the principle, or, more properly speaking, the axiom of Identity, *Those things which are identical with one and the same third, are identical with one another*, labours under the defect of a possible equivocation. For it is undoubtedly true, nay, axiomatic, that *Those things which are at once really and conceptually identical with one and the same third, are really and conceptually identical with one another*. But it is by no means true, that *Those things which are really identical with one and the same third, are conceptually identical with one another*; nor, again, is it true, that *Those things which are conceptually identical with one and the same third, are really identical with each other*. Hence the axiom of Identity must be equally barren of fruit, whether in Logic or Metaphysics; and can hardly, therefore, be elevated to the rank of a Principle. This animadversion touches on a fundamental error in Sir W. Hamilton's Logic. He has substituted this axiom of Identity for the *Dictum de omni*; and, thereby, has made Logic more intricate, at the expense of its fecundity.

RECAPITULATION.

DISTINCTION may be considered either *materially* or *formally*. It is considered *materially*, when the material part is alone taken into account, i. e. the entity or entities forming the subject of Distinction. It is considered *formally*, when the formal part alone is taken into account, that is to say, the absence or negation of identity between one thing and another, i. e. the distinction itself.

i. Distinction, regarded *materially*, is either *real* or *logical*, accordingly as the entities, conceived as distinct, are real or logical.

ii. Distinction *materially real*, regarded *formally*, is also either *real* or *logical*; accordingly as the real Subject of Distinction is really and truly several entities, independently of our mode of conceiving, or improperly and denominatively, and dependent on the mode of conceiving.

iii. *Real formal Distinction* is of two kinds; the *Greater*, which may be subdivided into *Substantial* and *Accidental*; the *Less* or *Modal*.

iv. *Logical formal Distinction* is likewise of two kinds, *purely logical* or *mental*; and *conceptual*, viz. with a real foundation. The former is called by the School *rationis ratiocinantis*; the latter, *rationis ratiocinatae*.

v. *Conceptual formal Distinction* is again of two kinds. For it is either based on the *perfection* of the entity, which is conceived as many, (and is called by some *virtual*); or it is based on the *imperfection*, wholly or in part, of the entity so conceived.

vi. *Materially logical Distinction*, considered *formally*, is, like *materially real Distinction*, either *real* or *logical*. Thus, the Distinction between a Generic Universal and its contracting Difference, as also the Distinction between the former and the Specific Universal under it, are both *materially logical*. But, if you regard them *formally*, in the instance first named the Distinction is *analogically real*; since, in the way that a Generic Universal is constituted as a logical entity, it is also constituted distinct from its Difference, in so far as it too is a logical entity. But in the second instance, it is a *logical Distinction*; because, in the way that any Universal is constituted as a logical entity, it is constituted as one with its included Species; and not as two, of which one is a Generic, the other a Specific, entity.

CHAPTER III.

TRUTH.

INTRODUCTION.

It occurs at once to inquire, why the consideration of *Truth* should precede that of *Goodness*, supposing, (as we most justly may), that there is a reason for the order of sequence in these Chapters. The question resolves itself into this: Has Truth, metaphysically speaking, any sort of priority over Goodness? And the answer is, that it has; and that in two ways. First of all, it has a nearer proximity to Being than has Goodness. For Truth bears a simple and immediate reference to Being, *as such*; whereas Goodness, (as we shall see in the next Chapter), is a consequent of Being, not formally *as such*, but *as perfect* and perfecting. In the next place, the Intellect is naturally prior to the Will; for, though in act there is such a vital intercommunion between these two faculties, that it is difficult to determine, in each individual case, with which the efficiency commences; yet, considering the two absolutely and in the abstract, it is plain that the Will, because itself is blind, must depend upon that faculty which sees. To put it otherwise; the Intellect must perceive the object to be true, before the Will can pursue it as a Good. The Angelic Doctor gives this answer¹; but he likewise adds another, taken from a different point of view. For one object, as he tells us, is conceptually prior to another, when it has precedence in intellectual cognition. 'But the intellect, first of all,

¹ 'Verum absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum; quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidam ex hoc quod verum propinquius se habet ad ens quod est prius quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate; ratio autem boni consequitur esse secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc quod cognitio naturaliter praeceedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum secundum rationem.' 1^o xvi, 4, o.

apprehends simple Being, then it apprehends its own cognition of Being; and, after that, it apprehends its appetite of Being. Wherefore, first comes the idea of Being; then the idea of the True; and, lastly, the idea of the Good¹.

Of Truth, in the full latitude of its signification, there can be no definition; for not only does it include a Transcendental, the main object of the present investigation, (and Transcendentals, as we have seen, cannot be defined); but it is predicated, equivocally or, at the most, according to analogy, of all save its primary significate. It behoves us, therefore, straightway to consider it under its diverse forms.

St. Thomas enumerates four kinds of Truth², to which a fifth may be added, by way of complement.

i. There is Truth *in speech or writing*, considered purely and simply as the vehicle of thought. It may be at once dismissed; since the investigation of it properly belongs to Dialectic or Grammar. The same Truth exists proportionately in other symbols of thought, such as *actions, telegraphic signals or communications*, and the like.

ii. There is *moral* Truth in word and, to a certain extent, in action; accordingly as the one or the other corresponds with the inner thought. Because it is moral, it claims a place in the special subject-matter of the ethical Science.

iii. There is *logical* Truth, which consists in the correspondence between the thought and the formal laws of thought, and is the object of pure Logic.

iv. There is *conceptual* Truth, which consists in the correspondence between the representative thought and the represented object. It enters into the subject-matter of Ideology; but cannot be ignored by the metaphysician.

v. There is *ontological or Transcendental* Truth, which (to speak summarily) may be said to consist in the actual or possible correspondence of Being with Intelligence. Such Truth is the proper object of Metaphysics. For this Queen of Sciences pursues the investigation of Truth in two ways. She aims at a scientific know-

¹ 'Secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione quod prius cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum ens, et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens, et tertio apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo ratio veri, tertio ratio boni.' 1^{no} xvi, 4, ad 2^m.

² *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 3, c. v. ff.*

ledge of her subject-matter, which may be called the pursuit of Truth materially in its relation to, and connection with, the object of cognition. This aim, however, is common to all the sciences, properly so called. But she likewise aims at a scientific knowledge of Truth, as it is formally in itself, of its essential nature, attributes, and the like; and this is her peculiar and exclusive province.

The present Chapter will open with an inquiry into the nature and characteristics of conceptual Truth. There are three principal reasons for such a course.

(a) The idea of Truth was originally derived from the judicial acts of the human mind, and the primary signification of the word corresponds with the original idea; its other meanings are derivatives from this source. So far, all are agreed. It is natural, therefore, to suppose, that an examination into the nature of conceptual Truth, will prepare the way for, and throw great light upon, the great question of Transcendental Truth, which is the direct and principal object of metaphysical research.

(b) Philosophical method requires, that an inquiry into the easier should precede an investigation of the more difficult; when both are pertinent to the subject-matter. But, evidently, conceptual Truth is more easily apprehended by the human mind, because it is an accidental perfection of the mind's own acts; whereas ontological, or Transcendental, Truth is objective, inasmuch as it runs parallel with Being with which it is *really* identified. And, though it is true that the latter includes the Subjective with the Objective, because the *Ego* (to borrow from modern phraseology) is included, equally with the *non-Ego*, within the circumference of Being; yet, regarded in this light, the Subjective is objectivized in thought, and becomes involved in the general obscurity of the Transcendental.

(c) But the paramount motive for adopting the present order of inquiry, is implicitly contained in the reason first given. Truth *formally* exists only in the intellect; and when the term is applied to sensible perception or to Being, it is so applied by analogy either of proportion or of attribution. As, then, in order to acquire an accurate knowledge of the secondary significates or analogates, it is necessary first of all to understand the primary; it follows, that we must commence with conceptual, in order that we may be the better enabled to understand ontological, Truth.

ARTICLE I.

Formal Conceptual Truth.

Conceptual Truth consists in a conformity between the representative concept and the object represented. Hence, it has been described as an equation, or adequation, between the two. But these terms must be rightly understood; otherwise, they may introduce confusion at the outset. They are intended to express a similitudinal equation, i.e. a *correspondence* between the representation in the mind and the object of cognition; so that there is a due *proportional* similarity between the two. They do not necessarily require an exhaustive representation of the object of thought; and most certainly do not suppose an entitative resemblance. In like manner, a photograph may be said to be adequate to the person or thing photographed; though it does not represent the colours, and though e.g. a plate of glass sensitized by a silver salt could bear no entitative resemblance to the flesh, blood, or bones of the person photographed.

Conceptual Truth is of two kinds, *Formal* and *Material*. Material Conceptual Truth consists in the simple conformity between the concept and its object; and excludes all cognizance by the intellect of the conformity. Thus informed, the intellect *is true*; but *holds not the truth*, because not *knowing* it. Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the same conformity between the concept and its object; but essentially includes the cognition of such conformity by the intellect. Wherefore, thus informed, the intellect not only *is true*, but holds or *possesses the truth*: and it is this which completes the conformity between the intellectual act and the object of thought. The nature of this important distinction will be made plain in the course of the following Propositions.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found in the judicial act of the intellect; and in that alone.

PROLEGOMENON.

It is supposed, as a *Lemma* from pure Logic, that there are only two primary forms of human thought, to wit, the *simple Apprehension* and the *Judgment*. Under the former, are included simple ideas;

under the latter, the mediate judgments of reason as well as the intuitive or immediate Judgments of the understanding. Thus, e.g. intellectual representations of a *cow*, a *pleasant breeze*, a *rational animal*, are simple Apprehensions; while, *this cow is a shorthorn*, *the breeze is not pleasant*, *man is a rational animal*, are Judgments. These latter are essentially enunciative either affirmatively or negatively, and consist of three components; the two *Terms*, which are respectively called the *Subject* and *Predicate*, and the *Copula* or *Logical verb*,—*is* or *is not*. In this connection it may not be amiss to introduce Aldrich's description of a Judgment; for though it hardly satisfies the requirements of a scientific definition, it nevertheless brings out the most important and most difficult point in the question upon which we are now entering. Judgment, then, according to this author, is an act 'by which the mind not only perceives two objects' (for this is the act of simple Apprehension, not of Judgment), 'but, as it were seated on its tribunal, expressly pronounces within itself that they agree or disagree.' The formal act of Judgment, therefore, consists in this *pronouncing* either affirmatively or negatively, as the case may be. It is precisely this *pronouncing* of the mind in its judicial act, which constitutes the knot of the difficulty that awaits us.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the present Proposition is proved by four arguments which go to prove the second Member also. Wherefore,

i. First of all, it is the common opinion of philosophers, including Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Suarez, that conceptual Truth formally exists in the judicial act, and in the judicial act alone. The declarations of St. Thomas touching this matter will be presented to the reader later on.

ii. Their opinion is supported by the verdict of common sense. For it is universally admitted by mankind that, when the mind has conceived a Judgment on any given matter, that Judgment must be either true or false. On this account, logicians teach that the quality of a Judgment, regarded *materially*, consists in its Truth or Falsity; regarded *formally* (i. e. as a pure Form of thought), in Composition or Division,—otherwise, in affirmation or negation.

iii. The above argument is further confirmed by the Judgment which men commonly pronounce on spoken or written thought. For, whenever Truth or Falsity is attributed by them to anything

said or written, the words are invariably in the form of a Proposition. In a similar manner, moral Truth is attributed to a man, only when his *Statements* or *Propositions* are in conformity with his thoughts. No one would dream of charging another with a lie, in virtue of any number of incongruous phrases or exclamations. Something must have been either affirmed or denied, in order to account for the accusation. But language is the mere symbol of thought; and, consequently, it is reasonable to argue from the symbol to the thing symbolized.

iv. The assertion is, moreover, proved from the definition of Formal Conceptual Truth. For this latter differs from Material Conceptual Truth, in that it not only supposes a conformity between the thought and its object; but likewise requires that the intellect should have cognition in some way or other of such conformity, or, in other words, that it should know the truth of its own representation. Now, in the judicial act, and in no other, the intellect does recognize such conformity; as will be explained at length in subsequent Theses. Therefore, Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found, (though neither necessarily nor invariably, yet solely), in the judicial act, or Judgment, of the mind.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER is proved by the same arguments. (For the sake of clearness, the enunciation of it may be thrown into this form: Formal Conceptual Truth cannot be discovered in simple Apprehension of whatever kind, *provided that it is in all respects a mere simple Apprehension*. This modifying clause is of no little importance; because there are some simple Apprehensions that either presuppose an antecedent Judgment, or virtually include the actual one.)

i. It is the all but universal opinion of philosophers, (including the three great names just mentioned), that such is the case.

ii. The common sense of mankind forbears from attributing truth to these incomplex concepts. It is often said, that such and such an idea is a queer one, is unreal, extravagant, nonsensical, or, that it is a brilliant, original idea; but it is not called true or false, unless, at least cryptically, it involves a Judgment.

iii. The same verdict is given as touching spoken or written thought. If any one, for instance, were to talk of *blue grass*, or of *winged iron*, the listeners might exclaim, 'What an outlandish idea!' but they would never accuse the speaker of falsehood. If, however, he should declare that, *This grass is blue*, or that, *This bar of iron has*

not wings, they would denounce the former assertion as false, and would pronounce the latter to be true.

iv. In simple Apprehension the intellect does not cognize the truth of its own representation; but simply represents the object to be represented, which is no other than the object that is *de facto* represented. The reason is, that, in simple Apprehension, there is no *intention* of the intellect, determining itself to the representation of any other object than that which it actually represents. To illustrate this observation: a man may be prompted, on the occasion of the presence before his eyes of some *aluminium* ornament, to conceive the idea of *gold*; but, so long as he merely conceives the idea of *gold*, that metal is the true object of his thought. For his mind has not determined itself to the representation of any other object than the gold which he actually thinks. But, if he goes on to pass Judgment, and to pronounce, *This ornament which I am looking at is gold*; who does not see that the mind has determined itself to the representation of a definite object, and virtually asserts its representation to be a true one? It suffices for the present to put the facts in evidence, in order to make the distinction clear between the two intellectual acts, in their relation to Conceptual Truth; it will remain for us, in after Theses, to confront the difficult question as to the intimate reason of the distinction.

Here is the place to introduce the teaching of the Angelic Doctor concerning this subject; as it will lead us on the road to the solution of the difficulty last mentioned. St. Thomas offers two reasons why Formal Conceptual Truth is discoverable in the Judgment, but not in the simple Apprehension. The first he explains in the following passage: 'The Essence of' (Formal Conceptual) 'Truth consists in an equation between the entity' (or object) 'and the intellect. Now, equation does not exist between a thing and itself; for it is the equality of distinct things. Hence, the characteristic of Truth is first discoverable in the intellect, as soon as the intellect begins to have something of its own which the entity external to the soul has not, though having something corresponding to it; and so, between these two, we may look for the equation. Now the intellect, while 'conceiving Quiddities' (i.e. by simple Apprehensions) 'has only a resemblance or image of the entity external to the soul, like one of the senses in receiving the *species* or *form* of a sensible entity. But, as soon as it begins to form a Judgment about the thing apprehended, then the Judgment of the intellect, as such,

is something proper to itself, and is not discoverable externally in the entity. When, then, there exists an equation between itself' (i.e. the judicial act of the intellect) 'and that which is externally in the entity, there is said to be a true Judgment¹.' The argument of St. Thomas is as follows: Conceptual Truth consists in an equation between the intellect and the object, as between the Representing and the Represented. But an equation is not consistent with identity; for equation may be defined to be the equality of distinct things. If therefore, there is to be an equation between the representing concept and the represented reality; there must be a difference between the conceptual representation, *as representing*, and the *represented* Reality. Now, in simple Apprehension there is no such distinction discoverable; for the intellectual *expressed species*, or concept, is a mere transcript of the original. In the order of representation, (which is the only order that comes into question in this matter), there is an identity between the Representation and the Represented. But, when the mind proceeds to a judicial act, it is quite the reverse. For the Judgment, *as Judgment*, finds no counterpart of itself in the reality represented. Suppose the Judgment to be true, there is no separation in the object, like to that which exists between the Subject and Predicate in the judicial concept; and the Copula, or logical verb, is altogether excluded from it. Hence, an equation is possible; because there is a distinction. This argument is subtle and ingenious; but its chief force resides in its virtual correspondence with the second reason given by St. Thomas.

Wherefore, the Angelic Doctor in another place explains the reason for the difference between the two intellectual acts, in regard of Conceptual Truth, after this wise: 'When a simple Apprehension is expressed or conceived, the Apprehension *of itself* forms neither

¹ 'Sicut verum per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus; ita etiam per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividensis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus. Idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est. Unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu, ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem, formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis. Sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum iudicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re. Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur iudicium verum esse.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 3, c.*

an equation nor an inequality with the object. For equation and default of equation are expressions that denote comparison. But a simple Apprehension of itself *involves no comparison with, or definite application to, the object*. Hence, of itself it can neither be called true nor false. This can only be predicated of Judgment, *in which the comparison of the simple Concept with the object is defined by means of Composition and Division*¹ (i. e. Affirmation and Negation)¹. This, then, in other words, is the argument of St. Thomas. Equation necessarily includes in its idea a comparison between the two terms of equation. If, then, Formal Conceptual Truth is an equation between the Concept and its object; it necessarily supposes a comparison made between the representing Concept and the represented object. Now, in a mere simple Apprehension such comparison is impossible. For the object is not defined, save by the perfected Concept; and there is no after act of the intellect, by which the comparison may be made. But, in a Judgment, the object is *intentionally* determined in the act of judging, before the completion of the act; and the formal act of affirming or denying, virtually includes the comparison of the complex Concept with its previously determined object. How the object is defined, and how this comparison is virtually included in the judicial act, will occupy us later.

DIFFICULTY.

There is only one objection of any value, that has been brought against the truth of the foregoing Proposition. If Formal Conceptual Truth, it is urged, can only be found in Composition and Division, or, in other words, in a judicial act of the intellect, it would seem to follow that Formal Truth has no place in the Divine Intelligence. For, in God, His Wisdom and Knowledge is one most simple Idea, one infinite Act of simple Apprehension, (so to say), or rather of simple Comprehension, which Act is His Being, Himself. But it is a contradiction in terms, to deny to the infinitely Perfect the most perfect form of Conceptual Truth; the more so, that such

¹ 'Cum aliquid incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei æquatum nec rei inaequale; cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparisonem dicantur. Incomplexum autem, quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparisonem vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest; sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis.' *q. Gent. L. I, c. 59, 2º.*

an opinion would suppose Him to be unconscious of His own Infallibility.

THE ANSWER. Though it is true that Composition and Division are not FORMALLY in the Divine Intelligence, because they connote imperfection; yet they are *eminently* there. That is to say, all that the finite intellect can do by its judicial acts, all the perfection that it acquires by them, are contained within the Divine Intuition in a superabundance of excess; as will be seen at length in the last Book, on Natural Theology. And, in that one infinite and infinitely perfect Intuition, He sees all complex truths in His own sea of Essence as Mirror and Substance of all Truth. Hence, the Angel of the Schools remarks: 'Although there is neither Composition nor Division in the Intellect of God; nevertheless, by His own simple Intelligence He judges of all things and knows all complex truths. And so, in His Intellect there is Truth¹.'

It is now proposed to examine into the nature of Formal Conceptual Truth, not only as a contribution towards the solution of a perplexed problem, but as auxiliary to the establishment of the more probable doctrine concerning ontological, or Transcendental, Truth. In a series of Propositions will be established, in what that conformity consists which characterizes Conceptual Truth,—how the intellect is conscious of the conformity,—what is preredquired in order that this consciousness may be possible,—and, lastly, the kinds of Judgment in which such Truth may be found.

PROPOSITION LXX.

The conformity by which Formal Conceptual Truth is constituted, is not a conformity between the objective Concept and the entity which is the object of cognition.

It will be necessary here to remind the reader once more, that, in the case of real entities, the objective Concept is that reality in the object which is formally covered by the subjective Concept, or act of cognition. Now, according to Durandus and some others,

¹ 'Licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam judicat de omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu ejus est veritas.' 1^o xvi, 5, *ad* 1^m.

Conceptual Truth does not consist in the conformity of the intellectual act with its object; but rather in the conformity of the objective Concept or, in other words, of that reality in the object, conceived by the intellect, with the object or entity itself. Besides the fact that this opinion is opposed to the common teaching of the Schools and to the authority of their most illustrious Doctors, (which, in the decision of intricate questions, is an argument of no small weight); there are five reasons of great cogency, why it should be rejected.

i. It is so plain as not to require any proof, that a Concept is not called true by denomination from the ontological Truth of the object, but from the conformity of the Concept itself with the object. Thus, when we say that such a statesman has formed a true Judgment of the state of affairs, we do not mean to assert that his Judgment is true, because the state of affairs is true, but because his Concept is conformable with the state of affairs or, in other words, because he represents things as they are. So, again, in the instance of sensible Judgments,—v. g. *The sun shines brightly*,—the Judgment is not said to be true, because the sun's shining brightly is conformable with the sun; but because the Concept represents the sun's shining as it really is.

ii. It is the same in language, as well as in all signs and images of things. For an expression or Proposition is said to be true, not because the Concept or object of the Concept is true in itself, but because the words are conformable to the Concept which they embody. In like manner, a statue of Napoleon is declared to be a true one, because it is a faithful representation of the person intended; not because the figure of Napoleon, as conceived, is conformable with himself. Hence the ordinary observation, that it is a true *likeness*. Yet Concepts are symbols of entities; as words are symbols of Concepts; and statues, of persons.

iii. No entity has an objective entity distinct from itself; so that there is no foundation for such a comparison. The reality which is called the objective Concept, is identical with the reality which is the object; and is called objective Concept by a merely extrinsic denomination, derived from the subjective Concept. In other words, it receives this name, because under such a form, (really its own, or rather itself), the intellect chooses to represent it. Thus, the anatomist represents *man* to himself as a *skeleton*; and the skeleton is, therefore, in his case the objective Concept.

But the skeleton and the man are not two distinct entities; so that the truth of the anatomist's Judgment should consist in the conformity of the man's skeleton with himself. His Judgment is true, in so far as it duly represents the human skeleton, which is nothing else than man partially considered. Again: The only difference between the entity and the objective Concept, is to be found in an extrinsic denomination, as has been already stated; and that denomination is received from the intellectual act, or cognition of the mind. Hence, a comparison of the two and a correspondence of the latter with the former, *really* resolve themselves into a comparison between the Concept and the entity, and a correspondence of the one with the other; which coincides with the common opinion.

iv. If it be true that Formal Conceptual Truth essentially consists in a correspondence between the entity and its objective Concept; it follows that, wherever Conceptual Truth is confessedly present, *there* must likewise be found this correspondence between the material and formal object. But, as a fact, there are many Judgments in which such correspondence is simply impossible; for the reason that there is no entity other than the objective Concept. Thus, in the knowledge of *things contingently future*, (such as the life and actions of *Antichrist*, for instance), there is nothing but the objective Concept which is present to the intellect. There is no corresponding *actual* reality. So, likewise, in the Judgment that a *Chimera* is a *fabulous being*, there is confessedly Conceptual Truth; yet there is no entity which is apart from, and comparable with, the objective Concept.

v. Not only is it generally understood, that all truth is primarily in the intellect; but, in particular, nothing can be clearer than that Conceptual Truth is subjective, because it is truth subsisting in the Concept, as the name sufficiently declares. But the opinion which is combated in this Proposition makes it objective; and thereby identifies it, more or less, with ontological Truth. To this it may be said, that the comparison is instituted by the judicial intellect. But this is nothing to the purpose. For the act of comparison is a *sine qua non*, if you please; but, in the hypothesis now under consideration, it does not enter into the formal constitution of Conceptual Truth, which consists in a certain correspondence or equation. If, then, that correspondence is between the cognized entity and itself, under the form according to which it

has been conceived ; the said Truth is not in the *Concept*, but in the *entity* or *object*.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The first objection against the present Thesis may be thus stated. The requisite conformity, which is now under discussion, cannot be a conformity between the formal or subjective Concept and the object. For such a conformity must be either entitative or intentional ; in other words, either between the respective natures of the two, or a representative conformity. But it is impossible to maintain the former hypothesis ; because, in a great number of Judgments, the object is material in its nature, while the Concept is spiritual. If the second hypothesis should be adopted ; then it will follow, that the correspondence must be such only as is discoverable between the objective Concept and the entity that is object of cognition. For the Concept can only be compared representatively with its object, by virtue of its actual representation ; and the actual representation, *qua* representation in the passive sense of the word, is the objective Concept. This is plain ; for the act itself of judging cannot be one of the terms of comparison, since there is so far no similarity. It must be, therefore, in that which is represented by the act.

ANSWER. The *Antecedent*, in which it is asserted that the required conformity cannot be any such as is supposed to exist between the concept and its object, is met with a simple negation. As to the proof of the *Antecedent*, the disjunctive *Major* is admitted ; for it is true that such conformity must be either entitative or intentional. Furthermore, the first member of the *Minor* is granted for the reason given in the proof. There can be no doubt, that such correspondence or equation is impossible between the nature of the Concept and the nature of the entity ; for, even where there may chance to be some such correspondence, it is quite accidental to the Truth of the Concept. But the second member of the *Minor* is denied. There may be a correspondence between the judicial act as representative and the entity as represented ; and that intellectual representation is in no wise identical with the objective Concept. For the objective Concept is the entity itself, so far as it is covered by the intellectual act ; and, accordingly, would not be the judgment as representative, but the object as represented.

Of course, there can be no correspondence, till the completion of the Concept; for it is not to be found in *judging* but in the *Judgment*. Now, if we look at the completed act, we discover that it is representative of a determined object; and it will be well to examine that intention or representation, since it will conduce towards a clearer solution of the difficulty. In that representation there are three elements, viz. the definite object of representation, symbolized by the *Subject*; the form under which the object is conceived, symbolized by the *Predicate*; and the logical Verb, *Is*, or *Is not*, which is the essential Form of the conceptual representation. Of these the former two have a corresponding object in real Judgments, (which are the only ones contemplated in the present inquiry); the latter cannot possibly exist out of the intellectual act. The objective Concept, then, *includes* the entity, together with the form or mode under which it is represented. Thus in the Judgment, *Man is an animal*, man is represented under the form of *animality*. But now, take a contrary Judgment, *Man is not an animal*. The first is true; the second is false. But why? The only contrast between the two Judgments is in the *Copula*, or logical Verb; yet there is nothing corresponding to it in the object. But it may be urged in reply; The objective Concept, in the second instance, is *Man deprived of animality*. This is impossible; for there is no such form in the object, but just the reverse. In such case, there is no objective Concept, properly so called; the only objective Concept is a logical entity, which is purely subjective. Wherefore, the Conceptual Truth or Falsity depends solely on the *Copula*, which is exclusively logical; and if so, Conceptual Truth is in the subject, not in the object. In answer, then, to the objection, that the Concept, compared *intentionally* with its object, is neither more nor less than the objective Concept, it must be asserted that the case is precisely the reverse. For the entity receives the name of the objective Concept from the intellectual act which represents it; and this argues a certain priority of nature in the Concept, not to the entity or the reality of that entity which is represented, but to the objective Concept in its distinction from the entity. The judicial act is, in its nature, representative; and, when that logical representation exhibits the entity as it really is, then, and then only, is it conceptually true.

II. It is, again, urged in objection, against the present Proposition,

that Truth is the object of the intellect and, in consequence, of its judicial act. Therefore the conformity, of which we are in search, must be in the object; not in the cognition. For, when the intellect forms a direct Judgment concerning the truth; it cannot be judging of the subjective conformity of its own act, but of the truth of the object itself.

ANSWER. Truth is not *formally*, but only *fundamentally*, the object of the intellect. On this point St. Thomas makes the apposite remark, that 'though conceptual Truth is caused in our intellects by the object, it is not necessary that the form of truth should be previously discoverable in the object; just as the form of health is not discoverable in the medicine, previously to its being in the animal. For it is the virtue of the medicine, not its healthiness, which causes health; since its agency is not univocal. And, in like manner, it is the being of the thing, not its truth, which causes Conceptual Truth. Wherefore, the Philosopher says, (in the *Categories*, c. 5,) that opinion and speech are true because of the existence of the thing, not because of its truth¹. The object, therefore, of the mind, is the entity which it represents; and its aim is to acquire a definite and scientific knowledge of that object, in which is essentially included the conformity of the intellectual representation and, consequently, Conceptual Truth. But the mind does not contemplate the truth of the object, (which is nothing other than its intelligibility), but the object itself. How it is that the intellect, (even in a direct, as distinguished from a reflex, Judgment), can judge of the conformity of its act with the entity represented by that act, will be discussed in the sequel.

III. It is objected, in the last place, that, when the intellect reflects on its direct act, in order to gain a formal cognition of its

¹ 'Licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis; sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in animali. Virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas ejus, causat sanitatem, cum non sit agens univocum' (that is, it does not produce health by healthiness, as fire produces fire). 'Et similiter esse rei, non veritas ejus, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde Philosophus dicit, quod opinio et oratio vera est ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res vera est.' 1^o xvi, 1, ad 3^m. The quotation from Aristotle is more a summary of his teaching in the Chapter alluded to; the only words that exactly correspond, are these, τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέγεται. The 'opinion' (δόξα) is not mentioned here, but is borrowed from the preceding context.

truth; it does not compare the direct Judgment with the object, but the object, under the form by which it is apprehended, with itself in its absolute entity. But, if so, it is plain that Conceptual Truth consists, as Dürandus maintains, in the conformity of the objective Concept with the entity that is the object of representation.

ANSWER. The assumption on which the argument rests, is wholly unfounded. In such reflex Judgments, the formal Concept is compared with the object.

PROPOSITION LXXI.

Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the judicial concept of the intellect with the object of cognition.

Before proceeding to the direct proof of this Thesis, it will be necessary to explain the nature of the conformity required, which cannot be given better than in the following words of St. Thomas. 'Since Conceptual Truth,' he observes, 'is an equation between the intellect and its object, in that the intellect pronounces that to be which is, and that not to be which is not; Truth' (Conceptual) 'appertains to that, in the formal Concept, which the intellect pronounces, not to the mode or form of operation by which it pronounces it. For it is not necessary to Conceptual Truth, that the intellectual act itself should form an equation with the object; since the object is sometimes material, while the intellectual act is immaterial. But that which the intellect by its act pronounces and cognizes, must form an equation with the object, in such sort that this latter should really be as the intellect pronounces¹ (that it is). In this passage St. Thomas admonishes us, in what respects conformity between the Concept and the object is not to be expected, and in what way such conformity is imperatively demanded, in order to satisfy the requirements of Formal Conceptual Truth. In the first place, we must not expect a conformity between the *nature* of the act, and the *nature* of the object; in other words,

¹ 'Cum veritas intellectus sit adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad id in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua id dicit. Non enim ad veritatem intellectus exigitur, ut ipsum intelligere rei adaequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, intelligere vero immateriale. Sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse rei aequatum, scil. ut ita in re sit, sicut intellectus dicit.' *q. Gentis, L. I, c. 59, 1º.*

between the entity of the act and the entity of the object. Again, he warns us not to anticipate a conformity between the form of the thought, or what logicians call *the Second Intention*, and the entity represented. For the form of a simple Apprehension is more conformable to the object than that of a Judgment, since one of the principal elements of the latter—its formal constitutive, in fact,—can have nothing even similitudinally corresponding with it in the objected entity. Moreover, the logical form of the Concept may be different, and yet the Conceptual Truth remain. For the Divine Idea is in infinite perfection conceptually true; nevertheless, It is not a Judgment, as St. Thomas points out. The conformity required, then, consists in an equation between the *pronounced* representation of the mind and the entity represented; which supposes, not only that the intellectual representation should be conformable to the object, but that the intellect should pronounce,—adjudge it to be so,—should ‘pronounce that *to be* which *is*, and that *not to be* which *is not*,’—the former by an affirmative, the latter by a negative, Judgment. But so to pronounce, argues consciousness of the conformity. It is manifest from the above commentary on this passage of the Angelic Doctor, (which is based on the words themselves, as interpreted by the context and the main drift of the Chapter), that they greatly err, who discover herein any countenance of the opinion which has been rejected in the preceding Proposition. If other proof were wanting, the expression of St. Thomas that ‘Conceptual Truth appertains to *that in the formal Concept*, &c.’ would be enough of itself to evince, that he is in no wise referring to the objective Concept.

THE PROOF of the present Thesis is easy; since it is contained in the simple application of the definition. For, if Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the intellectual act with the object represented by that act, as well as in the mental consciousness, or rather cognition, of such conformity; and if, moreover, such cognition of the conformity of the Concept with its object, by which the truth of the intellectual act becomes itself an object of mental apprehension, is limited to the Judgment of the intellect: it follows, as a demonstrative consequence, that Formal Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of the judicial act with the object of cognition. But the *Antecedent* has been in part established already, and will be further confirmed in Propositions

that are yet to follow. Therefore, the *Consequent* is demonstrably true.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

Formal Conceptual Truth differentially consists in a virtual or implicit Judgment, which the mind forms in the judicial act itself, as to the conformity between its own judicial representation and the object represented; or, in other words, in the explicit cognition by the intellect of the material truth of its own representation.

As the present Proposition is explanatory of the previous one, rather than any enunciation of a new principle, the declaration of it will be made clearer and more satisfactory by pursuing the method of analysis. Wherefore,

i. Formal, essentially differs from Material, Conceptual Truth, in that the mind knows the conformity of its own Concept with the object conceived in the former; whereas, in the latter, it does not know this conformity, but simply possesses it. In the one case, it pronounces on the truth of its own representation; in the other, it does not. In the one case, it is conscious of its own truth; in the other, it is not. This is the meaning of the word *differentially*, which appears in the Enunciation. The difference is most clearly defined by the Angelic Doctor in various places, of which two will be here presented to the reader, as guides in the prosecution of the present analysis. 'Truth,' he says, 'is in the intellect and in the senses; but not in the same way. For it is in the intellect as, so to speak, a consequent of the intellectual act, and as cognized by the intellect. For it is a consequent of intellectual operation, accordingly as the intellect judges of a thing as it really is: Furthermore, it is cognized by the intellect; forasmuch as the intellect reflects upon its own act, not only as knowing' (or being conscious of) 'its own act, but as knowing its proportion to the object. But this cannot be known, unless the nature of the act be known; and this latter cannot be known, unless the nature of the active principle be known. But such is the intellect itself, of whose nature it is to admit of a conformity with entities. Hence, it is because the intellect is self-reflexive, that it cognizes' (conceptual) 'Truth. But Truth is in the senses simply as the consequent of their act, when the sensible judgment is in accordance with what the object really is. Yet, on the other hand, it is not

in the senses as an object of sensible perception. For, although the senses form a true judgment of their object; they nevertheless do not cognize the truth according to which their judgment is true. For, albeit the senses are conscious that they perceive, they neither cognize their own nature, nor, as a consequence, the nature of their own acts, nor the proportion of these to their objects; and, therefore, they have no cognition of their truth¹. This passage will be of service in the sequel. At present it will only be necessary to remark that, when St. Thomas speaks of the *judgment* of the senses, he is using the word analogically; in that *the common sense*, (i. e. the faculty by which the separate perceptions of each sense are reduced to a common unity), exhibits acts which, as he describes them elsewhere, bear a shadowy resemblance to intellectual Judgments.

In the preceding quotation, the Angelic Doctor compares the judicial act of the intellect with sensitive perception only. In the one that follows, he likewise compares it with the intellectual act of simple Apprehension; and, in doing so, enters more explicitly into the reason why Conceptual Truth is not formally discoverable in the latter, but only in the Judgment. Here are his words:—
 ‘Truth according to its primary signification, is in the intellect. Now, since every entity is true, in that it possesses the Form proper to its own nature; it is necessary that the intellect in act should be true, in so far as it has a likeness of the thing conceived, which is its Form when it is in act. And it is for this reason that Truth is defined to be a conformity between the intellect and its object. Hence, to know this conformity, is to know the Truth.

¹ ‘Veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur super actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem. Quod quidem cognosci non potest, nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur. Unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus, quod supra seipsum reflectitur. Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum ejus; dum scilicet iudicium sensus est de re secundum quod est. Sed tamen non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu. Si enim sensus vere iudicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem qua vere iudicat. Quamvis enim sensus cognoscat se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam suam, et per consequens nec naturam sui actus, nec proportionem ejus ad res, et ita nec veritatem ejus. — *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 9, c.*

But the senses in nowise know it. For, though sight has a likeness of the object seen; nevertheless, it does not know the relation of resemblance which subsists between the object seen and its own sensible perception. But the intellect is capable of cognizing its own conformity with the intelligible entity. It does not, however, apprehend this conformity in its simple Apprehension of the Essence. But, when it judges that the entity really corresponds with the form under which it apprehends such entity; then, for the first time, it cognizes and pronounces the Truth. And this it does by Composition and Division. For, in every Proposition, *it applies a certain form symbolized by the Predicate to a certain entity symbolized by the Subject; or it separates the former from the latter.* Wherefore, it may be justly concluded that the senses are true in respect of such and such an object, and that the intellect is true in its simple Apprehension of Essence; but not that either of them cognizes or pronounces the Truth. The like may be said of simple Terms. To sum up: Truth can exist in the senses or in the intellectual simple Apprehension of Essence, *as in a certain true entity*, but not as a something *cognized* by the *cognizing*, which is what Truth means. For the perfection of the intellect is Truth, *as cognized*. Consequently, properly speaking, Truth is in the judicial act of the intellect affirmative or negative; but neither in the senses nor in simple Apprehension¹. From these two passages it is plain that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Formal

¹ 'Verum secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera, secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, in quantum est cognoscens, sit verus in quantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma ejus in quantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc, per conformitatem intellectus et rei, veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit. Licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilia, non tamen cognoscit comparisonem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, sed tamen non apprehendit eam, secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo *quod quid est*. Sed quando judicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo. Nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subjectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo *quod quid est*; sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus incomplexis. Veritas igitur potest esse in sensu vel in intellectu cognoscente *quod quid est*; ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente; quod importat nomen veri. Perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente *quod quid est*.' 1^o xvi, 2, o.

Conceptual Truth differs from Material, (as existing in simple Apprehension, and likewise analogically in the senses); in that the former essentially includes an intellectual cognition and expression of the conformity between the Concept and its object, which has no place in the latter.

ii. It further follows from the doctrine laid down in these passages, that Formal Conceptual Truth may be in every kind and form of Judgment; and that it *must* be there in every case, unless the Judgment should prove false. For St. Thomas attributes it to the judicial act of Composition and Division. Wherever, then, there is either Composition or Division, one or other of which occurs in every judicial act of the mind, as its essential Form; *there* must be cognized conformity or, in other words, Formal Truth, unless there should be a difformity of the Concept from its object.

iii. Therefore, Formal Conceptual Truth, and the judicial cognition of the conformity between the Concept and its object, by which the Formality of Conceptual Truth is constituted, are not limited to Judgments, which are, speaking according to the strictness of logical terminology, reflex. In the instance of these latter Judgments, there would be no difficulty; because, in them, the judicial cognition of the conformity between the Concept and its object, is expressly pronounced. Thus, for instance,—*That the earth moves round the sun and not the sun round the earth, is true*,—is, strictly speaking, a reflex Judgment; in which the conformity with the object is expressly predicated of the previous Judgment, assumed as subject. But Formal Conceptual Truth is to be found equally in the direct, as in the reflex, Judgment. Here it is, that we touch on the main difficulty of the present inquiry.

iv. In direct *affirmative* Judgments, (and that which is discoverable in them, may likewise be found, *servatis servandis*, in *negative* Judgments), the intellect pronounces *expressly* the conformity of a certain reality with the entity which is *hic et nunc* the object of its cognition. Thus, in the Judgment,—*a dog is a quadruped*,—*a four-legged body* is pronounced to be conformable with the animal known as *a dog*. The conformity is *objective*; and the Judgment refers to the object only. Yet there are no traces, at first sight, of any other Judgment in the act. Wait for a moment. Does the intellect judge of the dog and of its conformity with a four-legged body *immediately*? If so, the dog itself must be

inside the thinker's brain, in company with a really distinct four-legged body; because equation presupposes real distinction. But this is plainly absurd. Those entities are respectively represented by two Concepts; and, therefore, the *immediate* comparison, and the subsequent *immediate* judgment of conformity, are concerned with the Concepts, not with the realities. But it may be further urged; allowing the truth of this conclusion, still Judgment is principally, and, so to say, *intentionally* pronounced on the object. Most true; nevertheless, through the medium of the Concepts. Consequently, the intellect, while *formally* pronouncing on the conformity of the object with the reality attributed to it; in and by the same judgment, *virtually* pronounces on the conformity of its complex Concept with the object thus judicially represented. For it only reaches the objective reality through its Concepts. To affirm, therefore, the objective, is necessarily to affirm the subjective, conformity; the more so, because, in numberless cases, the two realities conceived are really identical in the object. But, then, how is it that the intellect can form this virtual Judgment? St. Thomas supplies us with the answer. Consciousness is not enough; for the senses are conscious of their sensible perceptions, yet are unable to cognize the conformity of such perceptions with the sensible object which they represent. Accordingly, as he remarks, 'They form a true judgment (so called) of their object, but nevertheless they cannot cognize the truth according to which their judgment is true.' The intellect, however, has the power of self-introspection; hence, St. Thomas derives the word *intellect* from the root *intra legere*,—as it were, *a reading inside itself*¹. This self-consciousness or self-introspection, of the intellect, is a necessary accompaniment of its own acts; and so, the mind, spontaneously reflecting on its own Judgments, cognizes, and virtually pronounces on, the conformity of its Concept with the object, in the act of composition or affirmation.

Hence, it follows, as a sort of Corollary, that all Judgments, even such as are in logical phrase direct, are in some way reflex. But there is this marked difference between these and logically reflex Judgments: that, in the former, the reflection is spontaneous and vital; in the latter, it is voluntary and accidental. The one is inseparable from all Judgments; the other constitutes the *Difference* of a particular class.

¹ 2. 2^{ae} viii, 1, c.; *De Verit.* Q. i, a. 12, c.; Q. xv, a. 1, c.

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

In order that the intellect may be able to judge of the conformity between its own judicial Concept and the object represented, it is necessary that the two ideas which form the terms of the Judgment should be intentionally accepted by the mind as symbols respectively of a definite reality.

The climax of the difficulty, which besets this question of Formal Conceptual Truth, is now reached. It has been shown, in the preceding Thesis, that the intellect must judge concerning its object through the medium of its own Concepts. It is natural to inquire, (and it is all important that a satisfactory answer should be given to the inquiry), first, whether those Concepts *must be*, and secondly in what way they *are*, determined by the representation of a definite object? But this problem must not be confounded with that other, touching the bridge which connects the subjective with the objective,—the *Ego* with the *non-Ego*,—Thought with Being. The discussion of this latter belongs to the province of Ideology; and has no claims on the metaphysician. On the contrary, in the present investigation it is taken for granted that the sensible and intellectual faculties of the human soul, (provided that they, for their part, are in a normal condition, and that their proper object is duly present), are practically infallible in their operation, as the natural means for the acquisition of Truth. It is, moreover, supposed from Ideology that the human intellect intues the Essences or Quiddities of things as its proper object; so that the simple Apprehension of them is a perception rather than a conception; direct, not reflex.

To the former and easier of the two questions proposed, an answer is given in the enunciation of the present Thesis; which is thus declared. In order that the mind may be enabled to pronounce upon the conformity of its own Concept with the object of its Judgment, the elements of that judicial concept must have a fixed objective value, i.e. must represent a definite objective reality. But this postulates that the two ideas, which form the Terms of the Judgment, should be *intentionally* accepted by the mind, as symbols of a definite reality. Therefore, &c.—The *Major* is plain; for if the Subject and Predicate have only a subjective value, and are not the determined symbols of a determined object; there can be neither similarity nor dissimilarity between the subjective Con-

cept and the object to be represented, and, accordingly, no reasonable foundation of a Judgment. The *Minor* is equally clear; for, supposing the necessity of determining somehow the symbolical value of the Subject and Predicate, there can evidently be nothing else ultimately capable of so determining them, save the mind that conceives, and alone uses, them, as constituents of its own judicial act.

But the second question, touching *the way in which* these Concepts are determined by the intellect, is far more difficult. It is a problem peculiar to the present subject; though it arises in some measure out of the doctrine which will presently claim our attention, concerning simple Apprehensions. It will be shown in its place that simple Apprehensions can never be otherwise than true; and for this reason. The mind, in a simple Apprehension, neither itself defines, nor accepts from any other source a definition of, the object to be represented; so that the act determines its own object, and, consequently, that which the simple Apprehension *de facto* represents, is necessarily the proper object of its representation. On the other hand, in the judicial act the object must be defined, before the intellectual composition is complete; because the mind compares the initial Concept with the object, and cognizes, as well as pronounces, the conformity between the two, in the act itself of judging. But how could it do this, unless the object were previously, at least in priority of nature, determined? Yet, how can it be determined? For until the judicial act is complete, and the Judgment pronounced, the only elements present to the mind are two simple Apprehensions. This is the gist of the difficulty.

It will be easier and clearer for the reader, if the solution is evolved by a process of analysis. Wherefore,

i. The material constituents of a Judgment are two simple Apprehensions, which respectively occupy the places of Subject and Predicate. Now, the first point to settle is, Are those simple Apprehensions determined in their representation? The answer is obvious, if it be only borne in mind, that these simple Apprehensions are not *in course of making*, but *made*; and have themselves become the object of subsequent thought. For, though the simple Apprehension is not determined to a definite object in its course of formation, or, as the Schoolmen say, *in fieri*; yet itself determines the object *by the fact of representation*, when formed, or, as the same Schoolmen say, *in facto esse*. Thus, to take an example, I

may see a *cut crystal*, which may be an occasion to my intellect of recalling the simple Apprehension, *diamond*. It is true, that the circumstance of the cut crystal occasioning my thought, may become the occasion of my subsequently forming the false Judgment, *This cut crystal is a diamond*; but, while I simply apprehend, I think *diamond*, not *cut crystal*. It is plain that I have already formed the idea of *diamond*; and, once this simple Apprehension is formed, it has defined its own object by virtue of its representation. For it is the determinate intellectual expression of *diamond*. Since, therefore, the idea has been defined in its representation; the mind may use it as the recognized symbol of that entity.

ii. But the difficulty is not yet solved. For the simple Apprehension *in facto esse*, though it defines its objective, by the formal or subjective Concept, does not necessarily determine itself to the representation of an external reality. It is a *mere*, (one might also say, passive), impression; a figure projected on the sheet, and the mind may have slipped in one of its own slides. Thus, *blue grass*, is a simple Apprehension, and the object is defined; yet that object has no existence outside the intellect. But, to the presence of Formal Conceptual Truth in real Judgments (which are the only ones now under consideration) it is required, that the Concept should be determined to the expression of a definite reality external to itself. And such determination is made in the judicial act. For the intellect, in judging, selects a simple Apprehension as its intentional symbol of a definite reality, and constitutes it the Subject of its Judgment. Before proceeding further, it will be well to confirm this assertion by the evidence of examples. Let us commence with vocal Judgments, or Enunciations; because in them it often happens, that the intention of the mind is made manifest by signs and gestures. Take the following, accompanied (as one may fairly suppose) by either the pointing of the finger or the grasp of the object;—*This is a Latin Grammar*. Here the Subject is, *This thing*; and the accompanying action makes known the intention of the speaker to pronounce judgment on that definite reality, which, as all the listeners understand, he is pointing out to them. So, again, one man may say to another, at the same time perhaps turning his eyes in the direction of the lawn, *This grass is very coarse*. Now, in that case, the word *grass* is used as the conventional symbol of a determined reality by the intention of the speaker, and is accepted as such by his companion. The addition

of the pronoun, *this*, serves to particularize the object in the minds of both. Thus the object is determined by the Subject of the Judgment. In like manner, when a man thinks within himself that *God is infinitely merciful*, the Subject, *God*, stands in his own mind for the symbol of The Supreme Being; and, if he were to express the Judgment in words, it would be so accepted by all that heard him. The Subject, therefore, is constituted, by the intention of the intellect, the symbol of a determined reality. In like manner, the Predicate is intentionally accepted as the symbol of a definite objective form or attribute; and the mind in its act of Judgment, through the medium of its two simple Concepts, predicates or affirms the attribute of the reality which is its defined object. This is, almost to the letter, the explanation of the Angelic Doctor, as is plainly gathered from the second passage quoted in the preceding Proposition. The intellect he says 'in every Proposition, or enunciated Judgment, applies a certain form symbolized by the Predicate to a certain entity symbolized by the Subject, or it separates the former from the latter,' i. e. in the case of negative Judgments. To take an instance: *The sea-anemone is an animal*. No one can doubt but that here the intellect has for its definite object a certain living entity, which is symbolized by the Concept and name of *sea-anemone*,—a symbol, moreover, universally recognized. Again, nobody doubts that the word and Concept *animal* symbolizes, by common consent, a definite existing external form or attribute. In its act of Judgment, then, the mind applies the attribute, *animal*, to the determinate entity, *sea-anemone*, by means of its two simple Apprehensions which respectively symbolize each. Precisely the same may be said of negative Judgments; the only difference between which and affirmative Judgments consists in this, that, in the case of the former, the mind in its judicial act pronounces the separation of the attribute from the reality. But such difference is wholly irrelevant to the present issue.

iii. So far, the nature of the *express* Judgment has been made manifest. It is clearly a pronounced application of the Attribute to the reality which is object of cognition. But what about the *virtual* Judgment, by which is essentially constituted the Formal Conceptual Truth of the act? The answer has already been implicitly provided. For, as a fact, the *immediate* composition is between the Subject and the Predicate, which are two Concepts. The composition itself is purely logical, and is symbolized by the

logical *Copula*. It is only through these, as symbols, that the Judgment is pronounced on the external object. Therefore, the latter necessarily includes within itself a virtual Judgment as to the conformity of the judicial Concept with the represented reality. Finally, it is effected by that vital self-consciousness of the intellect,—that spontaneous return upon itself, which enables it to eye its own immanent action as representative of the objective reality.

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

Formal Conceptual Truth is not limited to the speculative, but belongs in like manner to the practical, intellect; in so far as this latter is understood to be the actual cognition of proposed moral action or artificial production.

This Proposition likewise is intended to meet a special difficulty. For, as preceding Theses must have made sufficiently evident, the objects or entities represented are the measures of Conceptual Truth, which consists in the conformity of the intellectual act with the reality conceived. Wherefore, Formal Conceptual Truth can undoubtedly be found in the *speculative intellect*, a denomination given to that faculty in so far as it occupies itself with speculative subjects. But it would seem as though the reverse must be said of the *practical intellect*, i. e. the intellect as conversant with Ethics or Art. For the end of Ethics is *action*, and the end of Art is *production*; yet both these are moulded according to the knowledge of him who is acting and producing. Consequently, in the case of Ethics and Art, it is not *things* that measure *thought*, but *thought* that measures *things*. Thus, for instance, a watchmaker constructs a watch according to the rules which he has in his own mind; and, if the watch is a true one, it is so, because it is in conformity with the idea of the watchmaker. Yet, on the other hand, the practical intellect must admit of Formal Conceptual Truth; because, by the common consent of mankind, Truth and Falsity are predicated of the moral, as well as of the aesthetic, syllogism. Then, again, if there can be no Conceptual Truth, there can be no Science—but Ethics and Aesthetics are properly called Sciences. Lastly, the Divine Intellect, as will be seen, is the Measure of creation; yet, in God's knowledge of created things is to be found Formal Conceptual Truth in infinite perfection.

Such is the difficulty. That which follows is the solution; and will serve at the same time for a declaration of the Proposition.

There are two aspects under which ethical and artistic cognition may be regarded. For such a thought may be considered *as a thought* or Concept, and it may be also considered *as a cause*. Considered *as a cause*, it is the measure of entities; considered *as a thought*, it is measured, like all other thoughts, by a reality external to itself. This needs further explanation.

THE FIRST MEMBER will be willingly admitted. For, as the cause is author of the effect; this latter must depend, for its truth, on its conformity with the former. THE SECOND MEMBER requires some elucidation. The moral or aesthetic syllogism, considered as a mere Concept, deals with the natures or essences of things, not with their existence. Thus, e. g. *Fraud is unlawful. But such an action is fraudulent. Therefore it is unlawful.* Here is a moral syllogism, the *Major* of which, (as is generally the case), is a self-evident principle. Man's intellect did not make, and cannot unmake it. That such a given action is a fraud, depends wholly on its intrinsic nature; not on the conception of it by the intellect. Therefore, the syllogism is true, in so far as it is conformable to the objective nature of things. If I direct my individual action by its light; then it becomes a cause, and fashions the action. So it is in the aesthetic, or artistic, syllogism. Take the case of a watch-maker, who reasons with himself in this wise: 'If I am to have an hour-hand and a minute-hand; the wheel that conveys motion to the minute-hand and receives it from the wheel which gives motion to the hour-hand, is most conveniently arranged according to the proportion of 5 to 60. Therefore, the cogs in the former should be a multiple by 12 of the cogs in the latter.' The premisses are not a creation of his own brain; but depend on the laws of motion and the abstract relation of numbers. So, in painting, the artist must be guided in his conception by the laws of perspective, by those of light and shade, and by those of natural form and proportion. But all these laws are realities objective to the intellect, which, in proportion as its idea is conformed to them, attains to Conceptual Truth. That such separation between the ethical or aesthetic syllogism considered as a Concept and considered as a cause, is possible, may be easily proved by the logic of facts. For, if such separation did not take place in Ethics, there would be no crime;

and if there were no such separation in Art, all Art-critics would be artists.

PROPOSITION LXXV.

The conformity between the intellectual Judgment and its object, which constitutes Formal Conceptual Truth, is neither a real absolute perfection, nor a real or even (strictly speaking) logical relation, in the judicial act.

This proposition is composed of three Members, which it will be more convenient to consider separately.

I. First of all, *the conformity, which constitutes Formal Conceptual Truth, is not a real absolute perfection.*

It cannot be an essential perfection, as is plain. For, if it belonged to the entity of the act, every judicial Concept of the intellect would necessarily be true; and, consequently, it would be impossible to form a false Judgment. But neither can it be a real absolute *accidental* perfection. For a Judgment may remain intrinsically the same, the act entirely unchanged; and yet from being true it may become false, by a mere change in the object. Thus, we will suppose the following Judgment to have been formed—*It is very fine weather to-day.* When the Judgment was first formed, the sky was cloudless; the Judgment was true. The same Judgment remains identically what it was before; but the weather is no longer identically what it was before. The wind veers round, and the sky is surcharged with clouds. What is the result? That same Judgment has become false. But it is impossible that an entity, in its ultimate act, should thus change qualities; because such a change involves a real, though accidental, modification. Yet, in the present case, the act is supposed to remain entitatively the same. Again: Formal Conceptual Truth consists, as has been seen, in a *conformity* with the object of cognition. But *conformity* is a word indicative of relation. Therefore, if Conceptual Truth adds anything real to the judicial act, it must be a relative perfection. Lastly, there is this objection to its being an absolute perfection; that nobody can tell what this real possible perfection is, which is supposed to be added to the act, or the reason why it is there.

II. *The conformity, which constitutes Formal Conceptual Truth, is not a real predicamental relation.*

A predicamental relation is an accident, and constitutes one of the nine Categories, or *Predicamenta*, under which all accidents are grouped; hence its name. As relation will be discussed at length in a subsequent Book, it suffices to say here very briefly, that real predicamental relation requires a real term and a real foundation in the Subject, which foundation is really distinct from the other or correlative term, which must be also real. Thus, in *the father* the real foundation is the act of generation; and the act of generation is real and really distinct from the son, who is the other real term or correlative. Now, if the conformity by which Conceptual Truth is constituted, is a real predicamental relation; it follows that, wherever there is Conceptual Truth in such Concept, *there* must be a real term, which is the same as to say that there must be a real object. But this is notoriously not the case. For there are a vast number of Judgments conceptually true, which are representative of logical entities; as, for instance, *Difference divides Genus, and constitutes Species*. Then, again, nothing can be more certain than that the Divine Idea is in a pre-eminent way conceptually true; yet in It there can be no real relation. For if It is considered as representative of the Divine Nature, there is the most absolute identity between the Concept and Its object; and if It is taken as representative of created things, there still can be no relation. The reason is, that real relation connotes dependence of the relative on its correlative; and it is against the very Being of God, that He should be in any way dependent on His creatures.

III. *The conformity, by which Formal Conceptual Truth is constituted, cannot be a logical relation in the strict sense of the word.*

If it were; *then* only could a Judgment be regarded as conceptually true, when the mind is actually conceiving the conformity, and comparing its own act with the object represented. But it is surely evident that, independently of all such comparisons and cognition, a true Judgment is, and remains, simply true, so long as there is no change in the object.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

Formal Conceptual Truth merely adds, over and above the entity of the judicial act, a connotation of the object as being really that which it is represented to be in the Concept.

This Proposition may fairly be considered as a Corollary of the preceding. For, as Conceptual Truth is neither a real nor a logical relation, yet essentially consists in the conformity of the intellectual Concept with its object; and, as it is not *à fortiori* a real absolute perfection; nothing is left but that it should be the vital representative act itself, in conjunction with the aforesaid connotation. Thus, too, it is clearly seen how, the judicial act remaining identically the same, it may be now true, now false, by reason of a change in the object. For such a change would necessarily involve the loss of the connotation required for the existence of Conceptual Truth.

ARTICLE II.

Material Conceptual Truth.

According to the definition already given in the introduction to this Chapter, Material Conceptual Truth consists in a simple conformity between the idea and its object, to the exclusion of all intellectual recognition of such conformity. The mind is conscious indeed, of its own act; it ever must be. But it is a direct consciousness; and there is no reflex Judgment on the act. Not but that the intellect can form reflex ideas; for, as is well known, there are ideas *psychologically*, and ideas *ontologically*, reflex. Yet such reflection is voluntary and express, and exercises itself upon a previous idea. The reflection which is the invariable concomitant of the judicial act, is, on the contrary, spontaneous and, as it were, implicit; so that it accompanies the act which is its object. Of course, Material Conceptual Truth can be predicated univocally of an intellectual act alone; but it is *analogically* attributed likewise to sensible perception, as will be explained in the ensuing Thesis.

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Material Conceptual Truth is inseparable from the act of simple Apprehension; and its counterpart is to be found in all sensible perception. Both the one and the other, however, are really identical with the Transcendental, or ontological, Truth of the respective acts.

There are three Members in this Proposition; which we will consider separately.

I. In the **FIRST MEMBER** it is asserted that *Material Conceptual Truth is inseparable from the act of simple Apprehension*; or, in other words, that every simple Apprehension must necessarily be conceptually true. The assertion is thus proved. That intellectual act is materially true, which is conformable in its representation to the object that is to be represented. But every simple Apprehension, or Idea, is conformable, in its representation, to the object which is to be represented. Therefore, every simple Apprehension is materially true. There can be no doubt about the *Major*, because the Predicate is the definition of the Subject; the Proposition is, therefore, *per se* and *primo*, as Logicians say. The *Minor* is thus proved. That intellectual act, whose actually represented object is necessarily the object which is to be represented, is conformable in its representation to the object which is to be represented. But every simple Apprehension is of this nature. Therefore, it is always conformable to the object which is to be represented. *The Minor* of the proof needs declaration. The intellect, in its act of simple Apprehension, is purely passive as to its object. It is like a photographic Camera, producing an intellectual likeness of whatsoever chances to come within its field of view. Now,—to pursue the metaphor,—in its judicial act, the intellect pronounces that the photograph is the photograph of such a person, and that it is exactly like him. Here there is manifestly room for error; but not in the photograph itself. After the same sort, it is the office of the intellect, (using the term in its specific signification), to intue the Essences or Quiddities of things. It is its nature; and, as the faculty is not free, if it is in a normal condition and unimpeded, and if the object is duly set before it, it cannot help forming a similitude of that entity which is presented to it. Neither can the will or senses intervene to determine the object; for

there is no room for either. The photograph is taken, and the object is that which is *de facto* apprehended. To repeat an instance already used in connection with this matter:—an *aluminium pencil-case* is before me; and the sensible species or form is produced in my sensory, through the medium of the external senses. But that species is not the object of my intuition. It never could be; for it merely represents material conditions which could never become the object of the intellect. That species, as representative in its own imperfect way of the object, is the *occasion* of my thought; but my mind is in no way bound to represent that object, as determined by the sensible species. As a fact, I conceive a *gold pencil-case*. The similarity of the material conditions in the sensible species has given birth to the thought; but for all that I think a *gold pencil-case*; and a *gold pencil-case* is the one true object of my idea. The common sense of mankind confirms this doctrine; for who would ever dream of pronouncing such an idea, a *gold pencil-case*, false? And if I should give vocal expression to the simple Apprehension, is there any one would accuse me of error? If I were to say that *this* (pointing to the aluminium object before me) is a *gold pencil-case*; then my concept would be false. But why? Because my mind has intentionally determined the object to be represented. I am out of the range of simple Apprehensions, and am now pronouncing Judgment.

There are other simple Apprehensions, however, where it would seem, at first sight, as though the doctrine here maintained could with difficulty be defended. These are of two classes. In the first class are included those ideas which are not repugnant in themselves, but have no corresponding reality outside the mind. Of such kind are the ideas of a *golden mountain*, for instance, or a *Chimera*, or the *philosopher's stone*. Now, in order to make the matter clearer, let it be borne in mind that a simple Apprehension does not include existence in its representation. These entities are not conceived as existing; they are simply conceived. Accordingly, the only possible difficulty in the way of admitting that these ideas are materially true would be, that the object is self-contradictory, and will not endure as a term of thought. But no one would venture to affirm, that the existence of a golden mountain, of a Chimera, or even of the philosopher's stone, is metaphysically impossible, so that God could not create each or all of them, should it so please Him. But, if to any one such should

appear to be the case in either of these instances, the example would then be transferred from the class under consideration to the one which now follows. There are, therefore, ideas whose object is an impossibility, because it involves a metaphysical contradiction; as, v. g. *a round square, an insensile animal, a thinking stone.* Of these Suarez appositely remarks, that they are not apprehensions of entity, but vocal Concepts, i. e. Concepts of words. Yet, so far as they are ideas, they are true. But they are absurd, say you. Certainly they are absurd; because the objects represented are absurdities; and the ideas must *therefore* be absurd, because they are in conformity with their object and, consequently, conceptually true.

II. In the SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition it is asserted, that *the counterpart of Material Conceptual Truth is to be found in all sensible perception.*

It is quite evident that, if the universal opinion, inseparably connecting Truth with the intellect, is to be accepted, the perceptions of the senses cannot be called, *strictly speaking*, true. Nevertheless, the Angelic Doctor, (who repeatedly declares in favour of that opinion), pronouncedly affirms, in more than one place, that these perceptions are true and, if one may judge from the collocation, apparently in the same sense in which he predicates Truth of simple Apprehension. Nay, he goes further; for he speaks of sensible *Judgments*, as though, in some sort of a way, attributing to the senses even *formal* Conceptual Truth. This needs some explanation; and necessarily involves a reference to questions which properly belong to Psychology. These, however, will be considered here, only so far as is absolutely required for the enucleation of the present subject; and the statements introduced will not be proved, but assumed, as *Lemmata*, from their own special science. The human soul, then, is a simple spiritual substance, possessed of various faculties; but all these faculties are in one simple substance. Whence it follows, that complete isolation, on the part of any one of them, is impossible. There is strict inter-communion, by virtue of their one common source. Of these faculties the principal are the intellect, the will, and the senses. The two former are spiritual; the last is common to man with other animals. As to the will, nothing need be said; it remains, therefore, to consider the intellect and senses, in connection with the present inquiry. To begin with the latter: There are the external,

and there are the internal, senses. The former are organs of the body, and are subject to material modifications caused by the activity or, (if it pleases better), the active forces, of bodily accidents; by virtue of which modifications, sensile species or forms are impressed on the internal senses. And thus, these latter are evolved from their purely facultative state into act. We may at once dismiss the external senses, because they have no particular connection with the matter in hand; and limit our attention to the internal senses.

There are five internal, corresponding to the five external, senses. The object of each of these senses is threefold; to wit, its *proper* object, a *common* object, and that which is *accidentally* an object. The difference between them will be best understood by an example. A man is looking at a piece of *lapis lazuli*. Now, the *colour* of the stone is the *proper* object of sight; the form or shape is a *common* object, for it belongs as well to the sense of touch; the aluminous mineral itself is only *accidentally* an object, for no sense is cognizant of the inner substance, which it only recognizes through, or by, its accidental manifestations. Besides the five particular senses in the soul, there is a common or general sense, which contrasts, combines, reduces to unity of representation, the perceptions of the particular senses,—which distinguishes, e.g. between *sweet* and *hard*, *visible* and *sonorous*, and represents as one the different sensile perceptions which are awakened by the presence of one body. Of these senses only two are, strictly speaking, representative;—one, viz. sight, partially; the other, viz. touch, wholly. Besides these, there is sometimes to be found an additional faculty connected with sensation; about which it will be necessary, on account of its intrinsic importance, to enter into more detail.

Though, in nature, the orders of Being are clearly defined, being separated from each other by notes essentially distinct; yet there is generally a sort of no man's land between two orders, within which the lines of demarcation have so melted into each other, as to puzzle, not unfrequently, the most acute and scientific observers. To take an example: The animal, is commonly understood to be separated from the vegetable order, by at least two very broad distinctions. The one is given by Aristotle, and has again found acceptance in our own day; viz. that in the plant the stomach is outside, in the animal it is inside. A plant may almost be said

to resemble an animal turned inside out; for even its lungs are spread out upon its leaves. The other difference is to be found in the process of nutritive assimilation peculiar to each. For, in the plant it is *synthetical*; in the animal it is *analytical*. Yet there have been discovered several so-called carnivorous plants, as for instance the *fly-trap*, whose process of assimilation is partially analytical; while they extemporize an external stomach, by contracting their leaf round the animal object, and, from certain cells in the leaf functionally analogous to the gastric cells of the animal stomach, give forth the fluid by which the digestive process is accomplished. So, on the other hand, there are animals which are hardly distinguishable from plants; since they have no organs of sense, save the sense of touch; and this last only in a rudimentary form, little, if at all, superior to that of a sensitive plant. In addition, they have no ganglionic centres of nervous action; yet they have the two animal characteristics just mentioned. Such are *Zoophytes*; and among them one is inclined to select the *sea-anemone*, so called from its close resemblance to a flower. Yet the author has seen it feeding on mussels, rejecting the shell; while, by means of its serried tentacula, it drew within its body, and digested, the fish. Of course, the same may be said of that lowest sub-kingdom of animalcules, known by the name of the *Protozoa*. As, then, animal life ascends towards its higher grades of development and reaches nearer that boundary line which divides it off from man, its sensile faculties become more perfect; and there appears a sort of *distant obumbration* of those intellectual faculties, which, in reality, belong exclusively to man, by reason of his spiritual nature. It may well be, that these points of contact, above and below, between the respective orders of nature, were intended to be signified to us by the evenings and the mornings in those probably æonic days of the Mosaic Cosmogony¹. St. Thomas, then, calls attention to the fact that, in the higher classes of animals, there is a faculty called by him the *vis æstiativa*² or estimative faculty, by means of which the beast is enabled instinctively to form a sort of sensile Universal, and a spontaneous, *Judgment*, (using the word analogically). Thus,

¹ May not such an interpretation explain the repeated phrase 'And the evening and the morning' were the first day? In order of evolution, the *evening* of one order would be, as it were, coincident with the morning of the higher.

² 1st lxxviii, 4, o.

—to take his own example,—a sheep does not flee from *this individual wolf* with its proper notes of colour, size, and the rest; but it exhibits a distaste for the *wolf in general*. In like manner, a cat has a propensity for pouncing upon *mice in general*, not upon *this mouse in particular*; so much so, that if one imitates, in a very generic sort of way, the peculiar movements or noise of a mouse, its activity is at once aroused. This faculty also exists in man, but after a nobler sort; because it becomes now the appanage of an intellectual, or spiritual, Being. Hence, in him it is named by the Angelic Doctor *vis cogitativa*¹, or the cogitative faculty; probably because of its in some way blending with the intellect in act, or of its being modified and ennobled by it. This faculty St. Thomas declares to be the highest of the sensible faculties²,—ascribes to it the apprehension of that which is fitting and of that which is hurtful³,—asserts that in man it is on the boundary of thought⁴ and that, under that ennobling modification, as *vis cogitativa*, it is peculiar to man⁵;—while he adds, that its organ is in the central cellule of the brain⁶. There is, however, this marked distinction between the said faculty and the intellect. The former terminates with the individual, though under a more or less universal form, while the intellect properly intues the universal nature; and, moreover, the former apprehends the individuality of the Essence or Quiddity, while the latter conceives the Essence or Quiddity of the individual. There is the further distinction, that the *potentia cogitativa* only has material particular entity for its formal object; whereas the intellect only represents material or singular Being by accident, since its proper object is the immaterial and universal.

After this brief exposition touching the nature of the senses, let us consider how these lower psychical faculties differ from the higher or intellectual faculty. The principal points of difference are four. First of all, the internal senses can only act in, and through, the proper bodily organ. Hence, in a disembodied spirit, they would be purely facultative, and could never *naturally* be re-

¹ 1^o lxxxi. 3. c.

² *De Verit.* Q. xxv, a. 2, c. v. ff.; in 3 d. xxvi, Q. 1, a. 2, c; et d. xxxv, Q. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1^m.

³ In 3 d. xvii, Q. unica, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2^m.

⁴ 1-2^{as} lxxiv, 3, ad 1^m; in 3 d. xxiii, Q. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3^m.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ 1^o lxxviii, 4, c; q. Gent. L. II, c. 60, in init.; et alibi.

duced to act; while, on the contrary, the intellectual faculty would become better fitted for action. Again: the senses are restrained to the representation of the material, singular, present. On the other hand, the intellect has for its proper object, as has been said before, the immaterial and universal; and does not require the actual presence of the reality which it thinks of. There is, it is true, a faculty in the lower part (so to speak) of the soul, which has the power of again evoking sensile *Phantasmata*, in the absence of the object. But this faculty is *Imagination*, which is distinct from the internal senses. Nothing further need be said about it, as it does not affect the present question. Once more: the senses represent only the accidents, or material conditions, of substance, though virtually or implicitly they also represent, in conjunction with the *common* sense, substance likewise; but it is substance *qua* substance, i. e. simply as the unifying '*subjacence* or *substratum* of the accidents, not the Quiddity of substance. The same may be said of the *estimative faculty*, which represents indeed the individual Quiddity, as consisting of a *substratum* of such and such accidents, but does not represent the essential nature belonging to the individual. Lastly, the internal senses have no reflex action. They cannot return upon themselves. For they can only act through a bodily organ; so that there could be no distinct act of reflection. They cannot turn their eye back concomitantly on what they are about; because this vital self-consciousness and self-reflection are only possible to a spiritual nature. There is one further observation to be made, before proceeding to a declaration of this second Member of the Proposition. Though the sensile perceptions are *objectively* material representations, i. e. representations of material conditions, they are not material *subjectively*, i. e. in their own nature; for this simple reason, that they are acts of the human Soul. For the same reason they may truly be called spiritual in their root. Thus it may safely be affirmed of them, that they are material in representation, immaterial in their vital act, spiritual in their source.

In what sense, then, can Truth be predicated of sensile perception? and to what extent can the senses be said to form a Judgment?

i. To begin with the first question:—if Truth is conceived in a vague, generic, way, as the correspondence of a psychical representation of whatever kind with the object which it represents; in such

sense, and in such sense only, can Material Truth be predicated of sensible perception, as of the simple Apprehension. Accordingly, St. Thomas strings them together in this way, remarking that 'The intellect is not deceived in its cognition of Essence; as neither are the senses deceived in the sensible perception common to them!'. Supposed in both cases a normal condition of the faculty and a due presentation of the object according to the nature of each, the sensible representations of the latter are as infallible as the intellectual representations of the former. The representations of the senses are thus denominated true, in much the same way as we predicate truth of a photograph. Again: sensible perceptions may be called true *causatively*, inasmuch as they are naturally adapted for causing a true cognition in the intellect. In this sense, the term would be used analogically according to analogy of proportion in the first class, in which the form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate, and applied, by extrinsic denomination derived from the first, to the secondary analogates; whereas, according to the first meaning, the term would be used,—to say the most,—according to analogy of proportion. In a word, truth of representation can never be predicated *univocally* of sensible perception and of simple Apprehension. It is for this reason that, in the enunciation of the Thesis, the word, *counterpart*, has been selected.

ii. And now for the second question, touching the extent to which the senses may be considered capable of forming a Judgment. In the first place, this may be said generally, that the senses, *as such*, including the *common* sense, cannot of themselves form a Judgment in the strict meaning of the word. The obvious reason is, that they are, one and all, incapable of reflex action, i. e. of a return upon themselves. But, (a) the five internal senses may be pronounced capable of forming a Judgment, according to a distant analogy of proportion; inasmuch as there is a consciousness of the perception, and an instinctive practical conviction of the reality of its presentation, (using the term in its widest sense, as including *representative* presentation and *causal*, i. e. the representation of a cause by its effect, as in the instance of *colour*). In like manner and with greater reason, the *common* sense may also analogically

¹ 'Intellectus non decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est, sicut nec sensus in proprio sensibili.' *q. Gentis, L. I, c. 61, 2°.*

be pronounced capable of forming a Judgment; inasmuch as it unites in one Subject, and compares, the perceptions of the particular senses. Yet nearer is the approach of the *vis aestimativa*, in the higher order of brute animals, to this capacity for forming a Judgment; since, in the act of that faculty, there is the obumbration of a universal, and much more of comparison and composition. Hence, St. Thomas places it on the boundary line which divides the intellectual, from the sensile, faculties. In man, the approach is yet nearer, because of the intimate conjunction of these two orders of faculties. Hence, according to St. Thomas, the *vis cogitativa*, or as he otherwise calls it, the *ratio particularis*, (which is proper to man, and corresponds with the *vis aestimativa* of brutes), is of a much higher and nobler nature than this latter; and, in so far forth as it has some participation of reason, may be able to elicit a Judgment, properly so called. Finally, in the case of man, a sensible judgment is sometimes intended to mean a Judgment of the intellect on the object of sensile representation; and then, of course, it is a true and proper Judgment.

III. In the THIRD MEMBER of the Proposition it is asserted, that this Truth, (as analogically predicated of sensile perception and the simple Apprehension of the intellect), *is really identical with the Transcendental, or ontological, Truth of the respective acts.* This is the meaning of St. Thomas, in the second of the two passages quoted above in the seventy-second Proposition, where he asserts that 'Truth can exist in the senses or in the intellectual simple Apprehension of Essence *as in a certain true entity*, but not as something cognized by the cognizing, which is what' (formal Conceptual) 'Truth means.' It is, of course, difficult to make a declaration of this part of the Thesis, which will be intelligible to the reader, till we have considered what Transcendental, or ontological, Truth is. It will suffice here to say briefly, that ontological Truth is the Truth of Being, as the name implies; and that it is the Being itself, considered as naturally fitted to cause in whatsoever intellect a true estimate of itself. Now it is of the essence alike of a simple Apprehension of the intellect and of sensile perception, to be a representative act, i. e. a true and faithful representation, according to their respective capacities, of the object represented. As, then, their entity is representation, the Truth of their representation is the Truth of their entity.

ARTICLE III.

Ontological Truth.

We have now arrived at the main subject of this Chapter; to elucidate which, has been the sole reason for the introduction of the preceding discussions touching the nature and constitutives of conceptual Truth. That there is such a thing as Ontological or Transcendental Truth, cannot admit of serious doubt; since its existence is attested by the universal consent of mankind. In every language, ancient as well as modern, what is more habitual than the recurrence of such expressions as *a true man, true gold, a true friend, true virtue, true genius, true steel, true rosewood*, and others of a like kind? Nor can it be said that such modes of speech are a mere redundancy; for a man is conscious to himself that when he makes use of the phrase, *true gold*, for instance, he means something more by it than by the simple term *gold*. Consequently, as there is Truth in concepts, so is there a Truth in things or Beings; which, on this account, is called *Ontological Truth*. It is likewise called *Transcendental*, because it is limited to no particular category of Being, but permeates and transcends all the Categories, and is, wherever Being is; or, to speak more accurately, is really identical with Being.

Ontological, admits of the same declaration as conceptual, Truth; for wherever Truth is to be found, and whatever its definite nature, it always denotes an *equation or correspondence*; and, in the case of Transcendental, as of conceptual, Truth, that equation or correspondence is between intellect and Being. But there is this difference between the two; that in the latter, it is the correspondence of the intellect with Being as its object, whereas in the former it is the actual or aptitudinal correspondence of Being with intellect. So far, all is clear; but all is not plain. For it is in the effort to determine the nature of this conformity or conformability, that the difficulties begin; and difficulties, too, as one is compelled to own, of no ordinary character. In order to meet and solve these difficulties, a series of Propositions will be set before the reader: wherein, first of all, it will be stated what Transcendental Truth is not, spite of the opinion of some Doctors to the contrary; then, it will be determined in what it formally consists;

after this, its Transcendental character will be vindicated; and, finally, it will be traced to its primal source.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Ontological Truth does not import either any real absolute property of Being, conceptually distinguishable from it; or any real predicamental relation; or any, strictly speaking, conceptual relation of a like kind; or a simple negation.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is to the effect, that *Ontological Truth is not a real absolute property or perfection of Being, from which it is conceptually distinguishable*. Besides the arguments adduced in the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth Theses,—by which it was proved generally, that Being, as such, cannot have any positive attributes really distinguishable from itself, and that, consequently, the Transcendental attributes add to the idea of Being either a negation or an extrinsic referribility, (arguments which it would be of advantage for the reader to review);—there are others which apply more particularly to Ontological Truth. For (i.) the universally admitted description of this Transcendental attribute supplies a very strong argument in favour of the present position. Ontological Truth essentially denotes a conformity, correspondence, or equation. This is of its very nature. But conformity, correspondence, equation, are evidently *relative* terms. Consequently, if Being could admit of a perfection distinguishable from itself, Truth would be a relative, not an absolute, perfection. For Ontological Truth, over and above the idea of Being, adds nothing but an actual or aptitudinal commensuration, or conformity, with intellect. (ii.) Then again; this absolute perfection must either be something or nothing. If nothing, it is no perfection; if something, it is Being. How can it, therefore, be distinguishable, even conceptually, from Being? (iii.) Lastly, there is no conceivable foundation for any distinction. Evidently, it cannot be a real distinction, either greater or modal; for the last argument evinces that this is impossible. But neither can there be a *conceptual* distinction between Transcendental Truth and Being. For, if there can be, it follows, that the two terms are conceptually distinct; so that the idea of the one does not necessarily enter into the idea of the other. But, as a fact, it is precisely the reverse. For proof, let the two terms be considered

separately. It will not be doubted, that all Being in itself is *intelligible*, i. e. is naturally capable of provoking a corresponding representation of itself in the intellect that contemplates it. But it is precisely this which constitutes Ontological Truth. Therefore, Truth is essentially included in Being. Now take the other term, Truth. Truth is either something or nothing;—to put it more clearly in the concrete, the True is either something or nothing. If it is something, it is Being; if it is nothing, it is a manifest contradiction to call it an absolute perfection. Wherefore, Being is essentially included in Truth.

But here it is necessary to interpose a caution. When it is said that Truth is essentially included in Being, it is not meant that in the *concept* of Being is essentially included the *concept* of Truth; otherwise, to speak of *true Being* would be a mere verbal redundancy. All that is maintained is, that it is of the nature of Being that it should form, or be capable of forming, an equation with thought. Yet this does not hinder but that, by process of mental abstraction, Being may be simply conceived as Being, without taking into account, or representing, its referribility to intellect. This is sufficient to justify us in placing Truth among the Transcendental attributes of Being; but it excludes all pretext for considering Truth as a real absolute property. The distinction between the two is stated with his accustomed clearness and simplicity by St. Thomas. ‘When it is said,’ he remarks, ‘that Being cannot be apprehended without the form of the True, this assertion may be understood in two ways. First, it may be understood to mean that Being is not apprehended, unless the form of the True follows upon the apprehension of Being; and, in this sense, it is correct. But it may, again, bear this other meaning, viz. that Being could not be apprehended, without including an apprehension of the True; and in this sense it is false. The True, however, cannot be apprehended without including an apprehension of Being; because Being enters into the nature of the True. It is just as though we should compare the Intelligible with Being. For Being cannot be conceived, if Being is not conceivable; but notwithstanding, Being can be conceived, without conceiving its conceivability. In like manner, Being conceived is true; but the concept of Being does not include the concept of the True¹.’ Thus,

¹ ‘Cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur

Being can be conceived, without including the concept of Truth ; but Truth cannot be conceived, without including necessarily in itself the concept of Being. Therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for a conceptual distinction ; because, if either of the two terms essentially includes the other in its formal concept, that of itself is enough to exclude the possibility of conceptual distinction.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition declares, that *Ontological Truth does not import any real relation or any, strictly speaking, conceptual relation of a like kind*. It will be necessary to premise a few words of explanation touching the phraseology and latitude of this Member of the Thesis. The expression, *conceptual relation of a like kind*, is intended to mean a conceptual relation which is conceived under the form of a *predicamental* relation, to the exclusion of that which bears a resemblance to Transcendental relation. The words, *strictly speaking*; have been added to set aside as irrelevant any relation which is a mere figment of the mind, and is destitute of any shadow of a foundation in the object. As touching the latitude of the Enunciation, it embraces under its negation real at once, and conceptual, relation. The two species of relation have been taken together, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition ; since some of the arguments that follow, apply equally to both.

i. The first argument is based upon the perfection of the Divine Nature. For it cannot be denied that God is ontologically true. Nay more, it will be shown later on, that He is not only Ontological Truth in infinite Perfection, but that He is the measure of all Ontological Truth in created Being. But it is impossible that there should be predicamental relation, either real or conceptual, in God. The reason is, because all predicamental relation connotes dependence on the part of the related term ; but there can be no such dependence, real or conceptual, in God. If, then, Ontological Truth can exist, and *principally* exist, in the instance of a Being in Whom relation is inconceivable ; it is obvious that it cannot be constituted by any such relation, either real or conceptual.

apprehensionem entis ; et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri ; et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis ; quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile, sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile. Sed tamen potest intelligi ens ita quod non intelligatur ejus intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum ; non tamen intelligendo, intelligitur verum.' 1^o xvi, 3, ad 3.

ii. But neither is it possible that Transcendental Truth, in created Being, should be constituted by a real predicamental, relation. For such relation, from the nature of the case, would either have the Divine Prototypal Ideas or the finite intellect for its correlative term. But in neither case could the supposed relation constitute Transcendental Truth. In proof of the *Minor*, let us first of all consider, whether any relation of finite Being to the Exemplar Ideas in God can constitute its Truth. If it were so, the only relation possible would be a relation either of *similarity* or of *the measured to its measure*. But it can be neither the one nor the other. It cannot be a relation of similarity; for this is founded in formal unity, or in agreement of formal notes. Thus, *Henry* is like *William*; because there is, in both, a mutual agreement of the formal notes which are considered to constitute human nature. But it is obviously impossible that there could be any *formal* unity between the Divine Ideas and created Being. The nearest to it that there can be, is an intentional *similarity*, such as subsists between a representation and the object represented; but this does not suffice to constitute a relation of similitude. Neither, again, can it be a relation between the measured and its measure, that constitutes the Truth of the creature; because it would be vain to seek for any such *distinct* relation of finite Being to the Divine Ideas. The reason is, that the Divine prototypal Ideas only affect created Being, by constituting the Divine Will (to speak according to the analogy of finite action) in proximate preparation for, or (as the Schoolmen would say) in Its *first act* of, creating. For the pattern Idea, or exemplar Cause, only affects the production; forasmuch as It guides the efficient Cause in the specification of the work designed. Consequently, there is only one relation, viz. that subsisting between cause and effect, which accompanies the constitution of created Being. Nor let it be said, that the efficient Cause determines the *existence* of created Being; while the exemplar determines its *specification*. For, in the one act of creation, are determined indivisibly the existence at once and specification of the creature. To take an instance;—a *horse*, by the fact that it exists, exists *as a horse*. There is no room for real distinction. As this is a somewhat subtle doctrine and difficult to seize, it may be well to illustrate it from art. When a sculptor proposes to himself to execute a piece of sculpture, say, the *Laocoon*, he must first form the conception in his head as a type or pattern

of that which he intends to produce; and this idea determines his will to the production of such a group. But, in the execution of the work, the conception only acts as a direction to the will in producing the *Laocoon* rather than another subject. It has no immediate influx into the work itself; and, by the same act of volition by which the sculpture exists, it exists as *Laocoon*. Consequently, it is all really one relation, not two; the relation, viz. of the effect to its efficient cause. Hence, there is no room for this distinct relation between the measured and its measure, which is by some supposed to constitute Ontological Truth. It is true that, after the full constitution of Being, it may be compared with its prototype as its measure; but this presupposes already the Transcendental Truth of that Being. It is one thing to be the occasion of a resultant relation; quite another thing to be formally constituted by such relation. The last argument is further confirmed from the nature of a predicamental relation. For, in it, the foundation has a priority of nature over the relation itself. But, in the present case, the foundation is the true entity of the creature; wherefore, the *true* entity of the creature is prior in order of nature to the relation, and cannot be constituted by it. In other words, the creature is presupposed as constituted in its true specific nature, before the relation can arise. Therefore, it is presupposed as intelligible in such constituted order of Being; and, consequently, it is presupposed as true. The whole of this argument applies with equal force to the supposition of a conceptual relation. It may safely, then, be concluded, that Transcendental Truth, in finite Being, is not constituted by any relation of such Being to the Prototypal Ideas in God. But may it be constituted by relation of some sort to the finite intellect? This is the second and only remaining hypothesis. Yet this is, if such were possible, more destitute of foundation than the former. For such relation must be a relation either of actual, or of aptitudinal, conformity with the finite intellect. But, in the first place, whether it be considered as actual or aptitudinal conformity, such relation necessarily presupposes Being, as really and truly constituted in its specific nature; for this latter is the measure of the former. Then, as to aptitudinal conformity (or the capacity of Being to correspond with the finite intellect that shall truly cognize it) in particular, it is to be observed that there is here, strictly speaking, no relation. The *only* addition which is thereby made to Being considered as in-

telligible, is an aptitude for receiving to itself a certain extrinsic denomination, in which a Being would be represented as the term or subject-matter of possible cognition. Therefore, the Ontological Truth of finite Being cannot be constituted by any relation to the created intellect, either real or conceptual. Hence we conclude, that it cannot be constituted by any predicamental relation either real or of reason, to any intellect, Infinite or finite.

iii. The above arguments are further confirmed by another argument *a pari*. As the being knowable imports no predicamental relation to knowledge, and as the thing visible imports no relation to vision; so actual or aptitudinal conformity with the intellect imports no predicamental relation to the intellect.

iv. In the hypothesis that there were no intellect in existence either Divine or human, (and the absurdity of the hypothesis does not interfere with the value of the argument), Being would still be intelligible and true; i. e. Being would have, by virtue of its own entity, a capacity for exciting in the intellect, (should there be one), a true representation of itself, with which cognition it would be conformable.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER of the present Proposition asserts, that Ontological Truth does not import a simple negation. The opinion here rejected owes its origin apparently to a use of the term, *true*, which is frequent in ordinary conversation, more particularly in connection with the practical concerns of life. To take an instance or two: *True gold* stands for *not sham, not merely apparent, gold*. In like manner, a *true man* is contradistinguished from a *painted* or a *sculptured* man, as being such, not by mere similitude of art; or, if the term be employed in a moral sense, it means one who is not a *pretender* or *unreal*. Now, it is worth remarking that, in these and similar modes of expression, there is contained, (over and above the mere negation that has been signalized), the concept of that particular perfection of Being which, according to St. Thomas and the School generally, constitutes the foundation of Ontological Truth. For *true gold* is gold which corresponds, or is capable of corresponding, with the intellect truly conceiving, or capable of truly conceiving it; and the same may be said of a *true man*. Further; if we look a little deeper into the meaning of the phrases just given, in accordance with the interpretation assigned them, the truth of this part of our Thesis will be confirmed. For what is it that is denied? What is the nature of the denial? It is

a negation of a negation, which involves the position of a reality. *Fictitious, merely apparent, unreal*, are negations, and can have no substantive existence. Nor can the negative form of the interpretation given, affect the question; because it repeatedly happens, as there has been occasion to remark before, that simple perfections of the highest excellence are conceived by the human mind under the form of a negation of a negation. Such are *Immortal, Impossible, Infinite, Incorporeal*, and the like. This argument receives further confirmation from the fact, that Falsity (which is the contrary of Truth) is a negation,—to wit, a negation of Truth; therefore it is not a negation of a negation, else it would denote something positive. Consequently, it is the negation of something positive; and that something positive is Truth. But the most unanswerable argument against the opinion now under discussion, is derived from the common sense of mankind. There is no sane man who supposes that, when he speaks of *true Being*, he adds nothing to Being save a mere negation.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

Transcendental Truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination.

It is to be observed at the outset, that Ontological Truth, *as supremely applicable to God*, must be eliminated from the discussion; for it would be absurd, and something more, to maintain that God is true by a mere extrinsic denomination. Nor do the advocates of the opinion rejected in this Thesis contend for one moment, that their theory is applicable to Truth in God. It may be observed, however, in passing, that such an admission tells strongly against the theory as a whole; since all perfections are predicated *analogically* of God and of finite Being, according to analogy of attribution of the second class. But analogy of this kind demands, that the Form predicated should be one and the same in all the analogates; although in the secondary analogates the Form is dependent, whereas in the principal analogate it is absolute. The opinion, then, thus limited, amounts to this; that created things are called true by an extrinsic denomination, derived either from the Divine Truth, of which they are symbols and imitations, or from the Truth of the finite speculative intellect, of which they either are, or are capable of being, the cause.

THE PROPOSITION is thus briefly declared. i. It is universally ad-

mitted, that Truth is one of the Transcendental attributes of Being; so nearly equivalent to what, in a specific nature, is called a Property, that it occasionally goes by that name. Consequently, it must be intrinsic and essentially connected with Being; in such wise, that the two are simply convertible. Furthermore, as it may be said to be analogically a property; it must, at least in idea, add something intrinsic, which is not formally included in the essential idea of Being. Now, if Ontological Truth were merely an extrinsic denomination, all these requisites would be wanting; and Truth could not, in consequence, be a Transcendental attribute or passion of Being. For a mere extrinsic denomination is extrinsic and accidental in its very nature, more particularly if it is a relative denomination. Moreover, if the extrinsic denomination were abstracted, what would remain intrinsically? Nothing but Being. How then could the supposed attribute add anything intrinsic which is not formally included in the essential idea of Being?

ii. If this opinion were true, there would be no reason why Ontological Truth should not be *equally* predicable of logical, as of real, entities;—a hypothesis which, nevertheless, is universally rejected. For logical entities, such as *Genus*, *Species*, *Syllogism*, and other *Second Intentions*, would be as capable of receiving this extrinsic denomination from the intellect truly conceiving them as *man*, *tree*, *gold*, or other finite realities.

iii. It would follow from the opinion in question, that the perfection of Ontological Truth would not depend on the perfection of Being. Thus, a *stone* would have the same Ontological Truth as a *man*, a *man* the same as an *angel*; for the truth of the intellectual concept, from which the extrinsic denomination is supposed to be derived, is equal in all these cases, whether they are considered in relation to the Divine, or in relation to the finite, intellect.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

Transcendental or Ontological Truth imports the entity of Being; and, at the same time, connotes the conformity of such entity with intellect as rightly conceiving it, or its conformability with intellect as capable of rightly conceiving it.

The declaration of this Proposition will be more clearly understood, if we proceed by way of analysis. Now, the first question that confronts the inquirer is this; what is that which is really and intrinsically represented in the idea of Ontological Truth? The answer

is a simple, and, after due consideration, an evident, one; and it is this. Transcendental Truth really and intrinsically is nothing more or less than the entity of Being. This principle, as it may be almost called, has been sufficiently confirmed, as touching the Transcendental attributes generally, in the first Chapter of this Book; but it will not be amiss to recur to it once more, under a somewhat different form. A passion or attribute of Being is convertible with Being; therefore, it cannot be a determination of Being,—that is, it cannot contract the periphery of Being to a special Genus, as *substance* and *accident*, *created* and *uncreated* Being, do. These latter classify Being and divide it, by introducing into their express formal concept a reality which is only virtually and implicitly contained in Being, and is not discoverable in all Being; wherefore, they are not convertible with Being. Thus, *Substance* adds to the idea of Being, the reality of so subsisting in and of itself, as not to require any Subject of inhesion. But, for the very reason that it makes this addition, it is untrue to say that *all Being is Substance*. The two are not convertible. The mere addition, however, of *itself* does not afford a sufficient ground for the assertion of inconvertibility; because a specific property is undeniably convertible with the specific nature, yet, as undeniably, it adds a reality not included in the entity of that nature. Thus, *visible* is convertible with *human nature*; though it is not included in the Essence of the latter, and adds to it a reality of its own. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the above canon by the Transcendentalism of Being; by virtue of which, every real addition to Being must be a *contractive* determination. On the one hand, such addition is simply a determination of Being,—making no addition from without; because all real addition to Being must be Being, and, therefore, must be *virtually* included in the idea of Being. The only possible manner, therefore, of making any real addition is, to change the *virtual* into the *explicit*, and add it to the concept; and in this way, Being becomes as it were *implicit*, its Mode *explicit*. But, on the other hand, such determination must necessarily be contractive, and, consequently, not convertible with Being. The reason for this is, that in order to determine Being, there must be projected, in the concept, a reality which, together with other realities, was before virtually contained within the periphery of Being. But, to objectivize one reality of Being, that, by the force of its explicit position, excludes another,

involves of necessity a *contraction* of Being to that particular reality. If, then, there be a concept whose periphery is co-extensive with that of the concept of Being; it is impossible that the former should represent any other intrinsic reality than the simple entity of Being. But this it must represent; otherwise, it will represent nothing, and forfeits its claims to be a concept at all. Such is the principal point of difference between the opinion rejected in the last Thesis and the doctrine here established. In the former, *the True* is considered as separate from, and as a sort of independent addition to, Being; and is, accordingly, reduced to the level of a mere extrinsic denomination,—the only thing it could possibly be, under such treatment. It is here contended, on the contrary, that *the True*, or, (if you prefer it), Ontological Truth, necessarily and intrinsically includes the entity of Being in its concept; so that it is not an addition, properly speaking, but a conceptual mode rather,—or, as it is more truly called, an attribute of Being.

The next question which awaits us in the present analysis, is this: What is the addition made to the idea of Being, when it is conceived as true? For, though it is evident from what has just been said, that Being is essentially included in Ontological Truth; yet, in the concept of the latter, there must be something added to the concept of Being. Otherwise, the two would be conceptually identical; in which case it would be absurd to maintain, that Ontological Truth is an attribute of Being. Suppose, we answer: The *intelligibility* of Being. Such a solution would be right as far as it goes; but still, it is only half the solution. Notwithstanding, we may profitably use it as a stepping-stone. What, therefore, do we precisely mean, when we pronounce a thing *intelligible*? The imagination is apt to deceive us, by surrounding the object, so denominated, with a sort of halo of light. But, when the idea is submitted to the touchstone of pure reason, it is found to resolve itself into two elements; viz. the entity itself, and an *aptitude*. Now the entity itself forms no part of the conceptual addition, as is obvious; it may therefore be dismissed. The addition must be in the aforesaid *aptitude*; there only can be found a clue to the difficulty. What, then, is this aptitude? The word will help us. For the *Intelligible* evidently has relation to the *Intellect*. But of what kind? The *Intelligible* is that which has an aptitude for being conceived by the intellect. Thus, then, the foregoing analysis

has conducted us to this point; first of all, that Ontological Truth adds to the entity of Being, which it conceptually includes, a respect of some kind or other to the intellect. Furthermore, that respect is understood to be that of an object *conceivable*, to the intellect as *capable of conceiving*. But is this enough? In other words, does intelligibility cover the whole ground of Ontological Truth? Perhaps it may be said to do so fundamentally and by implication; but not formally or explicitly. There is no one who carefully thinks out the matter but will be free to own, that he means something more than *intelligibility*, when in his mind he pronounces an entity, v. g. *gold, man*, to be true. This is further confirmed by the meaning attached to *conceptual* Truth, from which the term Truth is originally derived. For *there* is found, as has been seen, the idea of *conformity* and, in a certain sense, of *adequation*. It may, therefore, well be supposed that Ontological Truth will be differentiated by a similar idea. Then, again, in conceptual Truth the other term of correspondence is *extrinsic* to the true concept; it is natural to infer, accordingly, that, in Ontological Truth likewise, the other term of correspondence will be extrinsic. But, from what has been already established by analysis, that extrinsic term can be no other than the intellect. So, then, Ontological Truth will be the entity of Being, as capable of exciting in the intellect a concept of itself conformable to, or corresponding with, that which it really is. But, as in conceptual Truth this correspondence or conformity denoted no real predicamental relation; so neither does it in Ontological Truth. Hence it is described, in the Enunciation of the present Proposition, as a *connotation*. Lastly, to the Ontological Truth of a thing it is not necessary that the concept of it should be *actually* formed, or the intellect *existing*; hence, are added the words '*conformability with intellect capable of rightly conceiving it.*' For fear of mistakes, however, let it be added, that, though the actuality of concept and existence of the intellect are not required to the essential idea of Ontological Truth; yet, they may be otherwise required, and as a fact exist. This will be explained in the sequel.

There are three observations which may be usefully added to the above analysis, by way of an appendix. The first is, that, by examination of the respective Propositions, there will be found to exist a perfect parallelism between conceptual and Ontological Truth, not only as to the points already enumerated in the pre-

ceding paragraph, but likewise as to the exclusion of those absolute and relative perfections, of that pure negation, and of that merely extrinsic denomination, which have formed the subject-matter of discussion in the two preceding Theses. The next observation is, that, from the doctrine here established, it may be seen how, while anything like a real or even conceptual predicamental relation cannot be admitted either in conceptual or Ontological Truth; nevertheless, the concomitant conformity or conformability approaches much nearer to the nature of a relative, than of an absolute, perfection; so that, in a loose sort of a way, it may be, as it has sometimes been, called a relation. But, as such, it partakes more of the character of a Transcendental, than of a predicamental, relation. Lastly, it is to be observed that, according to the theory here defended, it may be clearly seen, both how Truth can be a passion or attribute of Being, and also how the perfection of Ontological Truth is proportioned to the perfection of Being. The first is due to the fact, that Transcendental Truth includes in its concept a respective perfection which is not formally included in the simple concept of Being; the second is evident, because Truth essentially includes in its concept the entity of Being also, and, proportionally to the grade of Being, will be its intelligibility and its natural capability of causing a more or less perfect idea of itself in the intellect. Just as it is said, that matter is scarcely intelligible, because of its imperfect entity.

It now only remains to show, that the doctrine, established in these last three Propositions, is in exact accordance with the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. To begin with, then,—St. Thomas in the two following passages explains how Ontological Truth is properly a passion, or attribute, of Being. ‘The True,’ he remarks, ‘is a disposition of Being, not as if adding any nature’ (real, absolute, or relative, perfection), ‘nor as expressing any special’ (i. e. contracting or determining) ‘mode of Being; but as something that is to be found universally in Being, nevertheless not expressed by the word, Being¹.’ Lest, however, it might be supposed that by the phrase ‘to be found universally in Being,’ he implied a real distinction, he adds in another place: ‘It is not nugatory to speak

¹ ‘Verum est dispositio entis, non quasi addens aliquam naturam, nec quasi exprimens aliquem specialem modum entis; sed aliquid quod generaliter invenitur in ente, quod tamen nomine entis non exprimitur.’ *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 1, ad 4^m.*

of *true Being*; because there is something expressed by the word *True*, which is not expressed by the word *Being*; *not that they really differ*¹. How, then, do they differ? This, too, he explains elsewhere: 'The True cannot, properly speaking, be a difference of Being; for Being has no difference. But Ontological Truth holds the position, relatively to Being, *of a sort of Difference*; just as Goodness also does, in that it expresses concerning Being something which is not expressed by the word *Being*. And, accordingly, so far the idea of Being is indeterminate as regards the idea of Truth; so that the idea of Truth is compared to the idea of Being, in some sort of a way, as a Difference' (stands affected) 'to its Genus².' Once more, he tells us what the nature of this addition is: 'Truth adds, over and above Essence, something conceptual, i. e. order' (or respect) 'to the cognition or scientific knowledge of some one³.' Here let us pause for one moment, to recapitulate what S. Thomas establishes in these brief but pregnant passages. First of all, Truth is convertible with Being; and is not, by any real addition, a determination or 'special mode' of Being. Again: there is no real distinction between the two. But, thirdly, there is a conceptual distinction, sufficient to justify our considering Truth as an attribute of Being. Lastly, that addition in the idea of Truth which is not expressed in the idea of Being is, the order or habitude of Being to some intellectual cognition. It now follows to see in what, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, this order, respect, or habitude, of Being precisely consists. Here, too, he is equally plain. 'The word, Truth,' he proceeds to say, 'expresses the conformity of Being with Intelligence. Now, all cognition is completed by the assimilation of the thinker to the thing thought, so that the said assimilation is a cause of cognition; just as the sense of sight perceives colour, for the reason that it is disposed by

¹ 'Ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum, quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis; non propter quod re differant.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 1, ad 1^m contra*.

² 'Verum, proprie loquendo, non potest esse differentia entis; ens enim non habet aliquam differentiam, . . . sed aliquid verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae sicut et bonum; in quantum viz. exprimit aliquid circa ens quod nomine entis non exprimitur. Et secundum hoc intentio entis est indeterminata respectu intentionis veri. Et sic intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quodammodo ut differentia ad genus.' *Ibidem, Q. 1, a. 10, ad 2^m*.

³ 'Veritas addit supra essentiam secundum rationem, scil. ordinem ad cognitionem vel demonstrationem alicujus.' *In 1. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 1, c. in fi.*

the species' (or sensible impression) 'of colour. The primary habitude, then, of Being to intelligence is, that it should correspond with intelligence. And this correspondence is called an equation between the entity and the intellect. It is in this that the nature of Truth is formally perfected. This, then, is what Truth adds over and above Being, viz. a conformity or equation between the entity and the intellect; and upon this conformity follows the cognition of the entity¹. This is sufficiently plain. St. Thomas maintains, in accordance with the doctrine enunciated in the present Proposition, that this habitude of Being to intellect is a habitude of *correspondence*, or conformity. But there is one point still remaining, upon which St. Thomas has not revealed his mind in the passages hitherto cited. Is this conformity a mere extrinsic denomination? Here, (it must be owned), there is, at first sight, a difficulty; for there is a passage in which the Angelic Doctor has been understood by some to answer the question in the affirmative so clearly, as to justify them in ranking him among the fautors of this opinion. An examination, however, of his words, especially as interpreted by his general teaching on this subject, will sufficiently evince the injustice of such a judgment. 'Entities,' he observes, 'receive the denomination of true from the Truth which is in the Divine Intellect and in the human intellect, as food receives the denomination of healthy from the health which is in Animal, and not as from an inherent form; but' (they receive the same denomination) 'from the truth that is in themselves, (which is nothing else save the entity itself, as rendered equal to intellect or rendering intellect equal to itself), as from an inhering form; just as food receives the denomination of healthy from a quality of its own, by virtue of which it is called healthy².' This passage is worthy of careful

¹ 'Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen, *verum*. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam; ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis, sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspondeat; quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur. Et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scil. conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 1, c.*

² 'Dominantur autem res verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano, sicut denominatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in animali, et non sicut a forma inherente; sed a veritate quae est in ipsa re (quae nihil est aliud quam entitas intellectui adaequata, vel intellectum sibi adaequans), sicut a forma

examination ; for it will be found not only to confirm to the letter the doctrine advanced in this Article, but its consideration will throw great additional light on the whole subject. St. Thomas is treating of the question, *Whether there is one only Truth by which all things are true.* In its solution in the body of the Article, he premises certain distinct meanings of the word, *Truth*. It is properly predicated of Intellect ; improperly of Being. Again, in its proper signification, it is *primarily* predicated of the Divine, *secondarily*, of the human, Intellect. Hence three meanings ;—primary proper, secondary proper, and improper. This premised, he thus solves the question. If Truth be taken in the first sense, all things are true by one, i. e. by the Divine, Truth ; if in the second, there are many Truths of many true entities in different minds ; if in the last, there are many Truths of many true things, but of one thing there is only one Truth. Then follows the passage which has been quoted above. It is evident that, by the proper signification, St. Thomas understands *conceptual* ; by the improper, *Transcendental*, Truth. In each case there are two terms ; because in each case there is a correlation. We may call these terms, respectively, for the sake of clearness, the Subject and the Term. Now, these two change places, accordingly as Truth is assumed, in its proper or in its improper, signification. In conceptual Truth, the intellect is the Subject, and Being the Term ; in Ontological Truth, on the contrary, Being is the Subject, and intellect is, as it were, the Term. Let us for the moment confine our attention to the former. Conceptual Truth is in the intellect as in its Subject ; and the intellect is said to be true, inasmuch as its conceptual representation is conformable to its object or Term of thought. If, then, Being is considered, in its relation to conceptual Truth, as objective Term of this latter ; it is true, because it causes Truth in the intellect whose concept it measures. Regarded from this point of view, it is like food, when it is called healthy because of its aptitude for causing health in the animal body. The denomination is extrinsic ; and Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of attribution of the first class. Now, turn we to the latter signification of the word. Ontological Truth is in Being, as in its Subject. What is its nature, according to the Angelic Doctor in

inherente ; sicut cibus denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, a qua sanus dicitur.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 4, c. in fi.*

this passage? It bears resemblance to an inherent form. Is it, then, really an inherent form? No. Why? Because it is the entity of Being itself with a conceptual addition. But why, then, say, that it bears resemblance to an inherent form? To show that it is not a mere extrinsic denomination; but is the entity itself with an extrinsic connotation, having intellect for the term. In like manner, the form of health in food, considered as inherent in the food, is no mere extrinsic denomination; but denotes the nature of the food itself, connoting at the same time a conformity with the animal body. Thus it is made plain that, in this passage, St. Thomas admirably confirms the several Propositions enunciated in this Article. It may, however, be well to add that, when the Angelic Doctor declares here, as elsewhere in many places, that Truth is properly predicated of Intellect, improperly of Being, and when he also says that intellect has prior claim to the possession of Truth, Being only posterior, he is generally understood to be speaking of its conceptual origin and nominal derivation, rather than of itself in its absolute nature; though even in this latter sense, his assertions can be fully vindicated. One more point remains to be settled. Does St. Thomas teach that Ontological Truth essentially includes the entity of Being in its formal concept? The preceding passage can hardly be said to leave the matter doubtful. However, to set the question at rest, the following quotation shall close the present discussion. 'The Truth of things existing includes, in its formal nature, the entity of those things; and adds, over and above, a respect of adequation with the human and Divine Intellect¹.'

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

This actual or aptitudinal conformity of Being with the Intellect, on which Ontological Truth formally reposes, refers primarily to the Uncreated, secondarily to created or finite, Intelligence.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Thesis states, *that this conformity of Being with the intellect refers principally to the Uncreated Intelligence*; and the statement is thus proved. All Being is either Infinite or finite. But the Ontological Truth in both refers *principally* to the Divine Intelligence. First of all, then, the Truth of *Infinite Being*

¹ 'Unde veritas rerum existentium includit in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum humanum vel divinum.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 8, c. v. m.*

primarily connotes the Uncreated Intelligence, because of the intrinsic and essential identity in God of Subject and Object,—of Thought and Being; whence proceed two characteristics. The one is, that eternally and immutably there must be *actual* cognition, *actual* conformity; for Being is Thought, and Thought is Being. The other is that there is a *perfect adequation*; because there is perfect identity. Hence, God is infinitely comprehended by Himself; whence results a special and infinitely perfect conformity of Infinite Being with Infinite Cognition. But the Divine Nature, because of its Infinity, cannot be comprehended by any finite intelligence. There is a fathomless disproportion. Moreover, in the natural order, It is not of necessity actually conformed to the finite intellect; because It is not directly and formally present to it. Secondly, The Truth of *finite* Being primarily connotes the Uncreated Intelligence. For, to begin with, in the Divine Intelligence there is consummate and infallible Truth, all-embracing, infinitely complete, and the most perfect Idea or Representation of all things, as well possible as actual. Then, again, the Divine Intelligence is the one efficient Cause of all finite Truth; because God is the one supreme efficient Cause of all entity, and His Nature is fundamentally the one exemplar Cause of all things that are, or can be, created. Therefore, *in a certain sense*, it is most correct to say, that God is the Creator of finite Truth, save in the instance of those truths which are dependent on the free-will of the creature. Moreover, the Divine Cognition of the creature is necessarily actual and immutable, not by virtue of the object, but by virtue of the Divine Intelligence. Hence, though the existence of the creature is temporal and changing, the Divine Idea of the creature is everlasting and immutable; for really it is God Himself. But, of this more at length in the last Book, on Natural Theology. Enough has been said to show that, if Truth consists in a conformity or equation of Being with Intellect, such conformity or adequation, in the case either of Infinite or finite Being, must have primary reference to the Uncreated Intelligence.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is asserted that *the conformity of Being with Intellect secondarily refers to the finite intelligence*. This member virtually includes two Propositions; the one, that Being is conformable to the finite intelligence; the other that it is only conformable to that intelligence in a secondary or inferior way. These two statements it would be better to consider separately.

First of all, then, it is easy to see that there is an actual or, at least, aptitudinal conformity of Being with finite intelligence, speaking of Being generally; because finite intelligence is, after a manner, a participation of the Divine Intelligence; and, therefore, conformity with the Latter would presuppose conformability with the former. But, when the question is considered in relation to that primary determination and division of Being into the finite and Infinite; there straightway arises a difficulty of no mean importance, touching the conformability of Infinite Being with finite intelligence. For it is universally held by the Doctors of the School, that it is *naturally* impossible for the highest finite intelligence to have a direct intuition of the Divine Nature. But, if so, how can it be maintained that the Infinite Being is in anywise conformable to the finite intelligence? This whole question will have to be treated in its proper place; and, accordingly, here a short answer will be given. It is certain that the Divine Nature is intelligible, in infinite excess of all finite Being even when collected into one whole; consequently, of Itself It has an Infinite conformability with whatsoever intellect capable of forming a true concept of It. It follows, therefore, that the finite intellect not only *can*, but *does*, form a true concept of God, though imperfect, and, as it were, arguitive. It must necessarily *de potentia absoluta* be imperfect; because it is metaphysically impossible that the finite should *comprehend*, (though it may be able in a way to *apprehend*), the Infinite. Its cognition of God must *naturally* be deductive, not immediate; because of its natural weakness and imperfection. But this does not interfere with the *conformability* of the object; but with Its *actual conformity*. And, (if it may be allowed to assume a truth, as a *Lemma*, from Christian Theology, for the sake of illustrating this explanation), it is in exact conformity with what has been said, that, when the finite intellect is supernaturally comforted in its final beatitude by a Divine Grace which Theologians call *the light of glory*, it is rendered thereby capable of the Beatific Vision, that is of a direct, immediate cognition,—an intuition of God. Therefore, the natural impossibility, under which the finite intellect labours, of forming an intuitive idea of God, does not arise from any defect of conformability on the part of the object; but just the reverse. It originates in the incapacity and limitation of the finite intelligence itself.

As to the conformability of finite Being with the created intellect, there can be no possible doubt, save in the mind of universal sceptics,

who will not accept the first principles of thought, except under the safeguard of impossible proof. For, as a fact, we know existing things through our concepts of them; and all scientific knowledge is built up upon the foundation of conceptual definitions. The nature of the human intellect requires that we should accept its concepts as true symbols of objective realities; apart from primary intuitions which are direct, but are, nevertheless, the foundation of the reflex. Nature imperatively exacts of us this acceptance of ideas, as sterling coin, in the Empire of Truth, on peril of total intellectual bankruptcy; and nature is the voice of God. But what does this necessarily imply and presuppose? Surely, it implies and presupposes a conformability of finite Being with the human intellect. If there were no such conformability, there could be no bridge between the Subjective and the Objective; and, consequently, nature would be to human thought as though it were not,—an unknown possibility. But the same position can be thoroughly maintained on *à priori* grounds. For, if every existing Being is intelligible, i. e. has an aptitude for generating a true cognition of itself in any intellect capable of representing it, there must be conformability of finite Being with the created intellect, even though there should be, in certain cases, an absence of *actual conformity*, because of a deficiency in such or such a particular intelligence.

The second statement, included under the second member of the Proposition, to the effect that *the aforesaid conformity of Being refers only secondarily to finite intelligence*, is evident from the nature of the case; whether that conformity be considered in connection with Infinite, or with finite, Being. In the instance of the former it hardly needs declaration; for, while Infinite Being is ever actually one, and so, in the highest sense actually conformed with the Uncreated Intelligence, It is only conformable, and can never be adequately conformed, with created intelligence. But, speaking of the two kinds of Being indifferently, i. e. of Being in general, actual conformity with the Uncreated Intellect is a necessity, merely aptitudinal conformity, an impossibility; whereas, with the finite intellect, actual conformity is an accident, aptitudinal conformity essential. Again, Ontological Truth is (so to say) caused by the Uncreated Intellect, while itself is a cause to the created intellect; at once measured and measuring, as will be explained in a subsequent Thesis. Finally, between Being and the finite intellect

there may be difformity through the extravagance of the latter; with the Uncreated Intelligence it is impossible. St. Thomas adds another reason as important as any. 'The truth,' he remarks, 'which is predicated of entities,' (he is speaking of finite Beings, and his argument applies exclusively to them), 'by relation to the human intellect, is as it were accidental to entities, because in the hypothesis that there was not, and could not be, a human intellect, entities would still abide in their essential nature,' (and would therefore be ontologically true). 'But the truth which is predicated of them in relation to the Divine Intelligence, is inseparably communicated to them; for they cannot subsist, save by virtue of the Divine Intelligence which brings them into Being¹.' The Divine Idea, which is their Prototype, is really identical with the Divine Will that creates them; just as a work of art receives its aesthetic truth from the artist, according to whose conception it is formed and by whose will it is produced. Another passage from the Angelic Doctor may be inserted by way of conclusion to the present Thesis; as, in it, he unequivocally maintains the truth which has been here evolved. 'An entity intellectually apprehended,' he says, 'can stand in relation to an intellect either necessarily or accidentally. It has absolute relation to the intellect on which it is dependent for its being, accidental relation to the intellect by which it is cognizable; just as we might say that a building is conformable to the mind of the architect of necessity, but only accidentally to an intellect on which it is not dependent. But Judgment concerning any entity is not formed on that which is accidentally, but on that which is necessarily, inherent in it. Hence, everything is pronounced to be true absolutely, according to its order of relation to the intellect on which it depends. Hence it is, that artificial things are said to be true in reference to the human intellect. For that building is said to be a true one, which acquires a likeness to the form which is in the mind of the architect; and speech is said to be true, in so far as it is a symbol of true thought. In like manner, the things of nature are said to be true, in that they acquire a likeness to the Forms which are in the Divine Mind.

¹ 'Veritas autem quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quodammodo accidentalis; quia, posito quod intellectus humanus non esset nec esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia permanerent. Sed veritas, quae dicitur de eis in comparatione ad intellectum divinum, eis inseparabiliter communicatur; non enim subsistere possunt, nisi per intellectum divinum eas in esse producentem.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 4, c.*

For that is called a true stone, which acquires the proper nature of a stone, according to the Pattern preconceived in the Divine Intelligence¹.

PROPOSITION LXXXII.

The Divine Intelligence is the measure of Ontological Truth in finite Being; while finite Being is the measure to the human intellect of conceptual Truth, in all that pertains to the cognition of itself.

This Proposition, including both members, is simply a Corollary of the doctrine enunciated in preceding Theses, more particularly in the last. It stands in need, therefore, rather of exposition than of demonstration.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER Infinite Being has been excluded, for two reasons. The one is, that the term, *measure*, has no place in the Things of God. For Measured and Measure are relative terms and require real distinction; and a dependence, at least, of the former on the latter. But it is metaphysically impossible that there should be either a real distinction between the Divine Nature and the Divine Intelligence, or a dependence of the Divine Nature on the Divine Intelligence. The other is, that if such terms could be applied to Things Divine, the Divine Nature would with more show of reason be considered as measure of the Divine Intelligence, than the Divine Intelligence as measure of the Divine Nature. For it is not because God *conceives* His nature to be such, that It *is* such; but rather, because It *is* such, He *conceives* It *as* such.

The statement, then, having been thus restricted to finite Being, it is sufficiently clear that God is the measure of Ontological Truth in existing things, for two reasons already suggested in the

¹ 'Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse; per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut, si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad intellectum artificis per se; per accidens autem comparatur ad intellectum a quo non dependet. Judicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum. Dicitur enim domus vera quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, in quantum est signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt in mente divina. Dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini.' *De Verit. Q. xvi, a. 1, c.*

preceding Thesis. For He is the Measure of their existence, because He is their Artificer. Therefore, He is Measure of their Truth; since Ontological Truth is, essentially and intrinsically, nothing more nor less than the entity of these Beings. Then, He is their Measure, because their Being is constituted after the pattern of those Prototypal Ideas in the Divine Intelligence, which are the exemplar Cause of all created things; and they themselves are true, in so far as they correspond with those Types. Wherein they are discrepant from those Types, (either owing to the operation of secondary causes or to the action of free-will), they are not true; because in such respect they exhibit, not Being, but defect of Being. So far, then, as existing things are concerned, there is little or no difficulty. But does the same hold good in the case of possible beings? Considered as *intrinsically* possible, their only reality, (as we saw in the Article on Possible Being in the Second Book), is the Divine Nature as imitable, and the Divine Intellect, conceiving the imitability in such or such definite grade. Therefore, as real, they are identified with God. But their *extrinsic* possibility may be regarded from two points of view. If their *extrinsic* possibility is taken to represent *directly* the production, *indirectly* the thing to be produced, or (to speak after the manner of the School) the creative power *in recto*, the capacity for being created on the part of the possible Being *in obliquo*; then, again, their possibility is really identified with the Divine Will. If, however, their extrinsic possibility is taken to represent the thing to be produced *directly*, the possible act of production *indirectly*; the real foundation of such concept is the Prototypal Idea in the Divine Intelligence as Pattern, and the efficacy of the Divine Will as efficient Cause, without both of which, these possibles could not be truly conceived as capable of existence. So that, in this respect, their Ontological Truth would be as absolutely dependent on the Divine Intelligence as the Truth of existing things.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition is equally clear to those who have mastered the principles of Ideology, and receives no little light from the discussions on Conceptual Truth in the two preceding Articles. The human intellect, at the beginning, is purely facultative, and is determined to its acts of thought by the external objects which are presented to it through the senses; and its cognitions are true, when their representations are conformable with the object which they represent. Consequently, Conceptual

Truth is measured by the Truth of finite Being. Of course it would be measured in a much higher sense by the Truth of Infinite Being; if the human intellect were naturally capable of the intuition of God. But, as it is, the only knowledge of God to which the mind of man can naturally attain, is arguitive, being deduced from his cognitions of the creature; and therefore in the enunciation of the Thesis, the direct measure of the human intellect is restricted to finite Being.

This most interesting question must not be discussed, without affording the reader an opportunity of seeing what the Angelic Doctor has to say on the subject. Let the following quotations, therefore, serve as specimens of his teaching. It would be difficult to find anything more clear or more beautifully simple. 'The things of nature, from which our intellect derives its knowledge, *measure our intellect*; but *are measured* by the Divine Intelligence, in Which are all things created, as all works of art are in the mind of the artificer. Thus, the Divine Intelligence is measuring, not measured; while a thing of nature is both measuring and measured. But the human mind is measured, and does not measure the things of nature; but only productions of art.' Wherefore, a thing of nature is constituted between two intelligences; and is denominated true by reason of its equation with both. For it is said to be true, in regard of its correspondence with the Divine Intelligence; forasmuch as it fulfils that to which it has been ordained by the Divine Intelligence. . . . Again; an entity is said to be true, in regard of its adequation with human intelligence; forasmuch as it has a natural aptitude for engendering a true estimate of itself. . . . Now, the first-mentioned form of Truth in an entity has precedence over the second; because its comparison with the Divine, has precedence over its comparison with the human, Intellect. Hence, even if there were no human intellect, entities would still be called true, by virtue of their relation to the Divine Intelligence¹. Once more: 'The knowledge

¹ 'Res naturales ex quibus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mensurant intellectum nostrum ut dicitur 10 Metaphys. sed sunt mensurate ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia creata, sicut omnia artificata in intellectu artificis. Sic ergo intellectus divinus est mensurans, non mensuratus; res autem naturalis mensurans et mensurata. Sed intellectus noster est mensuratus, non mensurans quidem res naturales sed artificiales tantum. Res ergo naturalis inter duos intellectus constituta, secundum adaequationem ad utrumque vera dicitur. Secundum enim adaequationem ad intellectum divinum dicitur vera, in quantum implet hoc ad quod est ordinata per

of the human intellect is, in a certain sort of way, caused by entities. Hence it comes to pass, that the objects knowable are the measure of human knowledge. For the Judgment of the intellect is true, because so the thing really is; and not the other way about. But the Divine Intelligence, by Its knowledge, is the Cause of things. Hence, this knowledge must necessarily be the measure of things; as art is the measure of the productions of art, each one of which is perfect, in proportion as it comes up to the artistic conception. The Divine Intelligence, therefore, stands in a similar position to entities, that entities occupy in relation to human intelligence. Now, falsity, which is the result of a want of equation between the human mind and the object, is not in the entities, but in the human mind. If, *therefore*,¹ (i. e. in consequence of the inverse position of the Divine and human Intellect respectively, in relation to the things of nature, mentioned above) 'there were not an entire equation between the Divine Intelligence and entities; the falsity would be in the entities, not in the Divine Intelligence. However, there is no falsity in entities; because so much as each has of Being, so much has it of Truth¹.'

COROLLARY.

Hence, 'the Divine Truth is measure of all Truth. For the Truth of the human intellect is measured by the external object or entity; . . . and the Truth of the entity is measured by the Divine Intelligence, which is Cause of entities².'

intellectum divinum. . . . Secundum autem adaequationem ad intellectum humanum dicitur res vera, in quantum nata est de se formare veram aestimationem. . . . Prima autem ratio veritatis per prius inest rei quam secunda; quia prior est comparatio ad intellectum divinum quam humanum; unde etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum.' *De Verit. Q. i, a. 2, c.*

¹ 'Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur. Unde provenit quod scibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae; ex hoc enim verum est quod intellectu dijudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. Intellectus autem divinus per suam scientiam est causa rerum. Unde oportet quod scientia ejus sit mensura rerum; sicut ars est mensura artificiorum, quorum unumquodque in tantum perfectum est, in quantum arti concordat. Talis igitur est comparatio intellectus divini ad res, qualis est rerum ad intellectum humanum. Falsitas autem, causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei, non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur non esset omnimoda adaequatio intellectus divini ad res, falsitas esset in rebus, non in intellectu divino. Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas; quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate.' *q. Gentis, L. I, c. 61.*

² 'Divina veritas est mensura omnis veritatis. Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam. . . . Veritas autem rei mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, qui est causa rerum.' *Ibidem, c. 62.*

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The first objection made to the above doctrine is, that it represents Transcendental Truth as manifold, not one. For actual conformity is something very different from aptitudinal; and conformity with the speculative intellect is not the same as conformity with the practical, according to which the things of nature are created.

ANSWER. All these various significations of Transcendental Truth are determinations of one adequate meaning, to which the rest can be reduced. That meaning expresses the natural aptitude of Being to produce, in whatsoever intellect, a true estimate of itself. Actual conformity adds nothing to this, save an extrinsic denomination derived from co-existing cognition. In a similar way, conformity with the speculative, does not differ from conformity with the practical, intelligence; save that in the former there arises a real relation, which, however, presupposes the Transcendental Truth of the creature.

II. The second objection is, that Ontological Truth, fundamentally at least, denotes the relation of that which is measured to its measure. Consequently, it can only regard the Divine, and not the human, Intellect. For this latter, as has been declared, does not measure the things of nature, but is measured by them.

ANSWER. It is not true to say, that relation of the measured to its measure is essentially included, although only fundamentally, in Ontological Truth. If it were so, then the Divine Nature could not be true; because it is impossible that, in any true sense, It should be measured. Moreover, the statement that *Transcendental Truth includes the relation aforesaid*, is only true of speculative cognition, and that too only partially; for in practical cognition, as we have seen, the relation is transverse.

III. It is, lastly, objected, that Conceptual Truth consists in a conformity of the concept with its object. Therefore, Ontological Truth cannot consist in the conformity or conformability of the object or entity with the cognition; because there is in this case no relation of mutual similarity, but rather of dissimilarity.

ANSWER. The *Antecedent* is granted; but the *Consequent* must

be denied. The reason is, that Conceptual and Ontological Truth are not univocal, as will be presently seen. This understood, the natural inference tells precisely the other way. For, if it is essential to Conceptual Truth, (i.e. to the Truth of intellectual cognition), that the concept should be conformable to the object; this would more than imply, that the object is naturally capable of exciting in the intellect this conformity with itself. But what is this, if not that conformability of Being with intellect, which constitutes Ontological Truth?

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

Every Being, as such, is true.

The following is the proof. Every Being is actually conformed to the Divine Intellect, and is of itself conformable to the finite intellect. But in this conformity Ontological Truth consists. Consequently, every Being, as such, is true. The *Minor* is thus declared. Being is either Infinite or finite. Both are actually conformed to the Divine Intelligence;—Infinite Being, because of its real identity with that Intelligence; finite Being, because the knowledge of God, considered as speculative, is infinite and infinitely perfect; considered as practical, is the Cause of the existence, and the Measure of the Truth, of finite Being. Both, again, are conformable to the finite intellect; because, in that they are *one*, they are intelligible. It is added in the Enunciation of the Thesis, Being, *as such*, i. e. *Being as Being*; because *defect* of Being is not true, for the simple reason that it is nothing, and, therefore, can have no attribute, Transcendental or other. This will be explained more clearly and fully in the solution of the difficulties.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. Can a lie be true? Yet, it is evidently not mere nothingness. Therefore, it is something real. Consequently, not all Being is true.

ANSWER. This, when examined, is no great difficulty. For a word may be considered *entitatively*, as a certain emission of articulate sound; or it may be considered as a mere symbol of thought; or it may, lastly, be considered as the intentional symbol of Being. As an emission of articulate sound, (which is its entity), it is true.

Regarded as a mere conventional symbol of thought, it is *symbolically* true; for the thought conveyed by it is the one intended to be conveyed by the speaker, and is accepted as such by the hearer. So far, the lie is symbolically true; true, therefore, in its conventional nature. But, if it is taken for the symbol of the entity concerning which the speaker intends to convey a difform Judgment,—difform in his own consciousness; then it is false. But this is moral, not ontological, or even conceptual, falsity.

II. The second objection is a much more serious one; and it is this. It seems impossible to deny, that certain entities are difform from the human practical intellect. This assertion will be best explained by an example. An artist is engaged to paint the portrait of a man. He forms his conception of the sitter; and proceeds with his work. The picture is no likeness; and is even a deformed representation of the human face. Add another example, to make the illustration complete. Let it be supposed that a painter has formed in his mind or imagination the conception of a beautiful, and (if the term be lawful in such connection) original, landscape. He sets about realizing it on canvas; and in the end his trees are no trees, his river is lead, and his mountains, in the back-ground, as if they had been cut out of tin. Surely, in these and similar instances, the picture is difform from the conception in the mind, i. e. from the practical intellect and, therefore, false. Accordingly, St. Thomas says, ‘the productions of art, then, are denominated false, simply, and absolutely, in so far as they fall off from the form of art. Hence, an artist is said to produce a false work, when he is deficient in the practice of art¹.’ So again, ‘Wherefore, the work of an artist is said to be true, in so far as it reaches the idea of art; and false, when it is deficient in the idea of art².’ We have, then, the authority of St. Thomas for saying that artificial entities may be ‘*simply and absolutely false*.’

ANSWER. It cannot be denied that there is often a marked discrepancy between a work of art, and the ideal; and this discrepancy

¹ ‘Dicuntur igitur res artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se in quantum deficiunt a forma artis; unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere, quando deficit ab operatione artis.’ 1^o xvii, I, c.

² ‘Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum, in quantum attingit ad rationem artis; falsum vero, in quantum deficit a ratione artis.’ *Periher. L. 1, Lect. iii, v. m.*

is of a different kind in different cases. For the ideal may mean the conception of the artist, or it may denote the admitted principles of art; and the discrepancy, therefore, may apply to the one or the other. If it is between the particular production and the principles of art that the discrepancy is found; here, at all events, there can be no ontological falsity, properly so called. For the principles of art are not the measure of the work; but rather the conception in the mind of the individual artist, which was its exemplar cause, and from which it proceeded. Yet, it may be observed, in passing, such is precisely the discrepancy of which St. Thomas speaks, in the two passages which have been quoted in support of the objection. But the objicient may still press his difficulty. According to the above hypothesis, the artist actually works on an imperfect idea; but intends to work on a really and perfectly artistic ideal, and thinks he is doing so. True, but irrelevant. The production *de facto* proceeds from the imperfect idea, and is conformable to it. His intention has nothing to do with the matter. This may be confirmed by an illustration. Suppose that an artist has in his mind habitually a perfect ideal of the human form, yet on a special occasion conceives, and executes, a gross caricature; the production could not in such case be called false. On the contrary, in the instance supposed, the truth of the representation would be found in its very grotesqueness. Why? Because the pattern idea was grotesque. Exclude now the perfect ideal from the caricaturist's mind; what difference would it make to the truth of the caricature? So, then, an artist may unintentionally work on an imperfect conception, deeming it perfect; yet the production will be ontologically true, because it is conformable to the practical intellect which is its cause. That the artist has mistaken an imperfect for a perfect ideal, is a speculative error; antecedent to the conception on which he works.

In the foregoing cases, the production of art is supposed to be in conformity with the ideal of the artist who executes it. But what if it is not; as in the examples which the objicient has brought forward? Here lies the main difficulty. In such cases, one thing is plain. The defect is not in the conception, but in the execution. Hence the *cause* of the defect is not the ideal of the artist, but something else. But what of that? As a fact, the production is compared with the conception; and is found to be difform or discrepant. Therefore, it is false in relation to the

practical intellect from which it proceeded. True, but the comparison is unjust; and there is really no falsity in relation to the practical intellect. Why so? Because the deficiency of the work did not proceed from the practical intellect, but from defective execution, or some accident. And we have a sign of this in the fact, that the practical intellect of the artist is the first to discover the defect. To make this reply more clear, suppose a not impossible case. An artist of high celebrity is finishing a picture of the best promise; when he chances to upset a bottle of ink over it, and it is ruined. Would any one dream of saying that the picture was false? Well then, suppose now that, from an ignorance of the proper mixture of colours, the trees and verdure of his early spring appear in the brown tints of autumn, to his utter dismay; would it not be equally unjust to lay the fault at the door of the conception, and to say that the effect is not conformable with its exemplar cause? As a fact, the ideal of the artist is not difform from such production, for it never really had that production for its object; and, therefore, the production cannot be called false in relation to that ideal conception, since it is not the effect of such idea, so far as its imperfection is concerned. Wherefore, it may be called incongruous; but not, properly speaking, false. If it should be further asked: According to what model, then, is it to be judged? it will suffice to say that, in so far as it proceeds from, and corresponds with, the conception of the artist, it is comparable with this latter. Its deficiency, *formally* considered, needs no further exemplar or other cause, because it is a simple privation; materially considered, it is due either to accident or to want of practical skill. For this reason, the Greek Philosopher deemed this practical skill (*ἐμπειρία*) to be totally distinct from aesthetical cognition (*γνώσις ποιητική*). As to the passages cited from St. Thomas in support of the objection; besides the animadversion already made in the solution of the difficulty, thus much has to be said. In both places, the observations are, as it were, parenthetical, and illustrative; for the discussion does not turn on the productions of art, but on the Ontological Truth of created Being. On this subject the Angelic Doctor remarks, that the Truth of finite Being is not measured by comparison with the speculative intellect which is accidental to it; but by simple and absolute comparison with the Divine practical Intellect, on which such Being depends, as an effect on its Cause. Then he proceeds to say, that created things depend on the

Divine Intellect, in somewhat the same way as productions of art depend on the human intellect. But productions of art are called, (*dicuntur*,—used carefully in both passages, as though to mark the analogical and improper use of the words), true or false, not in comparison with the intellect of the chance spectator, but with the ideal, or with the practical intellect of the artist who has produced them. So, in like manner, it is with the things of nature. This paraphrase will enable the reader to see, that St. Thomas does not attribute real falsity to a work of art; but uses the words in a transferred and analogical sense. And this is in accordance with his general teaching again and again repeated, that there can be in Being no such thing as falsity, properly so called; because every Being is true. If, then, those productions of art, which have formed the subject of discussion, are only called false in this secondary sense, as implying their discordance with the ideal; the difficulty has vanished.

III. The third objection is intimately connected with the preceding; but presents far less difficulty. It is based on the known existence of natural monsters, such as, for instance, the Siamese twins; or the woman born with a pig's head; or a lamb born with six legs; and many other such malformations recorded in books of Physiology. The argument is as follows. It cannot be imagined, that the Divine Prototypal Idea of such creatures included these monstrosities. Consequently, such Beings would be discrepant from their Exemplar in the Divine Intellect; therefore, ontologically false.

ANSWER. There can be no difficulty here; because it is of all things most certain, that there is nothing either immediately created, or brought into existence with the co-operation of secondary causes, which has not its corresponding Idea in the Divine Intelligence. Yet, as the subject is one that might cause perplexity in the minds of some, it will not be inopportune to consider it more nearly. The Angelic Doctor has stated, in a passage already quoted in the earlier pages of this work, that the Prototypal Ideas in God *principally* represent the essential nature of each finite Being, but do not stop there; for they also perfectly represent the individual determinations of each creature in the minutest particulars. Following this division, it is first of all plain, that the creature *in its essential nature* is conformable to the Divine Idea. It is not

here, that any monstrosity or malformation can be found ; but only in *the individual modifications*. These, however, are accidental to the nature of Essence. Now, these accidental monstrosities or malformations may be regarded in two ways ; either as simply Being, or as aberrations from order and proportion, and *therefore* privations. Thus, the pig's head on the porcine woman may be considered as a real entity simply and absolutely, or as something that offends against order and proportion. The former is evidently represented directly in the Divine Idea, the latter indirectly and implicitly ; for there is no direct and explicit representation of a privation. But, it may be said, the implicit and indirect Pattern of a monstrosity is a derogation from the Divine Wisdom and Perfection. By way of answer we may first of all inquire, how far is this criticism to go ? Few would perhaps be inclined to deny that a pug nose, or juvenile obesity, involves a certain aberration from the order of proportion ; yet, would any one venture to maintain, that to suppose, in the Divine Wisdom, exemplar Ideas of individuals so constituted, would be a derogation from the Divine Perfection. But, it may be further urged, that the last-named peculiarities are not, after all, what we usually call monstrosities. Cannot, however, such difference be traced, in not a few instances, to the rareness and unexpectedness of the one, and the frequent recurrence of the other ? Still it must be owned that, in certain cases, such as that of the porcine woman, there is a manifest and repulsive confusion of the established order. Besides, these abortions are produced through the intervention of secondary causes ; and, therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose, that the operation of these causes may produce in the creature a difformity from the Divine Idea. Nevertheless, such a hypothesis is impossible. For secondary causes cannot act without the Divine Concurrence ; which necessarily presupposes the Divine Idea of the creature that is yet to be, and the Divine Will concurring with the secondary causes in its production. As, therefore, if an artist chooses of his own free will to design a caricature, the resulting sketch cannot be justly denominated false in relation to his conception ; so, in a somewhat similar manner, if God knowingly and willingly concurs in the production of monsters, these creatures cannot be justly called false in relation to the Divine Intellect from which ultimately they proceed. How this can be consistent with the Goodness of God, is another matter beside the present question. There may be reasons for it knowable by man, such as punishment

of sin; and there may be reasons that man cannot at present fathom. Nor is it our business. It suffices that such beings cannot exist, save in conformity with a pre-existing Type in the Divine Intelligence. But can they be false relatively to their second causes? Impossible; for falsity supposes intellect, as its connoted term; and natural entities are in no wise produced by finite intellect, but by corporal activities. But, at least, do they not exhibit a discrepancy from the perfect Ideal of that nature in the creative Intellect of the Uncreated, so that they may be said to be reductively false in relation to the second cause, inasmuch as this latter is directed, by that Ideal, to the production of a perfect effect? To a certain extent this may be admitted. But such deviation is not a discrepancy from the Exemplar Idea of the particular creature; and, therefore, does not make the creature false in relation to the intellect of the second cause, as *proximately* directed by the Divine Exemplar Idea. Moreover, such discrepancy does not arise from any defect of the intellect of the second cause; which is excluded, as has been shown. Wherefore, these abortions could not be called *false*, properly speaking; but rather, in accordance with the ordinary way of speaking about such things, *monsters* or *faults* of nature, (*peccata naturae*),—expressions which denote a dissonance from goodness or perfection, not from Truth.

It now only remains, before concluding this Article, to consider certain questions which arise out of a comparison between Conceptual and Ontological Truth. For it is a natural subject of inquiry, whether Truth is predicated *univocally* of the Intellect and of Being; whether these two kinds of truth ever meet in the same subject; and whether Conceptual, is a *mere determination* of Transcendental, Truth, or distinct from it. The three following Propositions will resolve these points, in the order in which they stand.

PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion.

PROLEGOMENON.

It would ill harmonize with the purpose of the present work, to discuss *ex professo* what may be called the historical origin of the word, *Truth*. Besides, it seems to be admitted on all hands, that it

was primarily used to express the conformity of judicial thought with its object; and that it was thence borrowed to represent the conformity of the senses and of simple Apprehension with their object, the conformity of language with thought, and the conformability of Being with Intelligence. It is of much greater importance to the metaphysician, that he should accurately determine whether this form of Truth, which is predicated of these various subjects, is the same, or different;—in other words, whether it is predicated of them *univocally* or *analogously*; and, if the latter, by what sort of analogy. And here, the origin and universal acceptation of the word will be of some service. Let it suffice, then, to say that, by the general consent of mankind, the proper and peculiar home of Truth is the intellect.

The present Proposition really embraces two Members; the one implicit, the other explicit. For it explicitly states that Truth is predicated of Being, according to analogy of proportion; which necessarily implies that it is not predicated univocally of Thought and Being. Wherefore,

I. It has to be shown, that Truth is not *predicated univocally of Thought and of Being*. An attribute is predicated univocally of its various subjects, when the form, which it expresses, is the same in each subject, and equally or independently appertains to each and all. But the Truth which is predicated of Thought, is not of the same form as the Truth which is predicated of Being. On the contrary, they are entirely distinct. For the latter is a Transcendental and, therefore, an essential attribute or passion of all real Being; the former, as will be seen, is an adventitious perfection of only a certain class of Being. The one is identified with the entity of its subject; the other is not. Therefore, Truth cannot be predicated univocally of the two.

II. The second Member of the Thesis is much more important, by reason of its intimate connection with the doctrine established in the present Article. It asserts, that Truth is *predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion*. This implies, that the judicial concept is the primary analogate; Being, the secondary. Nor will it be necessary to prove the position; since it has been sufficiently established in the *Prolegomenon*. In addition, it has been virtually proved in the preceding argument. For, if the form predicated is simply different, as has been shown, in the several analogates, the analogy of attribution is thereby excluded; since, in this latter, the

form is the same with respect to all the analogates. Therefore, it must be analogy of proportion. But, for the sake of its connection with the main subject, the declaration of this Member shall be extended. The reader may remember that, in the first class of analogy of attribution, the form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate, and is predicated of the secondary analogates by extrinsic denomination. Thus,—to repeat the example given once before,—*health* in *man* is intrinsic; whereas it is predicated of *food*, v. g. an *apple*, by extrinsic denomination from the form of health in man. May not, then, Truth be in the same way predicable of Being according to such analogy of proportion? For Being is true, in that it is capable of causing Truth in the intellectual Judgment; and, furthermore, it is admitted that Truth formally and primarily appertains to the intellect. Here, therefore, are all the elements required for the verification of such analogy. But if this were really so, then Ontological Truth would denote nothing more than an extrinsic denomination; which is an opinion that has been rejected already. For it has been shown, that Ontological Truth essentially includes in its concept the entity of the Being of which it is predicated. It may, however, be further urged that the distinctive character of Ontological Truth,—the *quasi*-Difference which distinguishes it from Being, is this causal conformability; and that this is the reason for the transfer of the name from Thought to Being. True; but there still remains the fact, that Ontological Truth necessarily includes also the entity of Being as subject of this conformity and, therefore, is a real passion or perfection of Being. The instance of analogy of attribution of the first class, adduced more than once in these pages, will serve to illustrate the present contention. For, besides the attribution of healthiness to an apple by reason of its conformity with animal health; the term is likewise applied in another sense to the same apple, according to *analogy of proportion*. It is said to be healthy and sound, because of the normal disposition of its elements, and the absence of partial corruption; which is manifestly an intrinsic perfection. But, as has been urged before, if Ontological Truth denoted nothing else than an extrinsic denomination, it could no longer claim to be a true attribute or perfection of Being.

Therefore, Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion, not of attribution. In what, then, does the proportion between Ontological and Conceptual Truth consist? To answer

this question, was the principal motive for the introduction of the discussion concerning Conceptual Truth.

The proportion consists in this, that both forms include a conformity, either actual or aptitudinal; so that, as Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of Thought with Being, so Ontological Truth consists in the conformity of Being with Thought. Further; neither of them is a real absolute perfection, or a real or even logical or predicamental relation.

Once more; each is differentiated in its own sphere by a simple connotation. Add to this, that there is an intimate conjunction between them; since they stand to one another in the relation of Measured to Measure. These points of similarity and conjunction are sufficient to hinder us from pronouncing, as some have done, that the use of the word in the two cases is equivocal; and seem to justify the opinion, that it is analogous according to analogy of proportion¹.

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

In every true Judgment there is a twofold Truth, Ontological and Conceptual.

After the exposition of the preceding Thesis, the present will require only a brief declaration. A Judgment is an intellectual act and, as such, is a real entity. Therefore, it, like every other Being, must be transcendently true. That it is a real entity, is so obvious as hardly to require proof. For every psychological act is something real; and something real, added to the faculty which elicits it, that did not exist before. But it will be of advantage once more to refer to the nature of this act. As it is an energy of the intellectual faculty, it is essentially representative; as are all the other acts of that faculty. As such, it is conformed to the Divine, and conformable to the finite, intellect; because it has a natural aptitude for generating in whatsoever mind a true estimate of itself. So far, it differs in nothing from the act of simple Apprehension; whose *Conceptual*, is, consequently, identified with its *Ontological*, Truth. The same may be said proportionably of sensible perception, in so far as it is essentially representative. Both of these statements have been already proved in the twenty-seventh Proposition. Such Truth, as can be plainly seen, is inalienable

¹ St. Thomas, 1^o xvi, 2, c.; cf. 1^o Sentt. d. xix, Q. 5, a. 1, 0, v. m.; *De Verit.* Q. 1, a. 4, c.

from a Judgment; because it is in reality the very entity of its Being. But into its Essence does not enter the conformity of the judicial act with the intended object. The Judgment is essentially representative; but it is not essentially a representation conformed to the object represented. And in this it differs from simple Apprehension and sensible perception; since the two latter must in their nature be conformable to their object, because the object to be represented must in their case necessarily be the object *de facto* represented. Now, when the judicial act of the mind is conformable with the object which it is intended to represent,—in other words, when the Judgment is true; then, besides its Ontological, it exhibits likewise Conceptual, Truth, which is formal and peculiar to itself. But this latter is evidently not essential to the act; otherwise it would be impossible that there should be a false Judgment. Here, again, the Angelic Doctor shall be heard in confirmation. ‘Things pertaining to the intellect,’ he remarks, ‘so far as the question of Truth is concerned, may be regarded in two ways; first, in that they are certain definite entities. Thus considered, Truth is predicated of them in like manner as of other entities. As, therefore, an entity is said to be true because, by retaining its nature; it answers to that which has been assigned it in the Mind of God; so, an enunciation is said to be true, because it retains the nature allotted to it in the Mind of God, and cannot be separated from it, for as long as the enunciation itself abides. Secondly,’ (it may be considered) ‘in relation to the objects apprehended. Thus understood, an enunciation is said to be true, when it is in equation with the object¹.’ And again: ‘A Proposition has Truth, not only as other entities are said to have Truth, in that they fulfil the ordination of the Divine Intelligence in their regard; but it is said to have Truth in a certain special way, in that it symbolizes the Truth of the intellect, which consists in a conformity between the intellect and its object².’

¹ ‘Quae ad intellectum pertinent, secundum quod ad rationem veritatis spectant, possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod sunt res quaedam. Et sic eodem modo dicitur de eis veritas, sicut de aliis rebus; ut, si ut res dicitur vera, quia implet hoc quod accepit in mente divina retinendo naturam suam; ita enuntiatio vera dicatur retinendo naturam suam quae est ei dispensata in mente divina; nec potest ab ea removeri, enuntiatione ipsa manente. Alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res intellectas; et sic dicitur enuntiatio vera quando adaequatur rei. *De Verit. Q. I, a. 6, ad 2^m.*

² ‘Propositio non solum habet veritatem, sicut res aliae veritatem habere dicuntur

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

Formal Conceptual Truth is an accident of thought and, as such, a predicamental quality; while Ontological Truth is convertible and really identical with Being,—that is to say, it is a Transcendental.

This Proposition follows, as a Corollary, from the doctrine already established.

ARTICLE IV.

Falsity.

As Truth is said to consist in a conformity between Intellect and Being; so Falsity may be described as a *difformity between Intellect and Being*. Since, then, there is a twofold conformity which has received the name of Truth,—Conformity of Intellect with Being, (which is Conceptual), and conformity of Being with Intellect, (which is Ontological, or Transcendental, Truth); it is natural to inquire, whether there may not be a parallel twofold difformity between the two,—in other words, whether there may not be Ontological and Conceptual Falsity, as there is Ontological and Conceptual Truth. This is the first point. Next, it follows to examine, in what intellectual act Falsity is properly to be found. Then, it becomes us to determine, in what sense Falsity is predicated of other things besides the intellectual act; after this, to examine into the nature of Falsity; and lastly to determine its origin. These questions will be discussed, according to their order, in the following Theses.

PROPOSITION LXXXVII.

There can be Ontological Falsity, properly so-called, neither in respect of the Divine, nor of the finite, (either speculative or practical), Intellect.

It will be of help to the declaration of this Thesis, if a few preliminary observations are here introduced touching the nature of finite Being. They are confined, for an evident reason, to *finite*

in quantum implent id quod de eis est ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam speciali modo, in quantum significat veritatem intellectus, quæ quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei.' 1^o xvi, 8, *ad* 3^m.

Being; because the idea that Falsity, under whatever shape, could attach itself to Infinite Being, is patently absurd. If, therefore, there could be such a thing as Ontological Falsity; it would not be Transcendental, or convertible with Being. Finite Being implies two things, viz. Being and limit—that which the thing *is*, and that which it *is not*. It is Being with defect of ulterior Being. Now, this defect may be either metaphysical or physical. A metaphysical defect is that which arises from the constitution of Being in a definite order of reality, implying a more distant or nearer approach to the Divine Nature, of which each created Being is an imperfect imitation. Thus, a *stone*, as compared with a *plant*, is deficient in reality; because it does not possess the vegetable life of the latter. The same holds good of a *plant* as compared with an *animal*, of an *animal* as compared with a *man*, and of a *man* as compared with an *Angel*. Such defect is necessary and essential to finite Being. But there can be also physical defects; which may be either, strictly speaking, physical, (as it is often called, natural), or moral. A strictly speaking physical defect consists in the absence of a perfection due to the nature of such Being. Examples of this sort of defect would be, a *rotten apple*, a *pig with six legs*, a *man without arms and legs*, or *deaf*, or *dumb*, and the like. A physical moral defect is the absence of a perfection due to the moral nature of the entity; as, a *sinful thought*, for instance, a *sinful word or action*. There might be added another kind, which is moral in its cause, and physical in effect; as is all *punishment for sin*,—most especially, the final and irrevocable. Now, all these kinds of physical defect, (so called because they are absolute defects in the nature itself, and not merely relative limits), must be accidental. For a nature, in order to be defective, must be a nature; and must, consequently, be essentially constituted. If it were wanting to the essentials of its supposed nature; it would not belong to that nature, but to some other. It should be further remarked, that the intellect can formally and directly represent Being only; for Being alone is intelligible. But deficiency of Being is a negation, or not-Being, and can, therefore, become an object of thought indirectly only, i. e. in its connection with Being. In like manner, Falsity is a *negation*; and must, therefore, in any case, be a deficiency, or want (*carentia*), of something.

I. Premising thus much, let us now proceed to the proof. First of all, it must strike every one, that Ontological Falsity, assuming

the phrase in its native sense, is a contradiction in terms. For how can Being be false? By the fact that it is Being, it is intelligible, and able to give a good account of itself to whatsoever intellect. Therefore, as is proved in the eighty-third Thesis, every Being, as such, is true. Nor is it in this sense that the subject requires discussion. Why, then, discuss it? Because, by the universal consent of mankind in every age, certain *things* have been, and are, pronounced false; and he would not deserve the name of a philosopher, who should make no count of so important a criterion of truth, which within its own proper sphere may safely be pronounced infallible. There must be a sense, therefore, in which such expressions as *false gold*, *false diamonds*, a *false friend*, *false hair*, and the like, can be understood as significative of a truth. Since, then, Falsity cannot be in finite Being, *qua* Being; can it be in Being, by reason of its *defect of Being*, in any of the ways mentioned above? St. Thomas remarks,—‘The Truth of created things has itself nothing like Falsity in it; although every creature has something like Falsity in it, forasmuch as it is defective. But Truth is not the consequent of the creature by reason of its defectiveness, but in so far as, by conformation with the Divine Truth, it is free from defect¹.’ It is worthy of remark, that St. Thomas does not affirm the existence of Falsity in finite Being; whenever he refers to the subject, he carefully uses the expression, ‘*something like Falsity*.’ In what way this is to be understood, will be shown presently. The question now is, whether any of these defects are *really* Falsity in Being? The answer, of which proof will now be given is, that,

II. No finite Being can be false by reason of any metaphysical or physical defect, to which it is obnoxious. If an entity could become, strictly speaking, false by reason of either metaphysical or physical defect; then such defect must render finite Being incapable of conformity with, i. e. essentially difform from, any whatsoever intellect that cognizes or is capable of cognizing it. But, on the contrary, finite Being, as such, i. e. as existing with defect, is *actually* conformed to the Divine Mind, by relation to which

¹ ‘Ipsa veritas creata non habet aliquid simile falso, quamvis creatura quaelibet aliquid simile falso habeat. Intantum enim simile aliquid falso creatura habet, in quantum deficiens est. Sed veritas non ex ea parte consequitur creaturam qua deficiens est, sed secundum quod a defectu recedit primæ veritatis conformata.’ *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 4, ad 7^m.*

its Truth is primarily and absolutely constituted; and is either actually conformed, or is at least conformable, to finite intelligence. Therefore, it cannot become false by reason of any such defect. The two members of the *Minor* shall be proved separately.

i. Finite Being, as existing with defect, is actually conformed to the Divine Mind. Take we, first of all, the *metaphysical* defect in finite Being, i. e. Being as existing with defect of ulterior reality, or of higher forms of entity. It is plain that it is conformed to the Divine Practical Intellect; for the Will of God created that Being in such a constituted order,—in that exact degree of the imitability of the Divine Nature; and, by so ordaining, appointed those limits of the particular entity, which are its metaphysical defect. When, for instance, He established the *vegetative* order, He not only had the positive pattern Idea of the entity of each *plant, grass, tree*, and the rest; but that Idea indirectly excluded all notes of *animal* or *rational* life. It not only represented Being but, indirectly, defect of Being; by virtue of those prescribed limits which defined the essence of the creature. *A fortiori* is the same object actually conformed to the Divine Speculative Intellect, which perfectly represents each creature in minutest detail. Very much the same may be said of finite Being, as physically defective. For, though these defects are mainly, if not entirely, due to the operation of secondary causes; yet, since these causes would be impotent by themselves and, consequently, require the co-operation of the First Cause, and since every smallest physical phenomenon and physical change are directed by the Divine Providence, and are subject to the laws imposed on nature by His Supreme Will; He had—and must have had—the Exemplar Idea of that individual entity, and that Idea must have represented those physical defects which are peculiar to such entity. Thus, the Exemplar Idea of *a man born without arms or legs*, represented him as composed of a body in which those members were wanting. Not that God so created him *immediately*; but He foresaw the effect arising from the operation of natural laws and the defective action of secondary causes, (with which He has bound Himself, as an ordinary rule, to co-operate); and foreseeing, conceived the entity according to its individual constitution. Here we come across traces of something that bears a distant resemblance to Falsity; inasmuch as a Being, thus naturally defective, is difform from what it may be permitted to call the generic or typical Idea in the Divine Mind.

But real Falsity there is not ; neither can there be. For, in the given instance, that individual man was not created after the pattern of the so-called generic Idea, but after that individual Prototype to which he is exactly conformed. Far less can finite Being, affected with physical defect, be ever disform from the speculative Divine Intellect. Which perfectly represents to Itself every creature, exactly as it is constituted in its individual notes. Lastly, finite Being, existing with *moral* defect, is actually conformed to the Divine Intelligence. Here there can be no question as to the practical Intellect of God ; for it were horrible sacrilege to suppose that, in any possible sense, He could be the Author of sin, though, as will be seen in Natural Theology, He co-operates towards the production of the *entity* of the act. But His speculative Intellect conceives that Being with his moral deficiency. He knows him not only to be a man, but to be a sinful man, guilty of such and such sins in definite number and gravity. Therefore, in sum, there is no finite Being whatsoever, which is not actually conformed to the Divine Intelligence.

ii. Finite Being, as existing with defect, is either actually conformed or, at least, conformable to the human intellect. And, first of all, as to finite Being, considered as metaphysically deficient :—It is plain enough, that all men who truly conceive this or that finite Being, conceive it with its essential limits. If they did not do so, definition, and consequently all science, would be impossible. For these necessarily presuppose difference of nature,—that one thing is essentially not another thing : and this involves limitation. As a fact, when a man has formed a more or less clear notion of a *stone*, he not only understands that a stone is a material substance composed of such or such chemical elements ; but he also knows that it has not the organization, assimilating power, self-evolution, of either vegetable or animal life. This argument may be confirmed *à priori*. For the conformability of Being with intellect is commensurate with its intelligibility. Now, that intelligibility is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite ; then the Being is infinite, as infinitely intelligible. If it be finite, the conformity must be finite ; otherwise, it would cease to be conformity. But, if the conformed concept of the intellect represents its object as finite, it *ipso facto* represents that object with metaphysical defect. In two ways, then, the conformability of finite Being, (considered as metaphysically deficient), with whatsoever human

intellect, is already virtually proved from the foregoing arguments. For the second applies to conformability, at least equally with actual conformation. From the former the same conclusion is of easy deduction. For, if the object has so represented itself to the human mind that has contemplated it; it is a most unerring sign that it is capable of exciting the same adequate similitude of itself in every other human mind with which it might be confronted. Thus much for finite Being that is metaphysically deficient. Now, as touching entity physically or morally deficient. The two are grouped together, for the same argument applies to both; and in neither case can there be any question of human practical intelligence, that is, when the moral defect is in the object of cognition. Indeed, the same may be said of metaphysical defects. A like argument to that which has already served in the former instance, will apply here. The testimony of facts is a sufficient proof. For men have conceived throughout all time, and still conceive, or form an idea of, v. g. a *rotten apple*, *idiots*, *monsters*; as again of *thieves*, *liars*, *traitors*, *seditions*. But these cognitions (for the *Idea* can become a *Judgment*) are representative—those of Beings with a physical, these of Beings with a moral, defect. Therefore, such an object is not incapable of representation. Moreover, the mind is conscious, and pronounces, that its Judgment is true. Therefore, such object is actually conformed, and *a fortiori* conformable, to the human intellect; always supposing, of course, that it is in a normal condition. So much for the human speculative intellect. The practical intellect of man embraces two kinds of entities,—to wit, his own moral acts, and productions of art. The question, as touching these latter, has been fully discussed under the second difficulty to the eighty-third Proposition. It remains, therefore, to see whether moral action can be really false; that is, difform from the practical intellect of him who elicits the act. And it would seem at first sight as though it could. For most men (i. e. all adults who are in their right mind) are capable of sinning. Now, it is necessary, in order to be capable of sinning, that the man should know the principles of justice and prudence against which he is offending, and should have, at least, an habitual or virtual knowledge of the difformity from those principles of the act which he contemplates doing. Therefore, his sinful act is difform from the directive Judgment of his mind. But then, in answer, it must be observed that, in the case of a sinful action, the will is

not guided by these principles of right, but by an erroneous practical dictate of the reason, which really assumes the place of the prototypal idea. And to this erroneous dictate the action is conformed. Wherefore, the action is malicious; not false. It is true that, as in the productions of art, a work *may be called* false, because it is difform from the ideal of art; so, an inordinate moral act may receive the same appellation, forasmuch as it is difform from the ideal of right and law. But, in both cases, the term is applied, at the most, according to the analogy of proportion. In much the same way, an entity with a natural defect may be called false; because it does not correspond with the perfect type of its special nature. But, in all these cases, the expression is analogical; and does not convey the idea of real Falsity.

Such is the meaning of St. Thomas in the passage quoted above, where he declares that 'the' creature has *something* like Falsity in it; so far as it is defective. But, that he agrees with the doctrine inculcated in this Thesis, will appear from the following unequivocal statement. 'There is truth,' he remarks, 'in all entities, because they are that which they are in the Supreme Truth. . . . Absolutely speaking, every entity is true, and no entity is false; but, in a certain sort of a way, some entities are *called* false, in relation to human thought.' These last words afford a clue to the meaning of those common expressions, which have in great measure given occasion to the present controversy. But of these more presently.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Falsity, properly so called, is limited to the judicial act of the finite intellect.

The proof of this Thesis is implicitly included in the doctrine which forms the subject-matter of the first Article of this Book. For Falsity is the contrary of Truth and affects, therefore, the same subject. If, then, Truth really and properly belongs to the intellect; Falsity will, likewise, be really and properly found in the intellect alone. Again: as Conceptual Truth formally exists only in the judicial act; so, in like manner, Conceptual Falsity exists only in the judicial act. When applied to other concepts, the use of the word is metaphorical; as it is, when predicated of entities. This argument is strengthened by the consideration that, if Conceptual Truth cannot be formally predicated of simple

Apprehension, *à fortiori* Conceptual Falsity cannot be so predicated. The reason is, because the representation of a simple Apprehension must be conformable to the object which is to be represented ; seeing that the object actually represented is necessarily that which is to be represented. Therefore, it is **always** conform with, and never can be difform from, its object. But a renewed examination into the nature of the judicial act, will serve to bring out into clearer evidence the Truth which is enunciated in the present Proposition. In the case of a Judgment, the intellect conceptually connects, by affirmation or negation, a certain form with the entity which is the Subject of its cognition ; uniting the two by affirmation, or separating them by negation. Furthermore, in the act of judging, it also virtually pronounces, that its judicial representation is in correspondence with the object of its thoughts. Now, it may be that the form, which by affirmation is united to the Subject, is really and objectively excluded from it ; or that the form, which by negation is separated from the Subject, is really and objectively united to it. In both of these Judgments, therefore, the conceptual representation would be difform from the object which the intellect intends to represent. Thus, for instance, these Judgments, *All animals are self-existent—No man is free in his actions,*—are false. Besides, the intellect pronounces that its representation is conformed to the object of its thoughts. And herein consists the *formal* Falsity of the Judgment. Lastly, the universal consent of mankind confirms the truth of the Proposition. For, however extravagant a simple idea might be, no one would pronounce it false ; but, if that idea be resolved by reflection into the form of a Judgment, at once it is accused of Falsity. Thus, for instance, if one were to exclaim, *three-legged plants* ; there might be many discourteous epithets, but *false* would not be one of them. If, however, the same person were to affirm that *some plants are three-legged* ; nobody would be surprised at hearing the assertion condemned as false.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Simple Apprehensions are said to be false, either by analogy of attribution of the first class, or because they virtually include or presuppose a Judgment.

This Proposition consists of three Members, each of which shall be declared separately.

I. It is first of all stated, that *simple Apprehension may be analogically denominated false according to analogy of attribution of the first class*; that is, the Falsity will be inherent in the Judgment, but the simple Apprehension is called false by an extrinsic denomination, forasmuch as it is causative of a false cognition. This will be best explained by an illustration. Let us suppose a man looking out, through a dense morning mist, on a more or less distant object. The sensible representation in his internal sense is, accordingly, very imperfect and confused; so that it excites in his mind the simple Apprehension of an *ox*. So far forth, there is no real Falsity in the intellect; because the simple Apprehension truly represents its only defined object, which is an *ox*. But there is a vital connection between the simple Apprehension and the sensible perception, which are both in the same soul; in that the latter has, in fact, given occasion to the former. Hence, the mind is predisposed to attribute the simple Apprehension to the object of sensible perception, and so, to pronounce judiciously that *the object which I see through the mist is an ox*; whereas, in reality, it is a *man*. Here there is real, positive Falsity, or conceptual difformity from the object. As, then, *health* is attributed to medicine, not by reason of any health intrinsic in itself, but because it is provocative of health in the animal body; so, a simple Apprehension is said to be false, not because there is any Falsity intrinsic in the act itself, but because it inclines the mind to form a false Judgment.

II. It is in the second place asserted, that *simple Apprehensions are said to be false, because they virtually include a Judgment*. To take an instance: We will suppose a man ill versed in Zoology, who speaks of an oyster as a *Crustacean*, because it is covered all over with shell; or introduces it among the *Articulata*, because it has a beard, a breathing organ. He neither pronounces Judgment nor expresses a Proposition, as we will assume; but simply treats this bivalve mollusc in thought and speech as a *Crustacean*, or as one of the *Articulata*. But, in so doing, his thought either virtually includes the judgment that *oysters are Crustacean*, that they belong to the great division of the *Articulata*; or it presupposes the Judgment already formed. So, again, if any one should conceive of the *American cudweed*, that it is an immortal plant; the idea would be denounced as false, because it implicitly involves the Judgment, that a plant can be immortal.

III. Lastly, it is asserted that *simple Apprehensions may be called false, forasmuch as they presuppose a Judgment*. To recur to an illustration given in the earliest pages of this work,—we will suppose that a man, owing to some temporary defect in his organ of sight, has been convinced, and formed a settled Judgment, that *the grass in Hampton Court is blue*. Whenever the occasion presents itself, he speaks of *that peculiar blue grass in Hampton Court*. There is nothing false in the simple idea itself; but it is false, by virtue of a previous Judgment. So, if a man has already formed a fixed Judgment in his own mind, that *all animals are immortal*; he conceives a donkey as an *immortal irrational animal*. If the more common opinion among philosophers be true, (about which there is no question in the present inquiry); such a definition is self-contradictory, and will not endure as a term of thought. But the definition, considered as a mere simple Apprehension, would only be false; because it presupposes the Judgment, that *irrational animals are immortal*.

And so much suffices for the declaration of the Proposition.

NOTE I.

Before proceeding to determine, in what sense Falsity may be attributed to sensible perception or to finite Being; it will conduce to a more complete understanding of Conceptual Falsity, if we supplement the doctrine already established by the addition of certain explanatory notes. And, first of all, it should be understood that Conceptual Truth and Falsity are said to be contraries, only in relation to *the same* object; according to the fullest meaning of identity, as it is understood in the laws of logical contradiction. For the same Judgment may be now true, now false, concerning the same object; if the object changes in any such way as to affect the representation of the mind. Thus, the same Judgment, *The Prince of Wales is ill*, is true at one time, false at another. So, again, it may be at once true and false to say that, *Descartes was a great philosopher*. For he was undoubtedly great as a mathematician; but it is open at least to doubt, whether he was great as a metaphysician.

NOTE II.

Conceptual Falsity, like Conceptual Truth, denotes no real absolute or relative form in the judicial act nor any conceptual relation, properly so called; but adds, over and above the entity of the concept, a connotation of the object, as difform from the representation of it in the mind.

NOTE III.

The word, *intellect*, may be used *generically* much in the same sense as *mind*; or it may be used *specifically* for the *intuitive*, as distinguished from the *ratiocinative*, faculty. Furthermore, intellect in this specific sense has *its own proper object* and an *accidental object*. Its own proper object are the essences of things; its accidental objects are sensible perceptions. These may be set aside, as having a more intimate connection with the next Proposition. The specific intellect, then, contemplating the Essences, or Natures, of things, can evolve into an act of simple intuition; or may further proceed to an intuitive Judgment. The Angelic Doctor asserts, that in either case, the intellectual act is necessarily true. These are his words: 'The quiddity of a thing is properly the object of the intellect. Wherefore, as the senses are always true in relation to their own proper sensible objects; so is the intellect, likewise, in its cognition of Essence, as Aristotle says in the third Book *de Anima*. But, nevertheless, accidentally it may chance to be false; that is to say, inasmuch as the intellect conjoins or separates' (by an affirmative or negative Judgment) 'falsely. This takes place in two ways; either by its attributing the definition of one thing to another, as if it should conceive, for instance, *rational animal* to be the definition of an *ass*; or, by joining together members in a definition, which do not admit of such conjunction; as, for instance, if it should conceive *immortal irrational animal* to be the definition of an *ass*. For this is false, *Some irrational animals are immortal*. Hence it is plain that a definition cannot be false, except as involving a false affirmation. . . . In like manner, the intellect is not in any way subject to deception as to first principles. Wherefore, it is evident that, if intellect is taken to mean that action whence it derives its name' (*intus legere*, which is equivalent to intuition) 'Falsity is not in the

intellect¹. From this passage it is gathered that, according to St. Thomas, the intuitive intellect is infallible in its simple intuition of the essences, or natures, of things. But, when that intuition is not simple, (forasmuch as it either presupposes, or virtually includes, a Judgment); there may be room for Falsity. One reason for the former is, that every simple Apprehension is true; and that such Truth is identical with the ontological Truth of the intellectual act. The other reason, and a far more pregnant one, is this; that essence is the true and proper object of the intellect. Whence it comes to pass, that not only that which is to be represented is that which is actually represented, but that what is actually represented is that which is to be represented; for the nature of the faculty in relation to its proper object supplies the determinating intention that is required for the formal conceptual Truth of the judicial act. The reason of the latter is, that, generally speaking, Falsity is always possible; when there is the presence, either express or implicit, of an intellectual Judgment. From the same passage it is further gathered, that not all intuitive Judgments admit of being false; for the intuition of first principles is infallible. St. Thomas gives the reason of this in another place, where he observes that 'the intellect is always right in the intuition of first principles, in relation to which it is not subject to deception, for the same reason that it is not subject to deception as to essence. For self-evident principles are such as are cognized immediately on the understanding of the terms; because the Predicate is included in the definition of the Subject².' The present is not the place to offer proof of the truth of these statements; they are here assumed as *Lemmata* from Ideology. It must not, however, be supposed that the task is at all formidable.

¹ 'Quidditas autem rei est proprie objectum intellectus. Unde, sicut sensus sensibilibus propriis semper est verus, ita et intellectus in cognoscendo quod quid est, ut dicitur in 3^o de Anima. Sed tamen per accidens potest ibi falsitas accidere; in quantum, videlicet, intellectus falso componit et dividit. Quod contingit dupliciter, vel in quantum definitionem unius attribuit alteri, ut si animal rationale mortale conciperet quasi definitionem asini; vel in quantum conjungit partes definitionis ad invicem quae conjungi non possunt; ut si conciperet quasi definitionem asini animal irrationale immortale. Haec enim est falsa, aliquod animal irrationale est immortale. Et sic patet quod definitio non potest esse falsa, nisi in quantum implicat affirmationem falsam. . . . Similiter nec in primis principiis ullo modo decipitur.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 12, c.*

² 'Intellectus semper est rectus secundum quod intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur ex eadem causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur ex eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subjecti.' 1^{ae} xvii, 3, ad 2^m.

PROPOSITION XC.

Sensile perceptions, though they cannot be, properly speaking, false, may be called false analogically.

In the origin of human thought, the senses stand midway between the Intellect and Being; so that the saying is true, *There is nothing in the intellect, that has not first passed through the senses*. Consequently, these latter stand in a twofold relation; viz. in their relation to the intellect, and in their relation to Being. Considered in their relation to the intellect, they present themselves as psychological entities, or as lenses which present the sensible object; in other words, as *representative* or, (to speak more accurately), *presentative*. Considered in their relation to Being, they appear either as pure sensible perceptions or as sensible judgments. It will be well to consider them under each of these four aspects separately. i. A sensible perception is a real Being and has a physical entity of its own and, therefore, as such, is intelligible and a proper object of the intellect. Under this form, a sensible perception shows itself before the intellect as a certain definite modification of the soul; and, as such, it can never, in any sense of the term whatsoever, be false. For, however disordered the perception may be presentatively, there can be no doubt as to the subjective impression. Thus, for instance, a patient in a fever may mistake *milk* for *quinine*; but it is certain that he has felt the sensation of *bitterness*. It is not, of course, a question now about fancies, but about real sensations; and these are,—must be,—without exception, subjectively true. ii. But, in the second place, these sensile perceptions come before the mind as presentative of their sensible object; so that, by reason of their presence, the intellect is determined to the cognition of that entity so presented. Here there is room for a species of Falsity. For the sensile perception, owing to a variety of causes, may be so indistinct as to occasion the formation of a false Judgment. Thus, for instance, in an example already adduced, owing to the mist, the impression on the sense of sight was so confused as to induce the intellect to conclude that what was really a *man* was an *ox*. So, again, the patient was led, by the deceptive sensation in his fevered tongue, to form the erroneous Judgment that the proffered cup of *milk* was *quinine*. In this way, a sensile perception may

justly be called false according to analogy of attribution of the first class; forasmuch as, though not false itself, it becomes the occasion or cause of a false Judgment in the mind. iii. A sensile perception may be considered in relation to Being; in that it is, after its own fashion, itself presentative. In this respect it follows the analogy of intellectual presentation; and, as a simple Apprehension of the intellect, is always true and never can be false, for reasons already stated; so, a pure perception of the senses can never be called, even analogically, false *in itself*; though it may be called analogically false, as inducing the *cogitative force* (*vis cogitativa*) to form a false sensile Judgment. Such Falsity, again, would be predicated analogically of the simple sensile perception, according to the analogy of attribution of the first class. iv. Sensile perception, as representative of its object, may assume the shape of a *quasi-judgment*. This, in animals, would be purely instinctive, and proceeds from its *estimative force*; but in man it is more or less combined with intellectual activity. Accordingly, a name is given to this faculty in man, which is proper to him. So far as the intellectual element is concerned, the Truth or Falsity would be predicated univocally. But the question at present is, touching that faculty of *purely* sensile judgment in all animals, which is eminently possessed by man. In such judgments can there be Falsity? If so, in what sense? Here it is necessary to introduce the division, already given in an earlier part, of the objects of sense. There is, then, first of all, the proper object of each separate sense. Then there is the proper object common to more than one sense, such as *form, magnitude, distance*, and the like. Lastly, there is the accidental object, which is the subject of the sensible accidents. Thus the sight perceives *colour*, as its special object; *form*, as an object common to it with the sense of touch; *the man*, whose colour and magnitude it perceives, becomes its object *accidentally*, and only so far forth as he is the one subject of the sensile accidents. Following this division, it appears (a) that a sensile Judgment concerning the proper separate object of any given sense is, under normal conditions, invariably true; because it is the natural act of that sense, and nature never fails in things necessary. The words, *under normal conditions*, have been advisedly added; because any lesion or defect of the organ on the one hand, or a failure in the due presentation of the object—including external impediments of whatever kind—on the other,

might induce a wrong Judgment concerning even the proper separate object. Thus, for instance, the eye might judge the *blues* in a painting to be *greens*; if the picture were examined by gaslight. Here the subjective sensation would be true, because the yellow light of the gas on the blue produces really and truly the sensible impression of green; but the Judgment would be wrong, that should attribute this colour to the painting. (b) A sensible Judgment concerning the proper object common to more senses than one, is liable to error. Thus, distance is common to eye, ear, and in some degree, touch. Now, it is not an uncommon thing, on first waking, when the faculties are not as yet in full activity, to see some piece of furniture in the room close up by the bedside: whereas it is really at an appreciable distance. So again, in the twilight, a gate has seemed to be close in front of one; whereas it was really yards off. In some of these instances it may be, that the imagination plays its role; still, making all reasonable deductions on this score, it seems to be little short of certain, that the eye grows to the accurate measure of distance, by habituation, and study of relations between objects. That the ear likewise may be deceived as to the distance of sounds, is sufficiently proved by the tricks of the ventriloquist. It is for this reason, doubtless, that such accidents are appointed to be the object of more than one sense; in order that the perceptions of various senses may, so to speak, correct each other. Hence, too, the necessity of *the common sense* and of *the estimative faculty* in animals. (c) A sensible Judgment is most especially liable to error touching the accidental objects of sense; because *directly* they are beyond its reach, and are only revealed to it as the common subject of those sensible accidents which are its proper object¹.

Thus, then, in these two last species of sensible Judgments, there may be Falsity; but of what kind? Certainly, it cannot be predicated of them univocally; for Falsity is proper to the intellect. It is, therefore, predicated of them according to *analogy of proportion*.

¹ Vide D. Thom., *De Verit.* Q. 1, a. 11, c.; 1^o xvii, 2, c., et ad 1^m.

PROPOSITION XCI.

Finite entities are said to be false, according to analogy of attribution of the first class.

It has been made sufficiently clear, in the eighty-seventh Proposition, that there can be no such thing as real ontological Falsity, —or, in other words, Falsity in Being. Yet there remains the fact, (which has not, as yet, been sufficiently cleared up), that men do commonly call things false; and it is impossible that such a mode of expression should have been of universal occurrence, unless there were some real foundation for it. It is the object of the present Thesis to determine that foundation.

Now, it cannot be doubted, for reasons already given in the above-named Proposition, that no finite entity can be called false, owing to any difformity from the Divine, (whether practical or speculative), Intelligence. It has been also proved, that no entity has in itself an *aptitudinal* difformity from the human intellect; that is to say, there is no real entity whatsoever which has not a natural aptitude for exciting in our minds a cognition conformable with itself. The only remaining question, therefore, is, whether there are any entities *actually* difform from a general human cognition of them; and whether that difformity is in some sort traceable to themselves. In answer, it must be admitted that there *are* entities thus actually difform from the common judgment of men; and that the difformity is in some measure attributable to the entities themselves. This is the real foundation for the expressions to which allusion has been made. But how can this be? We will begin by giving the reason for it, in the words of the Angelic Doctor. ‘In relation to the human intellect,’ he observes, ‘there is sometimes found to be an inequality between the entity and the intellect, which is in some measure caused by the entity itself. For an entity causes a knowledge of itself in the mind by means of its external phenomena; since human cognition originates from the senses. Hence Aristotle says, in his first book *De Anima*, that accidents mainly contribute to our cognition of essence. Wherefore, when there appear in an entity sensible qualities that indicate a nature to which they do not really belong; that entity is said to be false. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, in his sixth book of the *Metaphysics*, that those entities are called false, which

have a natural aptitude to appear either of a kind other than they are or of a nature different from their own; as, for instance, false' (or sham) 'gold, in which there appear externally the colour and other congruous accidents of gold, while internally the nature of gold is not there¹.' In a parallel passage he puts it yet more clearly. 'Because,' he says, 'it is in our nature to judge of entities by their external phenomena, (since our cognition takes its beginning from the senses, which primarily and absolutely have for object external accidents); hence it arises that those entities which, in their sensible accidents, have a similarity to other entities, are called false in respect of these other entities. . . . Accordingly, the Pseudo-Augustine says, in the Second Book of his *Soliloquies*, that 'we call things false, which we apprehend as verisimilitudes².' In these passages we have an exhaustive explanation of the reason, why some entities have a natural tendency to tempt the human mind into a false Judgment. In the actual order, and for such time as the soul is the substantial form of an actuated body, (in other words, for so long as the two are actually united), all cognition of nature or essence begins with, and to a great extent depends on, sensible perception. But sensible perception directly and formally represents only the sensible accidents. Hence, if it should so happen, (as it often does), that there is a close similarity, amounting at times to a virtual identity, between the accidents of two different substances; the intellect is naturally prone to mistake one substance for the other and, accordingly, to form a false Judgment. Instances of this kind are very common. Thus, for example, there are kinds

¹ 'Per comparationem ad intellectum humanum invenitur interdum inaequalitas rei ad intellectum quae quodanimodo ex ipsa re causatur. Res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent; quia cognitio nostra initium a sensu sumit, cujus per se objectum sunt sensibiles qualitates. Unde et in I^o de Anima dicitur, quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est. Et ideo, quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res esse falsa. Unde Philosophus dicit 6^o Metaph. (5, com. 34, et lib 4, com. 37) quod illa dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt; ut aurum falsum, in quo exterius apparet color auri et alia hujusmodi accidentia, cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit.' *De Verit. Q. I, a. 10, c.*

² 'Quia innatum est nobis, per ea quae exterius apparent, de rebus judicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res . . . et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus (in lib. 2 Soliloq. cap. 6 in fin) quod eas res esse falsas nominamus, quae verisimilia apprehendimus.' 1^o xvii, 1, c. in fl.

of *topaz*, which are sensibly undistinguishable from *quartz*. The only discoverable difference is in the striation; which would not be likely to discover itself, save to the practised eye of a mineralogist. So, again, take an ordinary *cotton-thread*; and compare it with *pyroxyline* or gun-cotton. As they present themselves to the senses of sight and touch, they seem identical; and yet, there has been, in the case of *pyroxyline*, a chemical transformation which has probably made the cotton into a new substance. Take, once more, the instance of the *mormolyce*, or leaf-insect. Its outward accidents are so exactly like those of a leaf, that, unless it sensibly moves, it would all but inevitably be mistaken for a leaf. It is on this principle, that false eggs, (or what are called nest-eggs), are placed in the roosting-places of hens and ducks, in order to encourage them to lay; and that scarecrows are placed over fields newly sown.

It must not, however, be supposed, by reason of this actual difformity from a more or less general cognition of men's minds, that there is anything like real Falsity in the entities themselves. For, first of all, the primary and essential relation of Being is to the Divine Intellect, by which its truth is determined; and there neither is, nor can be, any difformity of finite Being from the Divine Intellect. Then, again, the actual difformity of certain finite Beings from the idea of many men, is not invincible; for it can be reformed by a closer and more scientific examination of the object. Oftentimes it is removed, by a simple comparison of the apparent with the true; otherwise, the former could never get the name of false. Lastly, it is not the essence of the thing that causes a false Judgment in the mind, but it is external phenomena only; and these are not of a nature to compel a false Judgment. So that the error arises in great measure from the defects of the human intellect; one, (which is natural to it), that it gains its knowledge of material entities from their external or sensible accidents; the other, (which is voluntary), that it is often over-hasty in jumping to conclusions. Hence, St. Thomas wisely remarks that 'An entity is not in such wise the cause of Falsity in the mind, as to cause Falsity necessarily. For Truth and Falsity primarily exist in the Judgment of the mind. But the mind, so far as its *Judgment* about entities goes, is not passively acted on by entities; but rather acts of itself after a certain manner. Hence, an entity is not said to be false, because it always causes a false

apprehension of itself; but because it has a natural aptitude to do so, by virtue of its sensible phenomena¹.

From all that has been said, then, it is manifest, that Falsity is only analogously predicated of finite Being, and that the analogy is that of attribution of the first class. For the form (if so it may be called) of Falsity is only intrinsic in the human mind, which is the principal analogate; while it is attributed to the entity by extrinsic denomination, for the reason that it is to a certain extent the cause of Falsity in the principal analogate.

PROPOSITION XCII.

There is an essential difference between the nature of Conceptual Truth and that of Conceptual Falsity, viz. that, in the former, the conformity of the cognition with its object is itself cognized by the intellect; whereas, in the latter, the difformity of the judicial representation from the object, is in nowise apprehended.

It has been already proved, that, in a Judgment of the mind which is formally true, there is always a virtual recognition of the conformity of the cognition with the object. It remains to explain why it is, (for the fact itself is beyond all doubt), that, in a false Judgment, the mind is ignorant of the difformity existing between its concept and the object conceived. A little consideration, however, will serve to make the matter clear. Formal Conceptual Truth differs from material, (which is shared by simple Apprehension), in this one point precisely; that, in the former, the intellect pronounces on the Truth of its own Concept, whereas in the latter it does not. Therefore, the form of Conceptual Truth, (that by which it is, as it were, essentially constituted), is to be found in the second implicit Judgment, which pronounces on the conformity of the intellectual Judgment with the object intentionally represented. But, where the form of Truth is to be found; *there* must we look for the *quasi*-form of its contrary, Falsity. Hence, Falsity would formally consist in the Judgment of the

¹ 'Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima, quod necessario falsitatem causet; quia veritas et falsitas præcipue in iudicio animæ existunt. Anima vero, inquantum de rebus iudicat, non patitur a rebus, sed magis quodammodo agit. Unde res non dicitur falsa, quia semper de se falsam facit apprehensionem, sed quia nata est facere per ea quæ de ipsa apparent.' *De Verit. Q. 1, a. 10, c. v. fi.*

mind, that its concept is conformed with the object; whereas it is really difform from that object. Therefore, the mind cannot know the difformity. Otherwise, it would pronounce within itself as much; and the Judgment would, in consequence, be formally true.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

Falsity, in the judicial act itself, is justly attributed to the will.

PROLEGOMENON.

The present Proposition does not attempt to determine the root, (or roots), from which springs the numerous errors in its Judgments to which the human intellect is liable. These are manifold; and differ, according to the process adopted in the investigation or acquisition of Truth. Thus, for instance, when knowledge is learnt from a teacher, there is no more common root of Falsity than a blind adherence to the mere authority of him who teaches. Though such submission is obviously necessary at the beginning; yet, with a sincere seeker after truth, whose intellect is sufficiently matured to justify him in thinking for himself, that submission is always temporary and conditional. He accepts as true what he receives; till he is conscious that he is in a condition to judge for himself. Then, and not till then, will he think of maintaining a settled and definite opinion. But the majority of men is not of this intellectual shape. Hence, so many students cherish errors, their life through, with almost a factious spirit. The evidence they possess is of the weakest, for it is mainly extrinsic; and there arises an unwise disparity between the amount of evidence on the one hand, and the tenacity of opinion on the other. This is a most fatal obstacle to all philosophic progress. In subjects which are competent to the natural reason, (and to such subjects alone can reference be appropriately made in a work like the present), and which have not been in any way decided by some acknowledged infallible authority; no motto is more deserving of perpetual memory and of serving as a practical rule for the student of Philosophy, than this: *Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*. There are many other sources of error and Falsity; but they will be considered under a somewhat different form in the following Thesis.

THE PROOF of the Proposition is as follows. Though the intellect

is a faculty which in itself is not free, so that in presence of its proper object, formal and material, it is compelled by its own nature to assent; yet, in the absence of its formal object, it is in nowise necessitated to its act. By the formal object is to be understood objective evidence or, in other words, the clear intelligibility of the object, which, as the Ideologist will tell us, is the general motive of all true and certain cognition. If, therefore, there be no objective evidence; there can be no real motive for judging either way. If the evidence be not clear; there can be no sufficient motive for a categorical, or unconditioned, Judgment. But, in a false Judgment, there can be no real objective evidence; as is plain. Consequently, the intellect is not forced to a decision; and, as its acts are either spontaneous and necessary or under order of the will, it follows that a false Judgment, (i.e. the *act itself* of judging), since it cannot be spontaneous, must be elicited at the dictation of the will. There is, however, an objection of sufficient gravity, which may be made to this argument. It may be said that, although there be an absence of *real* objective evidence, still there must be, at least, some sort of *apparent* evidence; otherwise, the judicial act would be inexplicable, and could scarcely be called human. But this apparent evidence may be sufficient to compel the assent of the mind, without any intervention of the will. What is to be said to this difficulty? Well, though the *Antecedent* will be willingly granted; yet the *Consequent* must be denied. It is most true that, in a false Judgment, the intellect is allured to an assent of *apparent* evidence under some form or another. But what does *apparent* evidence mean? Obviously, it cannot be *objective* evidence, or the clear intelligibility of the object; for that is real, and, when duly present to the intellect, forces its assent. It must, therefore, be *subjective* evidence; that is, evidence which exists only in the mind of the thinker. But how did it get there? The object itself did not cause it? The intellect cannot create evidence for itself at pleasure. Whence came it? Motives of course there will be, with more or less show of probability in them; and these will come to hand from various sources, with which we are not concerned for the present. But whence that inclination of the mind to make, as it were, this so-called evidence *subjective*, and to elicit the judicial act on the strength of it? The intellect cannot, in such cases, be compelled to its assent naturally; it must, therefore, have received its inclination from without. But there

is no other faculty which has this directive power over the intellect, save the will. Hence, while admitting that there must be *apparent* evidence which allures the intellect to a false cognition; we deny that such evidence can be a sufficient motive to compel intellectual assent, without the intervention of the will.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

The difficulty which men experience in the attainment of Truth, is attributable, partly to the nature of the objects of possible cognition, partly to the imperfection of the human mind.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is thus declared. There are a great number of entities, (in fact the greater number of those which are the primary objects of human cognition), which have little intelligibility in themselves, because of their wholly material nature. They are only intelligible by their substantial forms; and by how much these are more nearly wedded to matter, by so much does their intelligibility diminish. Thus, all sensible things other than man, (and from sensible things the human mind derives its knowledge), are inferior in their intelligibility to man himself. From these beginnings, it is true, the intellect of man, by laboured processes of abstraction and generalization, arrives at higher and purer intelligibilities; but the journey is difficult, the obstacles many, the result imperfect. The more there is of generalization, the less there is of distinctness; and the nearer the approach to the unity of true science, the further the distance from the individuality of objective existence. The perfect synthesis of the two belongs to God alone. But here unconsciously an invasion has been made into the second Member of the Thesis. There is another reason, (traceable to the objects of cognition), why men experience such difficulty in the attainment of Truth. Truth is one; Error and Falsity are manifold. The former gathers into one each ray of created light, and reflects the whole bundle of rays in unbroken unity. But this is no easy task. Let slip one ray, immediately there is error; and, as the rays of intelligible Being are numberless, the possibilities of error and falsehood are likewise numberless. We may, therefore, fairly borrow Aristotle's quotation from the Greek poet and apply it to the present subject,

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παρτοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί¹,—men arrive at truth by one only road; but at Falsity and error in countless ways.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Thesis is thus declared. As there are entities below man; so there are a far greater number of Beings above man, mounting, by higher and higher degrees of excellence and intelligibility, towards the one Supreme and Infinite. The difficulty, which the mind of man finds in attaining to the Truth touching these objects of cognition, does not arise from any defect of objective evidence, but from its excess; or, in other words, from the disproportion existing between the perfection of the object of thought, and the imperfection or weakness of the human intellect which can only be awakened into activity by the intervention of sensile species. Hence, the well-known statement of the Philosopher that, 'as is the eye of an owl before the light of the sun, so is our mind in presence of the most manifest and evident things of nature²;' in accordance with which, he so often makes the distinction between those things which are most evident to us, and those which are absolutely and in their own nature most evident, placing the two in antithesis to each other.

These two sources of the difficulty which men experience in the attainment of Truth, Suarez illustrates by an apposite comparison. 'The human eye,' he says, 'cannot look at the sun by reason of its own imperfection, and it cannot perceive an exceedingly small amount of light, or a very minute object' (such as e. g. *infusoria*) 'by reason of the imperfection of the object, which has no power to act on the faculty of sight³.' In both cases, as it is easy to see, the difficulty in the attainment of Truth is in part owing to the imperfection of the human intellect. But the difference between the one and the other, is this; that, whereas, in the cognition of the objects included under the second Member of the Thesis, the difficulty is wholly attributable to this cause; in the cognition of the objects included under the first Member, it is partially due to the natural imperfection of the entities themselves.

¹ *Ethic. N. L.* ii, c. 5, *in f.*

² "Ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *Metaph.* ii. (*aliter I minor*), c. 1.

³ *Metaph.*, *Disp.* ix, *sect.* 3, n. 4.

NOTE.

The sources of human error will, naturally enough, prove impediments to the acquisition of Truth ; so that the last two Propositions are intimately connected. The practical importance of the subject seems to demand, that something more detailed and definite should be added, touching the variety and respective characteristics of those sources ; and, to this end, no better classification can be found than that of Bacon in his *Novum Organon*¹, though the nomenclature is perhaps none of the happiest. He divides false notions, (or, as he terms them, *idola*), prevalent among men, into four classes, viz. *idola tribus*, *idola specus*, *idola fori*, *idola theatri*. By the *idola tribus* he understands all those errors which arise from the constitution of human nature, and to which, consequently, the whole *tribe* of man is liable. *Idola specus* are the errors which are peculiar to each man's *cave* ; and arise from the peculiar character and disposition of each individual. *Idola fori* are such as spring out of *commerce* with men ; and are principally brought home to a man by the tyranny of public opinion. *Idola theatri* represent the errors which men imbibe from those countless perverse systems of philosophy ; whose professors Bacon, it may be, intended to set before us, as so many *actors* on the world's stage. Now, it is not intended here to point out all the forms of error to which men are subject under each of these heads ; but it may be well to signalize some which more prominently beset our path in our own time. For the rest, the pages of Bacon may be consulted with profit. The *idola tribus* have formed the subject of the last Thesis ; they may, therefore, be dismissed. Among the *idola specus*, or errors arising from a man's peculiar character and turn of mind, there are two which merit consideration. The first is *viewiness*, as it is not uncommonly called. It consists in the hasty assumption of certain half truths or entire falsities, by reason of a certain glimmer of supposed originality, or boldness, or paradox, which marks them. They are tinsel at the best, often worse ; yet their glitter is attractive. These *views* are not revelations of Truth, pure and undefiled ; and, accordingly, they are constantly found to clash with each other, though indifferently accepted by one and the same intellect. Practically, therefore, they are like children's toy-watches ; they have no motive force in them. Men of a quick,

¹ *Novum Organon*, L. i. *Aphorismi* xxxviii-lxviii.

superficial, unlaborious brain, with a lively imagination, or rather fancy, are peculiarly inclined to take up with *views*. They have not the patience to go round a truth,—to contemplate it from this side and from that,—to measure their concept of it by comparison with other neighbouring concepts, and by careful estimate of the difficulties which seem to environ it. They do not master their idea; the idea masters them. Consequently, though often entertaining companions; they are eminently unsafe guides. For, themselves, they possess few truths, but many opinions, chiefly of the fanciful sort. Such a propensity of mind is prolific of errors, practical as well as speculative, and a fatal impediment to the acquisition of a sound Philosophy. The other is an unhealthy intellectual greed for mere information, as distinguished from scientific cognition. The ambition of some men is to become encyclopedists—to acquire an acquaintance with a mass of facts connected with every sphere of Truth, at the expense for the most part of collocation, subordination, and relation. But facts do not constitute knowledge of themselves; true Science principally embraces the laws and causes of things. Now, it is peculiar to the weakness of the human intellect, that it cannot retain in equal ratio the Universal and the Individual; in proportion as it nears the one, it recedes from the other. That mind will not be over elastic, which is buried under a heap of isolated facts. Moreover, those Disciplines (*πραγματείαι*, as the Philosopher calls them) which principally concern themselves with experimental facts, have made such progress and have received such additions to their number, that another Admirable Crichton would nowadays be a practical impossibility; and, if he *could* be, would be a nonentity for his pains. Facts are valuable indeed as the *materia prima*—the substratum of Science; but they are hardly intelligible without their form. Now, men who are possessed with such diseased hunger, can never reach Truth. They may be practically useful, in some few instances even ornamental; but they can never be philosophers. They scratch at the surface of Being, very much as geologists scratch on the earth's rind, but without the success of the latter; for they never arrive at the *flora* and *fauna* of their world; resting satisfied with the most recent alluvial deposits. It is now, more than ever, advisable to be *a man of one book*; not in the sense of excluding all other reading, (which would be intellectual bigotry), but in this sense, that all other reading should be subsidiary to,

and illustrative of, the central authority. Thus knowledge may be true and deep, without being narrow; and you may multiply your planets at discretion, because they will be all under the safe guidance of one centripetal force.

Next in order come the *idola fori*, or errors which spring from public opinion and the characteristics of modern thought. There are seven sources of error, conspicuous in our eyes, which deserve mention under this head. The *first* is a prevailing *passivity of thought*, which has been in great measure brought about by the spread of newspapers, periodicals, and cheap literature. People have been thereby trained to consider ideas and knowledge as marketable goods, which they can purchase for their own use, and even trade upon, in the intercourse of life. So they take to their chosen newspaper, or monthly, or book, and quietly receive, without questioning, the views and impressions which they can thence obtain, making the same do duty as their own. The result is that, though knowledge of a certain sort may have become more general among the masses, it grows daily more superficial; and that *they* are comparatively few, who have so realized their opinions as to be able to defend them, if assailed. Hence, by far the greater number are at the mercy of every shallow sophist who has a ready pen or a glib tongue, and follows in the wake of predominant prejudices. The *second* source is the omnipresence of *the critical temper*. This is fertile in error; for it is caused by, and in turn causes, a self-sufficiency which is the most fatal obstacle to philosophical acquirement. From it proceeds that unwise contempt of all the rich treasures of the past, that mad profession of building up a philosophy, each man for himself, which has condemned to sterility the efforts of the human mind in the higher regions of thought for at least two hundred years. Not but that *in the end* it is wise and necessary, so far to make Philosophy our own, as to grasp and realize and test, by painful study, those truths which we embrace in their harmony of order. But this is a very different thing from rejecting, at the very commencement, all that has been thought or written before our time, and making our own half-formed opinions the measure of the world. A *third* source of error is the prevailing *unreality* of thought. It is not uncommon to come across writers and instructors of the people, who openly profess, that the one only end of philosophical inquiry is the exercise of intellectual activity in and for itself; and that the results are

of comparatively little importance. In their judgment, all the value is in *the search*; not in *the discovery*. Thus Philosophy is transformed into a simple mental gymnasium; and the only advantage that one system has over another is, its superior aptitude for strengthening the intellectual make. In all other respects it is a matter of indifference which system is adopted. What is this but to deny either the existence or, at least, the attainableness of Truth; and to turn that noblest pursuit of man, which makes him most like God, into another kind of calisthenics? Nothing can be more ruinous. A *fourth* source of error, nearly akin to the preceding is, a *practical incredulity touching the responsibility of thought*. It stands to reason, that evil may attach to thought, more especially to spoken or written thought, quite as much as to action; to say the least. While, then, it may be readily granted, that a man will not be culpable, who has done his best to test his own opinions, and has long made them his own, on solid conviction, before communicating them to others, even should they prove false; yet he who hastily adopts dangerous and evil opinions out of caprice, and endeavours to propagate them among his fellows, is at least as guilty of a crime, as the man who should strive to spread small-pox in his neighbourhood, or should betray his country into the hands of its enemies. But nowadays there does not seem to be the slightest sense of this responsibility. Each man speaks and writes as it seems good in his own eyes; and, like Cain, denies, (in act at least), that he is his brother's keeper. Men treat as an axiom which none but a fool or a bigot would think of questioning, that the propagation of opinions, (no matter how false, immoral, pernicious to society), ought never to be considered as a statutable offence. Yet, the evil is more wide-spread and persistent than in the case of criminal actions; and it is hard to understand why the murder of the soul should be a less offence than the murder of the body. If a man were practically conscious to himself of his fearful responsibility, at the time that he was about to excite the passions of the mob by a seditious harangue, or that he was beginning a calumnious article against some great public character or a particular body of his fellow-men; how many speeches would be burked and how many articles suppressed, greatly to the relief of the national conscience! A *fifth* prolific source of error in our own time is, *literary venality*. Publicists, and authors generally, too often look upon writing as a trade. Editors of newspapers

never dream of *directing*, but only of *reflecting*, public opinion. Accordingly, one hears of men, whose trade it is to feel the pulse of the community in clubs and elsewhere, and to report to those who dictate the tone to be adopted on any given question. Hence, politics, ethics, religion, are treated as mere elements of a commercial speculation or of a party triumph. Correspondents are commissioned to *write down* on one side and *write up* on the other, before arrival at the scene of their labours, without personal knowledge of the state of things which it will be their task to depict. Inconvenient letters, revealing the truth, are suppressed; and an unpopular cause is shut out from all hope of self-vindication. All this forms part of what our modern euphemists characterize as the liberty of the press. Thus it comes to pass, that the people are fed upon lies, and transmit what they have received; till at length there arises a strong tradition of falsities. A *sixth* source of error is *an aversion*, hitherto developed among the English people, *for the abstract and difficult*,—for all, in effect, that requires great pains of thought. So imbued is the popular mind with this aversion, that metaphysical investigation has come to be identified with useless hair-splitting, and the contemplation of abstract Truth is considered as the antithesis of common sense. The eccentricities of modern *soi-disant* metaphysicians are partly in cause, partly the designing assaults of polemical writers who dread the probable issues of a sound philosophy; but it is likewise due, in some measure, to the materialism engendered by our devotion to trade and commerce. It cannot be too fully realized that Truth lies hidden in a deep mine; and that they who dig most laboriously and most perseveringly, will possess themselves of its richest treasures. The *last* cause of error is *the neglect of moral preparation*,—a neglect which is alike speculative and practical. It is impossible for a man who is the slave of his passions to be a true philosopher. ‘He that wants true virtue,’ says Smith, ‘in Heaven’s logic is blind, and cannot see afar off.’ And Schlegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, expresses the same truth, when he declares that ‘the will and not the understanding, is in man the principal organ for the perception of Divine truths.’ And again, ‘I affirm that in men the understanding is not the principal organ for the perception of Divine truth; that is to say, the understanding *alone*. On the understanding alone, indeed, the light may dawn and may even be received; but if the will be not there, if the will pursue

a separate and contrary course, that light of higher knowledge is soon obscured; or, if it should still gleam, it is changed into the treacherous meteor of illusion.' Hence it is that, in his system of Ethics, the Philosopher puts the contemplative life at the end of his Ethics as man's crown and beatitude. It is not until after we have conquered our lower nature to the obedience of right reason and become continent in the largest sense of the term, that we can become fitting theorists of Truth. When the eye of the understanding is clouded over with the film of irregular desires; then false philosophies are most hopeful of triumph.

The last class are the *idola theatri*, the false systems of philosophy in our time. These are sufficiently patent to the student; and it will, therefore, be only necessary to say that, various and often opposed to one another as they are, they may all be grouped under one of two classes, the idealistic or the materialistic. The former has greater attractions for those of a speculative turn of mind; the latter, for the practical and superficial. The one exaggerates the abstract to the exclusion of the concrete; the other exaggerates the concrete to the exclusion of the abstract. Both are dangerous forms of error; and the best preservative against them is the scientific exposition of Truth.

SUMMARY OF THIS ARTICLE.

I. Truth is primarily predicated of *intellect*; analogically, of sensile perception and Being. The same may be said of Falsity, which is the contrary of Truth.

II. Conceptual Truth, or the Truth of intellect, is twofold, Material and Formal. Material Truth is in the *simple Apprehension*; and consists in the conformity of the intellectual representation with the object represented. Formal Conceptual Truth, (which is what is ordinarily meant by Truth), is peculiar to the *Judgment*, or judicial act, of the mind; and consists in the *conscious* conformity of the cognition with the object to be represented. Conceptual Falsity consists in a difformity of the cognition from the object to be represented, which the intellect pronounces to be conform; hence it can be found only in the *Judgment*.

III. Material Conceptual Truth, or the Truth of a simple Apprehension, is called Truth *analogically*; and it is identified with the Ontological Truth of the intellectual act. Its analogy can thus

be twofold, viz., analogy of *proportion*, if considered *absolutely*; of *attribution of the first class*, if considered in its relation to Judgment. Falsity cannot properly exist in simple Apprehension; but may, like Truth, be predicated of it according to analogy of proportion.

IV. Formal Conceptual Truth is neither a real absolute nor a real or logical predicamental Relation, nor a mere negation, nor a mere extrinsic denomination; but, besides the entity of the judicial act, connotes the object as conform to the cognition of it.

V. Truth cannot be predicated univocally of *sensile* perception; but it is attributed to it either according to analogy of *proportion*, if considered as representative of the sensile object; or according to analogy of attribution of the first class, if considered as determinative of intellectual cognition, and is identical with the Ontological Truth of the sensile act. Falsity can be attributed to sensile perception in the same way. Regarded according to analogy of proportion, it follows Conceptual Truth in this; that both formally belong to sensile Judgment only.

VI. Ontological Truth, or Truth of Being, is a Transcendental attribute, and consists in the conformity or conformability of Being with Intellect. It is predicated analogically of Being according to analogy of proportion. This conformity has relation primarily to the Divine practical and speculative Intellect; secondarily and, as it were, accidentally, to the finite intellect.

VII. Ontological Truth is neither a real absolute nor a real or logical predicamental relation, nor a mere negation, nor a mere extrinsic denomination; but expresses the entity of Being and, besides, connotes intellect, to which it is conformed or conformable.

VIII. It formally consists in the intelligibility of Being, as capable of causing a conformable cognition of itself in whatsoever intellect.

IX. The root of Ontological Truth in finite Being is, the Divine practical Intellect, to which finite Being is necessarily conformed.

X. Hence, finite Being stands midway between two intellects, the Divine and human. It is measured by the Former, and, in turn, measures the latter.

XI. Hence it follows, that the Divine Truth is the Measure in ultimate analysis of all whatsoever Truth.

XII. Properly speaking, there can be no such thing as Ontological Falsity. For all Being is *ipso facto* conformed to the

Divine Intelligence, both practical and speculative. Neither can it properly be called, in a secondary sense, false, in regard of the human intellect. For there is no Being, as such, which is not apt to generate in our minds a just estimate and conform representation of itself. But it may be sometimes improperly called false, according to analogy of attribution of the first class; inasmuch as it allures the human mind to form a false Judgment. This arises from no defect in Being; but partly, by reason of the similarity of the sensible accidents of an entity with those of other entities distinct from itself; partly, by reason of the imperfection of the human intellect, which depends in great measure on sensible accidents for its cognition of Being.

CHAPTER IV.

GOODNESS.

ARTICLE I.

Transcendental Goodness.

By way of introduction to the subject of this Chapter, it will not be out of place to examine at greater length a question, to which some reference has been already made in the preceding Chapters. The question is this. Has the order in which these Transcendentals have been considered, following the universally received method, any real foundation in the Transcendentals themselves, or is it the result of mere arbitrary selection. In other words; Is one objectively prior to another according to the order of their treatment? The question has been already answered in the affirmative; but an explanation of the answer is given by St. Thomas in the following passage, which will help towards a clear concept of that attribute of Being, *Goodness*, to which our attention is now called. These are his words: 'Both Truth and Goodness are of the nature of perfectives or, in other words, have perfection. Now, we may consider the order existing between certain perfectives under a twofold aspect; first of all, on the part of the perfections themselves, or, secondly, on the part of those things which are perfectible. If, then, we consider Truth and Goodness in themselves, Truth is conceptually prior to Goodness; seeing that the former is perfective of a thing after the manner of a species' (intellectual form), 'while Goodness is perfective, not only after the manner of a species, but also by virtue of its real Being. And so, the nature of Goodness includes within itself more elements, and assumes, as it were, the shape of an addition to those' (of Truth). 'For Being has the virtue of exciting in the intellect an intelligible species of itself; and, *because* this

intelligible species is a perfecting of the intellect, therefore, it naturally desires it as a *good*. And, in this manner, the Good presupposes the True. But Truth presupposes Unity. For the nature of Truth receives its perfection from the apprehension of the intellect. Now, a thing is intelligible, inasmuch as it is one; for he who does not intue the One, intues nothing, as the Philosopher remarks in the fourth Book of his *Metaphysics*. Wherefore, the following is the order of these Transcendentals, if they are considered in themselves; to wit, next after Being, Unity; then Truth; lastly, after Truth, Goodness. But, if we regard the order between the True and the Good as determined by those things which are perfectible by them, in this sense the Good is naturally prior to the True; and this for two reasons. In the first place, because the perfection of Goodness extends to a larger number than does the perfection of Truth. For only such entities are perfectible by the True, as can within themselves perceive some Being, i. e. as possess it within themselves after the manner of their own nature, and not according to that nature which the things' (perceived) 'themselves have. Now, Beings of this kind are such only as receive an entity immaterially, and are capable of cognition. For the species or form of a stone is in the mind; not, however, according to the entity which it has in the stone. But those things are perfectible by the Good, which receive an entity according to its material being. For the nature of Goodness consists, as we have said, in this; that an entity is perfective, not only after the manner of a species, but by virtue of its Being. Wherefore, all things desire the Good; but not all know the True. . . . Secondly, because those things which are perfectible by the Good and the True, are perfected by the Good before they are perfected by the True. For, from the simple fact of their participating in Being, they are perfected by the Good, as we have seen; whereas, from the fact of their cognizing some entity, they are perfected by the True. But Thought comes after Being¹. Now, since in Meta-

¹ 'Tam verum quam bonum . . . habent rationem perfectivorum, sive perfectionem. Ordo autem inter perfectiones aliquas potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsarum perfectionum, alio modo ex parte perfectibilium. Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfectivum alicujus secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem, non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa. Et sic

physics Goodness and Truth are primarily regarded as attributes of Being, connoting an external *respect* or relation, so that the perfectness is *in recto*, the perfectibility (which is extrinsic) *in obliquo*; it follows, that the metaphysical order of the attributes would be measured by their own perfectiveness, rather than by the perfectibility which they connote.

According to such measure, then, Truth would hold the prior place to Goodness, for the following reasons. First of all, it would be prior in excellence; for it connotes and is perfective of the intellect, whereas Goodness connotes and is perfective of desire. But, assuming desire in its highest form of will, it is manifest that, even so, it is, as a faculty, inferior to the intellect; for the will is blind, the intellect sees. Then, it would be naturally prior, because a thing must be understood and recognized as good, before it can be desired; in other words, to the intelligent creature a thing is first true, then good. Thirdly, as St. Thomas says, the Good is, as it were, constituted by addition to the True; because it is not only appreciated by the intellect, and is in this way perfective of another under the form of an intelligible species which it causes in the mind; but it is in its own nature the object of desire, and is thus perfective of another by its own substantial, or real, entity also. But that which is an addition, is posterior to the subject of addition. In the words of the Angelic Doctor, the Good presupposes the True. Again, Truth comes nearer to Being than Goodness; therefore, it is prior. For, in

bonum praesupponit verum; verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur. Unumquodque autem intelligibile est, inquantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in 4 Metaph. Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur; quod post ens est unum, deinde verum, deinde post verum, bonum. Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, sic bonum est naturaliter prius quam verum duplici ratione. Primo, quia perfectio boni ad plura se extendit quam perfectio veri. A vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae possunt aliquid ens percipere in se ipsis, vel in se ipsis habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in se ipso. Et hujusmodi sunt solum ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cognoscitiva. Species enim lapidis est in anima, non autem secundum esse quod habet in lapide. Sed a bono nata sunt perfici illa quae secundum materiale esse aliquid recipiunt, cum ratio boni in hoc consistat, quod aliquid sit perfectivum tam secundum rationem speciei quam secundum esse, ut prius dictum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt bonum; sed non omnia cognoscunt verum. . . . Secundo quia illa quae nata sunt perfici bono et vero, per prius perficiuntur bono quam vero. Ex hoc enim quod participant esse, perficiuntur bono, ut dictum est; ex hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid, perficiuntur vero. Cognitio autem est posterior quam esse.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 3, o.*

that a thing simply is, it is ontologically true; because it is naturally capable of causing a corresponding representation of itself in whatsoever intellect. But, in the idea of Goodness, more is essentially included than mere Being; for the thing must be clothed in some sort of perfection, in order to its being conceived as Good, and, consequently, as fit object of desire. The second and third of these reasons are given by St. Thomas in another passage. 'Truth,' he says, 'absolutely speaking, is prior to Goodness; as is plain for two reasons. First, because the True is nearer to Being than the Good; and that means, to be prior to the Good. For Truth regards Being simply and immediately. But the idea of Goodness is the accompaniment of Being, according as this latter is in some way perfect; for in such wise it is desirable. Secondly, because cognition naturally precedes desire¹.' It is for these reasons, then, that in all metaphysical treatises Truth precedes Goodness. Similarly, Unity precedes both. For Unity is an absolute attribute, Truth and Goodness are respective; and the absolute is naturally prior to the relative. Further: as has been already remarked, a thing must be one, in order to be conceived. For everything that is, is one; and, in consequence, he who does not conceive the One, conceives nothing.

If, however, the two attributes of Truth and Goodness are to be measured by those entities which they are naturally capable of perfecting; then, the order of priority is reversed, and Goodness precedes Truth. But, as such is not their principal or primary measure, it might have been left to the declaration of St. Thomas already cited; were it not that the reasons he gives for his assertion may, without some explanation, cause a difficulty to the reader. The first reason, then, why Goodness precedes Truth, if precedence should be determined by the perfectible, is this; that the Good is capable of perfecting any Being whatsoever, save of course the Infinitely and Essentially Perfect in Himself; whereas the True is only capable of perfecting an intelligent nature. Hence, all things desire the Good; but not all things are capable of knowing the True. The other reason is, because Goodness

¹ 'Verum, absolute loquendo, prius est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc quod verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius quam bonum. Nam verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate; ratio autem boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc quod cognitio naturaliter præcedit appetitum.' 1^o xvi, 4, c.

naturally precedes Truth in the perfectionated entity. For the first thing that can possibly occur to any Being, is its being; and its being is a Good by which it is perfected. But, in order to know, and so to be perfected by, the True, it is first necessary to be; for there is no thinking without being. As, then, Being precedes Thinking; so, Goodness precedes Truth.

And now it is time to enter upon the consideration of Transcendental Goodness, which will require less effort of thought, for the most part, and less of detailed exposition, because of the all but unbroken parallel that subsists between it and Transcendental Truth. Its nature,—relation to, and distinction from, kindred concepts,—finally, its extension, will be determined in the following Propositions.

PROPOSITION XCV.

Goodness is neither a real nor a conceptual relation, nor an absolute Perfection really distinct from Being.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Thesis asserts, that *Goodness is not a real predicamental relation*. At first sight it might seem as though it were. For it is quite certain that Goodness is a reality. The common sense of mankind recognizes, in the idea of good, something beyond a mere fiction of the mind. But, though real, it cannot be an absolute perfection; therefore it must be relative. If relative, it must be a predicamental relation; for a Transcendental relation presupposes the absolute entity of which it is the consequent, and with whose nature it is really identified. Finally, if Goodness be real and is a predicamental relation, it follows that it must be a real predicamental relation. Indeed, what else can it be? Nevertheless, it is impossible that it should be a real predicamental relation, for the same reasons which have been already given in the discussion concerning the nature of Transcendental Truth. For God is in an infinite sense Good; yet, in Him, a real predicamental relation is inconceivable. So, again,—to put the second argument in the form of an example,—when a man is a just man, he is informed with the habit of justice. That habit is good alike to him and to others; but it is good as an absolute form, that is, absolute in its own nature, antecedently to any resulting relation. The absolute terms of the relation are, at least in order of nature, prior to the relation which arises

between them; and justice, in the present instance, is one of the terms. Therefore, justice is in its own absolute entity a good, antecedently to any relation of which it forms a term. Lastly; either the said relation is itself a real and perfect entity, or it is not. If it be not, how can it give Goodness to its term? For nothing gives what it has not itself. But if it be a real and perfect entity, it is itself good; and must, consequently, according to the hypothesis now under consideration, have been constituted by a previous relation, and so on for ever. This is contrary to right reason.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is further declared, that *Goodness is not a conceptual predicamental relation*; i. e. that it is not a relation which the mind has invented, after the form of a predicamental relation, in order to represent or express a certain real phase of Being, which is objectively identical with Being. Here, again, there are arguments which at first sight seem to conclude the other way. For Goodness cannot be a privation; since privation is not perfection, but want of perfection; whereas Goodness is perfection. It cannot be a negation; for negation is absolute, and the only negation which is conceivable of Being, as a real attribute, is Indivision or Unity. It must, therefore, be something positive. But it has been already proved, and will be further confirmed as regards Goodness in particular, that it cannot be an *absolute* perfection; and, consequently, it must be relative. If, however, it is a relative perfection, it must be a conceptual relation; because it has been proved in the preceding Member, that it cannot be a real relation. If it is not a conceptual relation, what can it be? There is nothing left. Besides, according to the teaching of St. Thomas in various writings, the Good is the object of desire, because there is that in it which is consonant with, or agreeable to, the entity that desires it and is perfectible by it. But the very words, *Desirable, Consonant, Agreeable, Perfective*, seem to convey the idea of at least a conceptual relation. Nevertheless, it must be said, that Goodness is not even a conceptual predicamental relation, *properly so called*; and that, for much the same reasons which have led to the conclusion that Transcendental Truth is not a conceptual relation. For, according to such opinion, Being would not enter into the essential concept of Goodness. But if it does not, then Goodness is nothing; for outside of Being, there is nothingness. But, if Goodness be

nothing real, how can it be the object of desire? Moreover, that which is good, so far as it is good, is perfect; but how can nothingness be perfect? Again, Goodness is distinguished from Truth, in that it is in entities themselves, as will be seen. Consequently, it is impossible that it should formally be a mere conceptual relation. Once more; the Angelic Doctor confirms the doctrine of St. Augustine, that Goodness consists in *Measure*, *Species*, and *Order*. But, evidently, these three are not relations. Finally; true is distinguished from apparent Goodness, in that the former is real, the latter only conceptual. But how can this be, if all Goodness, of whatever kind, were a merely conceptual relation?

III. IN THE THIRD MEMBER it is declared, that *Goodness is not an absolute perfection, really distinct from Being*. It has already been proved in the first Chapter of this Book, that no Transcendental attribute or passion of Being can be a perfection of such a kind; and the same arguments, therefore, serve to show, that Goodness, as being one of the attributes, cannot be so constituted. This is further confirmed by a reasoning derived from the special nature of Goodness. Every good thing may be considered as good for itself, and as good for another. Now, it seems obvious enough, that the Goodness which is good for another is no absolute perfection, modal or otherwise, really distinct from the entity which is, in such wise, denominated good. For the said entity itself, apart from any supposed modal or other addition, is consonant with, and agreeable to, the being that is perfectible by it; therefore, the introduction of any real addition is vain and useless. Thus, for instance, *bread* in its own nature is agreeable to a hungry man. So, in like manner, *wisdom* is of itself, prescinding from any supervening mode, consonant with our intellectual nature. Similarly, the *odour of a rose* is in itself concordant with the sense of smell. Then, again, if this supposed real addition induces Goodness in its subject, it must itself be good, and would, consequently, require another mode constitutive of its Goodness; which would necessitate an infinite progression. Lastly, it is of perpetual occurrence, that the same thing, at one and the same time, remaining identically the same, is good for one and bad for another. Thus, for instance, *stimulants* are good for persons suffering from one form of disease, and are fatally bad for persons suffering from another form of disease. *Milk* is good

for *cats*, but is said to be bad for *dogs*. The same quantity of *water* which is good for the *nasturtium*, would be bad for the *maiden-hair fern*. *Sand* answers as a mould for *iron*, not for *glass*. *Nitrate of silver* is a useful re-agent for testing the presence of a *chloride*, but not the presence of a *sulphate*. But, if so, Goodness cannot be an absolute perfection added to the entity; otherwise, remaining the same, such entity would exhibit its Goodness indifferently to all. If the good thing is considered as good in and to itself; it is likewise manifest, that its Goodness is not constituted by any modal or other addition made to itself. For, —to take an example,—*life* is good to every living thing in and of itself, precluding from any supposed mode. But it is not necessary to insist on this form of Goodness; since it is not of itself sufficient for the adequate concept of Transcendental Goodness; as will appear from the next Thesis.

PROPOSITION XCVI.

Transcendental Goodness does not exclusively consist in the real Perfection of Being.

It is the opinion of some, that Goodness is nothing more or less than the Perfection by which every Being exists in its own adequate entity. Hence, if it be simply and absolutely Being as substance is, it is in itself perfect and good absolutely; if it be Being of Being as Accident is, it is good and perfect in itself, proportionally to its diminished nature, by its own entity, and by that same entity it is good, relatively to that whose being it informs or perfects. Thus, the part of a composite is good in itself, by the same proper entity by which it is likewise good to the whole composite. Wherefore, the Goodness is the same. This hypothesis is rendered probable by the fact, that every other possible hypothesis would seem to have been eliminated in the preceding Thesis. Besides, it is supported by the authority of St. Thomas, who is continually identifying the Perfect with the Good.

In order to a due understanding of this interesting question, it is necessary to determine the exact nature of Perfection. Now, the Perfect bears two meanings. It may in the first place mean an entity so fully constituted, as to render it impossible to find a single one of its elements outside itself; or, in other words, an entity that is wanting in nothing. This is the first meaning

which the Philosopher attaches to the word¹. But, in this sense, it is neither identified with Being nor with the Good ; as is plain. For, a *boy* is a man and, as such, a Being, and ontologically good ; yet he is not a *perfect* man. So, a *tree in winter* has its vegetative life, and is, consequently, an entity and good, but it is not perfect ; for there are many parts wanting to it, which the summer will disclose. But the Perfect, in another sense, stands for whatsoever Being that possesses everything which is necessary to its essential nature. Thus, a man is said to have a perfect body, when the latter has all the limbs and members which go to make up its normal structure ; even though the limbs are not well proportioned, and the features anything but pleasing. And, so understood, the Perfect is fundamentally identical with the Good. For the Perfection of a thing, according to this meaning of the word, is nothing more or less than the entity of a thing ; and that entity enters essentially into the concept of its Goodness. And, in reality, very much the same may be said of the Perfect, taken in its first sense. For it simply represents Being, as possessed of the full entity requisite for the complement of its nature. It follows from these premisses, that there is an element of truth in the opinion which forms the subject of the present Thesis. Perfection does undoubtedly enter as an essential element into the concept of Goodness ; nay more, there is nothing else real and objective, really distinct from Being or the Perfect, which is included in this concept. Nevertheless, it is contended, that Perfection does not adequately represent the idea of Goodness ; so that Goodness does not *exclusively* consist in the real Perfection of Being.

THE PROPOSITION, THEN, IS PROVED by two arguments. For, if Goodness were identical with Perfection in such sense, that nothing were included in the concept of Goodness which is not included in the concept of Perfection ; it would follow, that Goodness could not be an attribute of Being. The reason is, that Perfection, in the sense just explained, is synonymous with Being ; consequently, Goodness would be synonymous with Being. But, if synonymous, how could it be even conceptually distinguished from Being as its attribute ? Again : it has been already shown

¹ Τέλειον λέγεται ἐν μὲν οὐ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν, μῆδὲ ἐν μόνιον, . . . καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ τοῦ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος, . . . ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μῆθὲν ἐλλείπωσιν. *Metaph.* iv (al. v), c. 16. The Philosopher gives other significations subsequently in the same Chapter.

that the same thing, remaining precisely the same in both cases, can be good for one, and not good, but bad, for another. But, if in the concept of Goodness nothing were included save the entity or Perfection of Being, this would be impossible. For, as a thing is its own Being or entity; so, it would be its own Goodness, which would be no more amissible than its essential entity.

PROPOSITION XCVII.

In the formal idea of Transcendental Goodness is included, besides the Perfection of Being, its consonance with other Being; that is, the Good adds to Being a connotation of some other entity which has a natural inclination and capacity for, or actual conjunction with it.

PROLEGOMENON.

Before undertaking the proof of this Proposition, a fitting occasion presents itself for explaining a not unimportant point, included in the Scholastic doctrine touching the two *respective* Transcendentals, which will greatly assist the reader in understanding the Enunciation of the present Thesis. By *respective* Transcendentals are intended Truth and Goodness, which essentially include in their concept a connotation of something outside themselves, in contradistinction to Unity which is *absolute*; as has been sufficiently declared in the first Chapter. It is to be observed, then, with regard to these two Transcendentals, that the term, (as it were), which they primarily connote, is the human soul; because of the universality of its tendencies, as contrasted with all other finite beings. For the Infinite Being is the Measure, rather than the Term, of both. The human mind is capable of Truth under whatsoever form, and the human will has a natural appetite for the Good of whatsoever kind. Now, as regards Truth, the connoted term must necessarily be an intellectual Being. Hence, all entities that are not intellectual are necessarily excluded from its connotation, respect, or relation. But it is not the same with Goodness; for all things seek after the Good, as the Philosopher remarks. The highest and noblest kind of appetite is, of course, that of will; because it is free and directed by intellectual cognition. But, according to their capacity, there is in animals likewise an appetite, or natural inclination, for that which is a Good to them. Obviously, they have a sensile inclination for sensile goods.

Beyond this, however, there is a natural tendency towards their own Perfection, and towards the end for which they were created; not thought out or willed, but fostered by an order imposed upon them from without. This is shared by every created thing in every order of Being; and may be a natural *inclination*, as it is in animal and, after a manner, in vegetable life. In the inferior ranks of existence it may, perhaps, be more clearly expressed as a natural *capacity*. Furthermore, there are certain capacities for Good, which are never mere *capacities*; because the Perfectible and Perfective are always in actual conjunction. Thus, the substantial Form of purely material substances is, evidently enough, a Good to, because it perfects, the Matter; yet Matter cannot exist without a Form, and such a Form cannot exist save in Matter. This is the reason why, in the Enunciation of the Proposition, the connoted entity is declared to have either a *natural inclination and capacity for, or actual conjunction with, it*; though, strictly speaking, *natural inclination* in its generic signification would serve for all three, provided that we eliminate the idea of mere tendency, as exclusive of consecution. There is a division of the Good, to which allusion has been already made, that will further illustrate the point in hand. There is that which is good in itself; and there is that which is good for another. The former does not, at first sight, seem to include that extrinsic respect which is said to form an essential element in the concept of Goodness. Hence, Suarez simply identifies it with perfection or Being; and would, consequently, exclude it from the category of Transcendental Goodness. Yet, he elsewhere implies the distinction which will now be made, by way of answer to the difficulty. A difficulty confessedly there is; for one does not see why a thing should with reason be called Good, yet, why its Goodness should be distinct from Transcendental Goodness,—that is, should be no Goodness at all. If the term means nothing else than Being or the Perfection of Being; why call it Goodness? Now, the essential entity or integral complement of any finite Being may be regarded in either of two ways. It may either be considered as identical with the Being, as it really and objectively is; and *then*, the concept exclusively expresses the Perfection of Being. Or it may be considered as a participation, as something bestowed upon the Being,—a concept founded on its contingency and dependence upon an efficient cause. *Then*, the

essence or integral complement assumes the form of a perfection by which such Being is perfected, and the connotation of a virtual other is included ; consequently, it may in strict phrase be denominated Good. It is in this sense that existence is good for things existing ; and a man is said to have a good memory or a good head. In such cases, the Perfective and the Perfectible are, as is plain, only conceptually distinguished from each other.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of the Proposition declares, that in the essential idea of Goodness is included *a consonance of the Good with other Being, that is, a connotation of some other entity which has a natural inclination, capacity for, or actual conjunction with it.* The truth of the assertion follows, as a simple Corollary, from the two preceding Theses. For, if Goodness consists neither in a real absolute Perfection distinct from Being, nor in a real or even conceptual predicamental relation, and yet does not *exclusively* consist in the real Perfection of Being ; there is nothing else conceivable, save the said connotation. Again, if it be true that Goodness, like Truth, is essentially *respective*, not *absolute*, and that, nevertheless, it is neither a real nor a conceptual relation properly so called, it must be connotative ; for there is nothing else left. But Truth is connotative of Intellect ; therefore, Goodness, of Desire. The Angelic Doctor explains his mind upon this point very clearly ; and it is the more necessary to put his own declaration before the reader, because his opinion has been misunderstood. ‘A word,’ he remarks, ‘may express a *respect* in two ways. One way is, when the word is instituted to express the respect itself ; as, for instance, *father*, or *son*, or *paternity*’ (in the abstract). ‘On the other hand, some words are said to convey the idea of a respect, because they express a certain kind of entity which is accompanied by a respect ; although the word has not been instituted to express the respect itself. Thus, the word, *science*, has been instituted to express a certain quality which is followed by respect, but not to express the respect itself.’ Here, for some perhaps, there is need of a little explanation. Science, in its subjective sense, or scientific knowledge, is a spiritual quality informing the intellect ; because it is an intellectual habit. This is what the word *Science* formally represents. But it gives birth to a relation ; because knowledge connotes the knowable. St. Thomas proceeds : ‘It is after this way, that the idea of Goodness implies a respect. Not that the word, Goodness, expresses the respect itself only ; but that it expresses that of which the

respect is a consequent, together with the respect itself. Now, the respect which is expressed by the word *Goodness*, is a respect of perfectiveness¹.

There are three things observable in this passage. First of all, the Angelic Doctor carefully avoids the term, *relation*; though all his examples, save Goodness itself, are real relations. He, moreover, explicitly denies that Goodness is a predicamental relation, by excluding it from the first category; and, by not entirely including it even in his second, he implies that it is not a Transcendental relation in the strict sense. Secondly, he affirms that the concept of Goodness essentially includes two elements; viz. something absolute, and a respect which is consequent upon the former. That Absolute, as will be seen in the second Member, is perfect entity or Being; and the respect is a connotation. Therefore, in his judgment, Goodness, on the one hand, is not an absolute perfection really distinct from Being; and, on the other hand, does not exclusively consist in the real perfection of Being, because it includes a connotation. Lastly, he tells us that this connotation, or *respect*, is the perfectiveness of Being; for, obviously, that which is perfective must be perfective of something. But it should be noticed, that this respect comes out of itself, so to say, and is formally rooted in the perfectness of the Good. It does not come to it, in any form, from without. It is its own nature looking out, as it were, for a term; not the term looking out for it. This last observation will prove of some service in determining the question which forms the subject of the next Proposition.

There is one other argument confirmatory of this first Member. The doctrine here maintained satisfactorily accounts for the fact, that the same entity, remaining identically the same, is at once good for one and bad for another. *For, though every Being is good; nevertheless, it is not good for every Being.* Every Being is perfective

¹ 'Aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter. Uno modo sic, quod nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc nomen, *pater*, vel *filius*, aut *paternitas* ipsa. Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicujus generis quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significandum. Sicut hoc nomen, *scientia*, est impositum ad significandum qualitatem quandam quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum ipsum. Et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum implicat; non quia ipsum nomen boni significet ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem qui importatur nomine boni, est habitudo perfectivi.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 6, c.*

of something, but not of everything. Hence, its perfectivity postulates that precisely which is perfectible by it; in which consists the connotation. Of one entity it is perfective and, therefore, good; of another entity it is not perfective and, therefore, evil. But, then, this latter does not enter into the connotation.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER of the Proposition asserts, that *the formal idea of Goodness includes the Perfection of Being*. The Perfection of Being, then, or the entity itself, is the absolute something which the Angelic Doctor represents as expressed by the word *Goodness*. It is plain that such is the mind of St. Thomas, from the fact that he has in his writings identified the Good with the Perfect so often, as to have given occasion to the misconception, that he held Goodness to consist *exclusively* in the Perfection of Being. However, in order to remove all doubt, he shall speak for himself. 'Goodness and Being,' he says, 'are *really* the same, but differ conceptually; as will appear from the following. For the nature of Goodness' (practically and *à posteriori*) 'consists in this, that an entity is desirable. Wherefore, the Philosopher says, that the Good is that which all things desire. Now, it is plain that a thing is desirable according to its perfection; for all things desire their own perfection. But a thing is perfect, in proportion as it is actual. Hence it is plain, that a thing is good forasmuch as it is Being¹.' Again, he thus puts the same idea under a somewhat different form: 'That, by virtue of which everything is said to be good, is its own excellence. For a thing's own proper excellence it is, that causes it to have goodness, and makes its operation to be good. But excellence is a certain perfection. For we then call a thing perfect, when it attains its proper excellence. Therefore, a thing is good because it is perfect, which is the reason why everything desires its own perfection as its proper good².' From these two passages it is

¹ 'Bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum; quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit quod aliquid sit appetibile. Unde Philosophus (in 1 Ethic. in principio) dicit quod *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile, secundum quod est perfectum. Nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. In tantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, in quantum est in actu. Unde manifestum est quod in tantum est aliquid bonum, in quantum est ens.' 1^o v, 1, c.

² 'Id quo unumquodque bonum dicitur, est propria virtus ejus. Propria namque virtus uniuscujusque est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum reddit. Virtus autem est perfectio quaedam. Tunc enim unumquodque perfectum dicimus, quando attingit propriam virtutem, ut patet in septimo Physicorum. Ex hoc igitur

just to conclude that, according to the Angelic Doctor, (excluding for the present the question of *desirableness*), an entity is good, forasmuch as it is excellent; that it is excellent, forasmuch as it is perfect; that it is perfect, forasmuch as it is actual; and that it is actual, forasmuch as it is Being. Hence, in another place, he remarks that 'it is of the nature of the Good that it does not differ really from Being; and therefore, wherever we find the Good and Being, they are the same really¹.' It follows, therefore, that, according to St. Thomas, all the reality in the concept of Goodness is Being, or essential Perfection.

The intrinsic reasons have been already mentioned in the first Chapter, where it was shown that Being essentially enters into the formal concept of all the three Transcendentals; since, if they do not include Being, they include nothing, and *nothing* can hardly be an Attribute of Being. But there are, besides, certain arguments derived from the peculiar nature of Goodness. One is borrowed from the common judgment of mankind, as confirmed by the universal teaching of philosophers. For all seem to be agreed, that the Good and the Perfect, if not altogether identical, are yet so closely allied that the latter is always included in the former. But everything is perfect, either by its own essential Being, or by its full complement of Being. Then, again, the Good is divided into that which 'is good in itself and that which is good for another. Now, as to that which is good in itself, there can be no doubt but that it must include the entity of the thing which is denominated good; and it, therefore, remains to show that the same must be the case in that which is good for another. What, then, is the nature of that which is good for another? It is that which is perfective of another in such wise, that the supposed other has, or may have, a natural desire or inclination for it. But, how can nothingness be perfective; or how can an entity have a natural inclination towards nothingness?

unumquodque bonum est; quod perfectum est. Et inde est. quod unumquodque suam perfectionem appetit sicut proprium bonum.' *c. Gentes, L. 1, c. 37.*

¹ 'De ratione boni est quod non differat secundum rem ab ente; et ideo ubicunque invenitur bonum et ens, sunt idem secundum rem.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 1, ad 5^m.*

DIFFICULTIES.

I. St. Thomas, in the following passage, makes a distinction between Being and Goodness, which seems to be subversive of the doctrine here maintained. These are his words: 'Since Being expresses the true actuality of Being, and act refers exclusively to potentiality; a thing is simply and absolutely denominated Being, according to its primary distinction from the purely potential. Now, this is the substantial existence of the thing. Hence, by its substantial existence a thing is denominated Being absolutely; but, by superadded actuation, it is said to be Being after a manner. As, for instance, *to be white*, signifies Being after a manner. For *the being white* does not remove simple or absolute potentiality; since it accrues to an entity already actually existing. But Goodness expresses perfectness, which is the object of desire; and, consequently, expresses ultimate completeness. Hence, that which is *completely* perfect, is said to be good simply and absolutely; but that which has not the ultimate perfection due to it, although it may have a sort of perfection by reason of its being actual, is, nevertheless, not called perfect absolutely, but after a certain manner. So then, a thing, in regard of its first substantial act, is said to be Being *absolutely* and good *after a manner*, i. e. forasmuch as it is Being; as regards its ultimate act, on the contrary, it is said to be Being after a manner, and absolutely good¹. Thus, then, according to St. Thomas, Being and Goodness so far differ from each other, that they are, relatively to the same entity, in exactly inverse ratio. How is it possible, therefore, that they should be

¹ 'Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter. Nam, cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid; sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid. Non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei jam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem in quantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum secundum quid, id est, in quantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter.' 1^{ae} v, 1, ad 1^m.

really identical, and that Being should be essentially included in the idea of Goodness?

ANSWER. i. Unless it is to be supposed that the Angelic Doctor was guilty of a serious self-contradiction in one and the same Article, there must be a way of explaining this passage in accordance with the doctrine here established. For not only does he professedly undertake to show, in the *body* of the Article, that Being and the Good are really identical; but, at the commencement of the very answer from which the above quotation has been made, he observes that 'the Good and Being are really the same, and only differ conceptually.'

ii. It is to be remarked, that the passage in question forms part of the solution of a difficulty. The Angelic Doctor was anxious to save Boetius, who had said in his *Book on the Weeks*, 'I perceive in entities, that their Goodness is one thing; their Being, another.'

iii. St. Thomas declares that this difference is discoverable, not in any want of real identity, but in the conceptual distinction between the two. But, as has been shown, he places that conceptual distinction in a certain connotation, included in Goodness, and not included in the concept of Being.

iv. The preceding remark affords a clue to the true interpretation of the passage. In the idea of Being is formally and principally contained the idea of existence, which is the primal actuation of an entity. Every subsequent actuation by informing accidents is not *simply* Being, which already *is*, prior, at least in order of nature, to the supervening information; it can only, therefore, be *such* Being, that is, not simply Being, but Being under such and such determinations. Yet, on the other hand, if Goodness is formally considered as perfective of something other than itself, though it is true that, in its first substantial act of being or existing, it is good in a way, good to itself, good for others, because so far perfect; yet it is not *wholly* perfect, not *wholly* or *simply* good and perfective, till it has reached its last act of development. An animal does not feel a drawing towards food principally, because of the mere existence of that food; but because of the nutritive qualities, the flavour, and so forth, which belong to it in its state of perfection.

v. Nevertheless, on close examination, it appears that *really* the

ratio between the two is preserved. For, if those ulterior acts of an entity are considered *separately and in themselves*, they are *simply and absolutely* Being. It is only when considered as adjuncts of Being already constituted, that they may be said to be Being *after a manner*. Further, if regarded in the same light, they are so many distinct goods and so many distinct perfects; it is only in their synthesis, that they constitute the more good, the more perfect and, consequently, the more perfective, the more desirable. But, in like manner, the synthesis of beings makes more Being; nevertheless, it does not constitute Being simply and absolutely, (which is one indivisible act), but Being after such a sort, determined in such a way.

vi. If this interpretation of the doctrine conveyed by St. Thomas in the above passage be the correct one, the charge which Suarez brings against the Angelic Doctor would seem to be unfounded, where he remarks that 'there seems to be an equivocation in these phrases, *after a manner*, and *simply*. For, when they are predicated of Being, they seem to be predicated of substance and accidents, compared separately; but, when they are predicated of the Good, they are predicated of the created substance, now taken apart by itself, now as informed by dispositions and powers connatural with it¹.'

II. It cannot be denied, that there are certain privations and negations which men commonly pronounce good. Thus, for instance, people say that *it is good for a warm bath not to be above 94° Fahrenheit*. So again, *it is good not to do evil*. Again, there are some cynics who maintain, that *man's highest natural good consists in the entire absence of pain*. Finally, it has been said on the highest authority, that *it would have been good for a certain man, if he had never been born*. But such kinds of Good do not include Being or Perfection; on the contrary, they exclude it. Hence it follows, that the concept of Goodness does not formally and essentially include Being or the perfection of entity.

ANSWER. The mere absence or privation of an evil can never be

¹ 'Unde in illis vocibus, *secundum quid*, et *simpliciter*, videtur esse aequivocatio. Nam cum dicuntur de ente, videntur dici de substantia et accidente praeclise comparatis; cum autem dicuntur de bono, dicuntur de substantia creata aut solitarie sumpta, aut ut affecta dispositionibus et facultatibus sibi connaturalibus.' *Metaph. Disp. x, sect. 1, n. 16*.

a good, really and properly speaking ; but absence or privation of an evil may be a good in three ways. First, because the absence of an evil may include the position of a good. Thus, the absence of the overgreat heat in the bath includes, or supposes, that moderate heat which is a positive good. It is thus that negatives are often the most emphatic expression of a positive Perfection. Secondly, because the absence of evil presupposes a real entity which has caused, so to say, this absence of evil. Thus, it is good for a man not to commit evil. But why? Because it presupposes, in that man, a positive will not to commit evil ; and that act of the will is a real entity and, consequently, is really good. Thirdly, a mere absence or privation may be called good, by a sort of analogy, or simply by way of metaphor ; as in the instance of the words applied to Judas. But, in such cases, the privation is conceived under the form of a certain entity, and, so conceived, is conceived as a Good.

PROPOSITION XCVIII.

The Desirable is fundamentally the same as the Good, but it formally differs from this latter in two respects. For it is posterior to, and consequent upon, Goodness ; and it is, moreover, a merely extrinsic denomination derived from the Desire, of which it is aptitudinally the object.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition is sufficiently obvious. For, (as St. Thomas has remarked in a passage already quoted), since every entity naturally desires its own Perfection, it desires that which is perfecting, as complement of itself. But that which is perfecting must itself be perfect and, therefore, good ; so that it is true to say, that Goodness is perfective Perfection. Furthermore, Goodness differs from Perfection, in that it connotes another entity, with whose natural inclination the Good and Perfect is consonant. This fundamental identity between the Desirable and the Good has been so repeatedly and so emphatically insisted on by the Angelic Doctor, that his declarations seem at first sight to imperil the subsequent conclusions of this Thesis. He says, for instance, that '*the nature of the Good consists in this, that a thing is desirable ;*' again, that '*the Good adds nothing, over and above Being, except only the idea of the Desirable ;*' and he is frequently repeating, as though he deemed it a sort of definition,

that well-known saying of Aristotle, '*all things seek after the Good.*' This might naturally lead to the supposition, that the Desirable entered formally into the concept of Goodness. Nevertheless, it is here maintained, that the Desirable formally differs from the Good in two respects. This twofold difference awaits us in the subsequent Members.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER it is asserted, that *the Desirable and the Good formally differ, in that the former is posterior to, and consequent upon, the latter.* At first sight, it might seem,—independently of the declarations of the Angelic Doctor quoted above, (which will be discussed in their place), and for intrinsic reasons,—that the Good and the Desirable are formally identical. For it has been seen, that both the Good and the True are respective; and that, consequently, they both agree in this, viz. in their connoting something external to themselves. As, then, the True connotes the Intellect; so, the Good connotes Will, or Desire, with which it is concordant. But what is this, if it is not to be desirable? Nevertheless, it must be said, that the Desirable is not formally contained in the concept of Goodness. A thing is not good, because it is desirable; on the contrary, this other causal is true,—that a thing is desirable, because it is good. The appetibility does not constitute Goodness; but Goodness constitutes appetibility. Hence, the latter is consequent upon the former. Again: Appetibility borrows its concept from the effect, which is posterior to the cause. The Perfectiveness of entity is the cause, or reason, why it is desirable on the part of the appetite or inclination. Therefore, Desirableness is posterior to Goodness. Now, Perfectiveness is connotative; for the Perfective connotes the Perfectible. But the idea of the Perfective is formally taken from that which is intrinsic to the Good, viz. its Perfection; whereas the idea of the Desirable is borrowed from that which is extrinsic to the Good, viz. the will or inclination of something else. Perfectiveness, therefore, enters into the formal concept of Goodness; but not Appetibility. As touching, then, the authority of the Angelic Doctor, it suffices to say; that he is speaking, in the passage alleged, of the material, not of the formal, concept of Goodness. It is quite true that the Good is the Desirable; though it may not be true, that Goodness contains the Desirable in its formal concept. Thus, what is *visible* is *lucid*, i. e. informed with light; but lucidness is not included in the formal concept of the

visible. Nor is this fathering upon St. Thomas a meaning foreign to his own intention. For, in commenting upon that famous axiom in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, which teaches that 'All things desire the Good,' the Angelic Doctor speaks in this wise: 'Primary entities cannot be made intelligible by anything prior to them, but are made intelligible by certain things that are posterior; as causes are explained by their proper effects. Since, then, Goodness is properly the motive cause of the Desire; Goodness is described by means of the motion of Desire, as a motive power is wont to be made manifest by motion. Wherefore, Aristotle says, that the philosophers have rightly declared the Good to be that which all things desire¹.' Add to this, that the same Doctor so frequently insists on the essential inclusion of the Perfective in the concept of Goodness.

III. THE THIRD MEMBER, which declares that *the Desirable is a merely extrinsic denomination derived from the Desire of which Good is aptitudinally the object*, needs no proof; since it has been sufficiently confirmed, during the course of the arguments adduced in favour of the preceding Member.

COROLLARY.

It follows from what has been said, that the Good fundamentally includes within itself the idea of a final cause. For a final cause constitutes the motive of action, or that for the sake of which things act or operate, consciously or unconsciously. But things operate *immediately* for their own Perfection and, consequently, for the sake of the Perfective; for the possession of the Perfective assists towards the complement of their proper Perfection. Accordingly, St. Thomas tells us that, 'since Good is desirable, it assumes the character of a final cause².' It cannot, therefore, afford matter for surprise, that the Philosopher, at the outset of his *Ethics*, should practically so identify *the Good* with *Ends* or *Final Causes* as to use the terms indifferently. And it is in this light, that the Good

¹ 'Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciarunt bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.' *Comment. in Ethic. Nic. L. I, Lect. 2^a, ad l.*

² 'Bonum autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae finalis.' 1^o v, 2, ad 1^m.

is so often described as self-diffusive. For, as the end of operation, it allures the Desire of entities, external to itself, to the possession of itself; not (be it observed) by any activity as of an efficient cause, but as that for the sake of which the Desire is set in motion. This is pronounced by the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. In one place he remarks, 'the Good is said to be self-diffusive, after the same manner as a final cause is said to move¹.' And again, 'The Good is said to be diffusive, after the manner of a final cause; like as the final cause is said to move the efficient².' It follows, that the *Good* and a *final cause* are convertible; and, in such sort, that whatever is simply and absolutely Good, is simply and absolutely a final cause, and that which is a Good after a manner, is a final cause after a manner. Thus, a useful Good is only good after a manner, because it is perfective and desirable, only as the means for attaining another Good; consequently, it is an end, or a final cause, after a manner. It is an end, because the will or Desire is to a certain extent satisfied in the possession of it. It is only an end after a sort, because the Desire goes on to the acquisition of another Good by means of it.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

There is this difference between the two Transcendental attributes of Truth and Goodness; that the former essentially includes in its concept conformability to the intellect, while the latter does not include in its essential concept conformability to Desire.

This Proposition is a simple Corollary from the preceding; and, therefore, stands in need of declaration rather than of proof. It has been inserted by way of answer to the argument, adduced at the commencement of the last Thesis, by which it was intended to demonstrate, in virtue of the assumed parallel between Truth and Goodness, that the Desirable and the Good are identical. The fact is, that the two are not identical, precisely for the reason that the parallel fails, just where it is most needed for the establishment of

¹ 'Bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse eo modo quo finis dicitur movere.' 1^o v, 4, ad 2^m.

² 'Bonum dicitur diffusivum per modum finis, secundum quod dicitur quod finis movet efficientem.' 1, d. xxxiv, Q. 2, ad 4^m.

such identity; and in its place, there is found to be a notable divergence. This divergence arises out of the contrast between the two faculties which respectively embrace the True and the Good, no less than from the different way in which these objects perfect the corresponding faculty. The intellect gathers all things to itself, so as, in a way, by cognition to become all things. The Will or appetite for Good *goes forth outside itself*; and tends to conjunction with things, in so far forth as they are consonant with it, so as to gather to itself those things that are Good. This is beautifully explained by the Angelic Doctor as follows: 'There is a twofold perfection in all entities; the one belonging to the absolute subsistence of an entity in itself; the other arising out of its order of relation to other entities. . . . It is manifest, then, that cognition appertains to that perfection of the intelligent Being, by which he is perfected in himself; but the will appertains to the perfection of an entity, arising out of its order of relation to other entities¹.' This doctrine will be made easier of comprehension, by considering the different way in which the True and the Good perfect the faculties of which they are respectively the object. An entity, as object of the intellect, does not communicate itself or its nature really and entitatively to that faculty, but arouses the faculty to a conformable representation of itself; which representation is the act of the intellect. But this representation is precisely that by which the intellect is perfected; so that the intellect in the truth of its cognition is perfected by itself, something after the same manner as living things grow and perfect themselves on what comes from without *by a process of assimilation*. But the same entity, (let us say), as object of the will or Desire, does communicate itself or its nature really and entitatively to that faculty, so that the will or Desire is perfected by real conjunction with an object external to it; something after the same manner as a snow-ball increases by accretion from without. If it were not that the similitude might seem too fanciful, this difference would be said to bear some sort of resemblance to that between endogenous and exogenous plants. St. Thomas calls attention to this contrast in a passage where,—after showing that Being can be perfective of

¹ 'In rebus omnibus duplex perfectio invenitur; una qua in se subsistit; alia qua ad res alias ordinatur. . . . Patet ergo quod cognitio pertinet ad perfectionem cognoscentis, qua in seipso perfectum est; voluntas autem pertinet ad perfectionem rei, secundum ordinem ad alias res.' *In 3, d. xxvii, Q. 1, a. 4, c.*

the intellect, in that it is capable of imparting, as it were, to that faculty an ideal representation of itself, and in that Truth is properly in the intellect,—he goes on to say, ‘Being is perfective of Being other than itself, in another way, viz. by the entity which it has in nature. And this is how the Good is perfective. For Goodness is in entities, as says the Philosopher¹.’ By way of ending to the declaration of the present Thesis, the reader shall be presented with a passage from the same Doctor, in which the doctrine, here contended for, is most lucidly and completely given. ‘As the Good,’ he writes, ‘stands for that towards which Appetite tends; so the True stands for that towards which the Intellect tends. But there is this difference between Appetite and Intellect, (or concept of whatsoever kind); that a concept exists, accordingly as the object conceived is in the mind of him that conceives; whereas appetition exists, accordingly as the appetent is inclined towards the object of appetition. Hence, the term of appetition, which is the Good, is in the appetible object; while the term of cognition, which is the True, is in the intellect itself. Now, as Goodness is in the object, for that it connotes a relation to the appetite, and as, on this account, the idea of Goodness is translated from the appetible object to the appetite, so that the appetite is pronounced good because of the goodness of its object; in like manner, since Truth is in the intellect, for that this latter is conformed to the object of cognition, the idea of Truth is transferred from the intellect to the object of cognition, so that the object of cognition, even as cognized, is pronounced true, because of the relation which it bears to the intellect².’

¹ ‘Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius, non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum; bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit in 6^o. Metaphys.’ *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 1, c. ad fi.*

² ‘Sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente; appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili; sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. Sicut autem bonum est in re, in quantum habet ordinem ad appetitum, et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni; ita, cum verum sit in intellectu, secundum quod conformatur rei intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum.’ 1^o xvi, 1, c.

PROPOSITION C.

Every Being, as such, is good.

THIS PROPOSITION is thus briefly proved. Everything that is consonant with, and desirable for, its subject, (i.e. for itself), and is consonant with and desirable for another, is good. But every Being, as such, is consonant with, and desirable for itself, as well as for some other. Therefore, every Being, as such, is good.

The Minor Premiss will be declared and developed, taking each of its Members separately.

I. *Every Being, as such, is consonant with, and desirable for, itself.* As the reader will doubtless remember, it was shown in an earlier part of this Chapter, that what is good *in itself* satisfies the quasi-definition of Goodness, if considered after the manner of receiving and received. Now, if we conceive any whatsoever entity as passing from a state of pure objective potentiality to actuation; that first act, or actuation, (existence, in other words), is a good to it. All things that can be, may be said to have a natural inclination for Being; and those things which already possess it, rejoice in its possession. Wherefore, as St. Thomas says, 'Everything, so far as it is Being, is actual and, in a manner, perfect; because every act is a certain Perfection. But the perfect is essentially desirable and good¹.' The same Doctor confirms this conclusion by another argument drawn from the fundamental identity between Goodness and end or final cause. 'Since the nature of Goodness,' he writes, 'consists in this, that one thing is capable of perfecting another as its end; everything that is of the nature of an end, is also of the nature of Goodness. Now, two things belong to the nature of an end; of which the first is, that it be desired, or wanted, by those things which are not as yet in possession of their end; and, secondly, that it be loved and, as it were, loveable by such as have attained their end. For it is the part of the same nature to tend towards its end and, to a certain extent, to rest in its possession; just as it is by the same nature that a stone is drawn towards the centre, and rests in the centre. But these two elements are discoverable in pure and simple Being. For those things which as yet have no share in Being, tend towards Being by a sort of natural Desire; . . . while those things

¹ 'Omne ens, in quantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum; quia omnis actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni.' 1^o v, 3, o.

which have Being already, naturally love that Being of theirs, and preserve it with all their might. Therefore, Being itself has the nature of Goodness. Hence, as it is impossible that there should be an entity that has not Being; every entity is good, by the simple fact that it has Being¹. If the consideration is carried further to the subsequent accidental actuations of Being, the argument becomes clearer and more cogent. For the acts of each entity are so many fresh additions of perfection to it and, consequently, are good and desirable. The same may be said in the case of things material, concerning *growth, increase of strength*, and the like; in the case of spiritual Beings, concerning acts and habits, whether of intellect or will, such as *science, fortitude, contemplation, temperance*. Further, in composite entities it is plain that the substantial Form is a good to the Matter, as in like manner the Matter is a good to the Form;—Part is a good to Part and to the Whole;—Substance is a good to the Accidents, and the Accidents to the Substance. In these last instances, the Good is so really distinct from the subject which receives it, that the cases seem to be more naturally included under the second, than under the first, Member of the *Minor*. This would indeed be the true arrangement; if these entities were taken separately, instead of being considered as constituents of one and the same individual entity.

II. *Every Being is consonant with, and consequently desirable for, some other*. This is the second Member of the *Minor*, which remains to be declared. i. Its truth may be, first of all, developed on principles that are, more or less, *à priori*. Every existing essence or nature has, by the fact of its existence and by reason also of all that goes to make up the complement of its existing Being, a perfection of its own, but a perfection limited and capable of indefinite accidental increase; and each nature has a

¹ 'Cum ratio boni in hoc consistat, quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis, omne id quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet et rationem boni. Duo autem sunt de ratione finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, aut sit dilectum et quasi delectabile ab his quae finem participant; cum ejusdem rationis sit tendere in finem et in fine quodammodo quiescere; sicut per eandem naturam lapis movetur ad medium, et quiescit in medio. Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse. Quae enim nondum esse participant, in esse quodam naturali appetitu tendunt. . . . Omnia autem quae jam esse habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute conservant. . . . Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse; ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, o.*

natural inclination for such growth in perfection. Now, if the universe were a mass of independent entities; it would be difficult to understand how this natural inclination could be satisfied. Yet satisfied it must be somehow; *for nature makes nothing in vain*. We know, however, as a fact, that the universe is not so constituted. Metaphysics, Physics, and Ethics, conspire to show that it is a *κόσμος*,—a perfect order, composed of successive grades of Being, ascending in excellence and perfection towards the highest, yet for the most part insensibly melting into each other,—a system of universal action and reaction, such as to allow of its being said, without hyperbole, that the displacement of a pebble affects the equilibrium of the whole. In the midst of such ever-spreading relation and correlation, every perfection is not only perfect to itself, but gives perfection,—directly to some other, indirectly to the rest. It spreads, communicates, diffuses itself. Each entity does this in various ways. To one fellow-entity it serves as efficient cause,—to another, it may be, as part of itself,—to another, as a convenience or pleasure,—to the whole, as contributing to its beauty and the complement of its perfection. Thus there is no Being whatsoever which cannot become in some way or other an object of the human will, as fitted for some end or purpose.

ii. This truth is further confirmed by an argument drawn from the well-known division of Being. For all Being is either Infinite or finite. There is no middle term. Now, finite Being is a partial, remote, *similitudinal*, participation of the Infinite. The latter, therefore, is an Infinite Good to the former, by virtue of this similitudinal participation. God is in effect Good to finite Being as Exemplar, Efficient, and Final Cause. On the other hand, finite Being is in its turn a good to the Infinite, as the copy is to the Pattern, as the representation to the Represented, as the effect to its Cause.

iii. The Truth of the present Proposition receives additional confirmation from induction of facts. For, in the first place, every Accident is good to the Substance which it can or does inform. So, in material substances, the Form is a good to the Matter, the Matter to the Form, and the Union to both. So, the Whole is a good to its Parts; its Parts to the Whole; which occasions the remark of the Angelic Doctor, touching material things, that 'Each Part naturally loves the common Good of the Whole, more than its own particular Good. This is plainly shown by its action; for each

Part is principally inclined to that action which conduces to the common advantage of the Whole¹. Again: it is equally plain that integral composite substances are a good to some one or other of the creatures that surround them. Some are good, as supplying necessities of life,—some, as objects of art and profitable labour,—some, for the pleasure they afford,—some, for their beauty,—some, for their usefulness—all, in one way or another, as symbols of that which is higher and nobler than themselves. Man is a good to man in numberless ways so evident as to spare one the necessity of pausing over them. Pure spiritual Forms are a good to each other and a good to man, by a variety of service. Lastly and principally, God is the supreme, infinite, necessary, unalienable, Good to each and all of His creatures.

Therefore, to conclude:—There is no Being of whatsoever kind which, in so far as its Being, is not good.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The first objection that occurs, concerns the nature of mathematical entities. For it must be admitted that they are real entities; otherwise, if they were mere logical entities, they could not embody necessary truths objective to the intellect, and could find no place within the sphere of Philosophy properly so-called. Further, they could provide us with no necessary and eternal laws, to which material things are naturally subject. But, as a fact, they do supply us with such laws; and nothing can be naturally more certain than mathematical deduction. Moreover, the Philosopher claims a place for mathematics, higher than is attainable by any physical discipline, in the commonwealth of sciences; mathematical entities, therefore, are undoubtedly real. But Aristotle denies that they have anything to do with Goodness. Therefore, there are some real entities which are not good.

ANSWER. To reply in brief:—mathematical entities are good like all other entities; but they are abstractively, so to say, (i.e. *as* mathematical entities), neither good nor bad. This needs explaining. The subject-matter of mathematics is quantity con-

¹ 'Unaquæque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere. Quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius.' 2-2^o xxvi, 3, c.

tinuous and discrete. Now, quantity itself is good, like every other Being;—good to substance which it informs, good to the other accidents which it immediately sustains. Without it, no extension in space; without it, no local separation; without it, no sensible phenomena. It is quantity that introduces material substance to our sensible perception. But quantity, as it really exists in the nature of things, is not, cannot be, the subject-matter of mathematics. It needs purifying by process of intellectual abstraction. Hence, the mathematical science is said, by the School, to be conversant with intelligible matter,—with matter, as cognizable by us through its primary accident,—with intelligible matter, because it has become subject of intellectual abstraction. But, in this process of abstraction, all that is causative of motion or inclination in others, is eliminated; consequently, all that partakes of the nature of a final cause, in other words, its Goodness. Nor is it true, that the Philosopher denies to mathematical entities the attribute of Goodness. What he does say is, that ‘the mathematical sciences make no account of the good or bad in entities¹,’ and this remark is in exact correspondence with the explanation just given. The answer of St. Thomas to the difficulty is the same. He says: ‘Those things which come under the observation of a mathematician are good, according to the existence which they have in nature. For the Being of a line or of a discrete quantity is of itself good. But they are not considered by the mathematician according to their simple Being, but only according to their specific nature. For he considers them in the abstract; and abstracts are not real, but conceptual in their formation. . . . Wherefore, the idea of Goodness does not attach to a line or discrete quantity, when considered mathematically; although the line and discrete quantity are (in themselves) good².’ And the reason why the idea of Goodness does not attach to them when mathematically treated, is, that ‘they abstract from motion and from matter’

¹ Τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. *Metaph.* ii. (al. iii) c. 2, in i.

² ‘Ea de quibus mathematicus considerat, secundum esse quod habent in rebus, bona sunt. Ipsum enim esse lineae vel numeri bonum est; sed a mathematico non considerantur secundum suum esse, sed solum secundum rationem speciei. Considerat enim cum abstractione. Non enim sunt abstracta secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem. . . . Et ideo ratio boni non competit lineae vel numero secundum hoc quod cadunt in consideratione mathematica, quamvis linea et numerus bona sint.’ *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, ad 4^m.*

(i.e. sensible matter); 'and, in this way, they abstract from the idea of a final cause, which has a motive nature¹;' for which reason, the end, or final cause, of an action is commonly called the *motive*.

II. It would seem, at first sight, as though primordial matter could not be good; yet, it is evidently, in some way or other, Being. And the reason why it would seem as though it could not be good, is this. All that is really good must exist or, at least, must be formally and proximately capable of existence. But primordial matter neither exists nor can exist by itself. Therefore, it cannot be truly denominated good.

ANSWER. i. By a like process of reasoning it would follow, that primordial matter cannot be truly denominated Being; so that the Proposition would remain untouched. For that which neither exists nor is in proximate capacity of existence, is, so far forth, not Being.

ii. The same argument would go to prove that purely material forms are neither good nor Beings; for they cannot naturally exist, save in the matter which they inform. Wherefore, by the composition of two nothings would all material things be formed; and a composite nothingness would become a Good.

iii. The answers hitherto given are purely elenctic; let us now examine the difficulty absolutely in itself. It is, first of all, sufficiently plain that primordial matter, considered by itself separately, is not nothing. For, according to the teaching of the School, it is a subjective potentiality; (as will be explained fully in the fifth Book). Now, a subjective potentiality,—in other words, that which is *in itself* a potentiality and not a mere possible by virtue of the active potentiality of another,—is something real and, consequently, capable of existence. It is true that, on account of its imperfection, it is only capable of conjoint and essentially dependent existence; but this does not prevent its being formally and proximately capable of *co-existence*. Hence, it is Being and good. That it is in such sort Being, is confirmed by the fact that it naturally desires its form, and its form naturally desires it. But that which naturally desires and is the natural object of desire, must be Being and must be good. Furthermore: though the existence of matter

¹ 'Prout abstrahunt a motu et a materia; et sic abstrahunt a ratione finis, qui habet rationem moventis.' 1^o v, 3, ad 4^m.

is essentially dependent on its form; yet it has its own proper and inseparable existence, as included in the existence of the composite whole. Hence it is concluded, that primordial matter is not simply and absolutely good, just as it is not simply and absolutely Being; but that, to adopt the words of the Angelic Doctor; 'as primordial matter is potential and not actual Being, so it is a potential and not actual Perfect, a potential and not actual Good¹.' The same Doctor explains this solution of the present difficulty, at greater length and with greater clearness, in a passage which shall be quoted by way of conclusion to the answer. 'Every thing,' he remarks, 'that is potential of the Good, for the very reason that it is potential of the Good, has an orderly relation to the Good; because potentiality is nothing more or less than the being ordained for actuation. It is plain, then, that whatever is potential, for the very reason that it is potential, partakes of Goodness. Wherefore, every subject, so far as it is potential in regard of any whatsoever perfection,—even primordial matter,—for the simple reason that it is potential, partakes of Goodness. . . . Primordial matter is not denominated Being, save potentially; and receives Being, simply by virtue of its form. But it has its potentiality from itself; and since potentiality partakes of the nature of Goodness, as we have said; it follows, that Goodness attaches to it in its own right².'

PROPOSITION CI.

**There are three elements, or constituents, of finite Goodness, viz.,
Measure, Species, Order.**

PROLEGOMENON.

When it is said in the Enunciation, that there are three elements of created Goodness, the expression must be understood *meta-*

¹ 'Sicut materia prima est ens in potentia et non in actu; ita est perfecta in potentia et non in actu, et bona in potentia et non in actu.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 2, ad 3^m.*

² 'Omne quod est in potentia ad bonum, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia ad bonum, habet ad bonum ordinem; cum esse in potentia nihil aliud sit quam ordinari in actum. Patet ergo quod id quod est in potentia, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia, habet rationem boni. Omne ergo subjectum, in quantum est in potentia respectu cujuscumque perfectionis, etiam materia prima, ex hoc ipso quod est in potentia, habet boni rationem. . . . Materia prima non dicitur ens nisi in potentia, et esse simpliciter habet per formam; sed potentiam habet per seipsam. Et cum potentia pertineat ad rationem boni, ut dictum est, sequitur quod bonum conveniat ei per seipsam.' *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 2, c. init.*

physically. We must not for one moment be deceived into the idea, that there are certain real parts which together constitute Goodness. For Goodness itself includes *really* nothing that, other than conceptually, is distinct from Being. It is simply Being itself with a conceptual connotation, as we have already seen. What is meant, is this; that, in the essence of finite Being, there are three notes or characteristics which formally constitute its perfection in itself, its consonance with other Being, and, consequently, its appetibility. As the Angelic Doctor observes, 'Measure, Species, and Order, are denominated good and entities, not as if they were themselves, so to say, subsisting; but, because, by virtue of these, other things are both entities and good. Wherefore, there is no need of their having some other things, by which they are good themselves. For, when it is said that they are good, it is not meant that they are formally good to things distinct from themselves; but that, by virtue of them, certain things are formally good ¹.'

SCHOLION.

The doctrine enunciated in this Proposition is derived from St. Augustine; who so explains those words of Holy Writ, '*Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight*' (Wisdom xi. 21); understanding by number, *Species*, and by weight, *Order*.

As this Thesis is of a nature to require declaration rather than proof, and as the Angelic Doctor is the one from whom we have received the Augustinian idea in its present scientific form, it will be most convenient to open up the question with that Doctor's exposition. 'Everything,' he remarks, 'is denominated good, forasmuch as it is perfect, for thus it is desirable; and a thing is said to be perfect, in which there is nothing wanting proportioned to the measure of its perfection. Now, seeing that everything is what it is, by virtue of its form, and that the form presupposes certain things, while certain other things necessarily follow upon it; in order that a thing may be perfect and good, it must necessarily be in possession of its form, of the prerequisites, and of the consequents, of this latter. Now, form *prerequisites* the determination or commensuration of its causes material or efficient. This is

¹ 'Modus, species, et ordo, eo modo dicuntur bona sicut et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua alia quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi formaliter aliis sint bona, sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt bona.' 1^o v, 5, ad 2^m.

signified by *Mode* or *Measure*. . . . The form itself is signified by *Species*; for everything is specifically constituted by its form. . . . The consequent of form is an inclination towards its end, or to activity, or to something of this kind. For everything, in so far as it is actual, 'acts and tends towards that which accords with its form. And this is what is meant by *Weight* or *Order*¹.' It is necessary to call the reader's attention to the fact, that St. Thomas is not here referring to the physical form of finite Beings, but to the metaphysical form or, in other words, the specific nature of each, which he regards as received in the individual. If this is not carefully realized, there is danger of failing to see, (as some have failed to see), the identity between the Angelic Doctor's teaching in this and in the following passage. Speaking, then, in another place of these three elements of goodness, St. Thomas says that 'the last, viz. *Order*, is that respect' (or connotation) 'which is expressed by the word *Good*; but the other two, viz. *Species* and *Measure*, are the causes of that respect' (connoted in the idea of Goodness). 'For *Species* belongs to the specific nature itself; and this nature, as having existence in any given individual, is received after a certain determined *Mode* or *Measure*; since everything that is in a thing, is in it after the measure of the recipient. Thus then, every *Good*, in that it is perfection by virtue of its specific nature and of its being, has *Measure*, *Species*, and *Order*;—*Species*, by reason of its specific nature; *Measure*, by reason of its existence; *Order*, by virtue of its perfective character².'

¹ 'Unumquodque dicitur bonum, in quantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile. . . . Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam, forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et ea quae praeexiguntur, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio, sive commensuratio principiorum seu materialium seu efficientium ipsam. Et hoc significatur per modum. . . . Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem; quia per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur. . . . Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid hujusmodi. Quia unumquodque, in quantum est actu, agit et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad pondus et ordinem.' I^{ae} v, 5, 0.

² 'Ultimum, scil. *ordo*, est respectus quem nomen boni importat; sed alia duo, *species* scil. et *modus*, causant illum respectum. *Species* enim pertinet ad ipsam rationem speciei, quae quidem, secundum quod in aliquo esse habet, recipitur per aliquem modum determinatum; cum omne quod est in aliquo, sit in eo per modum recipientis. Ita igitur unumquodque bonum, in quantum est perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, habet modum, speciem, et ordinem; speciem quidem,

For the purpose of facilitating the apprehension of this somewhat abstruse doctrine, it may not be amiss to open ground with a simple illustration.

Let us suppose that the construction of a Town-Hall has been undertaken. The first thing would necessarily be, to have the architectural plan,—or say, a more or less general artistic idea. But the next question would be, with what material it should be constructed; whether (as in some countries) with wood, or with brick, or with stone. The nature of the ground, climate, civic customs, the position in the streets, and other similar matters, have to be considered; and the architect's general idea would require modification, in the working plan, conformably with these considerations. When the building has been erected, in proportion as the plan and the execution have been perfect, will it be a desirable Town-Hall for the citizens, i.e. a real good to them. Now, in this example, the architect's first idea represents the *Species*; the practical realization of the idea in the constructed edifice, would stand for its *Measure*; and the advantage of the Town-Hall for public meetings and similar purposes, would embody its *Order*. With the aid of this illustration, let us consider these three elements of Goodness separately.

I. One element of Goodness is *Species*, or the *Specific Nature*. It naturally comes first in the consideration of the present subject; because it is the principal and central element. For *Measure* is its prerequisite; *Order*, its consequent. The specific nature is the source of unity in entities,—not of individual unity which is the foundation of variety and distinction, but of that essential unity which groups, and reduces into order, and is parent, of all Science. Indeed, it may be said that it is the root of individual unity; for in simple Being it, so to speak, constitutes this unity, as St. Thomas teaches; and what would composite substance become but an accidental and chaotic collection, if there were no specific nature to bind together in one the various parts? Take a man, by way of example; and begin by examination of his body. Apart from his individual characteristics, the body of *James* is, plainly enough, constructed after a definite type. There are a great number of points, wherein it is of precisely the same cast as the

quantum ad ipsam rationem; modum, quantum ad esse; ordinem, quantum ad ipsam habitudinem perfectivi.' *De Verit. Q. xxi, a. 6, c. in fi.*

bodies of other men. There is a similar organic structure, similar distribution of vital organs, the same number of limbs and members, a similar proportion between them. Such is the essential nature of the human body. But what would be the good to us, or even to itself, of a body as this without life? There would be eyes without sight, ears without hearing, hands without touch, legs without motion, lungs without breath, a heart without circulation of blood. That which gives real unity of person and of action to this material structure is, the *soul* of James. Take now the soul of James. It too has its individual characteristics; but these can be dismissed for the moment. That soul, like the body, has been created on a certain type. In many respects, it is like all other human souls. It has sensitive faculties, vegetative and animal life; and it is gifted with the two characteristic faculties of intellect and will. All these it is, or has, in its own simple substance; but the sensitive faculties it cannot naturally use, save in and through the body. Therefore, it essentially requires its partner for the complement of its natural perfection; consequently, in itself it is an incomplete substance. In these and similar respects, we have all been formed in one mould. Well, these essential notes which principally constitute James in soul and body, which constitute him a man and not a brute or a plant, make up together his specific nature, or Species. Whatever he receives additional as James, (i. e. as this individual), is illuminated, perfected, made reasonable, beautiful, by this Species. Hence the origin of the Latin word, *Speciosus*, fair of form; which suggests that human beauty is derived from the Species, or specific nature. And, if it were not so, the ideal beauty of man, such as is in some measure represented by the Apollo Belvidere, would be a simple anomaly; for if there were no typical man, or specific unity, there could be no common measure of perfection. To resume the exordial illustration; if there were no common type in art of a *Town-Hall*, (as specifically distinct from other buildings, such as *churches*, *galleries*, *theatres*, *shops*, *private dwellings*, and the like), the former would be undistinguishable from the latter; and to require a plan, in the severe sense of the term, would be simply ridiculous. Or, to pursue the illustration, if there were no general types of *Greek*, *Byzantine*, *Italian*, *Gothic*, architecture and of the various species of each; building would become, what it was in the last and in the earlier part of the present century, an unsightly heaping

together of incongruities. Style connotes Species. Thus, then, perfection and, consequently, Goodness, is principally founded in the specific nature of Being.

II. Another element of Goodness is *Measure* or *Mode*. That which is received, (to quote an axiom of the Schools), is received according to the Measure of the receiver. Thus, *water*, poured into a glass, accommodates itself to the Measure of the glass in which it is received. So, external material objects are received in the human intellect; not in their own material Measure, but intellectually according to the Mode of the faculty that receives them. The same may be said of the same objects, as intentionally received into one or other of the senses. Similarly, the architectural idea of our Town-Hall is, as it were, received into the existing structure according to the Measure of its material, standing-ground, environments, and the like. Now, in the composite entities of nature, there are two things requisite, antecedently to their production;—matter out of which they are formed, and an efficient cause. By efficient cause is here meant a *secondary* efficient cause; not the First Cause. Both these regard formally and immediately the existence of the thing; just as bricks and masons are formally connected with the existence of the building. And, in this way, matter is not here considered *in general*, (for as such it enters into the specific nature), but *this* matter which is preredquired to the evolution of *this* form; and, therefore, to the existence of the individual entity,—that which the Doctors of the School intended by their *materia signata*. It is evident, then, that the specific nature, in the case of composite entities, is measured or modified by the preajacent matter, out of which it is evolved as an existing reality. If the preparation of the matter for the evolution of the form be incomplete or defective, the specific nature will be measured and determined in its actuation by such incompleteness or defect. Hence the origin of monsters. But the modification of the specific nature does not depend on the matter alone or principally; but on the second prerequisite, viz. the efficient cause. No effect can go beyond its cause; and the specific nature, as received in the individual and existing, is the effect of the efficient cause that produces it. Thus, the *idea* of a *picture* may be perfect; yet, when carried out into execution and produced on the canvas, it may be terribly defective, owing to a want of practical skill in the painter. So, in the things of nature, a similar modification will

be generated in the effect, by defect in the efficient cause. This is the reason why there are hereditary taints. As yet, in both cases, *defect or incompleteness* alone has been considered as a cause of modification; but the remark equally applies to *excellence and completeness* in the preparation or organization of matter, and in the efficiency of the productive cause. A *statue* would come better out of *Parian marble* than out of *plaster of Paris*. The importance of efficiency in the cause is evinced by the value attached to the genealogy of animals; as of horses, for instance, and bulls. It is thus, then, that the specific nature becomes modified in each individual, and assumes distinctive notes, by which an endless variety is produced in the same Species. Unity in plurality, or variety, is a property, to say the least, of beauty and perfection. Species gives the unity; Measure, the plurality. And, as this variety is an element in the perfection of the entity itself and of its Goodness for itself; so is it likewise an element in its perfectiveness or Goodness for another. It is true that those modifications and varieties are incidental; but then, it must be remembered, it is only through and by its accidents, that one nature acts upon another. No one would be inclined to disown the respective, yet utterly distinct, merits of a *greyhound* and a *bull-dog*; yet here the specific nature is most probably the same, and the modifications are accidental. The same may be said of the difference between *Mocha* and other kinds of coffee, and of the difference between a *crab-apple* and a *Ribston-pippin*. In ascending upwards to man, these individual varieties become more pronounced; because the bodily modifications are brought out in stronger relief by modifications of the soul. Hence, countless varieties of expression in the countenance, of tones of voice, of walk, of gesture, of action;—to say nothing of those individual notes which are entirely bodily or entirely spiritual. These two elements, therefore, together constitute the perfection, or intrinsic Goodness, of finite Being; and they are causes of the last element which remains to be considered.

III. The third element of Goodness is *Order*. The visible creation is not a fortuitous aggregation of independent entities. It is an interwoven chain; and each link is supported by its neighbours, and gives strength, beauty, continuity, to the whole. For each finite Being is finitely perfect; and its finite perfection is a thing of growth and time. It seeks, therefore, outside itself for

that which will aid in the increase of its own perfection. To this end, there is implanted in its nature an appetite, or desire, for such external Good; and, consequently, that external Good becomes the end or object of the desire, and prompts it to activity. In man, it becomes, by virtue of his intellect, the intention of his action. And thus we are confronted, spite of ourselves and by the logic of facts, with that doctrine of final causes, which it has pleased certain modern 'philosophers' to visit with contempt and invective. It is, in reality, final causes which give to all created things the unity of a whole. But, since it is the intrinsic perfection of an entity which makes it to be perfective of another, and since the intrinsic perfection of each individual entity consists in its specific nature and its individual modification, it follows that *Measure* and *Species* are the causes of *Order*. Thus, as the Angelic Doctor puts it in a passage already quoted, *Species*, *Measure*, *Order*, are the three constituents of Goodness; and of these, *Species* represents the essential nature; *Measure*, existence, or the individual modifications; *Order*, the perfectiveness of the *Good*, which is the formal characteristic of Goodness.

ARTICLE II.

Divisions or Determinations of Goodness.

PROPOSITION CII.

Goodness is either natural, moral, pleasurable, or useful.

PROLEGOMENON I.

The ancient division, universally adopted by the School, was tripartite, viz. *honestum*, *delectabile*, *utile*. But, apart from the difficulty of exhibiting the first in an English dress,—the same authorities, who have handed down this division of the Good, acknowledge that the *bonum honestum* is capable of subdivision, forasmuch as it includes the *naturally* Good, (or, as they called it, *bonum naturae*), as well as the *morally* Good, (*bonum per se decens*). Now, since there would seem to be as great a distinction between the *naturally* Good and the *morally* Good as there is between the *naturally* Good and the *pleasurably* Good, and since the difficulty just mentioned had to be overcome; the *bonum honestum* has been eliminated, and its two species substituted in its place. The reason why the ancients combined them in one, is this; that they agree,

as to a most important point, in the nature of their perfectiveness. For both are consonant with human nature in themselves, that is, by virtue simply of their own intrinsic perfection ; as will be explained more fully in the declaration of the Thesis.

PROLEGOMENON II.

In this Article, Goodness is considered in its formal character as *perfective*, in other words, *as good for another*.

PROLEGOMENON III.

The above division primarily regards *human* Good, or that which is a Good to man ; nevertheless it is capable of application to the Good generally. So says St. Thomas in the following passage : ‘ This division seems properly to belong to human Goodness ’ (i. e. to the Good in relation to man). ‘ Nevertheless, if we consider the nature of Goodness in its higher and wider signification, this division is found to be properly applicable to the Good, considered under the form of Goodness. For a thing is good, forasmuch as it is desirable, and term of the motion of desire ; and we may consider this termination of the motion of desire by the light of the motion of a natural body. Now, the motion of a natural body is *simply* terminated at the last point ; but is, after a manner, terminated at any intervening point, through which it passes to the last point which terminates its motion ; and any point is called a term of motion, inasmuch as it terminates some part of the motion. Again : that which is called the ultimate term of motion, may be understood in two ways ; either as the entity itself towards which the motion tends,’ (and this is *objective*), ‘ such as, for instance, a certain spot, or some form ; or as rest in the possession of that entity,’ (and this is *subjective*). ‘ After the same way, then, in the motion of desire that which is desirable because it terminates the motion of desire *partially* as a means of tending towards something else, is called *useful*. That, again, which is desired as the ultimate end, entirely terminating the motion of desire, because it is something towards which the desire tends for its own sake, is called *honestum* ; because that which is desired for its own sake, is called *honestum*. Lastly, that which terminates the motion of the appetite itself by way of rest in the possession of the object desired, is *pleasurable*¹.’

¹ ‘ Haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius et communius

This exposition of the Angelic Doctor introduces us to the PROOF OR DECLARATION OF THE PROPOSITION. The above division satisfies the three canons of true division, which are these. First, the sphere of each separate part must be less than the sphere of the whole. Secondly, the sphere of all the parts together must be equal to, i. e. neither more or less than the sphere of the whole. Thirdly, the spheres must not cross each other. Therefore, it is a true and exhaustive division. The *Antecedent* is made up of three Members, equivalent to the three canons; and the declaration of it will, therefore, assume a threefold shape.

I. The above division satisfies the first canon, which requires that the sphere of each separate part should be less than the sphere of the whole. Here it will be necessary to premise an observation, which will be of great service in the application of each one of these rules. There is, what may be called, a *material*, and there is a *formal*, subject of division. These rules are applicable to the latter; not to the former, save by accident. Thus, the *solar spectrum* exhibits the seven *prismatic colours* from one ray of white light; it does **not** follow that the division of the prismatic colours into seven is false, because they are all contained, so to speak, in one ray. Hence, St. Thomas remarks, 'the same thing, so far as the subject is concerned, is *honestum* and useful and pleasurable; but these three differ conceptually. For a thing is called *honestum*, because it has a certain excellence worthy of honour, by reason of its spiritual beauty. It is called pleasurable, because it gives rest to desire; useful, because it is referred to some other².' Wherefore,

rationem boni consideremus, invenitur hæc divisio proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est aliquid, in quantum est appetibile et terminus motus appetitus; cujus quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum, secundum quid autem, etiam ad medium per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum. Et dicitur aliquid terminus motus, in quantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter; vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus, vel forma; vel quies in re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum; quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum appetitus, ut quies in re desiderata, est delectabile.' 1^o v, 6, o.

² 'Idem subjecto est honestum, et utile, et delectabile; sed ratione differunt. Nam honestum dicitur, secundum quod aliquid habet quandam excellentiam dignam honore

the same entity may be at once naturally, morally, pleurably, and usefully, good to the same man, yet these four kinds of Good be essentially distinct; for the division does not fall on the subject, but on the attribute. Now, no one of these divisions includes the rest; no one of them separately can include all Good. This will be clearly seen by instituting an examination into the nature of each kind. The naturally and the morally Good agree in this, that the entity, so denominated, is desirable by man for its own sake; so that the appetite tends towards the acquisition of it, as a simple end in and for itself. But they differ in many important respects. For the naturally Good is that which *on its own account* is desirable by man *in relation to his vital action*, of whatever kind that vital action may be. It is, for this reason, called a *Good of nature*, understanding by nature the principle of vital tendency howsoever exhibited, and putting out of consideration the unity of that principle, consequent upon the reduction to order of its complex constituents. Thus, *food* is a natural Good; because it is consonant with, and necessary to, vegetative and animal life in man. For a similar reason, *health* is a natural Good; and, in like manner, *well-disposed organs of sense, bodily strength, and life* itself. So, *knowledge* is a natural Good to the intellectual faculty; so are *sound faculties, and intellectual habits*. To these, perhaps, might be added a *competency, the esteem of others, the normal term of life*. Now, it is plain that natural Good is not limited to man; but must extend itself to every living entity. For every finite Being is perfectible; and naturally seeks its own perfection outside itself. Wherefore, since nature makes nothing in vain; there must be, and is, some external entity, by conjunction with which each Being is naturally perfected. Therefore, that an external entity is desirable to such finite Being for its own sake, is in itself consonant with the nature of that Being; consequently, a natural Good. Hence it may be said that, of the three kinds of Goodness, the natural Good comes nearest, in its essence and in the extent of its periphery, to Transcendental Goodness.

Moral Goodness, or the morally Good, *is that which is on its own account* desirable by man *in relation to his moral nature*. Nature is now no longer considered as the mere principle of vital tendency,

assumed, as it were, indiscriminately; but as that same principle reduced to a harmonious whole. Butler has shown us, in his sermons on this subject, that human nature, strictly so called, is a commonwealth of faculties and of tendencies, in which there are subordination and supreme rule. Of this commonwealth reason is the queen; free-will, the chief executive. To these two faculties all the other faculties and tendencies, by the constitution of man's nature, are subordinated; wherefore, that will be a moral Good to man, which is in itself consonant with right reason and, therefore, fitting object of desire to the will, or spiritual appetite, as directed by the reason. This moral Good may be considered under three distinct forms. For *the acts* of virtue are in themselves formally good, whether of the intellect as supplying the intention, or (and that principally) of the will, freely choosing that which is consonant with right reason. Then, virtuous *habits* are paramountly good in the moral order; not only because they facilitate the action of the will and give to it a stability in the pursuit of what is right, but because they are formed by a repetition of ordered and becoming acts in the same direction. Lastly, virtuous acts and habits presuppose a moral Goodness in the formal object. For a right action does not constitute, it presupposes, the Goodness in the object; wherefore, St. Thomas calls this last the *primordial*¹ in moral Goodness. From what has been said it is manifest, that moral Goodness is only possible to spiritual Beings; since they alone have reason and will.

Moral Goodness is, therefore, essentially distinct from mere natural Goodness; which is made patent by three of its primary characteristics. For, first of all, its periphery is narrowly limited; seeing that of the whole visible creation it connotes man alone, whereas natural Goodness includes, in its connotation, every real finite Being. Secondly, it is formally desirable by *the will* of man only; whereas the merely natural Good is formally desirable by every vital appetite, and, when it is desirable by the will, it ceases to be merely natural, and becomes moral, Good. Lastly, in the case of man himself, the two kinds of Good are quite distinct; so much so, that they are often in antagonism. *Life* is the highest of natural Goods; yet circumstances arise,—as for instance when the salvation of our own country is at stake, or the open profession of

¹ *De Ma. Q. ii, a. 3, c.*

our faith is a plain duty,—in which the preservation of life would be undeniably a moral evil. Knowledge is a conspicuous natural Good; yet if it should defile the imagination, or stimulate the passions, or engender a spirit of insubordination to constituted authority or of discontent with one's state in life, or should make a man conceited, presumptuous, it would not be, to such an one, a moral Good. So, a competency is a natural Good; but, if it has been gained by dishonest tricks in trade, by miserly thrift at home, by an habitual disregard for the just claims of the poor, it is a moral evil of no ordinary magnitude.

Pleasurable Goodness is essentially distinct from the two preceding kinds. This will be seen by an examination into its nature, which shall now be prosecuted under the guidance of the Angelic Doctor. To all natural motion there are two terms, or ends; one objective to the thing that is moved, the other subjective. For a body in motion arrives at a certain point which is the end of its motion; and that point is its *terminus*, or objective term. But, observe, it *stops*. That stopping is its own; it has nothing to do with the terminal point of motion. It is the body's rest, which is purely subjective to it. And, if the body were conscious, it would little matter to it, desiring rest, at what point it stopped; so long as it could remain quietly there. Now, desire, or appetite, is the motion of a faculty towards its object which is consonant with such faculty and, therefore, its Good. When it has obtained possession of that object, the motion of desire ceases; for the faculty has, as it were, reached its terminal point in the possession of its Good. That possession produces a quiet, a sense of satisfaction, in the faculty so actuated; and this quiet is what is meant by pleasure. Hence, in the motion of desire there are two terms; viz. the object of the appetite, or the Good aimed at, and repose in possession of the object. From the description thus given it will be seen, that pleasure or delectation must accompany the actuation of every faculty, at least in sentient natures. For, when a faculty is in complete act, it is so far in possession of its object, and rests; whereas, before that, it was subject to the motion of tendency, from the moment that it was first awakened from its facultative indifference by the object coming within view. The subjoined clause, *at least in sentient natures*, must not be passed over without notice. For, though inanimate things, and those which have a vegetable life only, rest in the object possessed; yet, they have no

pleasure or delectation, save metaphorically. For it is a necessary condition of pleasure, that it should be accompanied by some sort of apprehension, i. e. that there should be *consciousness* of the rest in possession of the coveted Good; and, in proportion as that apprehension is of a higher order, so will the pleasure, *caeteris paribus*, be more intense. But, to resume:—it is plain that delectation of one kind or other accompanies every vital act. Yet, it is not every delectation that is of such a nature as to allure man to pursue it for its own sake. Hence, when it is a question of pleasurable Good, by *pleasurable* is understood that which affords *sensile* pleasure, or a feeling of repose in the senses. But here, to avoid all difficulties, we must not misunderstand the word, *quiet*. It does not exclude all motion; but only the motion of tendency. A billiard ball may rest on a certain spot of the table, and yet revolve with great speed,—the result, not unfrequently, of a screw stroke. The ball in such case rests, and does not rest. It rests in its acquisition of that spot; but it does not rest within the sphere of its own entity. So, sensible pleasure is not the rest of sleep, but the repose of wakeful activity. Again, as sensile possession is not simple, instantaneous, and indivisible, the sensile Good may be more and more possessed; so that there may be partial possession in every part of the motion, as in the case of the motion of natural bodies. Wherefore, there may be partial delectation, accumulating in proportion as the faculty nears the full acquisition of its object. Now, accordingly as this sense of satisfaction or repose is more active and vivid, it becomes more attractive; and this is one reason why, as a rule, the young are more subject to the influences of sensual pleasure than those who are advanced in life. When this vital rest or satisfaction, arising from the union of any one of the senses with its object, is intense; the human will is prone to pursue the object, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the mere sensual satisfaction; and that which causes the satisfaction is called a pleasurable Good. In such cases, the acquisition of the sensile entity, in and for itself, is not the object of desire; but the repose and satisfaction which the object brings with it, and that alone. To take an instance:—a drunkard does not continue his potations, because the liquor he is taking allays the natural appetite of thirst; but he takes it, because it causes a pleasing rest of the nerves for the time being, or an animal hilarity, or a relief from bitter memories. Nor is it the liquor for itself that he desires, for some-

times it is positively nauseous, as in the instance of *absinthe* or *laudanum*; and, in most cases, confirmed drunkards are not particular as to what they take, so long as the desired effect is produced. So,—to take a more agreeable example,—people will go to the sea-side, some at least, not for the sake of health only or principally, but because the presence of the sea is an intense pleasure to them. The sight of its broad expanse, the heavings of its bosom, the sunlight bespangling it with countless jewels, the cloud-shadows that make floating islands on its green waters, the dying murmur of its tide upon the shore, produce a sensile pleasure, not unmixed with higher delectation. We seek the sea in such case, not for the mere sight or hearing of it, but for the wondrous sense of calm which it causes in the soul. That the sphere of the pleasurable Good is less than that of the Good generally, needs no proof; for there are many real Goods which are not pleasurable. *Medicine* is undeniably a Good to those who are sick; but no one will be inclined to maintain that it is for the most part delectable. So, the *extraction of a tooth* is often a great Good; but there is very little sensile repose in the operation. Thus, then, the pleasurable Good satisfies the first Canon.

There now remains the *useful* Good. When an entity is not an object of desire or will, either for its own sake or because of the sensible gratification which it affords; it may, for all that, become an object of desire. But how? In what element of its nature is that congruity with the desire discoverable, which can justify it in claiming the title of a Good? The answer is, that it may become an object of desire and exhibit the nature of a Good, inasmuch as it is the necessary, or most commodious, or certainly a commodious, means of obtaining another Good which we desire for its own sake. Thus, let it be supposed, for the sake of illustration, that *a man desires to divide a piece of wood*. It matters little or nothing to the aptness of the illustration, whether the severing of the wood be itself a merely useful Good or, as it might possibly be, a moral Good. So, let it be taken for the latter. The carpenter knows that the saw would be the fittest instrument for the purpose; therefore, without any special predilection for the saw over the axe, adze, gimlet, chisel, screw-driver, or plane, he chooses the saw, because it is the best instrument for effecting his purpose. His desire is for the saw, therefore, not because of any special and independent congruity of the saw with any vital action of his own;

but because it is the most commodious instrument for attaining the end which is the ultimate object of his will. So, a man may have an intense aversion to *railway-travelling*, and yet may be frequently found in a train; because it is his only means of arriving at a place which he must visit, and of afterwards returning home. It needs no proof, that the Useful does not include every kind of Good within its category; therefore it too, as one of the dividing members, satisfies the first Canon.

II. The division here enunciated will also bear the test of the second Canon, which prescribes that *the sphere of all the parts together must be equal to, that is, be neither more or less than, the space of the whole*. If these four kinds of Good do not make up the sum of Good, then there must be certain Goods which are included under no one of these divisions; in which case, let them be produced. Till this has been done, it is fair to conclude that this anciently accepted division is exhaustive. However, the adequacy of the division admits, in a certain way, of positive declaration. For, between that which is congruous and good in itself and that which is not congruous and good in itself but only for the sake of something else, there is no middle term. Consequently, the division between the *Useful* and the three other kinds which are congruous and good in themselves, is immediate. Now, that which is good and perfective in itself may be so either objectively to the term it connotes (i.e. the perfective entity), or else subjectively. Here, again, it is vain to look for a middle term. But, if it is the former, it is called *honestum* Good; if the latter, *pleasurable* Good. Lastly, the *honestum* Good may connote either the nature of Being as principle of operation or human nature as the principle of moral action; and, here again, there would appear to be no middle term. But the former is called the *naturally Good*; the latter, the *morally Good*.

III. This division satisfies the third Canon, which requires that *the spheres of the parts should not cross each other*. It is very important that this logical Canon should be accurately understood. It does not then, forbid that, among the members of a division, there should be enumerated a part which is constituted by the composition of two other parts already enumerated, provided that the said composition results in the genesis of a new entity distinct from its two parts, according to that formality which is the direct object of division. What it does forbid is, that the same entity

under the same formal consideration should be enumerated twice. These observations will be best understood by an example or two. Physicians tell us that there are really only three primitive colours, *red*, *green*, and *blue*; and that the other prismatic colours result from the combination of these three. *Yellow*, (so they say), is produced by the direct mixture of prismatic *green* and *red*; and so on, for the rest. Yet, for all that, the division of the colours into *red*, *orange*, *yellow*, *green*, *blue*, *violet*, *indigo*, and the *half-ghostly lavender*, would not offend against this last Canon; because the mixture or combination produces a colour entitatively distinct from both of its two constituents. But now, on the other hand, if *animal* were divided into *man*, the *brute*, and the *quadruped*, the division would sin against this third Canon; because *quadruped* is included under the *brute*, and hence the sphere of the one crosses the sphere of the other. In fact, it will be found on investigation to violate the second Canon. For let *man* be *a*; the *brute*, *b*; the *quadruped*, *q*; and let *x* represent *animal*. The equation would then be, according to the second rule of division, $x = a + b + q$. Now, the brute is divisible into quadruped and not quadruped; i. e. into *q*, and, say, *y*. Hence, substituting for *b*, $q + y$, the equation will be

$$x = a + q + y + q = a + 2q + y.$$

But *animal* equals *man*, *brute-quadruped*, and *brute-not-quadruped*. Therefore, $x = a + q + y$. Therefore, $a + q + y = x = a + 2q + y$. Therefore, $q = 2q$.

In a word, the members of division, taken together, are in excess of the divided whole. Now, it may easily be, that one and the same entity should offer itself as at once honestly, naturally, pleasurably, and usefully, good; but then, as a natural Good, it is desirable by man under one form; as a moral Good, under another distinct form; and so on, for the other two. When considered or desired as a natural Good, precision is made, by mind and will, of its consonance with man's moral nature, of the pleasure which follows from its possession, and of the advantages accruing from it; and the same may proportionally be said of the others. In order to satisfy the requirements of this last Canon, it suffices to show, that the form, by which each kind is, as it were, constituted, is essentially distinct from the forms of the others. Now, in the discussion touching the first Canon, this has already been sufficiently shown in the instance of natural and moral Good; but there are particular difficulties as regards the other two, which

demand more than a perfunctory notice. Wherefore, they will be reserved for discussion in the two following Theses.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It has been stated, in the declaration with respect to the first Canon, that the natural Good comes nearest to the Transcendental in the extent of its periphery. But this seems to be explicitly contradicted by St. Thomas, who says that 'the Pleasurable is of wider periphery than the Useful and *Honestum*; because everything that is useful and *honestum* is in some way or other pleasurable; but it is not everything that is pleasurable which is called useful and *honestum*¹.'

ANSWER. St. Thomas is here, in accordance with the nature of his subject-matter, using *honestum* in its most restricted, and *pleasurable* in its most extended, signification. As to the former, he tells us in another Article of the same Question, that 'the *Honestum* is, properly speaking, the same as virtue².' Wherefore, he identifies it with the morally Good, to the exclusion of the naturally Good; as might be expected from the fact, that the *Question* alluded to, which is devoted to the discussion *de honestate*, finds a place in the purely ethical part of the *Summa*. On the other hand, that he uses *pleasurable* in its most extended sense, is clearly gathered from his own words. For everything that is virtuous and useful is not *sensibly* pleasurable. It is a virtuous thing *to die for one's country*, or silently and in patience to endure a *calumnious accusation*. So, it is often useful to *take a dose of castor-oil*. But who would be found to maintain that any one of these acts is a source of sensible delectation? But how, then, can the assertion of the Angelic Doctor be justified? In this wise. Every act, whether vital or free, is a perfection acquired by a certain faculty, whose previous *action* was a tendency or motion towards the act. The act constitutes the faculty in a state of rest. Hence, as has been already said, two terms,—the objective and the subjective. The subjective

¹ 'In plus tamen est delectabile quam utile et honestum; quia omne utile et honestum est *aliqua*liter (note the modifying adverb) delectabile, sed non convertitur.' 2-2^{ae} cxlv, 3, c.

² 'Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute.' 2-2^{ae} cxlv, 1, c.

term is the aforesaid repose from motion. Now, strictly speaking, (as St. Thomas teaches), 'for delectation two things are required, viz. the attainment of an agreeable Good, and consciousness of such attainment¹;' or, in other words, rest, and consciousness of rest. But the rest itself may be considered as, in a sort of way, delectable to entities which have no consciousness. In a wide, then, and *analogical* sense, everything which perfects another thing may be called pleasurable to this latter. Strictly speaking, however, consciousness of rest essentially enters into the concept of the Pleasurable. Wherever, therefore, there is rest and consciousness of rest in the attainment of a Good, the object is truly a pleasurable Good. But the object, the faculty attaining such object, and the resulting delectation, may be spiritual or sensile. Wherefore, delectation may be either spiritual or sensile. To which of the two is the term most strictly and properly applied? In order to be able to answer this question to the satisfaction of the reader, it will be necessary to interpose an observation. Since consciousness is a requisite element in delectation; that Good will especially claim the title of delectable, which, when possessed, produces in the possessing faculty a more noticeable rest. The reason is, because, in proportion as the rest is more noticeable, it is less likely to escape notice. Now, it is undeniable that, limiting the question to man's actual condition, the quiet of the senses in the attainment of a sensile Good is the most vivid and provocative of consciousness, as a general rule. Therefore, delectation, or pleasure, in the strictest sense, is predicated of the senses; and a delectable Good is in the same way a sensile Good. Having premised thus much, it is easy to deduce the following conclusions. *First*; if the pleasurable Good is to be understood, in its widest and analogical meaning, for the rest which accompanies every act; it is wider in its periphery than the naturally, or morally, or usefully, Good. But this is not the sense in which the word is used in the division which is now under examination; neither is it the meaning of St. Thomas, in the passage quoted by way of objection. *Secondly*; if the pleasurable Good is understood in its strict sense, as including rest and consciousness of rest, it is necessary to introduce a distinction. If it be question of the Good in its universal application to all real

¹ 'Ad delectationem duo requiruntur; scil. consecutio boni convenientis, et cognitio hujusmodi adeptionis.' 1-2^{ae} xxxii, 1, c.

Being; then, the pleasurable, is of narrower periphery than the natural or the useful, Good. If it be question, on the other hand, of *human* Good only, (and such is the mind of the Angelic Doctor in the passage under consideration), then it is wider in its periphery than either natural, moral, or useful Goodness; for many things are pleasurable, which are naturally and morally evil, and further, are detrimental to our interests. *Lastly*; if the pleasurable Good is to be understood in its strictest sense as applicable exclusively to sensible Good, then it is narrower in its periphery than either the naturally, morally, or usefully Good. It is according to this last meaning, that the word is understood in the Thesis.

II. It is said in the declaration made under the first Canon,—and St. Thomas repeatedly makes a similar assertion,—that the *honestum* Good, including both natural and moral, is distinguishable from the other two, in that it is desirable on its own account or, in other words, for its own sake. But this seems very like putting the cart before the horse. For a natural or moral Good is only desirable for its own sake, because of the intrinsic Goodness or perfection, of whatsoever sort it be, which such object possesses. The question, therefore, turns upon the distinctive nature of such intrinsic Goodness, not on its appetibility which, as has been already shown, is only a consequent of the former.

ANSWER. There is truth in the objection. But the memory of the reader should be recalled to a pregnant observation (already quoted) of the Angelic Doctor, which is to the effect, that primary elements and, consequently, primary ideas, are best explained by their effects or results. If, however, this objection should be still urged, and a declaration as to the intrinsic nature of this Goodness be demanded; the following is the answer. The naturally Good is that entity which, by virtue of its perfection, is of itself absolutely perfective of human nature, considered as the principle of all the vital operations of man; whereas the morally Good is that entity which, by virtue of its perfection, is of itself absolutely perfective of man's moral nature, i.e. considered as principle of free and responsible action. Some have said, that the morally Good is that which is agreeable to right reason. But, if this is to be understood *formally*, it is liable to precisely the same objection as the one now under discussion. For the object is not Good, because right reason pronounces it to be such; on the contrary, right reason

pronounces it to be such, because the object is in itself consonant with man's moral nature. If understood *fundamentally*, it is true.

PROPOSITION CIII.

The pleasurable Good is essentially distinct from the naturally, morally, or usefully Good.

The truth of this Proposition is sufficiently obvious to common sense, and is abundantly confirmed by the experience of life; nevertheless, when considered philosophically, it is beset with peculiar difficulties. For that which is called the pleasurable Good, or the Pleasant, is either the object which causes delectation or the delectation itself. If the former, then it would seem to be identified with the usefully Good; if the latter, one does not see how it differs from the naturally Good. To explain: It is evident that the Pleasure is not in the object, but in the subject that is in possession of the object. Thus when a *child* eats a *sweetmeat*, the Pleasure of the taste is not in the sweetmeat, but in the child. Consequently, the object is sought after, not for its own sake, but for the sensible delectation which it affords. But, when an object is desired simply as a means for producing something else, it is a useful Good. If, however, it should be assumed, that the pleasurable Good is the Pleasure itself, then we are confronted with another difficulty. For, as has been already remarked, when delectation is said to be the rest or quiet of a faculty in the possession of a congenial Good, it must not be supposed that such quiet involves the absence of all motion. There is an end, it is true, to desire or the motion of tendency; but delectation is itself a vital act, though more properly called, perhaps, a *passion*, which, nevertheless, is itself a receiving act. Hence, St. Thomas decides that delectation is a passion; because '*the motion of the sensitive appetite is properly called a passion*¹.' But this motion or act is a vital one; that is, it is natural to the sensitive life of the human soul. As a consequence, delectation would seem to be a natural Good. But, further, it does not seem to be possible that the pleasurable Good should primarily consist in the delectation itself. For the latter presupposes some Good, whose acquisition causes this vital quiet. Neither does the delectation cause the possessed object to be good;

¹ '*Motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur.*' 1-2^o xxxi, 1, c.

on the contrary, the object causes delectation, because it is good. If this be so, then, either the object is a natural Good, or it has some form of Goodness proper to itself; and the division, here proposed, is inadequate.

Such are the difficulties which environ this question; and now for their solution. First of all, then, an appeal must be made to the testimony of common sense. There is no one who doubts that there are pleasurable Goods; and that they are really distinguishable from moral, natural, or useful Goods. Thus, when a *man drinks himself to death*, it is plain that his potations are morally evil. It is equally plain that they are not a natural Good; since they cause a premature death. They cannot be called useful; for there is no other Good which they procure their victim. But it is quite certain that the drunkard experiences in them a pleasure of some sort or other; otherwise, he would not persevere in face of so many powerful motives to deter him. Moreover, such phrases as, *a voluptuary*, *a man of pleasure*, *a man addicted to pleasures*, and others of a like nature, (common to all languages), very clearly indicate the universal recognition of pleasure as an end or Good which some men practically pursue, instead of their natural or moral Good. Yet again; everybody understands that, in such cases, the object of pursuit falls into the background, so to speak; and becomes an object of desire, solely because of the delectation which its possession procures. But, on the other hand, nobody who pays even a slight attention to the matter, can hesitate to own, that it is the acquisition of that particular object which causes the pleasure. The object is not an external means for helping along the road to something else. Its simple possession, solely and absolutely, is a pleasure. *The boy eats his tart*; and the act of eating it, gives him the desired delectation. But, if *a mason takes up his chisel*, the grasp of the chisel causes him no delectation; though, when by means of it he has accurately worked out the moulding, *that may cause him pleasure*. So, *a man takes medicine*, and the operation is anything but pleasurable; yet he feels pleasure afterwards, on finding that his troublesome indigestion has disappeared. Therefore, common sense teaches, that the Pleasurable is quite distinct from the Useful. On the other hand, daily observation shows us that men who have given themselves over to the delights of a favourite passion, will sacrifice their health, fortune, character, prospects, nay their very souls, in the pursuit of such Pleasures. Wherefore,

common sense likewise teaches, that the pleasurable, is really distinct from the moral or natural, Good.

It now remains to see, how this doctrine of common sense can be philosophically maintained; for of this we may be certain, that no true philosophy can ever run counter to common sense. Observe, then, in the first place, that a Good, or object possessed by any given faculty, may be considered in three different ways; viz. objectively, subjectively, and adequately (or both objectively and subjectively). This needs some further explanation. No appetitive faculty is moved to the acquisition of an object, unless that object is con-natural with, and agreeable to it and, as a consequence, a natural Good. When the said faculty is in possession of that object, its tendency is satisfied and quieted; whence arises in the soul a sense of delectation. Now, it is possible for the mind to consider the object thus possessed apart from its actual possession, examining into its intrinsic conveniency with human nature. It is then regarded *objectively*. Again, it is possible to reflect upon the possession simply, and the resultant pleasure; in which case the object possessed is regarded *subjectively*. Or we may consider the object and its possession together; and so, it is adequately regarded. Hence it follows, that the same object, materially speaking, may be at once a moral or natural, and a pleasurable, Good. It is a moral or natural Good *objectively*; and it becomes a pleasurable Good *subjectively*. Accordingly, St. Thomas remarks that the division of the Good, which forms the present subject of inquiry, 'is not according to real, but conceptual, opposition'; i.e. it does not follow that a natural or moral, must necessarily be distinct in reality from a pleasurable, Good, but only that what may be the same Good, is regarded under two distinct and opposite forms. For the acquisition of a natural Good must cause Pleasure; and all Pleasure arises from the acquisition of a natural Good. Nevertheless, as the said distinction or opposition is not purely logical, but conceptual (i.e. founded in reality); it follows that there are two really distinct forms of Goodness, according as the object possessed is regarded objectively or subjectively. For there is the Goodness of the object itself as proportioned and agreeable to human nature; and there is the Goodness of the rest and satisfaction which result from the

¹ 'Haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes.' 1^{ae} v. 6, ad 2^m.

possession of the former. The latter, too, may be said in a certain sense to be natural ; but it is natural subjectively as a passion, not in the same sense as the former is properly denominated a natural Good. Hence it may happen, as has been remarked before, that the two Goods are really distinct. Thus, *stimulants* are a natural evil to an *apoplectic subject* ; yet they are to him, it may be, a pleasurable Good. Here, however, we light upon a fresh difficulty ; for this last observation seems to be in open contradiction with what has been stated before, viz. that all pleasure or delectation arises from the acquisition of a natural Good. But the contradiction is only apparent. For the word *natural* is capable of two meanings. Human nature, like every other nature, may be considered either as a mere collection of parts or of separate constituents ; or, as a composite whole. Each part of our complex nature is natural ; and, consequently, every object that is consonant with, or fitted for, any faculty or sense, is truly a natural Good. But, if human nature is regarded as a whole, it is seen to consist not only of parts, but of *ordered* parts. There is an obvious correlation between them, and a subordination of each part to the whole. Thus considered, that object only can lay just claim to be a natural Good, which is agreeable to the whole physical nature. And thus it comes to pass, that an object may be a natural Good to a separate faculty, which is simply a natural evil to our physical nature, considered as a whole. For instance, a *plunge in the sea during the heats of summer* is a natural Good to a man's sense of touch ; yet, it may be absolutely an evil, if he has a complaint of the heart. To such an extent is this the case, that, universally speaking, over-indulgence of one faculty tends to impair the others and vitiate the whole nature. Hence it comes to pass, that pleasure may arise from the acquisition, by a particular faculty, of a Good connatural with itself ; which acquisition is, nevertheless, injurious to the whole nature. It is obvious, from what has been said, that no other object than that which is consonant with the entire nature, is a natural Good, absolutely and adequately ; whereas, the object which is connatural with a special faculty, is called a natural Good in a secondary and partial sense, or, as the Schoolmen would express it, it is natural *secundum quid*. It is evident, then, that the pleasurable Good is essentially distinct from the natural or moral Good, and that, as the Angelic Doctor remarks, 'Those things are called properly pleasurable, which are only regarded as desirable, by reason of the

delectation which they afford; since it sometimes happens that they are' (physically) 'injurious and morally unfitting'¹. Not that the pleasurable Good objectively and, so to speak, materially, need be really distinct from the natural Good; but, when the appetite seeks a natural Good for the mere gratification afforded by its possession, the natural Goodness is, as it were, accidental, and the object becomes, by virtue of the kind of desire which it has provoked, a pleasurable Good.

That the Delectable is essentially distinct from the Useful, hardly needs any declaration. For that which is merely useful has no convenience in itself with human nature or any constituent of that nature; nor does its possession cause any sensible delectation. It is desired wholly and solely for the sake of something else external to it, and external to the subjective act of possession; whereas the Pleasurable is sought for on its own account, because of the gratification which its presence affords. But it may be objected, that sometimes the possession of the merely Useful causes delectation of itself; as, for instance, when *a long-lost instrument or tool* has been at length found. But it will be seen, on closer examination, that such seeming exceptions only confirm what has been here advanced. For the pleasure, in these and like cases, does not arise from the mere possession of the tool; but from the cessation of trouble in the search,—exemption from the necessity of buying another,—or, because it chanced to be the gift of a friend,—or, for some other similar motive, extraneous to the mere usefulness of the instrument as such.

PROPOSITION CIV.

The usefully Good is essentially distinct from the other three.

The truth of this Thesis, likewise, is not free from difficulties. For, if the Useful be in any sense a real Good, it must have a perfection of its own, by virtue of which it becomes the object of legitimate desire. Nothing can be more plain than that an object could never be useful, unless it had some intrinsic efficacy, helping towards the attainment of that something else, relatively to which it is accounted useful. But that intrinsic efficacy constitutes its

¹ 'Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta.' 1^o v, 6, ad 2^m.

usefulness ; and, therefore, as a natural Good, stimulates desire. If so, how can it be maintained, with any show of justice, that the Useful differs from the rest, in that it is not desirable on its own account, but for the sake of something else? It may be urged against this objection, that the Goodness of the Useful does not consist in its usefulness, but in its connatural proportion with human desire; and that such proportion does not belong to it in its own right, but by reason of the end, towards the attainment of which it is serviceable. Such an answer, however, does not meet the difficulty. For, although it must be allowed that the Useful *presupposes* the fitness or conveniency of the end whose attainment it promotes ; yet, that presupposed, the Useful has *consequently* a fitness and proportion of its own, which causes it to be in itself good and desirable. Again : If the Useful borrows all its suitableness, proportion to human desire, and goodness, from the end whose attainment it subserves ; then it would appear as though the Useful should be subdivided into three kinds, to wit, the morally Useful, the naturally Useful, and the pleurably Useful, according to the nature of the end which it helps to secure. For, such as is the nature of the end, such will be the nature of the means for the attainment of that end ; since, according to the doctrine by which the division contended for is established, the end gives the character of Goodness to the means. Here, again, common sense comes to our aid. For it has been universally recognized that, (let the explanation be what it will), there are certain things which we desire, not on their own account, but because they help to the attainment of some end. No one imagines that there is some intrinsic excellence in a *saw* ; so that, if there were nothing to *sever*, it would nevertheless excite human desire to possess it. Similarly, there is nothing in a *scaffolding* to excite human desire ; if there were any other means equally fitted for purposes of building. And the commonest intelligence perceives, that the Goodness of the Useful is altogether of a different kind from either natural, moral, or pleasurable Goodness.

Now, to look at it philosophically. That perfection which is recognized as the usefulness of the Useful, may be regarded under two aspects ; viz. in its relation to the entity itself which is useful, and in its relation to the appetite of him who desires that entity as a means towards an end. Regarded in the first of these two ways, it cannot be doubted that such usefulness is a real intrinsic perfection,

existing in the useful object; and that it is naturally consonant with, and proportioned to, this latter. Consequently, it is to the same a real natural Good. But, if it is considered in relation to the person who desires the useful object, it is equally plain that in itself it is neither naturally consonant, nor proportioned, nor good; and that it derives such consonancy and proportion, simply and entirely from the end towards the attainment of which it conduces. Take, for instance, a *purgative medicine, such as castor-oil*. Certainly, that cathartic virtue which it has is a perfection of the plant itself, con-natural and proportioned to it; and is, therefore, to the plant a natural Good. But, in what possible way can it be considered as connatural with, or proportioned to, human nature, or to any one of its constituents, so as to excite the appetite of man? It is positively repugnant to more than one of the senses; and can add nothing to the perfection of our nature. But, if a man is ill, and it is necessary that corrupt humours should be expelled; the castor-oil becomes useful as a means for the recovery of health. Its consonancy, therefore, and proportion, in the given case, is purely derived from the end to which it is subservient, viz. the desired restoration of health; and a man would think twice before taking a dose of castor-oil, if he were in a sound condition of body. This declaration is confirmed by reflecting on the nature of a useful Good, which, as merely useful, does not move or attract the appetite to itself, but rather to the end which it subserves. It is the desire of the end, which moves the will to possess the means. If the means moved the will independently, then the means would be an end; which is false and repugnant. Not but that a useful object may be desired in and for itself, yet not as merely useful; and, in such case, it *pro tanto* ceases to be useful, and must be ranged under one of the other forms of Goodness. In fact, all other Goods, properly so called, in their relation to the Supreme Good, are useful, inasmuch as they conduce to Its attainment; but then, they are something more in themselves, which causes them to be *independently* objects of desire.

As to the second difficulty it must be said, that there is no sufficient reason for such a distinction or subdivision; because the usefulness is the same, whether the end desired be a moral, natural, or pleasurable Good. There must be the same adaptation of means to the end; and it is precisely in this adaptation that usefulness consists.

NOTE.

The question has been mooted, whether Goodness is predicated univocally, or only analogously, of these four divisions; and, as its solution serves to throw additional light on the subject of this Article, it would not be well to omit it. The Angelic Doctor resolves the doubt as follows: 'The Good is not divided into these members as a univocal, which is equally predicated of each; but, as an analogous, which is principally predicated of one and, secondarily, predicated of the rest.' And, retaining the old division into the *Honestum*, Pleasurable, and Useful, he goes on to say, that 'it is primarily predicated of the *Honestum*, secondarily, of the Pleasurable, thirdly, of the Useful ¹.' According to the quadripartite division which has been here adopted, the order would be this; first the moral, then the natural, after that the pleasurable, lastly, the useful Good. But it may be further asked, What is the nature of the analogy subsisting between the different kinds of Goodness? Is there one and the same analogy throughout? Now, as regards the Useful, the answer is plain enough. For the Useful borrows all its Goodness from the end which it subserves. As St. Thomas justly remarks, 'since the Good is the Desirable, that which is in itself desirable, is in itself good. Now, this is *the end*. But, because we desire the end, it follows that we desire those things which conspire towards the attainment of the end. Consequently, those things which conspire towards the attainment of the end, for the sole reason that they conspire towards the attainment of the end or Good, themselves attain to the nature of the Good. Hence, useful things are included under the divisions of Good ².' It follows, that the Useful is called Good by an extrinsic denomination. Wherefore, the analogy in its case is an analogy of attribution of the first class, in which the denominated form is intrinsic in the primary analogate, and in the secondary analogate is received by extrinsic denomination

¹ 'Bonum non dividitur in ista tria, sicut univocum aequaliter de his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum quod praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et secundario, de delectabili; tertio, de utili.' 1^{ae} v, 6, ad 3^m.

² 'Cum bonum sit id quod est appetibile, id quod est secundum se appetibile, est secundum se bonum. Hoc autem est finis. Sed quia ex hoc quod appetimus finem, sequitur quod appetamus ea quae in finem ordinantur; consequens est, ut ea quae ordinantur in finem, ex hoc ipso quod in finem vel bonum ordinantur, boni rationem obtineant. Unde utilia sub divisione boni comprehenduntur.' *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 2, c.*

from the form inherent in the primary. In this way, the first three would be principal analogates, and the Useful by itself the secondary; for, in the rest, the form of Goodness is intrinsic. But Goodness is not predicated of the other three univocally; and it remains to see, what is the nature of the analogy which subsists between these. It is quite plain that, in moral, natural, and pleasurable Goodness, there is a real, intrinsic conformity with, and proportion to, human nature; consequently, it cannot be an analogy of attribution of the first class. Furthermore, the perfective form, inherent in each, is generically the same; as consisting of a connaturality with human nature as perfectible. It cannot, then, be an analogy of proportion, wherein the forms of the several analogates are simply different. Consequently, it must be an analogy of attribution of the second class, in which the denominating form is one and the same, and is intrinsic in each one of the analogates; but the form in the secondary analogates has an essential relation to the form in the primary analogate. And, as a fact, so it is. For natural and pleasurable Goodness are really and intrinsically good, because proportioned to human desire; yet they are essentially dependent on moral Goodness, and must be estimated by its measure.

ARTICLE III.

Evil.

As Multitude is the opposite of Unity, and Falsity is the opposite of Truth; so, Evil is the opposite of Goodness. It would appear, then, that each one of the Transcendental attributes has its opposite. If so, how is it that Being, the fourth Transcendental, has no opposite, like its attributes? It is true that there is a logical opposition between Being and not-Being; but not-Being is Nothing, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a metaphysical opposite, which is necessarily in some sort real. It may, consequently, be held for certain, that Being has no opposite such as belongs to Unity, Truth, and Goodness. But why? The matter is worthy of our examination.

What is the nature of the opposition that subsists between the Transcendental attributes and their respective opposites? The opposition is privative, i.e. such as intercedes between a form or perfection and the privation of it; for instance, between sight and

blindness. Multitude is entity deprived of that form of intrinsic indivision which constitutes Unity. Falsity is entity deprived of that perfection of conformity between Being and concept which constitutes Truth. And Evil, as will be seen, is entity deprived of that consonancy and consequent appetibility which constitute Goodness. But a form and the privation of a form demand a Subject. A form informs; and if there be privation, there must of necessity be something or somebody that is deprived. Now, Being is in no Subject; for it is the ultimate, in which are founded all things; itself founded in nothing else. Therefore, it never can become a term of privative opposition. But Unity, Truth, and Goodness are so intimately founded in Being, that the latter enters into the essential declaration of the former. Therefore, they admit of such opposition; since their opposites, like themselves, have Being for their Subject. Such is the explanation of the Angelic Doctor. 'Being,' he remarks, 'is the primal concept of the intellect; wherefore, it can have no opposite in the shape of contrary or privative, but only of negative, opposition; because, as it has no foundation in any Subject, so neither could its opposite. For opposites are referred to the same subject. But Unity, Truth, and Goodness, in their proper concepts, have their proper foundation in the concept of Being. Therefore, they admit of contrary or privative opposition, as based on Being; just as they are themselves based on Being. Hence it is plain, that Truth and Falsity, Goodness and Evil, do not stand to one another in the same relation as Being and Nothing. . . . Wherefore, as every privation of a particular Being has a foundation in the Good; so, the False likewise has a foundation in a truth, because it has a foundation in an entity. Accordingly, as that in which there is Falsity or Evil, is a Being, though incomplete; so, in like manner, that which is evil or false is an incomplete Goodness or Truth¹.'

¹ 'Ens est prima conceptio intellectus. Unde enti non potest aliquid opponi per modum contrarietatis vel privationis, sed solum per modum negationis. Quia, sicut ipsum non fundatur in aliquo, ita nec oppositum suum; opposita enim sunt circa idem. Sed unum, verum, et bonum, secundum proprias intentiones, fundantur supra intentionem entis; et ideo possunt habere oppositionem contrarietatis vel privationis fundatae super ens, sicut et ipsa super ens fundantur. . . . Unde, sicut quaelibet privatio entis particularis fundatur in bono, sic et falsum fundatur in aliquo vero, sicut in aliquo esse. Unde, sicut illud in quo est falsitas et malitia, est aliquod ens, sed non est ens completum; ita etiam illud quod est malum vel falsum, est aliquod bonum vel verum incompletum.' *In 1 d. xix, Q. v, a. 1, ad 8^m.*

It is clear at once, that there can be no contrary opposition, except in relation to one and the same subject. Thus, there is no contrary opposition between *heat in fire* and *cold in water*; though there would be such opposition, if the same water were cold and then hot. So, in like manner, there would be no privative opposition between a *wingless snake* and a *winged bird*; but, if a winged bird lost its wings, or should have been born without them, there would be a privative opposition between its normal and abnormal state. It is worthy of remark, that contrary opposition seems to include privative; but the two differ, in that the latter is a simple defect,—absence or want of due perfection,—while the former, in addition, includes some positive form. Thus, *cold and hot water* are contraries; and *cold water* supposes the privation of the form of heat, but includes (speaking *metaphysically*) the positive form of cold¹.

There are four points, touching the question of Evil, which will be discussed in the present Article. The first regards the precise nature of Evil. The second embraces the divisions of the same. The third is occupied with its causes. The last determines its place in Metaphysics.

A. THE PRECISE NATURE OF EVIL.

PROPOSITION CV.

Evil is the privation of perfection in Being.

The Evil, like the Good, may be understood in two ways. For it may stand either for the subject which is so denominated, or for

¹ It is necessary to be constantly reminding the reader, that he is invited to consider these, and similar, examples from a *metaphysical*, not a *physical*, point of view. Aristotle knew, just as well as our modern physicists, that *cold* is a privation. *Ὅλον τὸ μὲν θεμελίον κατηγορία τις καὶ εἶδος, ἣ δὲ ψυχρότης ἀτέλεια*, are his words in his work *De Generat. et Corrupt.*, L. i, c. 3, p. m.; but *privations*, (though not as *privations*), are in a sense *causes*, and in a sense *accidental Forms*. Cold, for instance, is not a *mere* privation; save as *heat* may be described as a privation of cold. For, first of all, it (i. e. that sensible something which is ordinarily called *cold*) is natural to some bodies. Then, it really acts. It is used medically as an *anaesthetic*. Besides, it is chemically producible. But no natural act terminates in a simple privation; for a simple privation is entitatively nothingness. One almost despairs of ever being able to persuade physicists, that it is lawful to look at the phenomena which are their special study from any other point of view than their own, and to speak of them in terms which are not current in the laboratory or class-book of Physics. Many of these experimentalists are nothing loth to cabin the soul of man in the glass-case of an

the denominating privation itself; just as *white*, for instance, sometimes designates the thing which is informed by the accident, (as when an ethnographist speaks of the *Whites*); sometimes the accident itself, (as when *white* is reckoned among colours according to the vulgar idea). In the one case, Being is represented under the *quasi* form of a privation; in the other case, privation is represented as existing in Being. The difference is of some moment. For, if evil is taken in the concrete, the direct object of thought is Being; if in the abstract, the direct object of thought is not-Being. Now, Being, as such, is always good and desirable absolutely, and is only accidentally avoided; whereas not-Being is absolutely shunned, and is only by accident desired, (i.e. when not-Being is preservative of one's own Being), as a sheep—to adopt the illustration of St. Thomas¹,—desires the absence or non-presence of the wolf. It is evident, then, that, in the present Article, Evil is considered in the abstract as antagonistic to Goodness.

Of the existence of Evil there can be no possible doubt; for we meet with it at every turn in the pathway of life. Indeed, its continuous omnipresence in the universe ever has been, and still is, one of the most perplexing problems proposed to metaphysical inquiry. Many philosophers have been thereby led to sustain the preposterous theory of a duality of principles in the constitution of nature; while others have used it as an argument against either the Omnipotence or the infinite Goodness of the Creator. The solution of the problem belongs to the theologian rather than to the philosopher; for it could never have been discovered by pure reason and, therefore, seems to postulate a Divine Revelation. In Philosophy, the fact of the existence of Evil is accepted simply as a fact; and, the fact being assumed as incontestable, an examination is instituted touching the nature of Evil.

The Proposition consists of two Members or parts. In the former it is asserted, that *Evil is a privation*; in the latter, that *it is a privation in Being*.

I. It is proved that *Evil is a privation* by the following disjunctive syllogism. Evil is either something positive, something purely negative, or something privative. But it is neither some-

electrical machine; but are ready with a protest, when we elevate their *cold*, and *heat*, and *light*, into a higher sphere of contemplation; forgetful of the fact, that there are two sides to the statue.

¹ *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 1, ad 17^m.*

thing positive, nor something purely negative. Therefore, it is a privation. The *Minor* contains two members which will be proved separately.

i. That *Evil is nothing positive*, is proved by a threefold argument, borrowed from the Angelic Doctor. For the Good is essentially desirable; and, consequently, as Evil is opposed to Good, Evil is opposed to the Desirable, as such. But, that whatever is opposed to the Desirable (or, in other words, to appetibility), as such, can be nothing positive, is demonstrably proved in three ways. For, first of all, the Desirable, or object of desire, is an end. Now, the order of ends exactly corresponds with the order of efficient causes; so that, in proportion as the latter is higher and more universal, in a like proportion, the former will be also higher and more universal. The reason is, that the end is the directing intention of the efficient cause. If, then, there be a supreme efficient Cause, there must be a supreme Good or supreme End, under which all other Goods can be reduced. But, further, these two must be identical. For the supreme Cause must be the supreme Mover, Himself therefore unmoved by any other. Wherefore, He must be His own End, or supreme Good; seeing that He is self-moved. Hence, He must be at once Alpha and Omega; the first efficient Cause, and the only final Cause to Himself, (if it may be allowed to use the term *Cause* in His regard), and the ultimate final Cause to every other. As, therefore, from the supreme efficient Cause proceeds all particular or limited Being, so from the supreme Good proceeds all limited Good; and the limited Being and the limited Good are identical, as the supreme efficient and supreme final Cause are identical. For, as the supreme efficient Cause is essential Goodness, and His own essential Goodness is the supreme and complete End,—more especially if we take into account that the effect is of the nature of its efficient cause,—it cannot but be, that Being and the Good should be identical. If, then, all Being is desirable and good; that which is opposed to the Desirable, as such, cannot be Being, i. e. cannot be anything positive. The second argument is this. Every existing entity has a natural inclination and desire for something or other which is agreeable to its nature; and, consequently, that agreeable object must in turn find a consonancy or appetibility in the entity which it thus satisfies. But there is no appetibility in Evil. Wherefore, it cannot be anything positive. There is a further confirmation of the above argument. For that which has

a natural inclination for something agreeable to itself, has a natural inclination for the Good; and, therefore, a concord or consonancy with it. But Evil is opposed to the Good; and, consequently, cannot have a consonancy with it. Accordingly, anything which has such natural appetite or inclination, cannot be evil. But all Being, i.e. everything that is positive, has this natural inclination. Therefore, Evil cannot be anything positive. Lastly: there is nothing which is a more prominent and stronger object of desire than Being itself. Wherefore, everything naturally desires the preservation of its own being; and avoids and resists, with all its might, whatever tends to the destruction of its being. Consequently, Being is itself especially desirable. If, then, Evil is opposite to the Desirable as such, and *universally* opposed to it; it follows, that it is opposed to Being and cannot be anything positive¹.

The same assertion, that *Evil can be nothing positive*, follows as a Corollary from the hundredth Proposition, in which it is declared that every Being, *as such*, i.e. so far as it is something positive, is Good; whence it is concluded, that nothing which is positive can be evil, in so far as it is positive.

ii. *Neither can Evil be a pure negation.* For the only negation that can be supposed in the case, is negation of some perfection. But, if Evil were a pure negation of some perfection, it would follow that every finite Being would be *ipso facto* essentially evil. For, to be finite, means to have a limit; i.e. to have a perfection limited off from ulterior perfection. Consequently, finite Being means Being with a negation of ulterior perfection; that is, Evil according to the hypothesis. In this way a man would be evil, because he had not the wings of a bird, or the strength of a lion, or the swiftness of a race-horse; and a beast would be evil, because it has not the mind of a man; and a stone evil, because it has not the vegetative life of a plant. Again; it would follow, that entities not yet existing would be evil, as including in themselves the negation of existence. And so, all future generations of men and things would be evil, because they came to be.

It only remains, therefore, that Evil should be a privation; that is, the absence, or want, or (if you please) the negation, of a *due* perfection. The word, *due*, which contains within it the *differentia*

¹ See St. Thomas, *De Ma. Q. I, a. I, o.*

(or essential characteristic) of privation, leads to the second Member of the present Proposition.

II. *Evil is the privation of perfection in Being.* This second Member of the Proposition follows, as a Corollary, from the former. It only requires a distinct conception of the term, *privation*. For a privation of perfection is the absence or want of a perfection which ought to be there. But where? Surely, a privation essentially connotes something that has been deprived of something else; in other words, a Subject of such privation. It further denotes that this something, or Subject, has a natural claim to that of which it has been deprived; for here is precisely the difference between privation and simple absence. A man is properly said to be deprived of sight, but the same cannot be said of a stone; because sight is a natural perfection of the former, while it is quite foreign to the latter. Furthermore; a real privation must be the privation of a perfection, because privation of an evil would be no privation, and because everything that is positive and connatural with a thing must be perfective of its entity. With these distinguishing characteristics of privation for a guide, the truth of this second Member is made clear. For, if privation requires a Subject, or something that has been deprived; *that something* must be either Being or nothing. But, if nothing has been deprived, there can be no privation. Again: that which is capable of a real perfection, must be Being; for the subjective potentiality is something real, and connotes something real and potential in which itself is. Once more; that which has in its own nature a claim to such perfection, must be Being; for *Nothing* has neither a nature nor a claim to nature. Therefore, Evil is the privation of perfection in Being and, consequently, the privation of perfection in the Good; for every Being is, as we have seen, good. Hence, there can be no Evil save in the Good. But herein lurks a seeming contradiction; for, according to this doctrine, we can justly call Evil good, since whatsoever is in an entity, as part of itself, either participates in its nature or, at least, cannot be opposed to it. It will assist towards the solution of this difficulty, if we signalize three uses of the word, Good, in connection with the present subject. The perfection itself of which the Subject is naturally capable, is called good. The Subject, as informed with the given perfection, is called good; and the same Subject, as capable naturally of such perfection, is called good. Further, the term is justly applied in all three cases. As to the

first two there can be no doubt ; but, as the justice of the predication in the last instance might not perhaps so plainly appear at first sight, it may not be amiss to add a word or two by way of explanation. A natural tendency or aptitude in an entity is something positive and real. So that, in an entity endowed with such aptitude, there is a double Goodness, viz. the Goodness of its Being, and the Goodness of its aptitude or perfectibility. Few would be inclined to doubt that a blind man, for instance, is naturally better than a stone in this, if in no other respect ; that he has a natural aptitude for sight, even though as a fact he has been deprived of it. To resume : The Evil *destroys* the Good, as understood according to the first-named use of the word ; for it is the perfection that is good, and the perfection is wanting. According to the second use of the word, the Evil *diminishes* the Good ; because the Subject is deprived of its due perfection. But, assuming the last application of the term, the Good is *undiminished* ; for the Subject always remains with its natural aptitude or perfectibility, even under its actual privation. Now, the only real opposition in the concrete is between the Evil and the Good, as understood in the first way ; because the two terms are referred to the same formal object. But, when in the present Proposition it is affirmed that Evil is the privation of perfection in Being, and when it is, consequently, said by the Doctors of the School that Evil is in the Good, the term *Good* is evidently employed in the last of these three senses. It is, therefore, meant that the privation exists in an entity that has a natural aptitude for the perfection of which it has been deprived, and that, in such wise, the Evil is in the Good. But this involves no contradiction ; because Evil is predicated of one object, Good of another ; or, at least, it is predicated of the same object under two perfectly distinct points of view.

COROLLARY.

It follows from the above declaration, that unmixed Evil is an impossibility ; for Evil is always founded in the Good. Unmixed Evil would destroy itself¹ ; because it involves the absence of all good and, therefore, the impossibility of privation, which requires a positive Subject.

¹ *Arist. Eth. Nic L. iv, c. 11.* See St. Thomas, 1st xlix, 3, c.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It is hard to understand how moral Evil can be a mere privation; because the positive act of the will is evil. For, in the commission of a sin, the will chooses Evil instead of Good. But the choice of the will is a positive act; therefore, an evil choice is an evil positive act.

ANSWER. It is quite true that moral Evil *includes* a positive act; because it has its seat in the free-will of the intelligent creature. And, for this reason, there is a certain peculiarity in moral Evil, which will appear later on. Nevertheless, formally considered, it, like every other form of Evil, is a mere privation. That this truth may be more clearly recognized, it will be well to analyze a *sin*, and to consider its somewhat complex constituents. As it will be easier to pursue the analysis in the concrete, take an act of drunkenness. The senses (or, it may be, the imagination, which is the memory of the senses), render the stimulating draught present to the mind, and the conscious mind recognizes it as a natural Good. The sensual appetite is excited; and the will, under the influence of this sensual excitement, is aroused from its potential indifference, and wishes for the draught. It is now in, what the philosophers of the School term, its *first* or inchoate act. Up to this, all is positive; all is good. The action of the senses or of the imagination, the mental consciousness, the aroused appetite, the indeliberate motion of the will,—all are natural and good. There is as yet no moral Evil. But now, the will, by what has been called its *second* act,—an act of deliberate choice,—wills the draught; though the man is aware that it will cause drunkenness, and lead him into a breach of the moral law. An act of deliberate choice always and in its very nature presupposes at least a *virtual* cognition of the law in the mind; without it there can be no sin. Spite of this cognition of a higher Good than the sensual Good proposed to it in the assumed instance,—spite of the known violation of the natural order which such election must involve, the will freely elects the latter. Here there is Evil; but how? The action of the intellect is good. The choice of the will is entitatively good; for it is entitatively an act, and every faculty is perfected by its act. But the act is morally evil. Why? Because it is inordinate. But what is meant by saying that it is inordinate? We surely mean that the action is

out of the right order, that is, deprived of that orderliness by which it is naturally perfectible and which it naturally claims. Consequently, the Evil in the act of the will is reduced to a privation. Thus, then, moral differs from physical Evil, in that it essentially includes a positive act, (for evil habit is reducible to evil act), and the object of the volition or act is a positive Good; but, nevertheless, the object becomes morally evil and the choice evil, because the choice of that Good as an end carries along with it an aversion from the due end of human action. That aversion, however, is not positive; it is a privation, consequent on the positive act. To adopt the beautiful illustration of St. Thomas;—‘As, in the things of nature, there cannot be two ultimate substantial forms actually perfecting the same portion of matter; so, there cannot be two ultimate ends of the will. Wherefore, as a natural agent, by the fact of its introducing one form, causes the loss of the other form; so the will, in like manner, by the mere fact that it adheres, as to its last end, to some object which is not its due end, is turned away from its constituted end, (and it is in this that the complete nature of moral Evil essentially consists), apart from the actual intention of the will¹,’ which does not expressly intend this aversion from the supreme Good.

II. Suffering is an Evil; but suffering is something positive. There is no man in his senses who can doubt that a toothache, for instance, is something more than a mere privation of perfection. The same may be said of violent grief, such as arises, not unfrequently, from the death of a near relative or from loss of reputation. In like manner, nothing can be plainer than that a sweet thing is positively pleasant, and a bitter thing, (such as *aloes*), is positively displeasing and painful to the sense of taste. Therefore, not all evils are mere privations.

ANSWER.—This difficulty deserves minute examination, by reason of its complexity. There are so many elements, intrinsic as well

¹ ‘Sicut enim in naturalibus non possunt esse duae formae substantiales ultimae actu perficientes eandem partem materiae, ita non possunt esse duo ultimi fines voluntatis. Unde, sicut agens naturale ex hoc quod inducit unam formam, causat defectum alterius formae; ita etiam voluntas, ex hoc quod alicui tanquam ultimo fini inhaeret quod debitus sibi finis non est, avertitur a fine ultimo sibi debito, in quo completur ratio mali culpa, praeter intentionem voluntatis.’ *In 2 d. xxxiv. a. 3, c.*

as extrinsic, which enter into the constitution of suffering; that there is the greatest risk of confounding one thing with another, and so, of drawing an erroneous conclusion. What is suffering? As the word sufficiently indicates, it is a passion of the soul, produced in it by the presence of an Evil. In man, this passion may be produced either in the sensitive or in the intellectual part of the soul. Hence, two kinds of suffering; to wit, spiritual suffering or *grief*, and bodily suffering or *pain*. These two kinds of suffering are produced by two corresponding kinds of Evil; grief by a spiritual, pain by a bodily, Evil. Moreover, the Evil, which is the cause of suffering, is twofold. The one is intrinsic and immediate, i. e. something or other in the soul; the other mediate and, for the most part, either really extrinsic to the soul or relatively and conceptually extrinsic. Furthermore, this extrinsic Evil may be either evil in itself, or evil only in respect of something else. Let us consider each one of these constitutives separately, according to the two forms of suffering. I. It must be admitted that the passion itself is an act and, therefore, something positive. But is it absolutely in itself evil? On the contrary, it is a Good, an excellence, a perfection of our nature;—to limit the question to human suffering for the sake of succinctness, though, as regards corporal suffering, the conclusions apply to animals equally with man. For the passion of suffering serves to indicate the presence of an Evil, and necessarily includes an apprehension of it either sensible or intellectual. But this is simply a perfection; and is, moreover, of the greatest advantage. For, as to pain, if there were no such passion in the human soul; animal life might be extinguished by the tyrannous action of an Evil, of which, in such case, the victim would be unconscious. In a somewhat similar manner, moral Evil might continue unobserved to prey on the life of the will; unless there should intervene that remorse of conscience, which awakens the culprit to a sense of the presence of the Evil. So, again, if there were no power of grieving for the loss of relatives or for a ruined reputation; there would result an insensibility which would seriously affect the well-being of social life as well as individual culture and morality. In itself, therefore, suffering is a great Good; though under both its forms, it is a relative Evil, i. e. it is evil to the sufferer. But why? Because of the immediate cause to whose presence it bears witness. It is itself a useful admonitor; but it testifies to the presence of an Evil,—of something noxious, repugnant, disagreeable in the soul.

Let this Evil be the next subject for consideration. II. The *immediate* Evil, to which suffering calls attention, is always something *interior*, (or rather *intrinsic*), in the whole composite, man. In *pain*, this immediate Evil is the partial corruption of the Subject. In toothache, for instance, the pain arises from a decayed tooth, or from an abscess formed at the root, or from some other local indisposition; each of which is partial corruption, as the word *indisposition* clearly denotes. Is it in itself an Evil, then? Certainly, it is; but, at the same time, it should be noted that it is a mere privation. It is not the tooth in itself that gives pain, but the *decayed* tooth, or the decay of the tooth; and that is a simple privation. In *grief*, which is spiritual pain, the immediate and intrinsic cause is entitatively one with the sorrow itself; yet here, too, the analogy with *pain* may be traced by attentive introspection. For the grief is the passion itself, which is caused by an indisposition of the soul,—that which often goes by the name of *low* spirits, a mode of expression sufficiently indicative of its privative character. III. It remains to consider the mediate or extrinsic cause. In the case of *pain*, this may be natural or adventitious. Thus, a toothache or, more properly speaking, a decayed tooth, may proceed from a derangement, general or local, of the vital powers, or from the effects of a medicinal poison, such as *mercury*; in which latter case the mercury would be a more remote, the vitiation produced in the body, a less remote, cause; but both would be mediate. Pain may be the result of an adventitious cause, in two ways; by misadventure, or by design. It is produced by misadventure, when the inflicting cause acts upon us by accident; when it is designed, it assumes for the most part the shape of punishment. Now, in the instance of a natural mediate cause, (which is not extrinsic, therefore, to the composite as a whole), we are in presence of a simple privation. The body is *out of order*, as it is expressively said. If it be an adventitious mediate cause, the causal entity is in itself good. Thus, the *mercury which produces salivation* is not only an entity with its own proper nature and perfection; but that very property, by the action of which toothache may have been produced, forms part of its perfection, so that without it the mercury, as such, would be incomplete. Take, again, the case of *caning*. It is true that the effect of the cane is to produce a partial and temporary corruption of the body; as can be more clearly discerned, when the operation has

been excessive or severe. But the cane produces those disagreeable impressions on the body, by a real virtue proper to its own nature, which we are ready to recognize when it is exercised on a dusty carpet. So, the energetic hand that holds the cane, uses it as an instrument of penance, by virtue of a bodily energy which contributes to the perfection of the man. To apply this to one of the instances brought forward in the objection;—*the sweetness in sugar-candy* is a positive perfection of that substance; but equally so is *the bitterness of aloes* to that inspissated juice. It may also be of service to remark here parenthetically, that the action of the nerves of taste, which refers the sweetness and the bitterness to the sensitive faculty of the soul, is a real perfection of those nerves; and, moreover, that the formal sensations in the soul of sweet and bitter are positive acts and, therefore, positive perfections likewise. But the cause of the pain in the former cases, and of the distaste in the latter as touching the aloes, is this; that these causes and objects are not consonant with man and are, consequently, in relation to him, a relative Evil. This is very clearly illustrated in instances of partial tastes and distastes which are not the result of any morbid condition. There are some persons who cannot endure cheese; and the writer knows of a person who has an unconquerable aversion to apples. Yet, to the majority of mankind, neither cheese nor apples are an Evil. The same does not hold good of *grief* or spiritual sorrow. For the death of relatives or dear friends is, according to the common phrase, *a loss*; sins and faults are *inordination*; a ruined reputation is a *disadvantage*. All are a deprivation. To sum up;—sorrow, whether in the shape of bodily pain or spiritual grief, is something positive and in itself a Good. The immediate intrinsic cause of both is an Evil; but then, it is a mere privation. The mediate cause of pain, if intrinsic, is a mere privation and evil, but cannot be strictly termed a cause; if extrinsic, it is absolutely in itself a Good, (though in certain cases it may be an incomplete and deficient Good), and is only relatively an Evil. It now remains to consider pain and grief adequately, as including, i. e. all these constitutives in one. Is pain an Evil? A sensible Evil it undoubtedly is; but can it in no sense become a Good? For it must be remembered that Goodness is not like Truth. A concept is either true or false; and if false, it can under no conceivable circumstances be true. But a thing may be evil under one point of view, and good under another; by reason of

the diversity of appetites in our complex nature. It is absolutely certain, then, that bodily pain becomes, in unnumbered cases, a useful Good. To take the instance of corporal punishment,—not only is the vindication of justice in itself a great moral Good, as restorative of order; but it may become of service to the culprit, by assisting him in overcoming temptations to sin and crime, and in forming virtuous habits. Hence, the prominence assigned by the Philosopher in his *Ethics* to pleasure and pain as instruments in the work of education. And, of the two, pain is more effective than pleasure; because we naturally shrink from that which tends to not-Being with far more energy than we pursue that which is consonant with Being or contributes to its perfection. With irrational animals pain is the most efficacious means of training. And now, is grief, adequately considered, an Evil? To this question a like answer must be given. Grief is undeniably a physical Evil, and is incompatible with a state of perfection. Still, presupposing the Evils natural or moral which occasion it, grief is in itself good, when measured; and is a most useful instrument in the moral purification of man. There is no need of referring to the objection in detail; as the principles here developed easily suggest the answer.

III. No one would deny that monstrosities are natural Evils; yet, they are frequently positive entities. Thus, a man with six fingers and six toes is a monstrosity; yet he really receives four new members. Similarly, a child born with two heads has an important addition to his body; yet it is precisely this addition which is to him a natural Evil. Much the same may be said of giants. Therefore, there are some natural Evils that are not privations.

ANSWER. The natural Evil does not formally consist in the positive addition, or rather in the number added; but in the number *as* added. To explain:—The sixth finger and sixth toe and the second head are not in themselves evil. If they were cut off from the body to which they belong, no one would regard them as monstrosities, unless they were themselves malformations; and in such case we go back to the same question. The Evil consists in the addition of these members to a body already fully constituted in its natural form and proportion, both of which are destroyed by the addition. Hence, such addition is commonly

called a deformity, because it deprives the body of its appointed form. Consequently, it is a mere privation.

B. DIVISIONS OF EVIL.

I. Evil is divided into *metaphysical*, *physical*, and *moral*. *Metaphysical* Evil is only called such analogically; and, in this manner, is predicated of the limitation of finite Being. But, as this limitation is not a privation but a simple negation, and is only called evil by an analogy of proportion; it is wisely disregarded. *Physical* Evil is the privation of a merely natural Good in Being; such as, in man, are *blindness*, *ignorance*, *death*. *Moral* Evil is the privation, in an intelligent Being, of some moral Good.

II. Evil, as referred exclusively to the rational creature, is divided into *criminal* or *sinful* Evil and *penal* Evil; in other words, into the Evil of sin and the Evil of punishment. The former is the privation of a moral Good, when that privation is dependent on the free-will of the Subject. The latter is the privation of some Good (either natural or moral) in man, for the sake of repairing the order which has been violated by the sin of the Subject.

III. Evil is either *absolute* or *relative*. *Absolute* Evil, or that which is *in itself* an Evil, is that which is in itself the privation of some Good; *Relative Evil* is that which is not in itself an Evil, but on the contrary a Good; yet relatively to some other entity, in which it causes the privation of a Good, it is called an Evil. Thus, the *substantial form of fire* is in itself a Good; but it is an Evil to water, inasmuch as it tends to deprive this latter of its natural property of cold, and even of its substantial form. So, the *avenging justice of the judge* is a Good in itself; but it is a sensible Evil to the prisoner under sentence.

PROPOSITION CVI.

Relative Evil is properly a Good.

THIS PROPOSITION is proved by two arguments.

I. That is properly speaking good, which is good in its own essential nature. But a merely relative Evil is good in its own essential nature. Therefore, it is properly a Good. The *Minor* may be best confirmed by illustrations. For instance, the *sharpness*

and temper of a sword is a Good to the nature of the sword; but it becomes an Evil in respect of the decapitated person, upon whom it has been tried. So, the poisonous fang of a *Cobra-de-Capello* is a Good and perfection to the serpent itself; but it is a formidable evil to the animal that it seizes. The *upper jaw of the sword-fish* is in itself a natural perfection; but it becomes an Evil to the sailors whose boat it pierces. Again, the *electricity in thunder-clouds* is a natural perfection in itself; but it becomes an Evil to those whom it deprives of life.

II. If the Proposition were not true, it must follow that there would be nothing but Evil. For there is not an entity which is not repugnant to some other; according to the old proverb, 'What is one man's meat is another man's poison.' It has been said that *milk*, injected into the blood, becomes fatal to life; therefore, milk could no longer be considered as a Good. *Bathing* is noxious to apoplectic persons and to such as are afflicted with heart disease; consequently, it would be a simple Evil. *Restitution of unjust gains* is in one way an Evil to the restorer, since he loses by the transaction; therefore, it is evil in itself. Even God Himself becomes an Evil to the finally impenitent. The truth of the Thesis, therefore, follows from the absurdity of its converse.

NOTE.

It may not be inopportune to remark, in connection with this subject, that, while the intrinsic Goodness of every entity is philosophically certain; our judgment as to relative Evil may easily err, and is often the result of human ignorance. There are, for instance, insects which seem to be a universal nuisance, and gave occasion to the old Manichean difficulty narrated by St. Augustine. Few people would be found not to include in this Category the common *cockroach*. Yet it is a favourite repast of the hedgehog; and Doctor Bogomolow of St. Petersburg has found by experience, that this repulsive kitchen pest (the *Blatta orientalis*) is a valuable remedy for Bright's disease and dropsical affections; and he has succeeded in extracting from it a crystalline substance, to which he has given the name of *Antihydropsin*. Take another instance. The *Aphis*, or plant-louse, is a special enemy to the garden, and to rose trees in particular. Yet this insect has a

secretion which is so prized by the ant, that the latter makes use of the Aphis as its cow, to the apparent satisfaction of the wet-nurse. These and similar instances tend to confirm the philosophical conclusion, that there is nothing whatsoever in the universe, which is not to some entity or other a real Good, and does not, consequently, contribute to the universal order.

PROPOSITION CVII.

There are two kinds of Evil, which are peculiar to rational Being ; to wit, the Evil of sin and that of punishment.

As this Thesis demands declaration rather than proof, a quotation from the Angelic Doctor shall serve as foundation for the subsequent exposition. The passage shall be given in full for the sake of its completeness, though a part of it transgresses the limits of pure philosophical investigation ; as will be pointed out in its place. ‘Rational or intellectual Being,’ says St. Thomas, ‘stands in a certain special relation to Good and Evil, as compared with other creatures. For every other creature is ordained by nature for some particular Good ; whereas intellectual Being alone apprehends the common nature itself of the Good by the intellect, and is freely impelled towards the Good in general by the desire of the will. And it is on this account that Evil, in the instance of the rational creature, is specially divided into the Evil of sin and that of punishment ; . . . because it is in the nature of sin that it should be a result of the will, while it is in the nature of punishment that it should be contrary to the will. But will is only to be found in rational Being. Now, the distinction between these two divisions of Evil can be understood by what follows. For, since Evil is opposed to Good, the division of Evil must necessarily run parallel with the division of Good. Now, the Good denotes a certain perfection. But perfection is twofold, viz. primary, which is form or habit ; and consequent perfection, which is operation.’ For the first perfection of Being *is* its Being, as constituted by its essential form, and its habit or appointment by means of its connatural accidents. Its second perfection is its vital action ; for an entity must first exist, before it can act. ‘Further, under primary perfection, whose energy in exercise is its operation, may be included all that we make use of in operating. Wherefore,

conversely, there is a twofold Evil; one in the agent himself, in that he is deprived either of a form, or appointment, or of anything whatsoever that is necessary for his acting; as blindness or a bow-leg, for instance, is an Evil. The other kind of Evil is in the defective act; as limping in one's gait is an Evil. Now, as these two kinds of Evil are to be found in other entities; so are they also discovered in intellectual Being which acts by its will. It is plain, that in such Being the inordinate action of the will has the character of sin. For a man is blamed and is rendered culpable, because he elicits of free-will an inordinate action. We may likewise find Evil in the intellectual creature under the form of the privation of a habit, or disposition, or whatsoever else is necessary to proper action, whether pertaining to soul or body or things external; and such Evil, according to the Catholic Faith, is necessarily of that kind which goes by the name of punishment. For there are three things which are included in the essential idea of punishment. One is, that it has relation to sin; for a man is properly said to be punished, when he suffers Evil for something which he has committed. Now, it is held according to the tradition of the Faith, that a rational creature could not have incurred any harm either in soul or body or in any things external, save for some previous sin personal or original. Thus it follows, that every privation of such a Good as is serviceable for the purpose of operating properly, is said to be a punishment in the case of men. It is the same with the Angels. For this reason, every Evil, to which a rational creature is subject, is contained either under sin or under punishment. In so far as the Evil is of the nature of punishment, it is contrary to the will. For the will of every one is inclined towards his own private Good; wherefore, to be deprived of his own private Good, goes against his will. . . . Thus, then, punishment and sin differ in three ways. First, in that sin is an Evil in the action itself; whereas, punishment is an Evil in the agent. But the order of these two Evils is different in entities of nature and in entities endowed with will. For, in the former, Evil in the action is consequent on Evil in the agent, as for instance limping is the consequence of a bow-leg; whereas in the latter, on the contrary, Evil in the agent, (which is punishment), is the consequent of Evil in the action, (which is sin); since the Divine Providence remedies the disorder of sin by punishment. Secondly, punishment differs from sin, in that the

former is against the will; the latter, in accordance with the will. . . . Thirdly, in that sin is in action; punishment, in enduring¹.

In the above quotation, the Angelic Doctor establishes the following Propositions. i. Sin and punishment, in the proper and primary signification of this latter term, are Evils to which the rational creature alone is subject. The reason is, that every other creature is absolutely determined in its nature to some

¹ 'Natura rationalis vel intellectualis quodam speciali modo se habet ad bonum et malum prae aliis creaturis. Quia quaelibet alia creatura naturaliter ordinatur in aliquod particulare bonum; intellectualis autem natura sola apprehendit ipsam rationem boni communem per intellectum, et in bonum commune movetur per appetitum voluntatis. Et ideo malum rationalis creaturae speciali quadam divisione dividitur per culpam et poenam; . . . quia scilicet de ratione culpae est quod sit secundum voluntatem, de ratione autem poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Voluntas autem in sola natura intellectuali invenitur. Horum autem duorum distinctio sic potest accipi. Cum enim malum opponatur bono, necesse est quod secundum divisionem boni dividatur malum. Bonum autem quamdam perfectionem designat. Perfectio autem est duplex; scilicet prima quae est forma vel habitus; et secunda, quae est operatio. Ad perfectionem autem primam, cuius usus est operatio, potest reduci omne illud quo utimur operando. Unde et e converso, duplex malum invenitur; unum quidem in ipso agente, secundum quod privatur vel forma, vel habitu, vel quocunque quod necessarium sit ad operandum, sicut caecitas vel curvitas tibiae quoddam malum est. Aliud vero malum est in ipso actu deficiente, sicut si dicamus claudicationem esse aliquod malum. Sicut autem in aliis contingit haec duo reperiri, ita et in natura intellectuali quae per voluntatem operatur, in qua manifestum est quod inordinata actio voluntatis habet rationem culpae. Ex hoc enim aliquis vituperatur et culpabilis redditur, quod inordinatam actionem voluntarie operatur. Est autem et in creatura intellectuali invenire malum secundum privationem formae, aut habitus, aut cujuscunque alterius quod posset esse necessarium ad bene operandum, sive pertineat ad animam, sive ad corpus, sive ad res exteriores; et tale malum, secundum fidei catholicae sententiam, necesse est quod poena dicatur. Sunt enim tria de ratione poenae. Quorum unum est, quod habet respectum ad culpam. Dicitur enim proprie aliquis puniri, quando patitur malum pro aliquo quod commisit. Habet autem hoc traditio fidei, quod nullum nocumentum creatura potuisset incurere, neque quantum ad animam, neque quantum ad corpus, neque quantum ad aliqua exteriora, nisi peccato praecedente vel in persona vel saltem in natura. Et sic sequitur quod omnis talis boni privatio, quo uti quis potest ad bene operandum, in hominibus poena dicatur; et pari ratione in Angelis. Et sic omne malum rationalis creaturae vel sub culpa vel sub poena continetur. Secundum vero quod pertinet ad rationem poenae est quod voluntati repugnet. Voluntas enim uniuscujusque inclinationem habet in proprium bonum; unde privari proprio bono, voluntati repugnat. . . . Sic ergo tripliciter poena et culpa differunt. Primo quidem, quia culpa est malum ipsius actionis, poena autem est malum agentis. Sed haec duo mala aliter ordinantur in naturalibus et voluntariis. Nam in naturalibus ex malo agentis sequitur malum actionis, sicut ex tibia curva sequitur claudicatio; in voluntariis autem, e converso, ex malo actionis, quod est culpa, sequitur malum agentis, quod est poena, divina providentia culpam per poenam ordinante. Secundo modo differt poena a culpa per hoc quod est secundum voluntatem et contra voluntatem esse. . . . Tertio vero per hoc quod culpa est in agendo, poena vero in patiando.' *De Ma., Q. 1, a. 4, o.*

particular and definite end which is its immediate Good ; and, as it is so determined in its nature, it has no even germinal capacity for deflection from such end. But the rational Being has a mind capable of apprehending the universal Good, or Good in general ; and, by virtue of its free-will, it can choose as it pleases, within the sphere of the Good. Hence, it is able to choose inordinately ; and the inordinate choice of the will is sin. Thus sin is necessarily an act of the will ; and only a being endowed with free-will is capable of sin. But punishment essentially presupposes sin ; and, consequently, that entity alone is subject to punishment, which is subject to sin. Both sin and punishment, then, are Evils attaching to the will, but inversely ; for sin is in accordance with the will, while punishment is repugnant to it. It follows that, when the term *punishment* is applied to irrational animals, it is used in a sense purely analogical. ii. These two moral Evils correspond so nearly with the twofold division of natural Evils, that a consideration of these latter will facilitate a clear conception of the former. The division of Evil is a counterpart of the division of the Good. Now, Goodness is perfection ; and there are two kinds of perfection common to Being,—the one belonging to its first act, or *existence* ; the other, to its second act, or *operation*. Under the former are included not only the substantial form by which the entity is specifically constituted, but also all those accidental perfections which are either congenital with it or have developed subsequently,—in a word, all that fits it for its natural operation. To this twofold division of the Good answers a like division of Evil. There may be natural Evil in the agent or operating nature, as for instance in a *spavined horse* ; and there may be natural Evil in the operation or action, as there is *lameness* in the horse's action, owing to spavin. In like manner, *disorganization of the brain* is a natural Evil in man ; *extravagant thought, speech, action*, are a natural Evil in his operation. It is precisely the same with moral Evil in the rational creature. For there is a moral Evil in the intellectual nature,—some privation either in internal constitutives or external goods, which is punishment. But it must be understood, that such Evils do not for the most part differ entitatively from natural Evils ; but are denominated moral Evils according to analogy of attribution of the first class, inasmuch as they are natural Evils, *inflicted on account of sin*. There is also a moral Evil in action, which is sin, or an actual inordination of the will.

Between these two kinds of moral Evil there exists a marked antithesis. For, as the Angelic Doctor remarks, in a natural Evil the privation in the operation is consequent upon a previous privation in the operating nature ; whereas in moral Evil privation in the nature is consequent upon privation in the action ; or, in other words, punishment follows upon crime. iii. There are, accordingly, three primary differences between sin and punishment. The first is, that sin is in the action ; punishment, in the agent or author of the sin. Secondly, the former is in accordance with the will ; while the latter is against the will. Lastly, sin is action ; punishment is passion :—in other words, the one is active, the other passive. iv. We have now reached the point where the Angelic Doctor has carried the discussion beyond the sphere of philosophy into that of Theology. He observes that, according to the teaching of the Christian Faith, the only kinds of Evil to which, as a fact, man is subject, are those of sin and punishment ; forasmuch as all the natural Evils to which he is obnoxious, are the penal consequence of either original or actual sin. This revealed Truth is of the greatest service to Philosophy, in that it solves the difficult problem as to the amount of natural Evil in the world ; since it represents the visible universe as out of gear, quite changed from what it originally was ; and transformed, as it were, into a reformatory. But such doctrine is not purely philosophical ; for it could scarcely have been discovered by unassisted human reason. Hence, contemplating the facts of human life as they offer themselves to the mind, reason would have led us to conclude that man was subject to three forms of Evil,—viz. That which is purely natural, sin, and punishment ; unless the Christian Creed has taught us that, as man was originally raised into a supernatural order both in soul and body, those Evils which would otherwise have been purely natural, have become penal. But, in any case, the present Proposition would have held true ; for natural Evils are common to every creature ; sin and punishment, to rational Being only.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

The Evil of sin is greater than that of Punishment.

This Proposition is proved by the following arguments.

I. Whenever a form or *quasi* form so modifies its Subject as to

give to that Subject *simply and absolutely its own denomination*, it is more intensely and efficaciously that which it is in its own nature, than when it gives to its Subject its own denomination in a sort of manner and with a modifying addition. Thus, for instance, if a man is *simply* spoken of as learned, his learning is understood to be of a higher and more perfect kind than that of the man who is spoken of as learned *in Hebrew*. In like manner, carbon exists more absolutely in a diamond than in *carbonic oxide*. Now, a man who is subject to the Evil of sin is said to be simply a bad man; but a man enduring punishment is never on that account called a bad man. If the term is used at all, it will be found in combination; in such expressions, for instance, as, *he is badly off, he is bad in the head, he is in evil case, his days are evil*. Therefore, the Evil of sin is greater than the Evil of punishment.

II. Good and Evil are *absolutely* predicated of act; while of potentiality they are predicated only after a fashion (*secundum quid*). Thus, a man is said to be a good musician, who has either composed or played well. Accordingly, the latter is somewhat expressively called a good *performer*; whereas, if he only had a supposed aptitude, he would never be called a good musician without the addition of some qualifying phrase, unless at least he had *actually* exhibited his knowledge in some other way. Now, there are universally, as we have said, two acts, viz. the first and the second,—nature and operation; and the first is potential of the second. Therefore, Good and Evil are simply predicated of act, while of nature they are predicated with a qualifying addition. But sin is in operation; punishment, in nature. Therefore, Evil is absolutely predicated of sin; secondarily and with qualification, of punishment.

III. It is in the nature of Good to be an end, an object of desire. But an end is the perfection of an agent, inasmuch as he is in act. For it is the end which first moves an agent; and the actual possession of the end is his perfection. Consequently, an end and deflection from an end, (that is, Good and Evil), have priority of relation to an entity as active over that same entity as passive. Thus, a man would be justly designated a bad painter who, in the execution of his work, should have violated the rules of his art; but he would neither merit nor receive the same, if his hands were violently guided by another. Now, in sin the will of man is active; whereas in punishment it is passive. We *do* evil; we *receive* punish-

ment. Therefore, the relation of Evil to sin has priority over its relation to punishment.

IV. Since God is essential Goodness ; by how much anything is more alien from God, just in the same proportion does it become evil. But sin is far more alien from God than punishment ; of which a sufficient proof is afforded by the fact, that God is Author of punishment, while He never can be Author of sin. The reason why He cannot be the Author of sin, is this. Sin is a deflection of the free-will of the creature from Himself ; for God, as we learn in Ethics, is the Supreme End of all things and, in an especial manner, of rational Being. So is it essentially established in the very nature of things ; and it could not, consequently, be otherwise. If God, therefore, could be the Author of sin, He would deny Himself, i.e. He would not be God. It follows, then, from these premisses, that sin is a greater Evil than punishment ; even though that punishment should consist in the irrevocable loss of Him, and of beatitude in the possession of Him.

V. That Evil which the infinite Wisdom inflicts for the purpose of warding off or removing another Evil, must be a less Evil than that which it is intended to remove. But God inflicts punishment for the purpose of averting or remedying sin. Therefore, the former must be a less Evil than the latter.

C. THE CAUSE OF EVIL.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

Every Evil has a cause of some sort, which is in itself good.

I. IN THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition it is declared, that *every Evil has a cause of some sort*. The proof is as follows. Every Being, as such, is good ; according to the doctrine established in a previous Article. Therefore, no Being is in itself evil. Consequently, it cannot of itself be evil ; and must become such by the action of some cause. Nothing can be evil of itself ; because a thing is evil, forasmuch as it fails of acquiring or retaining its due perfection. Now, nothing fails of acquiring or retaining its due perfection, save by virtue of some cause, either acting upon it in a direction contrary to its own natural inclination or, at least, hindering it in its self-evolution. Thus, for instance, an apple, still united to its parent tree, becomes rotten. It has deflected from its

normal perfection. Whence has this arisen? If the rottenness be inside, it has arisen from some *maggot* or *other insect*, or from *groups of fungi in the form of mould*, or from some other similar cause. In like manner, if the rottenness be external, it has arisen from the *lesion of the outer skin*, which has exposed the pulp to the corrupting influences of the common air. Let it be here observed, however, that although the examples have been taken from efficient causes, because these are the most apt for purposes of illustration; yet, the causes of Evil must by no means be limited to this category. Thus, to resume the former example, the apple may become bad from some debility or disease in the tree itself. Of what kind such causes may be, will be decided in subsequent Theses.

II. IN THE SECOND MEMBER of this Proposition it is maintained, *that the cause of Evil is in itself good*. The truth of this assertion is proved in more ways than one. For, i. Nothing can in any true sense become a cause, unless it is itself something; since, in order to energize, it is necessary first of all to be. But if it is something, it is Being; and as Being, it is good. ii. It has been already shewn that every Evil has a cause. But that cause must be either good or evil. If evil, the question returns; for the reason, that every Evil has a cause. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to admit an infinite regress, which is justly rejected by all sane philosophers, it will be necessary to recur, in ultimate analysis, to some Good which is cause of the Evil. iii. Assuming, as true, that which will be proved in the following Thesis, viz. that whatever is the cause of Evil, causes it by accident; the following argument is built upon such assumption. Every accidental causation is reducible to causation that is direct and intentional. But the causation of Evil is only accidental; therefore it follows, that whatsoever is directly and intentionally caused, is good. If the effect, however, be good, the cause must be good; because every effect is assimilated to its cause. Consequently, Good must be the cause of Evil, at least by reduction; because accidental causation can be reduced to direct and intentional, whose cause is necessarily good. iv. Nothing acts, which is not itself actual. But, if a thing is actual, it is so by virtue of some definite form or perfection. Wherefore, everything that acts, acts inasmuch as it is perfect, i.e. inasmuch as it is *good*.

COROLLARY.

Hence it follows that anything like a supreme principle of Evil, such as was imagined by the Manicheans, is philosophically impossible.

PROPOSITION CX.

The Good is cause of Evil only by accident.

THIS PROPOSITION is proved by the following arguments.

I. The formal term of causality cannot be nothing; for all real action terminates in something. But Evil, as such, is a privation; and a pure privation is in itself nothing.

II. Every effect, which has a direct and absolute cause, is intended by its cause either *actually* or *interpretatively*. For either the cause is itself rational, and then the intention is actual; or the cause is without reason itself but is ordered to its effect by a higher rational cause, and then, the intention may be called interpretative. Thus, one might say that the saw intends to cut wood; which would mean that it is intended by man for that purpose. If, then, an effect is accidental, it is only accidentally caused. Thus, for instance, a body of men are occupied in digging a railway-cutting; and they come across a heap of hidden money. It is plain that the action of spade and pickaxe is only an accidental cause of the discovery of the treasure. So, the compressed steam in the engine of a steam-boat is intended to convey men and goods across the seas; it is accidental, if it blows a number of passengers into the air and causes loss of freight. But Evil, as such, cannot be intended; because it cannot become object of desire or will. For it is Good only that is desirable. Hence, whenever that which is evil is desired, it is always under the appearance of Good.

III. Every effect has a likeness to its cause. Consequently, Evil can only be the effect of the Good by accident.

IV. Between every direct cause and its effect there is a determinate order of relation. But a determinate order of relation is good; whereas, that which is evil transgresses determinate order, and cannot, therefore, be the direct effect of any cause.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It seems repugnant that Good should be the cause of Evil, even though it be by accident. For, granting that the causation is by accident, still, for all that, the action of the cause has its real influx into the effect; just as, in the instance adduced, the digging turned up the treasure, although the discovery was accidental. But any real causal influx of the Good into Evil as its effect is contrary to the recognized principle, that contraries do not produce their contraries. Therefore, it is impossible that in any way, even accidentally, the Good should be the cause of Evil.

ANSWER. As St. Thomas observes in connection with this difficulty, an accidental cause may be understood in two ways; accordingly as the characteristic of *accident* attaches to the cause, or attaches to the effect. In the former case, the cause itself has a real and direct causal influence in the production of the effect; but, because the cause is united to some accidental addition, considered in conjunction with such addition it is called accidental. Thus, *Sir Thomas Gresham built the first Royal Exchange in London. Queen Elizabeth had made him queen's merchant.* It may, therefore, be truly said that the queen's merchant was the builder of the Exchange, but *accidentally*; because it was an accident that Sir Thomas Gresham held that office. In the latter case also, the cause really and directly produces its effect; but there is an accident attaching to that effect, which is not subject to the direct action of the cause. Thus, for instance, *a man has built a hall* which is afterwards converted into a *Chapel*. He is directly cause of the hall, accidental cause of the chapel. Now, it is in this second sense, that the Good is said to be accidental cause of Evil; wherefore, the former kind may be dismissed, and further examination be restricted to the latter. It is to be observed, then, that in the case of accidental causation the cause may, or may not, have a real causal influx into the accident which gives its name to this species of causation. Thus, in the instance of the *treasure-trove*, there was a real influx of the cause; while, in the example of the *Chapel*, there was no such influx. Now, as to the latter, there can be no difficulty; the objection only applies to those cases, where there is a real influx of the cause into the production of the accident. Touching these, therefore, it is to be said, that the cause does not directly and, as it were, immediately or intentionally energize in

the production of the accident, but rather in that of the entity which is Subject of the accident. More particularly does this hold true, when the accident is a nothing, such as any privation must be ; for real causality must be terminated by a real effect. Consequently, the cause produces an entity, i. e. a Good, in which there is a privation. Wherefore, producing the Good, it produces unintentionally, or by accident, the Evil ; that is, it produces the Good with a defect. But the cause is so far from intending the defect, that the defect is, as the Pseudo-Areopagite quoted by St. Thomas¹ remarks, quite out of the road of the cause's motion, i. e. the cause was in no wise set in motion by the prospect of such a result. But now, what is to be said to the difficulty, that no opposite produces its corresponding opposite ? In the first place, *phenomenally* the principle in question is not universally true ; for the coldness of the circumambient air often produces an increase of warmth in the human body. But it is *really* verified, even in such cases. For the vital warmth is not caused, but only occasioned, by the frosty air. The true answer is, that the rule holds good as regards direct and intentional, not as regards indirect and accidental, causation. And, in this latter case, there is no true opposition ; for Good and Evil are not predicated of the same thing under the same respect. Thus, *fire* is good in itself, but evil to *water* ; because the form of fire tends to the substantial corruption of the water. But the direct action of the fire is to communicate its form and produce *steam* ; the consequent corruption of the water is, as it were, accidental and outside the intention. So, when it is said that man, as a Good, produces an evil action ; the Good is predicated entitatively, the Evil is moral. If the action were considered entitatively, it must be pronounced good ; and if the man were regarded morally, it must be owned that he is evil. And, in this way, Good is seen to produce Good, Evil is seen to produce Evil. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that Good and Evil are not, properly speaking, contraries, but opposites. For real contraries are, both, positive entities, as are *white* and *black*, *sweet* and *bitter*, *rough* and *smooth* ; whereas Good and Evil stand in the relation to each other of perfection and its privation, i. e. of something and the nothingness of something. It is true that moral Good and Evil partake of the nature of opposites ; but the reason of this is, as St. Thomas tells

¹ *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 3, ad 14^m.*

us¹, that moral Good and Evil are the object of the will ; and the act of the will is specifically determined by the formal object. Now, the will must choose either a Good which is rightly ordered, or a Good which is inordinate and, therefore, *relatively* evil. Consequently, the act will be either good or evil ; and if it is the one, it cannot be the other. The opposition is, therefore, to be found in the moral diversity of *positive* choice, as determined by the formal object. The privation is not in the act of the will ; but in the object as willed.

II. According to a statement made in the exposition of the preceding Proposition, every accidental cause is reducible to an absolute and direct cause. If, therefore, Evil have an accidental cause ; it follows that it must have an absolute and direct cause.

ANSWER. As the accidental cause is reducible to an absolute and direct cause ; so, proportionally, an accidental effect is reducible to the absolute and direct effect. But the absolute and direct effect is the Good in which the privation, or Evil, is to be found. Therefore, there is no absolute cause of Evil.

III. Nature is directly and absolutely cause of all that is produced in the natural order. But there are certain Evils produced in the natural order ; such as old age, and death. Therefore, the Good sometimes causes Evil directly and absolutely ; and not by accident only.

ANSWER. As St. Thomas remarks², the partial corruption of old age and the entire corruption of death are said to be a natural change, not relatively to the particular nature of that entity which is the subject of such corruption, but in regard of nature in general, which causes generation and corruption, or rather, generation out of corruption ; so that it primarily and absolutely intends generation, while it intends corruption only inasmuch as this latter is the necessary medium of the former. Wherefore, nature does not directly and absolutely cause corruption, but generation only.

¹ *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 1, ad 4^m.*

² *Ibidem, Q. 1, a. 3, ad 18^m.*

PROPOSITION CXI.

Evil, as such, does not require a final cause; which, however, may be added to it by the intention of the efficient cause.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER, wherein it is asserted that *Evil, as such, does not require a final cause*, is thus proved. The final cause is the intended end of an action or operation; and constitutes the intention of the efficient cause. But privation and defect are not themselves intended; therefore, they do not require any end for the sake of which they may be intended. Since, then, Evil is a privation; it does not require any final cause.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER, which affirms that *Evil may receive a final cause, or end, from the intention of the efficient cause*, is thus declared. A free agent may inflict an Evil for the purpose of attaining some end; such as, the securing of some positive Good, or the hindering of a greater Evil. But, for the sake of clearness, it will be well to recall to mind the division into the Evil of sin, and the Evil of punishment. The former not only does not require a final cause but, in a rightly ordered will, it does not, cannot, admit of one. The reason is, that we are not allowed to do Evil that Good may come; consequently, Evil can never become the direct object of intention. It may be indirectly intended, that is, permitted, (as God does in fact permit it), for the sake of the varied Good which flows from the permission; but no reason or excuse can for one moment justify the intention of sinning. It is true that a disordered will may intend to commit sin and, in certain extreme cases of depravity, may intend the very malice of the sin; even here, however, the moral Evil presents itself under the false appearance of some Good. But it is not so with punishment. For punishment, which is a natural Evil, may become a useful Good; and may be in this way directly intended by a well-ordered will, as the means for securing a moral Good. Thus, punishment may be inflicted for the purpose of vindicating outraged justice, or medicinally, i. e. for the purpose of reforming the sinner. Something precisely similar to this last intention is to be found in merely natural Evil. For, when a surgeon amputates a limb, he directly intends the Evil as the most efficacious means of securing a natural Good,—to wit, the restoration of health or the preservation of life. But, in these and similar cases, the Evil is intended as a

means and, therefore, receives a final cause from the intention of the agent.

PROPOSITION CXII.

Evil, as such, has necessarily a material cause.

The material cause of a thing is that out of which the thing is evolved, or in which that characteristic entity or *quasi* entity by which the thing is constituted in its special nature, inheres, and by which it is sustained. This description will be most easily explained by an example or two. A statue is constituted by an external form or delineation of some living figure,—for instance, of *Hercules*. But that form could not exist by itself; it requires something out of which it may be chiselled; and by which it may be sustained in being. This something would be the stone from which the statue has been made. The stone, therefore, would be its material cause. Again; the vegetative life of a plant is that by which a plant is specifically constituted what it is; and is on this account denominated its *substantial form*. But this substantial form is generated, not created; that is, it is evolved out of something else which potentially precontained it. Further; as it is not a spiritual form, it requires something to sustain it in Being,—something in which it is reduced to act. This is the organized matter in which it lives. Such, therefore, is its material cause. Once more; the redness, say of a rose, or that quality in the flower which produces in the sensible faculty of the soul the sensation of red, (for colour is not a representative sensation), is an accidental form which constitutes the rose such a kind of rose. Now, redness does not come of itself *from without*, but is evolved from *the within* of something. Moreover, redness cannot exist by itself. It is always a red *something*. That *something*, out of which redness is evolved and in which it exists and by which it is sustained in Being, is the flower; which is, therefore, its material cause¹. Thus much will suffice for the understanding of the present Proposition;

¹ There is no intention here of contravening the accepted theory of light and colour as taught by modern physical science. There is a cause, we will say, of the disintegration of the white ray and of the scattering of the red, etc. Metaphysically, all that is needed is a cause *in* the flower of the sensible phenomenon. That cause is metonymically called red, in accordance with common usage. The *how* of the phenomenon belongs to Physics; it concerns the metaphysician only indirectly and remotely.

and this is all that is aimed at. For the subject of causation will be discussed at length later on. Now, Evil may be regarded as a certain form; for it has just enough of reality to justify this mode of considering it, which is, besides, sanctioned by the ordinary way of speaking. For men talk of *blindness in the eye, deafness in the ear, of a bad light, of lameness in a horse, of sterility in a cow, of imbecility in an idiot*. Taking Evil, therefore, as a sort of form; the question is, whether it requires a material cause? To put it still more clearly,—Does Evil require a Subject out of which it is, so to say, evolved and in which it exists? The answer is plain; it imperatively requires such a Subject. The reason is as follows. Evil is a privation, as we know. But a privation connotes a something that has been deprived. Blindness would be impossible; unless there were some eye that could be deprived of sight. We never talk of a blind elm, because an elm tree has no eyes; but we do talk of blind puppies, because they have eyes. In like manner, it would be absurd to speak of a lame diamond, but it is common to speak of a lame dog; because the latter has legs, and the former has not. Similarly, no one would dream of stigmatizing a zoophyte as wicked, that is, as morally evil; because it is not possessed of free-will. It is, furthermore, plain that this Subject must be a positive entity; for *nothing*, deprived, is no privation. Yet again: Privation is the want of some perfection which is postulated by the nature of the Subject; and, consequently, the Subject is capable of such perfection. Therefore, the material cause of Evil must be Good on two accounts: first, because it is a positive entity, and all Being is good; secondly, because it is capable of a given perfection, and capacity for a given perfection is evidently a Good. And, in this way, the truth of the hundred and ninth Thesis receives fresh confirmation.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. The above proof supposes privation and, consequently, Evil to be in some sense or another real Being. But formally it is nothing of the sort. For it is a mere negation, which excludes anything real and positive. Wherefore, it is only a logical entity. But a logical entity not only does not require a real Subject, but, properly speaking, cannot have one; because it has no existence outside the mind. Therefore, Evil can have no material cause.

ANSWER. Privation is not a mere negation ; but a negation of something in a Subject, and of something which ought to be in that Subject. Therefore, its essential nature demands that it should be in a Subject, and in a Subject which naturally requires the perfection of which it has been deprived. It is precisely in these two points that privation differs from simple negation. Though, therefore, it is true that privation is formally a logical entity ; yet it is not a mere logical entity. For the concept has a real foundation in the Subject which is deprived. This is abundantly apparent to common sense. No blind man could be brought to believe that his blindness was a mere figment of the mind ; nor would an oculist desist from remedies, on the score that blindness is nothing real. Loss of any kind is a simple privation ; but, if some one should attempt to console a merchant whose freight had gone to the bottom, by assuring him that his loss was a mere logical fiction, he would probably tell his Job's comforter that, if he had tried it in his own case, he would find out that it was a reality.

II. Evil destroys the Good to which it is opposed ; therefore, it cannot be in the Good as in a Subject. For no form destroys the Subject in which it is.

ANSWER. An Evil is not opposed to every kind of Good, but only to that special Good of which it is the formal opposite ; and, consequently, it is only this latter that by its presence it destroys. Now, the Good, of which the Evil is the formal opposite, is not the Subject ; but a certain perfection of which the Subject has been deprived. Thus, the entity of a *devil* is good, although he has been deprived of every moral Good ; so that his faculties of intellect and will are, entitatively, precisely what they were at the first instant of his creation. Against the above answer, however, it may be urged, that Evil often does much more than destroy the perfection of which it is the privation ; for it corrupts the Subject in which it is found. Take, for instance, some sin, we will say, of incontinence. Not only does it deprive the action, to which the incontinence is attached, of the perfection of purity to which it was entitled, but it corrupts the nature of the man himself ; since it disposes him to similar excesses, and weakens within him the power of resistance. Consequently, it diminishes, and sometimes goes so far as even to destroy, the capacity of his nature for purity. It is to be observed, by way of answer to the objection thus urged, that there is a twofold

aptitude or capacity of a nature for a given perfection. The one is inherent in the nature itself; the other is superadded to it. The one is part of the nature and identical with it; the other is distinct from it and accidental. Again; there are two ways in which a capacity for good may be diminished; either by a subtraction, and diminution of the capacity itself, or by the cumulation of impediments in the way of its satisfaction. Now, in the case where the aptitude for chastity (to return to the instance given) is superadded by a formed habit, there is no difficulty in allowing that such Goodness in the subject may be diminished by the contrary act; because there is formal opposition between the two. But what is to be said about the natural aptitude in man? Can that be diminished? By a subtraction of capacity, certainly not; by an accumulation of external hindrances to the fulfilling of such capacity, yes. The nature of man has an innate capacity for continency, which can never be diminished; but evil habit, enervation of will which follows from indulgence, a diseased imagination, and similar impediments, may effectually hinder its reduction to act.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

Evil, as such, has no proper and intrinsic formal cause.

THIS PROPOSITION is declared as follows. Since Evil is a privation in Being, it assumes the nature of a form; while it is quite plain that a privation is not constituted by any other intrinsic form. Nor is it even conceivable how it could be. But it sometimes happens that it is constituted by some remote and extrinsic form; which is the reason why the words *proper and intrinsic* have been inserted in the Enunciation of the Thesis. For the privation of one form not unfrequently follows upon the presence of another form in the Subject; not by virtue of any efficient causality, but simply by the formal causality of the latter. Thus, water is deprived of its form of coldness by the mere formal presence of heat. Hence, this natural Evil accrues to the water from the simple introduction of a new and opposite form.

PROPOSITION CXIV.

Evil is always, though accidentally and unintentionally, the effect of some efficient cause.

I. THE FIRST MEMBER of this Proposition, which affirms that *Evil is always the effect of some efficient cause*, has been virtually proved already in the exposition of the hundred and ninth Thesis. For it was pointed out there, that Evil cannot belong to Being *intrinsically*. Consequently, it is an extrinsic modification and, as such, postulates an efficient cause.

II. THE SECOND MEMBER, maintaining that the *production of Evil is accidental and unintended on the part of the efficient cause*, requires more elaborate declaration. In accordance with the order which has been hitherto followed in the discussion of more difficult questions, and because it is most consonant with the scope of this Work as suggested by the title, let the authority of the Angelic Doctor lead the way. 'That any entity,' says St. Thomas, 'should fall short of its natural and due disposition, can only happen from the action of some cause which draws the entity out of its disposition. For a ponderous body cannot receive upward motion, save from an impelling agent; and an agent does not fail in its action, save on account of some impediment. Now, to be a cause is an attribute only of that which is good. For nothing can be a cause, except it is Being; but all Being, as such, is good¹.' According to St. Thomas, then, all Evil in Being comes to it from without; and requires an efficient cause, external to the entity that is subject to the Evil. But here it is that the difficulty begins. For, how can it be that a real efficient cause should have for its effect a mere privation, seeing that a mere privation is a negation of a certain kind? But a real efficient cause would seem to postulate a real effect, as term of its action; not a negation. For a cause of nothing is, so far forth, no cause. The answer to the difficulty in brief, is this; that the evil effect, (or privation in the effect), attributed to

¹ 'Quod aliquid deficiat a sua naturali et debita dispositione, non potest provenire nisi ex aliqua causa trahente rem extra suam dispositionem. Non enim grave movetur sursum nisi ab aliquo impellente, nec agens deficit a sua actione nisi propter aliquod impedimentum. Esse autem causam non potest provenire nisi bono; quia nihil potest esse causa, nisi inquantum est ens; omne autem ens, inquantum hujusmodi, bonum est.' 1^o xlix, 1, c.

the efficient cause, is neither directly intended by the agent nor the adequate or principal term of his or its action. But this answer needs a careful and minute examination, which shall be instituted with St. Thomas for our guide. In the passage which is about to be quoted, the Angelic Doctor is proving that the Good is cause of Evil, for the reason that every cause is a perfection and, therefore, in itself a Good. He confirms the statement, by introducing the four causes and considering their relation to Evil. 'That the Good is cause of Evil,' he says, 'as material cause, is evident from what has gone before; since it has been shown that the Good is the subject of Evil,' (i.e. that Evil exists in Good). 'But Evil has no formal cause; on the contrary, it is privation of form. In like manner, it has no final cause; but is rather the privation of the order conducing to the due end. . . . Evil, however, has an efficient cause; not absolutely, but by accident.' Having thus confirmed the truth of the preceding Thesis in this Article, he goes on to explain, in the following words, how efficient causation is, in the case of Evil, accidental and unintended; 'Evil is caused in action after another sort from what it is caused in an effect. In action it is caused from a defect in some one of the principles of action, either of the principal or of the instrumental agent. Thus, for instance, defect in the movement of an animal may arise, either from a debility of the motive power, as in children; or from a simple ineptness of the instrument of motion, as in the lame. But Evil is caused in an entity, sometimes from the virtue of the agent, (though the Evil is not in the *proper* effect of the agent), sometimes from a deficiency in the agent, sometimes from a deficiency in the matter' (which is subject of the action). 'It arises from the virtue or perfection of the agent, when the form intended by the agent necessarily carries along with it the exclusion of another form; as, e.g. the form of fire is necessarily accompanied by a privation of the form of air or water. . . . If there is a deficiency in the effect proper to fire, (for instance, that it fails to heat), this arises either from a defect in some one of the principles of action before mentioned, or from a defect in the disposition of the matter, which does not accept the action of the agent fire. But this very state of deficiency attaches to that which is good; and to the Good belongs the absolute power of action¹.' In another of his works, St. Thomas

¹ 'Esse causam non potest convenire nisi bono; quia nihil potest esse causa, nisi in quantum est ens; omne autem ens, in quantum hujusmodi, bonum est. Et si

makes a similar division of the ways in which the Good may be efficient cause of Evil. 'Defect,' he writes, 'happens without the intention of the agent. And it occurs in three ways. Sometimes it is due to the intent of the agent which, as not enduring the conjunction of some other perfection with itself, excludes the other. And this is patent in natural generation. . . . Sometimes it arises out of the matter receptive of the action, which is not in the disposition to arrive at that perfection which the agent intends to produce. . . . Sometimes it is owing to the instrument; as may be seen in limping¹.' It is plain, then, from these two quotations, that, in the judgment of the Angelic Doctor, whether the effect be a simple action or some entity which is the term of operation, an efficient cause may produce Evil in its effect in one of three ways; either by the activity and perfection of its causality, or by deficiency in its perfection, or by impediment in the way of its due action. In each one of these ways it causes Evil accidentally and unintentionally. This is the point awaiting examination, which for the present will be restricted to *natural* Evil; since the question of *moral* Evil requires separate treatment.

consideremus speciales rationes causarum, agens et forma et finis perfectionem quamdam important, quae pertinet ad rationem boni. Sed et materia, in quantum est in potentia ad bonum, habet rationem boni. Et quidem quod bonum sit causa mali per modum causae materialis, jam ex praemissis patet. Ostensum est enim quod bonum est subjectum mali. Causam autem formalem malum non habet, sed est magis privatio formae; et similiter nec causam finalem, sed magis est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum. . . . Causam autem per modum agentis habet malum, non autem per se, sed per accidens. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod aliter causatur malum in actione et aliter in effectu. In actione quidem causatur malum propter defectum alicujus principiorum actionis, vel principalis agentis vel instrumentalis; sicut defectus in motu animalis potest contingere, vel propter debilitatem virtutis motivi, ut in pueris, vel propter solam ineptitudinem instrumenti, ut in claudis. Causatur malum in re aliqua quandoque ex virtute agentis, non tamen in proprio effectu agentis; quandoque autem ex defectu ipsius vel materiae. Ex virtute quidem vel perfectione agentis, quando ad formam intentam ab agente sequitur ex necessitate alterius formae privatio, sicut ad formam ignis sequitur privatio formae aeris vel aquae. . . . Sed si sit defectus in effectu proprio ignis, puta quod deficiat a calefaciendo, hoc est vel propter defectum actionis, qui redundat in defectum alicujus principii, ut dictum est, vel ex indispositione materiae, quae non recipit actionem ignis agentis. Sed et hoc ipsum quod est esse deficiens, accidit bono, cui per se competit agere.' 1^o xlix, 1, o.

¹ 'Defectus incidit praeter intentionem agentis. Hoc autem contingit tripliciter. Aut ex parte ejus quod intentum est ab agente, quod cum non compatiatur secum quamdam aliam perfectionem, excludit eam, ut patet in generatione naturali. . . . Aut ex parte materiae recipientis actionem, quae indisposita est ad consequendam perfectionem quam agens intendit producere. . . . Aut ex parte instrumenti, ut patet in claudicatione.' *In 2 d. xxxiv, a. 3, c.*

i. An efficient cause, though necessarily good in itself, may be productive of Evil by reason of the very activity and perfection of its causality. The explanation is given by St. Thomas. The form which it *intentionally* introduces into the subject, essentially excludes its opposite; albeit this latter is likewise a form and a perfection. Nature abhors an absolute duality; and, therefore, when two independent forms meet in the same Subject, the one either absorbs or expels the other. Thus the efficient cause directly intends the communication of a form similar to its own, and the form so communicated is the direct term of its action; but this communication necessarily involves the expulsion of another form, incompatible with the presence of the former. In this way the Subject is deprived of its original form, which to it is an Evil; and it suffers the privation, prior, at least in order of nature, to its reception of the new form, according to the axiom that *the corruption of one thing is the generation of another*. Thus, for instance, *the corruption of water is the generation of steam*. Now, the form of fire or heat does not intend, so to speak, the expulsion of the form of water; but simply the introduction of its own form into the subjacent matter. As, however, the form of steam is incompatible with that of water; the latter is accidentally expelled by the presence of the former. The above statements are curiously illustrated by the metamorphosis of, (we will say for the sake of definiteness), *the cabbage-caterpillar* into the butterfly. There are three states or stages in this process of change. There is the primitive state of the worm or caterpillar, the state of transition, and the terminal state of evolution. It is clear that the butterfly is a higher and more organized form of life; and nature intends that form as her term of action. Furthermore, the two kinds of life are incompatible. The one is creeping; the other winged. The one feeds on the cabbage and requires jaws of more than ordinary strength, compared with its size; the other, if it feeds at all, as the *female* butterfly must, feeds on the honey of plants, and wants a long proboscis which can dive into the calyx of the flower. The one is in need of many feet for its motion on the earth's surface; the other cannot do without wings, by which to flutter about from flower to flower. There is a stage of transition, therefore,—the chrysalis state, as it is called,—during which the caterpillar-form recedes from the Subject, or the matter, in proportion as the butterfly-form becomes present, by natural evolution. Now, it is plain that nature does not directly

intend to deprive the Subject of its caterpillar-form. Its sole intention is to evolve the butterfly. But this includes the necessity of the expulsion of the preceding form; and, consequently, this privation, or Evil, in the Subject is caused accidentally and unintentionally. It is necessary again to remind the reader that, when the term, *intention*, is applied to unreasoning and material things, it is either used *analogically*, to express the direct term of causal action as determined by natural law, or it is used *univocally* of the intention of Him Who imposes His law on nature. It may, perhaps, be objected to the exposition just made, that, though the privation of the antecedent form is not *principally* intended; nevertheless, it is *secondarily* intended, as a necessary means for the attainment of the direct term of operation and, consequently, as a useful Good. The objection is true; but the statement only differs verbally from the explanation given. All that is contended for here is, that the said privation is not included in the primary or direct intention of the efficient cause.

ii. Natural Evil may be produced in Being by deficiency in the efficient cause either principal or instrumental. For sometimes it is the result of a deficiency in the one, sometimes of a deficiency in the other. Thus, to adopt the illustration of St. Thomas, imperfect walking may sometimes arise from the weakness of the motive faculty, as in young children; sometimes, from a lameness or a deformity in the leg. This doctrine, however, suggests a serious difficulty. For it seems to admit that Evil in the efficient cause is the cause of Evil in the effect; if so, then it is not always true, as has been asserted, that Good is the cause of Evil. But it behoves us to remember, that *deficiency* in the efficient cause is no cause at all; because a privation cannot be a cause. Consequently, although the Evil in the effect is absolutely the result of Evil, or defect, in the agent; yet the Evil in the effect is accidental to the effect; and it is the positive effect, *as* effect, which the cause, *as* cause, intends to produce. Hence it follows, that Evil, as such, cannot be the cause of Evil; but that the Good produces the positive effect, with which the Evil, or privation of perfectness, is accidentally united; because owing to an accidental Evil in the cause, (since all Evil is accidental to Being), it has not been able to exert its full causal energy. But this answer generates a fresh difficulty. For, according to what has been said, Evil in the effect always presupposes Evil in the efficient cause. If, however, this is conceded, then either we must

admit an infinite process ; or we must at length reach an efficient cause, in itself not evil, which produces Evil in its effect. Yet this latter alternative contradicts the original statement. Besides, it seems in itself an irrational hypothesis ; for, since every cause terminates in that which is similar and proportional to itself, how could a perfect cause produce an imperfect effect ? The answer to the above difficulty is very simple ; and consists in a categorical denial of the supposition on which the objection rests. Evil in the effect does not invariably connote or postulate Evil, or defect, in the efficient cause. For, if the cause be in any way hindered in its operation ; it may be free from all defect itself, and yet its effect will be imperfect. But it may be replied, this very liability to hindrance is itself a defect. Not so ; for all created Being is finite, or limited ; and, because it is essentially limited, it is naturally and essentially liable to hindrance from opposing forces. But a natural limitation is not a privation and, in consequence, not an Evil. To exhaust, however, the difficulty,—it is to be noted that Evil in the effect may be traced either to Evil in the cause or to an external impediment. About this second case there can be no reasonable doubt, after what has been said. As to the former, though it be true that Evil in the effect supposes Evil in the efficient cause ; nevertheless, there is no necessity for admitting an infinite process. For the Evil in the aforesaid cause may be due to the action of some efficient cause, perfect within its own limits, which, while intending to produce its perfect effect in the former cause that is Subject of its energy, expels some form from that cause, by reason of which the native activity of the latter is impaired. In such case, the causation of Evil in the effect is reduced to the first of the three categories already mentioned. Thus, then, although it is perfectly true, that from an efficient cause, (so far as it is a cause, i.e. good), can proceed only a good effect ; nevertheless, it is possible that the effect should not receive the entire perfection that is its due, owing to an impediment which hinders the perfect action of the cause. This, however, argues no imperfection in the cause itself ; but only the limitation of its nature. Hence, the natural limitation of one cause, together with some impediment interposed by the action of another, is sufficient to account for imperfection or evil in the effect, although there be no defect in either cause. The impediment is naturally created by the determined action, order, and mutual conjunction, of efficient causes. On the other hand, if

the cause is itself defective and, so far forth, evil; that defect may arise from such efficient cause having been previously the Subject of another cause, which has either expelled the due perfection by the perfectness of its own energy according to the manner indicated under the first heading, or has itself been hindered, by conflict with another cause, from expending in the effect the fulness of its energy. Wherefore, there is no need of an infinite process.

iii. Natural Evil may be produced in an effect by simple subtraction of causal efficiency. For, since Evil is a privation, it requires no positive action to produce it; therefore, to the existence of natural Evil it suffices, that the Subject should not receive that perfection to which it ceases not to lay claim. Now, as in the nature of things efficient causation is not free, and, consequently, an efficient cause, *positis ponendis*, has no power of restraining or withholding its own energy; it follows, that the suspension of its efficiency must be traced in some way or other to the Subject. Hence, St. Thomas, in both the passages quoted at the beginning, attributes it to a defective disposition of the matter. Thus,—to quote his example,—a carver desires to work a *figure* out of a *piece of wood*; but there is a *knot* in the centre of the wood, and he fails. In this case, there is no deficiency (as is supposed) either in the principal or instrumental cause, i. e. in the skilful manipulation of the carver, or in the tool which he employs; but the wood does not receive the perfect form, because it is defective. There is another example which will serve to illustrate all the three cases. Let us suppose that a baker is making *white* and *brown bread*. In the former case, he uses *pure wheat flour* for his matter; in the latter, *flour mixed with the bran*. He makes use of precisely the same *barm* in both instances; yet he finds, that the dough rises very unequally in the two. The reason is, that the bran offers an impediment to the full action of the yeast; in other words, the matter in the brown bread is defectively disposed. Similarly, the baker may by chance make use of flour which has been obtained from what is called *spriti wheat*, damaged by rain. The barm may be excellent, but the bread will be heavy. Again, if the barm is flat or sickly, the bread will be bad, *now* owing to a defect in the efficient cause. Lastly, if the barm is over active, the alcohol that has been generated in the process is not wholly evaporated; and the remainder becomes transformed into *acetic acid*, which makes the bread sour. Here, the perfection of the efficient cause introduces a form into the

matter, which is incompatible with the natural sweetness of the bread. There can be little or no doubt, that the generation of monsters is due for the most part to the deficient disposition of the matter. But this indisposition of the matter supposes the positive action of some cause, which produces an effect in the Subject, or matter, incompatible with the action of the other cause. Now, it is plain that in this, as in the former cases, the defect in the effect is not directly intended by the efficient cause; but is rather an accidental accompaniment. Therefore, though natural Evil postulates an efficient cause; the causation itself is unintentional and accidental.

It now remains to consider the same question in connection with moral Evil. And, here again, St. Thomas shall be our guide. 'There are two ways,' he says, 'in which Evil is caused by Good. In one way, the Good is cause of Evil, forasmuch as it is defective; in another way accidentally.' This latter category, as may be plainly seen, includes the first and third modes of the division which the Angelic Doctor has given in the passages previously quoted, and which has been adopted in the present Thesis. For, where there is no defect in the cause itself, it is clear that defect in the Subject of its action, or rather in the effect, can be only an accidental result of its energy. The Angelic Doctor proceeds: 'Now, in actions of the will, there is a certain amount of similarity; but not in every respect. For it is manifest that it is sensual pleasure which moves the will of the adulterer, and induces him to seek for gratification in a way that goes against the natural order and the Divine law. Such is moral Evil. If, then, it were the case, that the will admitted of necessity the impression of the Pleasurable, which attracts it in the same way as a physical body receives its impression from an efficient cause; there would be no difference between the things of nature and the acts of the will. But such is not the case. For, however much a sensible Good may attract externally; it is still in the power of the will to admit or not admit it. Hence, the cause of the evil resulting from its admission is not the Pleasurable which allures; but rather the will itself. Now, the will is cause of Evil in both of the aforesaid ways, i.e. accidentally, and as being defectively good. It is so accidentally; in that the will is attracted towards that which is a qualified Good, but conjoined with what is absolutely evil. It is cause of Evil also, as being a defective Good; since it is necessary to presuppose in the will the existence of some

defect, antecedently to the defective election itself, by which it chooses a qualified Good which is an absolute Evil. Now, this will plainly appear from what follows. For, in all cases in which one thing is the rule and measure of another, the one which is subject to rule and measure is good, in that it is ruled and conformed to measure; and evil, in that it is not under rule and measure. Thus, for instance, if a workman, whose duty it is to cut a piece of wood in a straight line by a rule, does not cut it straight, (which is the same as cutting it badly); the badness of his cutting will be caused by the workman being without his rule and measure. Similarly, pleasure and everything else in human affairs must be measured and ruled in accordance with the rule of measure and of the Divine Law. Wherefore, a failure to use the rule of reason and of the Divine Law, is presupposed in the will, antecedently to the inordinate election. Now, it is not necessary to search for a cause of such failure to make use of the aforesaid rule; because the liberty of the will, by which it has the power of acting or not acting, alone suffices. Further; the mere fact of not actually attending to such a rule, considered in itself, is not an Evil, whether in the shape of sin or of punishment; because the mind is not bound, and is in truth unable, continually to pay actual attention to such a rule. But it first begins to assume the nature of sin, when,—without actual consideration of the rule,—it proceeds to an election of this sort. Just as the workman does not commit a fault in not always having his rule by him; but because he proceeds to cut the wood, without having his rule¹.

¹ 'Est ergo duplex modus quo malum causatur ex bono. Uno modo bonum est causa mali inquantum est deficiens; alio modo inquantum est per accidens. . . . In voluntariis autem quodammodo similiter se habet, sed non quantum ad omnia. Manifestum est enim quod delectabile secundum sensum movet voluntatem adulteri, et afficit eam ad delectandum tali delectatione quae excludit ordinem rationis et legis divinae; quod est malum morale. Si ergo ita esset, quod voluntas ex necessitate reciperet impressionem delectabilis allicientis, sicut ex necessitate corpus naturale recipit impressionem agentis, omnino idem esset in voluntariis et naturalibus. Non est autem sic; quia quantumcumque exterius sensibile alliciat, in potestate tamen voluntatis est recipere vel non recipere. Unde mali, quod accidit ex hoc quod recipit, non est causa ipsum delectabile movens, sed magis ipsa voluntas. Quae quidem est causa mali secundum utrumque praedictorum modorum, scil. et per accidens, et inquantum est bonum deficiens: per accidens quidem, inquantum voluntas fertur in aliquid quod est bonum secundum quid, sed habet conjunctum quod est simpliciter malum; sed ut bonum deficiens, inquantum in voluntate oportet praeconsiderare aliquem defectum ante ipsam electionem deficientem, per quam eligit secundum quid bonum quod est simpliciter malum. Quod sic patet. In omnibus enim, quorum

One other passage shall be added, in order to set the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, touching this portion of the subject, completely before the reader. In the Article from which the ensuing quotation has been taken, St. Thomas makes that threefold division of modes by which an efficient cause may produce, or be responsible for, natural Evil in the effect; viz. owing to the intention of the agent, owing to defective disposition in the subject-matter, and, thirdly, owing to the instrument. Thence he pursues the investigation touching the production of moral Evil, or the Evil of sin, after this manner. 'The Evil of sin may occur in two of these ways, viz. owing to the intention, or owing to the instrument. . . . For, in every sin that is committed with deliberation of reason, Evil results from the intention. To explain: as in things of nature there cannot be two ultimate substantial forms actually perfecting the same portion of matter; so, there cannot be two ultimate ends of the will. Wherefore, as a natural agent, by introducing one form, causes the loss of some other; so the will likewise, by reason of its adhering to some object which is not its proper end as the ultimate end, is turned away from its proper ultimate end, (and in this consists the complete nature of the Evil of sin), apart from any intention of the will. Sins, on the other hand, which proceed without deliberation of reason' (and are, therefore, only analogically called sins), 'such as first movements of a passion, occur from defect in the instrument, i.e. in the inferior faculties of the soul, which are, as it were, instruments of the will or of the reason¹.'

unum debet esse regula et mensura alterius, bonum in regulato et mensurato est ex hoc quod regulatur et conformatur regulæ et mensuræ; malum vero ex hoc quod est non regulari et mensurari. Si ergo sit aliquis artifex qui debeat aliquod lignum recte incidere secundum aliquam regulam, si non directe incidat, (quod est male incidere), hæc mala incisio causabitur ex hoc defectu quod artifex erat sine regula et mensura. Similiter, delectatio et quodlibet aliud in rebus humanis est mensurandum et regulandum secundum regulam rationis et legis divinæ. Unde, non uti regula rationis et legis divinæ præintelligitur in voluntate ante inordinatam electionem. Hujusmodi autem quod non est uti regula prædicta, non oportet aliquam causam quaerere; quia ad hoc sufficit ipsa libertas voluntatis, per quam potest agere vel non agere. Et hoc ipsum quod est non attendere actu ad talem regulam, in se consideratum, non est malum nec culpa nec poena. Quia anima non tenetur nec potest attendere ad hujusmodi regulam semper in actu. Sed ex hoc accipit primo rationem culpæ, quod sine actuali consideratione regulæ procedit ad hujusmodi electionem. Sicut artifex non peccat in eo quod non semper tenet mensuram, sed ex hoc quod non tenens mensuram procedit ad incidendum.' *De Ma. Q. 1, a. 3, c. in m.*

¹ 'Malum autem culpæ ex duobus horum modorum contingere potest, scil., vel ex parte ejus quod intentum est, vel ex parte instrumenti. . . . In omnibus enim peccatis

From these two passages certain conclusions may be drawn touching the causality of sin, or of moral Evil, properly so called.

i. All sin, univocally understood, is the result in some way of a positive action of free-will. For the sin commences with the inordinate election, which is the second or completed act of the will. The Evil of sin commences with the act; and as the will is autonomous, (or free to act as it pleases), so far as concerns the eliciting of the act; consequently, ii. there is no need of looking further for the origin of the Evil; and the efficient cause is not in itself evil, independently of, and antecedently to, the act of deliberate choice. Herein, then, lie the principal points of difference between natural and moral Evil. But the Angelic Doctor tells us that there are also points of similarity between the two, which he enumerates. iii. There is this point of similarity between them, that, just as the energy of the efficient cause in the things of nature, by communicating a form like itself to the Subject, thereby expels another form incompatible with that which it engenders; so it is, in like manner, with the will. For, as there cannot be two substantial forms in the same material Subject, so that the presence of one necessarily involves the desition or absence of the other; neither, in like manner, can the will have two ultimate ends in the same act. Consequently, if it adheres to an unworthy end as its true ultimate end, such a choice inevitably involves exclusion of, and aversion from, the true ultimate end; even though the will may have no direct and explicit intention of rejecting it. Now, the essential nature of sin consists precisely in this exclusion of, and aversion from, man's true end. Further, in proportion to the energy with which the will adheres to the unworthy, and is averted from the true, end; in the same proportion is the moral Evil more intense: just as the energetic action of fire on water ends by destroying the substantial nature of the latter. iv. Another point of

quae per deliberationem rationis procedunt, malum incidit ex parte ejus quod intentum est. Sicut enim in naturalibus non possunt esse duae formae substantiales ultimae actu perficientes eandem partem materiae, ita non possunt esse duo ultimi fines voluntatis. Unde, sicut agens naturale ex hoc quod inducit unam formam, causat defectum alterius formae; ita etiam voluntas, ex hoc quod alicui tanquam ultimi fini inhaeret quod debitus sibi finis non est, avertitur a fine ultimo sibi debito, (in quo completur ratio mali culpae), praeter intentionem voluntatis. Peccata vero quae praeter deliberationem rationis procedunt, ut primi motus, incidunt ex defectu instrumenti, id est inferiorum virium, quae sunt sicut instrumenta voluntatis aut rationis.' *In 2 d. xxxiv, a. 3, c.*

similarity between the two is to be found in this, that Evil results from the deficiency of the cause in both cases. This has been already pointed out as regards natural Evil; it remains to show how it is verified in the case of sin. A choice of the will is good, inasmuch as it is conformable to the eternal and natural law of right, i. e. to the law of God as revealed to human reason,—or, in other words, to the dictates of conscience. Why so? Because Goodness, in that which is subject to direction, consists in this latter being so directed. But, as we are taught in Ethics, actions of free-will are essentially subject to rule or direction. Now, a free election of the will necessarily presupposes deliberation on the part of the reason. When, then, the claims of man's true end are not recognized in the deliberative act; the rule or measure is absent. But it ought to be there. Here, accordingly, it is, that a deficiency is observable in the efficient cause; and, owing to this deficiency, the choice is evil. There are two principles included in this teaching of the Angelic Doctor, which merit notice by reason of their importance. The one is, that it is not necessary to have the natural law ceaselessly present to the mind. The thing is impossible; and, if a man were foolishly to attempt it, he would lose his head. What is required, is this; that the law should be recalled to memory in the deliberation which precedes the choice of the will,—that the rule or measure should be applied, when the act is meditated which requires measurement and regulation. The other is, that sin does not, ordinarily at least, consist in an explicit and direct rejection of the ultimate end, or in a formal determination to disobey the law which is the measure of free-will. It suffices that, by the deliberate choice of the will, an illegitimate end should be preferred and, consequently, the true end virtually rejected, for the reason that the two are incompatible. v. There is another point of similarity; though it is far more remote than the others. It has been seen, that natural Evil may be produced in an effect by some deficiency in the secondary, or instrumental, cause. A distant resemblance to this is to be found in the production of moral Evil. For the first involuntary motions of concupiscence and of other passions may be regarded as sins in three ways; first of all, *by reason of their origin*, since it often happens, that these perturbations are the result of previous habitual indulgence. Then, they may be so considered *in regard of their tendency*. For they are the most powerful allurements to actual sin. Lastly, they may be considered sins

theologically, as being one among the consequences of original sin. It is principally in this last light, that they are regarded by St. Thomas in the second of the foregoing quotations. For the Christian Revelation teaches, that man was not originally created in a purely natural condition, as he might have been ; but was raised into a supernatural state, among whose privileges, exemption from these rebellions of our nature was not the least. Consequently, these involuntary motions, which would otherwise have been purely natural, are now a privation, and, as such, a moral Evil. But, looking at the question according to the light of reason only, as Philosophy must do, such motions would be purely natural ; and could in no wise, of themselves, partake of the nature of sin, save in the first two ways already indicated. To the existence of actual sin it is absolutely necessary that there should be free choice of the will and previous deliberation of some sort. But there are such things as half-voluntary sins, which suppose a sort of half-election, (to a certain extent free), and an attenuated deliberation. In these, there is moral Evil ; but less, in proportion, to the diminution of these two essential elements. Perhaps St. Thomas had an eye partially to such instances ; at all events, they may be included here. In whatever way, therefore, these motions lead to the commission of sin venial or mortal, it may be said that the moral Evil is in great measure due to a deficiency in the instrumental cause. For the passions of our lower nature are intended to be instruments of the will and reason ; whenever, then, they are not so, (as in the case of involuntary motions they are not), they are, as instruments, deficient. If moral Evil results in deliberate action of the will, in consequence of this deficiency ; it is partially attributable to the defective instrument, though not wholly. For the will is free in its election ; and, if at any time, (as may happen), it is not free, owing to the sudden inroad of exorbitant passion, there is no sin. To these points of similarity, suggested by the Angelic Doctor, may be added another : vi. As, in the things of nature, efficient causes, though good in themselves, produce Evil in the subject of their action, by reason of the limitation of their nature ; so, in the human will, a similar root of Evil is to be found. For it is because the will is limited, that it requires an external rule and measure of its action. For the same reason it is mutable. From the concurrence of these two facts follows defectibility from the rule or measure. Hence arises possibility, now of imperfection in obedience,

now of deliberate disobedience, i. e. possibility of defect,—of venial and mortal sin. Yet, the will, (as is plain), is in itself good, till it becomes evil *in its choice*.

It has doubtless been made evident, during the course of this elaborate discussion, that, as in natural Evil so in moral Evil, the efficient cause produces Evil in its effect by accident and unintentionally. For the positive action of the will is *entitatively* perfect, even in its commission of sin. It pursues that which is undeniably a *qualified* good; and it is accidental to the act and, for the most part, not expressly intended by the will, that adhesion to this end necessarily should involve aversion from man's true ultimate end. But this aversion constitutes the sin. Consequently, the sin is, *as sin*, a simple privation which is not absolutely and directly intended by the act. The same truth is elicited, by considering the action of the will as subject to rule and measure. The action of cutting the wood is (we will suppose) entitatively perfect; yet, the carpenter has sawed it badly. Why? He has forgotten to bring his rule with him; and it is all out of the straight line. But the crookedness is purely accidental to the act of sawing; and unintentional on the part of the workman. The defect has arisen from his not having guided his action by the rule, as he ought to have done; and for this he is responsible to his employer. The application of this illustration is too plain to require any expenditure of words. The case is yet clearer as regards the involuntary motions of our lower nature. For, considered absolutely as they are in their own entity, they are perfect; and, so far as they are involuntary, cannot be considered irregular, save in a theological sense, according to the explanation already given. They become evil, when they are deliberately accepted by the will under circumstances wherein their indulgence is prohibited by the rule of reason and of Divine law. But then, the moral Evil is attributable to the will. The action of these lower faculties is, in itself, good and intended for a wise purpose; and, when it is considered morally dangerous, it is only in relation to the will that it is so considered, over whose elections it exerts so powerful an influence.

Hence, then, it is concluded, that Evil in general is only by accident and unintentionally the effect of its efficient cause.

PROPOSITION CXV.

D. THE PLACE OF EVIL IN METAPHYSICS.

Evil is justly excluded from a place among the attributes of Being.

The truth of this Proposition commends itself at once so decidedly to the common sense of most men, that it may be regarded as axiomatic; and it might, therefore, be thought a waste of time to burden a self-evident truth with superfluous declaration. And yet, it is not without its difficulties. For Evil is plainly enough distinct from Being; more so, indeed, than the three attributes which are universally assigned to it. It is moreover, predicated of Being, and lends its name to Being. It may perhaps be said in reply, that Goodness is one of the attributes of Being, and that, consequently, Evil, which is the opposite of Goodness, could not be an attribute; because this would suppose the existence of opposites, a perfection and its privation, in one and the same Subject. But it is a sufficient answer to this objection, that Good and Evil may co-exist in the same Subject under different respects. For instance, *a good statesman* may be a *bad man*; and a *bad statesman* may be a *good man*. So *good weather* may be *bad for green crops*; and a *good waller* may be a *bad setter or mason*. It may, further, be objected against the admission of Evil among the attributes of Being, that it is formally a mere privation. But this objection proves too much; and, therefore, proves nothing. For it tells equally against unity; which is universally acknowledged to be an attribute of Being; since unity is formally indivision, i. e. privation of division, in Being. Lastly, it cannot be said that Evil is not coextensive with Being; because, though no Being, as such, is absolutely evil, nevertheless, there is no Being whatsoever, (God Himself included), that is not relatively evil. For God is an Evil to those whom He condemns to punishment. Moreover it has been admitted, that there is a certain reality in Evil; indeed, common sense teaches us as much. Therefore, there is abundant reason for including Evil among the attributes of Being.

Nevertheless, Evil is justly excluded from the catalogue, for the three following reasons.

I. Evil, in its formal character of Evil, does not express anything belonging to the nature of Being, but, on the contrary, a tendency

to not-Being,—the deficiency, diminution, of Being; so much so, that, as the Philosopher justly remarks, perfect Evil destroys itself and is *No-thing*. Consequently, the assumed parallel between Evil and unity does not hold good. For Evil is a disease of Being; unity is a perfection. And it is a sign of this, that unity essentially includes Being in its formal concept; whereas Evil is formally a privation, and if it includes Being, includes it as a Subject *in obliquo*. For it cannot be represented as *deprived Being*, as unity, or *the one*, can be described as undivided Being; but rather as privation in Being. Besides, unity is the privation of imperfection, which is tantamount to a position or real perfection; whereas Evil is the privation of real perfection. Hence, unity circumscribes and defines the integrity of Being and, as a consequence, its entity; whereas Evil defines defect or loss of entity.

II. Evil is not convertible with Being. Yet this is a necessary property of every true attribute. For, under one point of view, Evil overlaps Being; while, under another point of view, Being overlaps Evil. If we consider Evil *in itself*, for the reason that it does not essentially include entity in its concept but only privation of entity, that to which the name of Evil is legitimately given is not necessarily Being at all; for the privation is itself an Evil, though not *in itself*, (for in itself it is nothingness), but relatively to that entity in which it is. It is in this way that sins of omission are real moral Evils, though independent of all real entity. On the other hand, if we consider Being in itself, it cannot be denied that there are innumerable beings that are in no sense evil. For it is most certain that in God there is no defect or privation. Hence, Evil cannot attach to Him in such wise. Neither is He absolutely undesirable to any other Being whatsoever; but, on the contrary, infinitely desirable, and absolutely necessary to the perfection of all things whatsoever. And, if He is sometimes apprehended as undesirable; either the apprehension is false, or it is founded in a Divine operation that is disagreeable to some man or body of men, and this resultant Evil is attributed to God. But it is a mere extrinsic denomination; and does not properly constitute Evil.

III. All true attributes of Being are the absolute, essential, intrinsic, properties or consequents of Being. But Evil is neither an absolute, essential, nor intrinsic, consequent of Being. For we have seen, that it requires the extrinsic action of some efficient cause; for the very reason that it is not in itself intrinsic to Being.

It is neither absolute nor essential ; seeing that it is in every case caused by accident and unintentionally.

COROLLARY.

Evil is considered in Metaphysics as the opposite of Goodness ; just as multitude finds a place there as the opposite of unity ; and falsity, as the opposite of truth.

GLOSSARY.

A.

- ABSTRACTION.** A faculty of the mind by which we seize upon certain notes, or realities, in the object of thought and neglect the rest. Hence, the mind is considered as taking away (*abstrahere*) the former from the latter. It often stands objectively for the idea so formed. **PHYSICAL.** The abstracting of the specific or essential nature from the individual notes it has as *this* existing body. **MATHEMATICAL.** The abstracting of the laws and forms of continuous quantity from material things. **METAPHYSICAL.** The abstracting of essences or natures from all whatsoever material conditions. These terms are likewise applied to the ideas thus formed, pp. 24, 25.
- ACCIDENT.** An entity which cannot naturally exist by itself, but has an essential tendency to inhere in another. It is opposed to substance. The two divide all Being, p. 61.
- ACT.** The reduction of a possibility to a reality,—of a power active or passive to its complete reality. **FIRST AND SECOND ACT.** (i) The act of being or existing is the first, the act of operating or energizing is the second, act; because a being must exist, before it can do anything. (ii) The first act of a power or faculty is its first inchoative motion; the second act is its completed operation. Thus, the first act of fire is to assimilate the fuel to itself by communicating its own heat; the second act is combustion. **ACTUAL.** That which is in act. Act is opposed to potentiality; actual to potential. A form is called an Act, because it is either in act itself or actuates that which it informs.
- ANALOGY.** A proportion between things that are in other ways different, or a respect of things that are different to each other according to a certain form. **ANALOGOUS TERM.** A word which has a difference of meaning as applied to different objects, yet such a similarity as to justify its application to them. It differs from a univocal term, because the latter has absolutely but one signification, to whatsoever object it may be applied. It differs from an equivocal term; because the latter has no similarity of idea to justify its application to the different objects. Moreover, analogous terms are designedly used; equivocal, by accident. **ANALOGATES.** The objects to which the analogous term is applied. **THE PRIMARY.** That to which it is principally and rightly applied. **THE SECONDARY.** Those objects to which it is applied in a subordinate sense, because of some proportion or relation which they bear to the primary. **ANALOGY OF PROPORTION AND ATTRIBUTION.** See note, p. 30; also p. 67.
- ANALYSIS (ANALYTICAL).** The process of resolving an idea or cognition into its elements.
- ANTECEDENT.** In its most general sense, that which goes before the conclusion of a syllogism. It is more specifically applied to the major premiss in a conditional syllogism.
- ANTHROPOLOGY.** The science whose subject-matter is the nature of man.
- ATTRIBUTE.** That reality which properly belongs to an essence or nature, though

it forms no part of the latter. In Demonstration it is called the Passion, because it is that which is logically received in the Subject. It always constitutes the Major Term of the demonstrative syllogism; and is called an attribute, because it is assigned, or attributed, to the Subject in the Conclusion. pp. 155, 156.

C.

CATEGORY. One of the ten pigeon-holes in which Aristotle has arranged and distributed all real, finite, complete, beings. **CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT.** A Judgment which pronounces *absolutely* in the affirmative or negative; that is to say, without either condition or alternative. It is opposed to a conditional or disjunctive Judgment. **CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM.** A syllogism that is exclusively composed of categorical Judgments. The word, *Category*, is derived from a Greek verb which means to *predicate*.

CAUSE. An entity which is either absolutely or hypothetically both necessary and sufficient for the existence of something really distinct from itself. **MATERIAL, FORMAL, EFFICIENT, FINAL, EXEMPLAR.** Be patient, till the next volume appears. **UNIVOCAL.** A cause which is naturally limited to the production of one effect. **EQUIVOCAL.** A cause which is naturally capable of producing more than one effect. Thus, for instance, the sun is the cause both of light and heat; heat causes expansion and contraction.

CERTITUDE. The quality of a mental act, according to which the act is free from doubt, and the mind firmly adheres to its object. The term has been transferred to the object of thought, in so far as this latter is apt to produce a certain cognition of itself in the mind. The former (which is the primary signification) is called **SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY**; the latter, **OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY**. The correlative of certainty is evidence; which see. The division of certitude corresponds with that of evidence.

COGNITION (COGNIZE). A term derived from the Latin *cognitio*, knowing,—*cognoscere*, to know. It is sometimes used to express any kind of idea, or concept; but it is properly applied exclusively to judicial concepts, or Judgments of the mind as distinguished from simple Apprehensions.

COLLECTIVE IDEAS OR NOUNS. Ideas or words that represent a collection of individuals; and can only be predicated of the collection, not of each individual. Hence they approach nearer to the nature of singulars than to that of universals; and are not logically distributive. Thus, it is true that the soldiers in Afghanistan are an army; but no one would be so foolish as to say that General Roberts is an army. On the contrary, a distributive, or universal, term can be predicated of all and each. Thus, the said soldiers are men; and General Roberts is a man.

COMPOSITION (COMPOSITES). The being made up of parts; or the actual union of the parts. It is opposed to *simplicity*. **PHYSICAL COMPOSITION.** Composition of physical parts that are physically separable. **METAPHYSICAL COMPOSITION.** Composition of metaphysical parts which are only conceptually separable. **COMPOSITION AND DIVISION** in Logic are equivalent to Affirmative and Negative Judgments.

COMPOSSIBLE. That which is possible jointly with something else. Thus, redness and a sweet smell are compossible in the same rose; but redness and whiteness are not compossible in the same part of the rose at the same time.

COMPREHENSION. A perfect, or adequate, concept of the object. It is thus distinguished from mere *apprehension*. In Logic the **WHOLE OF COMPREHENSION** is opposed to the *whole of extension*. The former is smallest in extent and greatest in representation; that is to say, it represents the most limited range of objects,

but those representations are complete. It is also called the metaphysical whole. The latter, on the contrary, is widest in the range of objects that it includes ; but it is most meagre and indefinite in its representation. It is also called the logical whole. These two wholes are in inverse ratio to each other.

CONCEPT. A formed idea or cognition ; for the term *concept* includes both.

CONCEPTION. The act of forming the idea. We are indebted to Sir William Hamilton for this useful distinction. OBJECTIVE CONCEPT. That reality in the object which is covered by our present thought,—that which we are exclusively thinking about at the time. Thus, an anatomist, when he looks at an animal professionally, thinks only of its bodily structure. This reality, therefore, in the animal will be his objective concept. SUBJECTIVE OR FORMAL CONCEPT. The idea which is formed in the subject (the man who is thinking) of the objective concept, or particular reality in the object. See pp. 35, 36.

CONDITIONED. That which is subject to a condition. It is opposed to *absolute*.

Thus, for instance, that *projectiles will eventually fall towards the earth*, is a conditioned truth ; for it is only verified on the condition that He Who imposed the law of gravitation on bodies wills to continue the same order. But that *the limited and contingent cannot be the cause of its own existence*, is an absolute truth ; for no conceivable conditions can affect it.

CONNOTE (CONNOTATION, CONNOTATIVE). To designate something else that is not included in the object formally represented by the concept. Thus, *to wash* connotes the presence of water ; or better still perhaps, that he who washes is living. Similarly, a river connotes its banks.

CONSEQUENT. Conclusion drawn from the antecedent. Logicians make a distinction between *consequent* and *consequence* ; but the reader need not be troubled with it here.

CONTINGENT (CONTINGENCY). That which is, but possibly might not have been. Thus, the Mansion-house in London is ; but it might never have been. The contingent is opposed to the necessary. The former must be, because it is ; the latter is, because it must be. FUTURE CONTINGENTS. Almost the same to natural reason as purely possibles.

CONVERTIBLE. This epithet is ordinarily used to denote Judgments which are capable of simple conversion, as Logicians say ; that is, Judgments in which the Subject may become Predicate and the Predicate Subject without change of quantity or quality. Thus, *All A is B* is simply convertible, when it can be truly said that *All B is A*. When the above conversion is verified, it is by virtue of the matter of the Judgment (i.e. of the represented object) ; for it is never logically admissible in a Universal Affirmative. Nevertheless, by virtue of the matter, all the propositions in the highest form of Demonstration—to wit, the two premisses and the conclusion (though affirmative universal Judgments), are simply convertible.

CONVERTIBLE TERMS. Such as can be mutually used in the place of each other. Thus, *man* and *rational animal* are convertible terms.

COPULA. The Logical verb, *is* or *is not* ;—*is* for affirmative, *is not* for negative, Judgments. It is called the copula, because it couples either affirmatively or negatively the concept of the Subject with that of the Predicate.

COROLLARY. An immediately, or *as it were* immediately, evident consequence of a demonstrated truth. The deduction is so apparent, that proof is considered unnecessary.

COSMOLOGY. The science which treats of the material universe.

D.

DEFINITION. The synthesis, or conjunction, of the several parts which constitute an integral concept. It, therefore, always presupposes Division, or a previous analysis. **ESSENTIAL DEFINITION.** The synthesis of the metaphysical parts of a metaphysical whole; that is to say, the material and formal parts. **LOGICAL DEFINITION.** The synthesis of the logical parts of a logical whole. These are the genus and difference, which constitute the species. **PHYSICAL DEFINITION.** The synthesis of the accidents which are properties of a class. It is also called **DESCRIPTIVE DEFINITION.** The former of the two last named has been sometimes distinguished from the latter, as it would seem, without reason, p. 6.

DEMONSTRATION. A syllogism in necessary matter; that is, a syllogism applied to truths which are not contingent. **OSTENSIVE DEMONSTRATION.** A Demonstration which *directly* proves the truth of the conclusion, as contradistinguished from a *reductio ad absurdum*, in which a truth is *indirectly* proved by showing the absurdity of its contradictory. This latter is the only way of proving truths that are immediately evident. For the further divisions of demonstration, consult any competent treatise on Logic; as, for instance, that of Sanderson.

DETERMINATION. See pp. 22-24.

DICHOTOMY (DICHOTOMIC). The only logically exhaustive division; since it includes every entity under one or other of its two members. It is called *Dichotomy*, because it always divides a whole in two. Thus, *man and not man—finite and infinite—substance and accident—*are dichotomic Divisions; though the first is the only one that is *logically* dichotomic, that is to say, according to the formal laws of thought.

DIFFERENTIA or DIFFERENCE (DIFFERENTIAL). That which formally distinguishes one thing from another. **LOGICAL DIFFERENTIA.** That logical whole which intersects and so divides the genus; constituting the species, and distinguishing it from all the other species contained under the same genus. **INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENTIA.** That which formally distinguishes an individual from all other individuals of the same species, pp. 21 and 331.

DIGNITIES. Fundamental principles which never actually enter into demonstration; but are virtually present as the necessary basis on which all demonstration reposes. Such is, for instance, the principle of Contradiction.

DIMENSIONS. The measure, or limit, of continuous quantity in length, breadth, and thickness. **DETERMINATE DIMENSIONS.** The definite measure, or limit, of continuous quantity; as it always is, and must be, in real existing entities. **INDETERMINATE DIMENSIONS.** The measure, or limit, of continuous quantity, as conceived indefinitely by the mind. Such dimensions are purely conceptual; since it is impossible that they should really exist in a state of indetermination. Thus, for instance, we can conceive a circle indefinitely as a figure in which all straight lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal; and, by force of the imagination, we can even give to the concept a sort of individuality. Yet it is impossible that there should ever be a really existing circle, which has not a definitely measurable circumference and a radius of a determined length.

DISCIPLINE. A body of truths within a definite sphere, which have been obtained by means of physical induction.

DISTRIBUTION (DISTRIBUTIVE, — DISTRIBUTIVENESS). A Logical term, significative of a property of universals, by virtue of which these are applicable to all, *and each*, of the individuals that are included within the limits of their periphery.

DICI AD CONVERTENTIAM. To be predicated in such sort as to justify

a simple conversion of the Terms ; so that it is true that *All A is B*, and that *All B is A*.

DICTUM DE OMNI ET NULLO. The fundamental principle of the categorical syllogism, which may be thus enounced : That which is affirmed of the logical whole, is affirmed of each and every part contained under that whole ; and that which is denied of the logical whole, is denied of each and every part contained under that whole.

DISTINCTIO RATIONIS RATIOCINANTIS, ET RATIONIS RATIOCINATAE. See p. 353.

E.

ELENCHTIC. An *elenchus*, according to Aristotle, is a syllogism that contradicts the conclusion. (*συλλόγισμος μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος*. Soph. Elench. i.) Some say, that this supposes the conclusion contradicted to be your own ; and that, therefore, the *elenchus* is a syllogism which proves that it is impossible for the conclusion to be otherwise than it is. But it is more commonly understood to be directed against the conclusion of the opponent. Hence, an *elenchic* syllogism would be a syllogism of war. Accordingly, an *elenchic* argument has come to mean an argument directed against the conclusion of your adversary. It is in this sense that Ogilvie in his Dictionary defines *elenchus* to be 'a syllogism, by which the adversary is forced to contradict himself.' His meaning is plain ; but the definition is by no means accurate. p. 129.

ENTITY (ENTITATIVE). *Thingness*,—the reality of a thing. As Being (*ens*) has two significations,—one nominative, which is equivalent to essence ; the other participial, equivalent to existence ; in like manner, entity. More usually, however, it is accepted in the former of the two meanings specified.

ENUNCIATION. The pronouncing of a Judgment. In the present Work it is taken to mean the Proposition, or expressed Judgment, which is submitted to proof, and is printed in capitals.

EQUIVOCALS. Terms which accidentally represent wholly distinct objects and concepts. Thus, *line* stands for the limit of a superficies,—a horizontal mark on a sheet of paper,—part of the tackle of a fisherman,—a verse of poetry,—a range of soldiers,—the equator,—a family tree. **EQUIVOCAL CAUSE.** See **CAUSE**.

EVIDENCE. The intelligibility of an object. This word is primarily predicated of the object of thought ; secondarily of the thought itself. In the former acceptance it goes by the name of objective, in the latter, by the name of subjective, evidence. Objective evidence is threefold : i. **METAPHYSICAL**, which is absolutely unconditioned and, therefore, eternal and unchanging ; ii. **PHYSICAL**, which is conditioned by the Divine Will ; iii. **MORAL**, which is likewise conditioned by the human will. It is objective evidence that causes certainty in cognition ; consequently, there will be three kinds of certainty corresponding to the above division. See **CERTITUDE**.

EXEMPLAR IDEA. The pattern idea or plan, conceived in the mind of a maker, according to which the latter fashions his work.

EXTENSION. **INTRINSIC** is the existence of part outside part. This is an essential property of all bodies. **EXTRINSIC EXTENSION** is twofold. **APTITUDINAL EXTRINSIC EXTENSION** consists in an aptitude for local extension, or the distinct location of each part in space. It is identical with quantity. **ACTUAL EXTRINSIC EXTENSION.** The actual position of each part in space. This is the effect of quantity. **LOGICAL EXTENSION.** The quantity of objects included under an idea. Thus, the idea *animal* has a wider logical extension than the idea *man*. This use of the term is analogical.

F.

FORM. That which in anywise determines the indeterminate. It is one of the two essential constituents of bodies. See **MATTER**. As the various senses, divisions, etc., of this word and its cognates will be given at some length in the next Volume, the above will suffice for the present.

IN FIERI. The state of a new entity, when it is in course of being produced,—when it is in the course of being made.

IN FACTO ESSE. The state of a new entity, when it has been completely produced,—when it is made. Thus, the watch is *in fieri*, when the watchmaker is putting the watch together; it is *in facto esse*, when it is ready for sale. p. 384.

G.

GENUS. A logical whole, which is predicated of many that differ in species. It is contracted by the dividing difference to the species, losing in extension that which it gains in comprehension. The fuller the idea, the more restricted its application.

GENESIS (GENETIC). The generation or new production of a thing. **GENETIC ORDER.** The order in generation or production. Thus, in animal generation the evolution of the internal organs is prior in genetic order to that of the limbs. p. 225.

H.

HAECCEITY. The *thisness* of a thing,—that something which constitutes an entity to be individually itself, and really distinct from every other individual. See pp. 209, 210.

I.

IDEALISM (IDEALISTIC). A term applied to certain systems of philosophy, which deny the objective existence of the external visible universe, and maintain that it is a mere creation of the human mind,—in other words, purely ideal. Hence the name.

IDEAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY REFLEX,—IDEAS ONTOLOGICALLY REFLEX. When the mind looks out upon an object external to itself (which it does almost exclusively when it first begins to think and, indeed, for years after), it forms an idea of that object. This is called a *direct* idea. But the mind has a power of throwing itself back upon these its own primitive ideas, and of making them in turn the object of another idea. The latter is called a *reflex* idea. Now, the mind, in contemplating its own idea, may do so in two different ways. It may regard it as a purely psychological fact, that is to say, as an entity—a modification,—a fact,—in the soul. The idea that is formed accordingly, is said to be *psychologically reflex*. Or it may regard its own idea as representative of an object, with the intention of gaining, by analysis, abstraction, or other method, a more definite knowledge of the Being so represented. The idea thus formed is called *ontologically reflex*.

IDEOLOGY. The science which deals with thought in its relation to objective truth. By some it has been called *Applied Logic*. But the nomenclature is not happy. For *Logic* deals exclusively with the forms, or laws, of thought, and only considers the matter of thought (that in it which is representative of an object), in so far and to such extent as the matter postulates a modification of the form. That part of *Logic*, therefore, which has these modifications for its object (such as *Demonstration* or, again, the *Topics*), is rightly denominated *applied*, or (to use

another term that is in vogue) *special Logic*. I have, therefore, preferred to call the science first described by the name of Ideology.

INDIVISION. A state of undividedness.

INTENTION (INTENTIO). The stretch of the mind over its object—its grasp of the latter,—which really constitutes the idea. Now, the first stretch is the *direct idea*; as explained above under the word *idea*. This is called the *first intention* (*prima intentio*). The second stretch is over the *direct idea*; and is called the *second intention*. Hence, every reflex idea might be called a second intention. But, as a fact, the term is exclusively applied to ideas that are *logically reflex*. An idea is logically reflex, wherein the mind stretches itself afresh over its first intention or previous idea, simply and only to discover and represent to itself the form of the first thought,—the mould in which it is shaped,—the logical law in obedience to which it was generated. It entirely excludes from its consideration all in thought that is representative of an object, and simply looks to the shape which the thought, as a thought, exhibits. The ideas which result from this process are called *Second Intentions*,—‘the entire and adequate formal subject of Logic,’ as Sanderson justly remarks. **INTENTIO INTELLECTA.** The name given by Avicenna to the *objective concept*. See under **CONCEPT**. **INTENTIONAL (INTENTIONALLY).** In Ideology, that which partakes of the nature of a mental intention, or idea.

INTUITION (INTUITIVE). An act of the understanding specifically so called, as distinguished from an act of the reason specifically so called. The operation of the former is an act; of the latter, a process. The one primarily cognizes self-evident truths; the other discovers, or renders explicit, truths implicitly contained in others, by reasoning either inductive or deductive. Hence the understanding forms its intuitions; the reason, its conclusions. The verb **INTUE** is now used by some philosophical writers.

L.

LEMMA. Something borrowed from another science and assumed to be true on its authority. p. 290.

M.

MATTER. That element in an entity which is indeterminate in itself and is capable of receiving determination from another. Consequently, as *matter*, it is purely passive. This is the most generic meaning of the word. **PRIMORDIAL MATTER.** One of the two essential constituents of all bodies. It is a purely passive potentiality, only capable of existence in union with some form; of all real entities the nearest to nothingness. See **FORM**. Its existence and nature will be fully discussed in the next volume. p. 227. **INTELLIGIBLE MATTER.** That which is considered by mental abstraction as solely determined by the laws and forms of quantity,—the whole adequate formal subject of pure mathematics, p. 497.

MAJOR PREMISS. That Judgment of the syllogism, wherein the major term is judicially connected with the middle term. Hence its name. **MINOR PREMISS.** That Judgment, or Proposition, of the syllogism, wherein the minor term is judicially connected with the middle term. Hence its name. It is sometimes called the *assumption*. Both these Judgments, or Propositions, are called premisses, because they are presupposed to the conclusion, as its causes.

MAJOR TERM. The predicate of the conclusion. **MINOR TERM.** The subject of the conclusion.

MIDDLE TERM. That term which becomes the *medium* of judicially connecting the major and minor terms in the conclusion, by virtue of its previous judicial comparison with each of these terms in the premisses. Hence, each of these three

terms appears twice in the syllogism;—the middle term twice in the premisses, the major and minor terms each once in the premisses and once in the conclusion.

MODE. An entity which cannot by any possibility exist apart from the subject which it informs. Thus, the *contact* of the water with the glass cannot possibly exist apart from the water. The sitting position cannot exist apart from the man who is seated. p. 243.

À MINORI AD MAJUS. One of the *Places* (τόποι) enumerated by Aristotle. A *Place* is a particular class of arguments that are conversant with contingent matter, and belong to Rhetoric more than to pure Logic. Its symbol may be thus given: *Much more*, or *How much more*. It is only valid in an affirmative form; just as its opposite, À MAJORI AD MINUS, is only valid in a negative form. Example of the former: *If it takes so much to feed four persons; how much more to feed a dozen*. Example of the latter: *If a man cannot carry the weight; much less can a boy carry it*.

N.

NOTE. A mark which makes an entity known,—by which it is distinguished.

ESSENTIAL NOTE. That which makes an essence known, or that by which an essence is distinguished. ACCIDENTAL or INDIVIDUAL NOTE. That by which an individual is distinguished. p. 325.

O.

OBJECT. That which is objected, or presented before, the mind. FORMAL OBJECT of a science is that reality in the object which the science professedly contemplates, and which forms its adequate and distinctive subject-matter. MATERIAL OBJECT of a science is the entity which possesses the aforesaid reality, or which is really identified with it. The latter may be common to many entities; the former never can be. Thus, *man* is the material object common to many sciences or disciplines, v. g. Ethics, Psychology, Anatomy, Medicine, etc. But *man as a moral Being tending by his free-will to his constituted end*, is peculiar to Ethics. That which is the object, is also called the subject, of a science. It is the object of contemplation, the subject of investigation. MORAL OBJECT. The purpose or end of an action.

OBJECTIVE is opposed to SUBJECTIVE. The former denotes that which is outside us; the latter, that which is within us. Thus, *objective* truth is ontological; *subjective* truth is purely logical.

OECONOMICS. The science of social life. Some moderns have styled it *sociology*.

OBJECTIVE CONCEPT. See under CONCEPT.

ONTOLOGY. The science of Being. ONTOLOGICAL. Belonging to Being. ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH. Real, as distinguished from conceptual, or logical, truth. It is often used in the sense of metaphysical truth.

IN OBLIQUO. IN RECTO. These terms are grammatical. A substantive is said to be *in recto*, when it is in the direct or nominative case; *in obliquo*, when it is in any of the indirect or oblique cases, p. 329.

P.

PARALOGISM. A syllogism which is deficient in form.

PASSION (PASSIO). That by which an entity is affected;—that which is received in an entity. See pp. 155, 156. It is logically identical with *attribute*; and corresponds also, more or less, with *property* in the list of Predicables. In Metaphysics the three Transcendental attributes are commonly called *passiones* (affections) of Being. In demonstration, the major term of the syllogism is the *passio* of the subject.

PERIPATETICISM. The philosophy of Aristotle. A disciple of that School is

called a PERIPATETIC; so called, because the pupils of Aristotle were wont to walk about the Athenian Lyceum during their instructions and disputations.

PERIPHERY. The circumference of a circle. It is applied to the limit of a concept, a science, etc.

PERSEITY. The existing *by itself* of an entity,—the existing in its own right.

PERSONALITY (PERSON). A substantial mode by which a complete intellectual substance is so individually completed in his own right, that it is incommunicable to any other. This mode in *complete* irrational substance is called *supposit*. Intellectual substance, as perfected by this mode, is called PERSON. That which belongs to him by virtue of such individual incommunicability, is said to be PERSONAL. The subject will be treated at length in another volume.

PHANTASMA (PHANTASM). An impression made in the sensory by sensible perception, or the perception of the senses. It can be evoked at will by the imagination, which has been not inaptly termed the memory of the senses. While the human soul remains united to the body, a *phantasma* accompanies every,—even the most abstract,—concept, or act, of the intellect. The use of the Latin word is preferable to that of the English, because this latter is generally employed to signify a mere fancy.

PHENOMENON. An appearance; that which meets the senses. The formal objects, therefore, of experience,—of physical experiment,—are PHENOMENAL. The word is opposed to *noumenon*, which represents an object of the pure understanding. Accidents and their action are phenomena; essences, or natures, are *noumena*.

POSITION. In Ideology a truth laid down. Hence, the verb to POSIT, that is, to *lay down*.

POTENTIALITY (POTENTIAL). A capability. Now, a capability may be active or passive. An active capability is a capacity of doing, acting, energizing, working. This is called an ACTIVE POTENTIALITY. Such are the forces of nature, bodily power, the faculties of intellect and will. A passive capability is a capacity of receiving (i. e. a receptivity),—a capability of being perfected by another. Such are, the capacity of wax for receiving an impression, the capacity of water for receiving the form of heat, the capacity of a criminal for receiving corporal punishment, the capability of human nature for receiving the gift of immortality. This is called a PASSIVE POTENTIALITY. It is to be noticed, however, that all entities, save two, have both active and passive potentiality. These two are the Infinite, because, being most pure Act, He has no potentiality at all; and primordial matter which is simply and exclusively a passive potentiality. Every potentiality is perfected by its act. POTENTIAL. That which is capable of act or actuation. POTENTIAL WHOLE. That which is capable of becoming a true, or distributed, universal,—an absolute universal, pp. 293-296.

PRIORITY (PRIOR). The state of being before something else. PRIORITY OF NATURE. The state of being before something else by nature, inasmuch as the prior entity is independent of the something else, but the something else is dependent on the former. Thus, the intellectual faculty is prior in order of nature to its thought; for it is independent of the thought, but the thought is dependent on it. PRIORITY OF TIME. The state of being before something else in order of time. PRIORITY OF ORDER. The state of being before something else in a given series.

PRIVATION (PRIVATIVE). The being without something that belongs of right to the deprived entity. It is thus distinguished from *want* or *absence*, (carentia), which is simply being without something. Thus, a mackerel is deprived of its fins; but a bird wants, or is without them. See p. 533.

PROCESS INFINITE. When one thing supposes another, and that other another, and so on for ever. When one thing *presupposes* another, and so on for ever, it is called an *infinite regress*. Now, if one thing supposes

others in an infinite series as necessary condition of its own existence, it is plain that it could never be. But this is a contradiction in terms. In the condition of an infinite regress, there is no such metaphysical repugnance; because an infinite series *a parte ante* (that is to say, in its commencing,) completes itself existentially, as it goes on. In the one case, the series already is; in the other, it is to be.

PROLEGOMENON. An explanation prefixed to a proposition, in order to render the subsequent proof more intelligible.

PROPERTY. In Logic one of the five Predicables. Property is an accident that is simply convertible with the logical whole of which it is the property. **GENERIC PROPERTY** is that which is simply convertible with genus. **SPECIFIC PROPERTY** is that which is simply convertible with species. Considered metaphysically, Property is a reality which does not form any part of the essence of a thing, but flows from, and necessarily accompanies it. Thus, the intellectual faculties are properties of the human soul.

PROSYLLOGISM. A syllogism which contains within itself one or, at the most, two other cryptical syllogisms. For it includes a proof of either one or other of the premisses, or of both. To take an example from Aristotle's *Ethics*: The supreme good is perfect. But pleasure (since it is a motion and sort of generation) is not perfect. Therefore, it is not the supreme good. In this instance, the cryptical syllogism is contained in the minor premiss. Sometimes, the term *prosyllogism* is applied to the cryptical syllogism.

PROTOTYPE (PROTOTYPAL). The original pattern after which anything is formed. It is likewise called *archetype*.

PSYCHOLOGY (PSYCHOLOGICAL). The science of soul. It embraces within its subject-matter the souls of animals, but principally treats of the human soul, its nature, properties, etc.

PETITIO PRINCIPII. A begging of the question. It is a logical fallacy, wherein that which professedly has to be proved in the conclusion, is taken for granted in the premisses; so that it serves to prove itself.

DE POTENTIA ABSOLUTA. DE POTENTIA ORDINATA. These are two phrases which are used to modify possibility or impossibility. Accordingly, a thing is said to be possible or impossible *de potentia absoluta*, when it is absolutely possible or absolutely impossible, even in regard of the Divine Omnipotence. A thing is said to be possible or impossible *de potentia ordinata* when it is possible or impossible according to the moral order. Thus it is possible that a man should commit suicide *de potentia absoluta*; but it is impossible that he should do it *de potentia ordinata*. See pp. 77, 78.

À PRIORI. À POSTERIORI. These two terms are used relatively to experience, or experimental knowledge. The one expresses that which is antecedent to, the other that which is consequent upon, and derived from, experience.

Q.

QUIDDITY. Essence, Nature. It answers to the question, What (*Quid*) is the thing? p. 46.

R.

REASON. In Psychology it means two things. It is either taken for the intellectual faculties in general (its generic signification); or it is used to express that particular faculty which is discursive, as distinguished from the Understanding which is intuitive. The Greeks called the former λόγος, the latter νοῦς.

RECEPTIVITY. The capacity of receiving. **REAL RECEPTIVITY** is a real capability of receiving something, and connotes the existence of the subject capable of receiving. Thus, primordial matter is a real receptivity, because it is real itself and really receptive of the substantial form. **CONCEPTUAL RECEPTIVITY** is a capability of receiving

something that is not real, but is conceived by the mind ; and does not connote the existence of the subject. Thus, finite Being is said to be receptive of existence, because it is contingent and exists by virtue of another ; but there is no real receptivity, because there is no real being to receive.

REDUPLICATIVELY. A term which expresses a doubling back of the mind on its own concept and, consequently, on the word that expresses such concept. Thus,—to take an instance from Aristotle,—Virtue, as (qua) virtue, is an extreme ; considered in its relation to vice, it is a mean between two extremes. In the former of the two clauses, virtue is taken reduplicatively.

REFLEX—ONTOLOGICALLY ; PSYCHOLOGICALLY. See IDEAS.

RELATION. One of the ten Categories of Aristotle. It is an accident ; and may be described (for the definition of a supreme, or highest, genus is impossible) as the order or respect that one entity has to another. **PREDICAMENTAL RELATION** is a relation under the Category. It is simply and exclusively respective ; since it merely regards its term. Thus, brotherhood is a predicamental relation ; since its whole reality consists in its order towards another who is its term. A brother is the brother of his brother. A **TRANSCENDENTAL RELATION** is one which primarily connotes something positive,—such as dependence, production, cognoscibility, desirableness,—which is foundation of the relation. To put it more clearly : a *Predicamental relation* exercises no other office than that of simply looking to its term ; while *Transcendental relation* besides and primarily exercises some other office in respect of its term,—for instance, of producing, of depending, etc. Thus, there is a relation between knowledge and the truth known, *because* of the cognoscibility of the latter. As all finite Being is in some such way dependent on some other, such relation runs through all the Categories and beyond. Hence it is called Transcendental. Thus, every accident is related to substance, because it depends on the latter as its subject ; and substance is related to accident by which it is perfected, p. 390. **TERM OF RELATION.** That entity to which the relation looks. It is also used to signify the subject of the relation. Hence, one reads of the two terms of relation. **RELATIVE.** The subject of relation. **CORRELATIVE.** The term of the same relation. Thus, in fatherhood the father is the subject, or relative ; the son, the term, or correlative. The question will be fully investigated in another volume.

RESPECT. A bastard sort of relation,—neither a predicamental nor a transcendental relation, yet bearing a nearer resemblance to the latter. It is also called **HABITUDE** (habit). Such is the order of truth to the intellect and of goodness to the will. It may be described as a referribility to something else, founded in a certain convenience, or aptitude, or compatibility.

RATIONIS RATIOCINANTIS. RATIONIS RATIOCINATAE. See p. 353.

IN RECTO. See under **IN OBLIQUO.**

REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM. A reduction to an absurdity. A species of *elenctic* demonstration, which destroys the conclusion or antecedent of an opponent by reducing it to an absurdity. It is an inferior form of demonstration ; but is very useful when, from the nature of the case, ostensive demonstration is impossible. To take an instance :—It is impossible to demonstrate *directly* the falseness of perfect scepticism, because there is no foundation for an argument, that is not pre-occupied by a doubt. The infallibility of the reasoning faculty (*postis ponendis*) and of the understanding,—the formal laws of thought, lie under the interdict of doubt. But you can expose its absurdity thus ; Either the sceptic doubts the truth of his scepticism, or he does not. If he does doubt ; the categorical enunciation of his doubt is absurd. If he does not doubt ; he gives the lie to his own system, seeing that there is something about which he does not doubt,—to wit, his philosophy of doubt.

S.

SCIENCE. A habit in the soul demonstrative of truth (*ἔξῃ ἀποδεικνύς* as Aristotle defines it). Consequently, no habit of induction can be properly called a science. The above is the meaning of science, considered *subjectively*. *Objectively* considered, science means the collection of ordered truths, within a certain definite sphere, acquired by such habit. This latter use of the term is analogical. To speak, then, of the physical disciplines as sciences, is a strange misnomer. Similarly, experimentalists are nowadays commonly called, and rather like calling themselves, *scientific* men. Nay, more: there are some who have not scrupled to appropriate to these investigations the name of *philosophy*. Others, more moderate, have claimed a partnership in the name. Accordingly, in some library-catalogues one is amused at seeing a division headed *mental philosophy*; as though Philosophy could be anything else than mental, pp. 7-9. **SUBALTERNANT.**—**SUBALTERNATE**, pp. 13, 14. **SECOND INTENTIONS.** See under **INTENTIONS**.

SENSILE. That which belongs to the senses, or is connected with them. It is a word coined by the author from the Latin, in order to avoid the ambiguity of the English word *sensible*. **SENSILE JUDGMENT** bears two meanings. For it expresses either a sort of imitation-judgment of the senses, such as is observable in brute animals, or a true intellectual judgment concerning things of sense.

SPECIES. One of the five Predicables in Logic. It is the result of the determination of the genus by means of the difference. Metaphysically, it is representative of the essence. p. 332.

SUBALTERNANT. **SUBALTERNATE.** That which retains another under itself; and, That which is retained under the former. In Logic, they are the terms of subaltern opposition, i. e. of the opposition between a universal and its corresponding particular (in the same quality, AI and EO). The universal is the *subalternant*; the particular, the *subalternate*. As applied to the sciences, in Ideology the **SUBALTERNANT SCIENCE** is the one which imparts to its subordinate sciences their first principles; the **SUBALTERNATE SCIENCE** is the one that borrows its first principles from the former,—the governing science.

SUBJECT. i. That which is treated of in a science or discipline,—the subject-matter. Thus, the subject of Astronomy is the celestial bodies. ii. That which is subjected to the action of an efficient cause and, more especially, to the actuation of any form. Thus, for instance, substance is the common subject of all the accidents. For the sake of distinction, when the word is employed in this latter sense, it has been printed in this work with a capital S. In Logic, **SUBJECT** is the Minor Term of a syllogism.

SUBSISTENCE. A mode by which substance becomes master of itself and incommunicable to another. . An incomplete substance may be perfected by this mode; forasmuch as it is incommunicable to another as sustaining or receiving its nature, though capable of conjunction with another incomplete substance. Thus, for instance, the human soul, separated from the body, has subsistence, but not personality. The former mode secures it from the communicability native to an accident; the latter, from the communicability proper to an incomplete substance. See **PERSONALITY**.

SUPPOSIT (SUPPOSITUM). A substance complete in its nature alike and in its substantiality, and, consequently, master of itself and incommunicable to another in such wise as to become the latter's nature.

SYNTHESIS (SYNTHETICAL). Combination,—composition. It is the opposite of analysis. By synthesis the elements of a concept are gathered into one whole. Thus, induction, generalization, logical definition, are *synthetical*; deduction, abstraction, logical division, are *analytical*.

T.

TERM. A boundary or limit. In Logic it denotes the subject and predicate of a judgment; the major, minor, and middle, of a syllogism. In Metaphysics it denotes the limit of a cause, more particularly of an efficient cause. In Ethics, the final cause is the term, because the limit of desire. From the explanation given, it will be easy to gather the meaning of the verb **TERMINATE**, as well as of the adverb **TERMINATIVELY**.

TRANSCENDENTAL. That which enters into each one of the Categories of Aristotle, and goes beyond, or transcends, them.

TYPAL IDEA. An idea which serves as a model of production. Thus, the conception of the artist is the model of his painting.

U.

UBICATION. The position of an entity. In material entities, position in space.

UNDERSTANDING. The intuitive faculty of the human soul, p. 36. See **INTUITION**.

UNIVERSAL. A concept which represents its object apart from any individual notes or conditions. Among its various divisions two require special notice. i. A **DIRECT UNIVERSAL** is the primitive intuitive act of the understanding, which intues the essence, or partial essence, of its object through the sensible perception by its own (as it were) instinctive nature. For essence (which is an absolute universal) is the formal object of the understanding. Such acts of the understanding are patent in the first thoughts of a child. A **REFLEX UNIVERSAL**. That which is acquired by the reflection of the understanding on its own primitive concept. By such process the universal becomes more and more clear, definite, philosophical, p. 15. ii. **ABSOLUTE UNIVERSAL**, which is *metaphysical*. This is a true universal in germ, and foundation of the logical universal. It represents the object, stripped of its individual conditions, purely as it is in its own nature, or essence; but represents it in its simple unity, irrespective of its potential distribution. **RELATIVE UNIVERSAL**, which is *logical*. This is a true and proper universal. It formally represents an essence, or nature, as communicated and communicable to individuals either virtually or explicitly,—virtually, in genera and subaltern species; explicitly, in the ultimate species. But, in every case, it is measured by extension,—that is to say, by its referribility to those entities that are included within its periphery.

UNIVOCAL. A grammatical term which has found its entrance into Logic, with the authority of Aristotle in justification. As applied to words, (its primary and native meaning,) it is thus distinguished from equivocal and analogous terms. Univocal;—one word, one meaning. Equivocal;—one word with more than one meaning. Analogous;—one word with one meaning after a certain fashion, but with more than one meaning simply, p. 68. **UNIVOCAL CAUSE.** A cause which in its nature is terminated to one specific effect. See **CAUSE**.

UBI, or place, is one of the Categories of Aristotle.

W.

WHOLE. *Logical whole*,—the whole of extension; *metaphysical whole*,—the whole of comprehension. The two are in inverse ratio; that is to say, as you near the logical, you proportionally recede from the metaphysical, whole; and the nearer you are to the whole of comprehension, the further you are from the whole of extension. In plainer words, the wider the periphery of the idea, the fewer are the notes that it contains; and the more notes an idea contains, the more restricted and less containing its periphery. pp. 25, 26.

INDEX OF THE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS, TOGETHER WITH THE ABBREVIATIONS IN USE WHEN QUOTING FROM THEM.

I. The greatest and last work of St. Thomas is the *Summa*. He did not live to complete it. Consequently, a Supplement, collected from his Commentary on the *Sentences*, was subjoined to that which he had written of the third Part. This work is divided into three Parts. The second Part is divided into two, which are respectively called, the *First of the Second Part* and the *Second of the Second Part*. Each Part embraces a number of Questions; each Question, a certain number of Articles. The structure of each Article is as follows. First of all, objections, numbered 1, 2, 3. etc., are proposed to the prospective solution; then any argument, or arguments, in its favour. Next follows the resolution of the Question in the *body* of the Article, as it is called. Finally, answers are given to the Difficulties, following the numerical order.

In quoting from the *Summa*, the abbreviations are these:—

1st, li, 2, o; that is, the fifty-first Question of the First Part, Article the second, the *whole* body of the Article.

1st, li, 2, c; that is, the fifty-first Question, etc., *in* the body of the Article, when only a portion of the body is quoted.

1st, li, 2, ad 3^m; that is, the fifty-first Question, etc., in the answer to the second Difficulty.

1-2nd, indicates the first portion of the Second Part.

2-2nd, indicates the second portion of the Second Part. The notation for Questions, Articles, etc., is the same.

3rd, indicates the Third Part.

In some indexes, when quotation is made from the Supplement, it is noted thus, 3rd, Suppl.

II. The work of St. Thomas, the next in importance to the *Summa*, are his Commentaries on the Books of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard,—the text-book in the Schools, till the *Summa* of St. Thomas took their place. The *Sentences* are in four Books. Each Book consists of a certain number of *Distinctions*. St. Thomas in his Commentary divides each Distinction into a certain number of *Articles*. Occasionally an Article is subdivided into certain *quaestiunculae*, or *little questions*. Sometimes it happens that there is only one Question in a Distinction; in such case, the Question is not noted in the abbreviated Form. The following are examples of the ordinary abbreviations:—

In 3 Sentt. (or simply) 3 d. xxxiii, Q. 3, a. 3, q. 4, c., et ad 2^m. This means, the Commentary of St. Thomas on the thirty-third Distinction in the third Book; the third Question, the third Article of that Question, the fourth little question under the Article, in the solution of the question, and in answer to the second objection.

In 4 Sentt. d. ix, a. 5, q. 4, o. This means, the Commentary of St. Thomas on the ninth Distinction of the fourth Book: *in the only Question*, the third Article, the fourth little question, the whole of the solution.

III. We will place, next in order, certain Questions on different subjects; on *Truth*, on *Potentiality*, on *Evil*, on the *Virtues in general*. Each of these questions under each of the above titles is divided into Articles.

The abbreviated Forms are such as the following:—

De Verit. Q. xiv, a. 13, c.

De Pot. Q. ix, a. b, ad 3^m.

De Ma. (or Mal.) Q. xii, a. 1, o.

De Virt. Q. ii, a. 4, ad 3^m.

There are three other solitary Questions, which complete this third class; viz. a Question on *Spiritual Creatures*, another on the *Soul*, and another on the *Union of the Incarnate Word*. In their case, the Question is not noted in the abbreviation. Thus, *de Spir. Creat. (or Spiritu.) a. iii, ad 21; de Anima, a. x, c; de Unio. a. iii, ad 11^m.*

In the instance of all these Questions, the prefixed *de*, is generally omitted in the abbreviation. Thus, *Pot. or Po^a, Unio., Verit., etc.*

IV. To these Questions should be added a collection of Questions on all manner of subjects. Hence, they are called *Quodlibet*. There are twelve Quodlibets. Each Quodlibet is divided into Questions; each Question, into Articles. But, forasmuch as the Articles go on in their numeration, independently of the Questions, these latter are not noted in the abbreviated form of citation. Thus,

Quol. iv, a. 27, ad 1^m.

NOTE 1.

Sometimes, in these Articles included under Questions, there are two sets of objections, and two sets of resolutions. In this case, the former have an *a*, the latter a *b*, prefixed.

NOTE 2.

There is one *Opusculum* which is divided into Questions and Articles. It is a Commentary upon the supposed *Work of Boetius on the Trinity*. It is quoted after this manner:—

Trin. (or Opusc. LX), Q. iii. a. 2, c.

V. The Philosophical *Summa* against the Gentiles. This Work is divided into four Books; each Book into so many Chapters. Its abbreviated Forms of citation are such:—

Cg. (or, c. Gent.) L. iii, c^o. 17.

VI. The *Opuscula*, or *little Works*, are of various forms. One has been already mentioned. Others are very short, and have no division. Others, again, are divided into Chapters (c^o). Others that are much longer, are divided into Books (L) and Chapters; others, again, into Articles; and one, into Tractates (tr.). These *Opuscula* are not numbered in the same order in the different editions. Whenever they are cited in the present Work, the first number is that of the Roman edition, fol. A.D. 1571; the second number, between brackets, is that of the Parma edition, 4^o, A.D. 1852–1873.

VII. The *Commentaries on Aristotle* follow the divisions into Books, etc. of the original; but are further subdivided into *Lessons (Lectiones)*;—apparently an arrangement instituted for the benefit of the pupils. The abbreviations are as follows:—

Ethi., i.e. on the Books of Ethics.

Ente, 1, 2, i.e. on the first or second Book upon Being and Essence.

Meta., i.e. on the Books of Metaphysics.

Phy., i.e. on the Books of Physics.

Coe., i.e. on the Books concerning the Heaven and the Earth.

Gen., i.e. on the Books concerning Generation.

Anima, i.e. on the Books concerning the Soul.

Meteor., i.e. on the Books about Meteors.

Sensu., i.e. on the Book about Sensation.

Memo^a., i.e. on the Book about Memory.

Somno., i.e. on the Book about Sleep and Waking.

Poster., i.e. on the Books of the Posterior Analytics.

Periher., i.e. on the Book concerning Interpretation.

Lect., i.e. Lesson, or *Lectio*.

There are, besides, Commentaries on Job, the Psalms, Isaias, the Gospels of St. Matthew and of St. John, and on the Epistles of St. Paul; and a *Golden Chain* (*Catena Aurea*), i.e. a Patristic Commentary on the four Gospels. Of these nothing more need be said; since they are not likely to be quoted in the present Work.

NOTE.—Not unfrequently, when the body of an Article or a Chapter is very long, certain abbreviations have been adopted, in order to enable the reader more readily to find the passage :—

init. At the beginning.

v. m. Near the middle.

in m. In the middle.

p. m. After the middle.

v. fl. (or *v. f.*) Near the end.

fl. (or *f.*) At the end.

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